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This introduction provides the context and theoretical background that 
informs the studies in this volume. It introduces the volume’s common 
theme: the question of how different actors give shape to BRI projects. It 
outlines how, rather than treating nation states as singular, monolithic 
actors, this volume teases apart the way different people and organizations 
insert themselves into BRI decision-making and implementation. The 
chapter discusses how we might conceptualize agency in such contexts, 
drawing together the volume’s f indings to arrive at four conclusions: 1) that 
in understanding the BRI, geographical context matters; 2) that the BRI 
is a pluralist endeavour rather than a single, unif ied agenda; 3) that BRI 
efforts often extend rather than challenge existing politics; and 4) that 
outcomes depend on the activities of local actors.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, agency, China, local actors, introduc-
tion, pluralism
Two women are having a casual discussion about global affairs. One asks 
the other: ‘Kimi, ever heard of the Belt and Road?’ Kimi responds: ‘Yeah, 
the big vision of economic exchange.’ Her interlocutor swiftly follows up: 
‘Know exactly what they are?’ To which Kimi responds: ‘The Belt is along 
the old Silk Road and the Road is the Silk Road on the sea!’
‘Oh, I see,’ says the other woman, ‘in Chinese: Yi Dai Yi Lu!’ Music fades in, 
and a Chinese band of young men launches into a jazzy song, accompanied 
by funky percussion and a female background choir that hushes in husky 
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voices ‘Whoo, Yi Dai Yi Lu, the Belt and Road!’ Images show people around 
the world dancing and singing. Women in front of a Thai temple. A woman 
in front of Sydney’s famous opera house. Several young people at iconic sites 
in Washington, DC.
The front singer raps about how Sri Lankans will no longer have to worry 
about electricity bills and how a Malaysian boy can f inally scrape together 
the money to get married to his sweetheart. As images of harbour construc-
tion, highways, and railroads flicker across the screen, spliced with pictures 
of someone dancing in a panda costume, the rapper extols the virtues 
of infrastructure development: ‘More trains, more ships, more airlines!’ 
The choir sings ‘Mutual benefits, joint responsibility, and shared destiny’, 
then ‘Silk Road Fund! BRICS bank! AIIB!’ The music video culminates in a 
choreographed dance routine in an auditorium that features Chinese girls, 
the dancer in the panda suit, and, of course, the choir, which now sings 
‘Extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benef its’, before 
f inally concluding: ‘Uh, Yi Dai Yi Lu!’ (see f igure 1.1).
This propaganda video was launched on 14 May 2017. China’s central news 
agency Xinhua uploaded the clip to its official account, New China TV, on the 
video-sharing site YouTube and posted the link to its social media accounts 
on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram – all services that are blocked in China. 
Xinhua claims that ‘the sing-along was created by Chinese millennials. 
Young Generation around the world are singing and dancing with it [sic]’ 
Figure 1.1  Extolling the virtues of the Belt and Road; screenshot of YouTube music 
video taken on 25 June 2020
Source: new China TV (2017)
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(New China TV 2017). Reception on YouTube seems more muted than Xinhua 
suggests, with only about 200 comments at the time of writing, most of 
which are derisive. ‘These are some serious Nobel-prize-in-literature-level 
lyrics’, writes one commentator; another remarks that this is ‘like trying to 
garner support for textile mills through competitive break dancing’ (ibid.).
YouTube commentators hardly seem convinced, and this may at f irst sight 
seem like a scathing indictment of Chinese soft-power efforts, but it may 
also be beside the point. Under the banner of its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has rolled out a world-spanning 
economic, political, and social development strategy that is dizzying in scope. 
The Chinese state has flanked those efforts with propaganda videos like this 
one, which are probably meant less as a way to convince foreign audiences 
and more as a means to illustrate to relevant stakeholders the ambitions and 
motivations that fuel the BRI. Awkward and cringe-worthy as the propaganda 
may be, it offers useful insight into how China’s leaders want the BRI to be 
understood: as a set of ostensibly benevolent infrastructure and development 
projects that mutually benefit Chinese investors and people around the world.
But how do these projects work out in practice? What are the implications 
of the BRI in different contexts, and how should we assess official PRC claims 
about the mutual benefits that these developmental interventions ostensibly 
entail? The aim of this book is to explore such dynamics in global, regional, 
and local contexts. The research presented here is the result of a large-scale 
collaborative project started in 2019, pre-COVID-19, at the LeidenAsiaCentre 
(LAC). The project examined the BRI in global perspective and was informed 
by subsequent discussions at workshops at Singapore’s EU Centre and the 
LAC in the f irst half of 2020.
This chapter discusses the f indings from that project. It f irst outlines 
some of the major concerns and debates in the existing scholarship on 
the BRI, focusing in particular on the internal and external aspects of the 
initiative as well as on the BRI’s effects and the motivations that might 
drive its various projects. The chapter then introduces the core theme of 
this book: agency. It examines what ‘agency’ means in this volume, as well 
as why a focus on the actors that drive BRI-related processes is relevant. 
Following this brief conceptual discussion, the introduction provides an 
overview of the individual chapters and then concludes by presenting the 
core f indings that emerge from the contributions. These f indings are: that 
geography is an important factor in the BRI, that the initiative is shaped by 
diverse interests, that its projects often extend rather than challenge earlier 
initiatives (e.g. by international organizations), and that the BRI’s practical 
implementation depends heavily on the actions of local actors.
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Seven Years of the BRI: Hopes, Anxieties, and Controversies
According to estimates (Hillman 2018), the Chinese authorities plan to spend 
somewhere between US$1 to 8 trillion on BRI-related projects before the 
initiative runs its course on the eve of the PRC’s hundred-year anniversary 
in 2049. Infrastructure has been at the heart of the initiative since its launch 
in 2013. Under the BRI banner, Chinese foreign direct investment has flown 
into electric power projects, mineral mining and processing plants, and the 
construction of bridges, highways, ports, and railways (Dai 2018; Kuik 2020: 
82-83; Lai & Lentner 2018; Negara & Suryadinata 2018: 12-23).
Trade has been another crucial dimension. The BRI has ushered in numer-
ous ‘economic corridors’ and free trade agreements with partner countries 
(Lin 2015). As Li and Chaisse (2018: 465) put it, the BRI ‘plays a key role in 
China’s economic recovery agenda as its main purpose is to trigger various 
investment and trade demands to counteract the dwindling economic 
growth rate and excess production capacity’.
In this way, the BRI has much to do with China’s domestic politics 
and economics. It is today shaped by concerns over a perceived lack of 
consumer-driven growth at home, overcapacities among state-owned 
enterprises, potential instabilities in China’s f inancial system, and the wish 
to internationalize China’s currency as reliance on the US dollar becomes 
more risky in the wake of the US-China trade war (Gordon et al. 2020: 14-18; 
Tekdal 2018). But for elites in the PRC, the initiative also helps construct a 
community out of citizens who are at risk of becoming disillusioned by the 
waning of the Chinese Dream. Van Dinh (2020: 92) compares the BRI to the 
Great Wall and its ability to unite diverse peoples along China’s borders, 
arguing that:
After 30 years of development at all costs, China seems to be losing the 
driving force of development, a worrying prospect for a Chinese Com-
munist Party that has survived on the basis of continuous economic 
development for over 30 years. The BRI is the trump card that can supply 
a new glue for bonding the Chinese people against the temptations of 
separatism and disillusionment with progress.
Creating infrastructure networks to facilitate domestic cohesion and 
development is not at all a new strategy, and Ghiasy (Chapter 11 in this 
volume) reminds us that telegraph lines, railroads, and canals have been 
instrumental not just in facilitating trade but also in creating the standards 
and norms of how modernity now works. In many ways, the BRI is an 
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attempt to shape such standards in the twenty-f irst century, to usher in 
an age of hyper-modernity def ined by values popular in the PRC, whether 
it is in areas such as trade, taxation, and f inance, as Sampson, Wang, and 
Mosquera Valderrama discuss in their contribution to this book (Chapter 3), 
or whether it is in education, science, and technology, as D’Hooghe shows 
in her chapter (Chapter 2).
It should then come as no surprise that the BRI is predated by, and in 
many ways marks the culmination of, earlier developmental and foreign 
policy strategies that also tried to give China a greater role in regional and 
global networks. Previous administrations already promoted the idea of 
developing Chinese border regions by ‘going West’ via Xinjiang (Moneyhon 
2003) and by ‘going out’ to join international organizations like the WTO 
(Blanchard 2013; Lu 2015; and the contributions in Wang 2015). Indeed, while 
it may at times seem as though the BRI and its allied initiatives, such as 
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), challenge the institutions 
of the US-led Bretton Woods system, they frequently sit alongside existing 
institutions and they draw expertise and procedures from organizations 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (see Wilson 
2017). In some instances, as Gonzalez-Vicente illustrates in his chapter on 
China in the Caribbean (Chapter 7), BRI-related institutions reproduce 
rather than subvert the market-making and business-centric agendas and 
practices of the IMF, even if the different policy formats at times obscure 
such similarities. While this may not always be self-evident to practitioners 
in international organizations, the off icial motives that are meant to guide 
BRI investments are indeed not that different from those championed by 
earlier neoliberal capitalist institutions: to coordinate policy, improve 
connectivity, promote free trade, assure f inancial integration, and establish 
people-to-people bonds (State Council 2015).
As a vehicle for economic development, the BRI has been attractive 
in so-called developing countries, and it would be callous to dismiss the 
real-world transformative impact that BRI projects have had on people who 
can now often move more freely and live in more comfort due to the new 
infrastructure-led growth in their societies. However, the BRI’s record has 
not been an unqualif ied success. It is important to ask who the beneficiaries 
of these transformations really are. Who stands to gain, and who is left out? 
Several analysts have contended that BRI-fuelled investments often pose dire 
environmental risks (Ewing 2019; Hughes 2019; Teo et al. 2019) and reveal a 
‘treacherous disconnect between China’s commitment to f ighting climate 
change at home versus abroad’ (Friends of the Earth 2017: 61). Others have 
criticized the fact that BRI projects support states with poor governance 
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records (Dollar 2018), raise questions about local employment effects and 
general labour standards (Zou 2019), lack transparency and privilege Chinese 
companies in potentially unfair ways (European Chamber 2020), and risk 
creating signif icant debt vulnerabilities in partner countries (Bandiera & 
Tsiropoulos 2020; Dollar 2018).
In addition to these issues of BRI performance, the motivations behind 
the BRI have also been questioned, particularly the off icial Chinese nar-
rative that the BRI is a benevolent development agenda with no strings 
attached. Recent studies have made the case that the BRI is part of the PRC’s 
‘economic statecraft’, and that Chinese leaders are using the substantial 
economic resources at their disposal to further their interests abroad (see 
the contributions in Li 2017). The BRI has consequently been compared to 
the 1948 Marshall Plan, which provided aid to Western Europe after the 
devastation of the Second World War (Economist 2018). This is a comparison 
that Chinese BRI proponents loathe due to its geopolitical implications (see 
Mitchell 2018).
Even though this analogy with the Marshall Plan is neither historically nor 
analytically accurate (see Shen & Chan 2018 for an insightful critique), it is 
telling that the BRI’s political implications evoke such Cold War dichotomies, 
even if the two sides of that dichotomy are now effectively both capitalist. 
Perceptions about systemic and ostensibly irresolvable differences between 
China and ‘the West’ remain, and they continue to shape the debate. For 
instance, Chinese investments have raised concerns that the BRI might be 
accompanied by PRC attempts to strategically undermine liberal agendas, 
for instance by countering efforts to promote human rights, specif ically by 
the European Union (Wong 2017). In some EU contexts, BRI-related funding 
has started to fuel anxieties that ‘European member states are compromising 
on European principles to accommodate Chinese investment’ (Hanemann 
& Huotari 2017: 7; see also BusinessEurope 2020: 151). While in practice the 
record of the PRC’s efforts to turn ‘its economic heft into political influence’ 
is likely ‘far less worrisome than most popular writing suggests’ (Reilly 2017: 
182), Chinese off icials have nevertheless remained mostly unsuccessful 
at ‘reducing popular anxiety over China’s rise’ in target societies that are 
governed by long-standing threat perceptions of the PRC and its ruling 
Chinese Communist Party (ibid.; see also Pardo 2018).
Chinese leaders, diplomats, and planners continue to try and allevi-
ate such threat perceptions (Goh & Martina 2019) and address concerns 
about the BRI’s sustainability and corporate social responsibility, with Xi 
Jinping announcing a recalibration of the BRI towards more ‘high quality’ 
cooperation that is ‘open, green and clean’ (Xi 2019). However, many of the 
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complex problems that accompany the BRI are bound to persist. Preliminary 
observations about the effect that the COVID-19 crisis has had on the BRI 
suggest that some of these problems may even become further aggravated, 
for instance where BRI partners suffer crisis-related economic losses and 
f ind themselves hard-pressed to repay their debts (Kynge & Yu 2020; Tower 
& Staats 2020). All of this paints a picture of complex interactions that are 
extremely diff icult to pin down and evaluate systematically. How, then, 
should we assess Chinese BRI projects seven years after the initiative’s 
original inception?
Actors and Agency in China’s Globe-Spanning BRI Networks
As the rapidly evolving discussions about the BRI show, scholars, analysts, 
and policymakers are arriving at nuanced assessments of the initiative that 
move beyond early depictions of the BRI as either a benevolent Chinese 
development project or a sinister geopolitical play for world dominance. 
Recent contributions to the debate emphasize the diversity of BRI-related 
projects and the need for careful empirical analysis (e.g. the contributions in 
Cerrai et al. 2020; Chong & Pham 2020b; De Cremer et al. 2019). This present 
collection speaks to this growing field of inquiry that tries to tease apart how 
the BRI plays out in different contexts. It is informed by the realization that 
understanding the BRI requires both truly global perspectives and careful 
attention to the role that local actors play in giving shape to individual 
BRI projects.
The theme that runs through this book is agency. In much of the literature 
on global politics, and particularly in mainstream international relations 
theory, agency is located f irmly with nation states. It can indeed be tempt-
ing to treat states like the PRC as monolithic, unif ied actors that push 
politics forward through their behaviour in a seemingly anarchic world. The 
metaphor of the state as a person has consequently become a commonplace 
shorthand that allows academics, journalists, and practitioners to home 
in on a core dynamic in international relations. For many, speaking of 
what ‘China’ does, how ‘India’ reacts, or what ‘Indonesia’ wants is not just 
convenient, it is an essential conceptual choice for cutting to the heart of 
global politics, and scholars like Alexander Wendt (2004) have staunchly 
defended this practice.
The contributions in this volume do not dismiss the relevance of nation 
state actors in international relations, certainly not in a context like the 
BRI, where a one-party state is powerfully inserting itself into regional and 
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global networks of goods, people, f inances, and information. At the same 
time, this book contends that viewing the BRI mainly as a coherent strategy 
by a growing monolithic Great Power is too much of a simplif ication, and 
that we should instead understand the BRI as a complicated set of political, 
economic, and social initiatives launched by a dizzying array of actors, all 
of whom are trying to understand (and prof it from) the changing role of 
the PRC in world politics and economics. Importantly, our point is not just 
that there are many actors implementing the PRC government’s vision, but 
that the central government is one of many actors trying to make sense of 
an important moment in the developmental trajectory of the country as a 
whole (see also Gonzalez-Vicente, Chapter 7 in this volume).
Such a perspective promises to bring nuance to the discussion, but, as 
Healy (2017: 119) has warned, nuance for nuance’s sake is not necessarily 
helpful and can become a self-serving ‘holding manoeuvre’ that offers a 
convenient way not to have to make decisions ‘when faced with a question 
for which one does not yet have a compelling or interesting answer’. So 
why do we need the additional nuance that an analysis of actors and 
agency promises to offer? What do we gain by looking at this dimension 
of the BRI?
As Michael Billig (2013) has argued, academic accounts too frequently 
reify the processes that shape our world, turning them into handy categories 
that are ultimately inaccurate representations of what is actually happing 
around us. To Billig, there is a real risk of ‘describing how things happen in 
the social world without mentioning how people might make them happen, 
or, indeed who the people are who make them happen’ (ibid.: 142). Limiting 
an argument or analysis to categories like ‘China’, ‘Africa’, ‘Europe’, ‘the West’, 
etc., means doing injustice to the people who inhabit those categories. It 
means not describing the world as it is, and this should be of major concern 
to practitioners who must make decisions in complex, rapidly evolving 
situations shaped by high degrees of uncertainty. This is evident from various 
empirical studies of actors in different contexts (see, for example, Latour 
& Woolgar 1986; MacKenzie 2006; Miller & Slater 2000; Schneider 2019).
Another benefit of following the actors is that it provides a reality check 
on where agency truly lies. Latour, providing one definition of agency, has 
argued that agency describes the ability to ‘modify a state of affairs by 
making a difference’ in ways that ‘make others do things’ (Latour 2005: 71, 
107). We should then ask: Who has that ability in a specif ic context? Is it 
PRC government officials, private Chinese entrepreneurs, their counterparts 
elsewhere, or someone else entirely, for instance illegal actors (see Ferchen 
on China and Southeast Asia, Chapter 10 in this volume)?
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As Links demonstrates in her chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), and as is also 
evident from Van der Lugt’s contribution (Chapter 13), relations between 
Chinese actors and their interlocutors in African countries may at times 
take on dynamics that the existing literature on Chinese activities in Africa 
tends to overlook. African actors attract Chinese investments, negotiate 
context-dependent outcomes, or exert their own influence in the process. 
As often as not, Links points out, such agency does not turn adversarial; it 
empowers local actors to make their own choices. Similarly, Kuik shows 
in his chapter (Chapter 9) how agency can be unevenly distributed across 
Southeast Asia, with actors carefully balancing their own interests against 
different domestic constraints. But agency does not have to be limited to 
making decisions and acting in the world; for some actors, it can mean 
shaping and remaking the world in which they then act. As Forough shows 
(in Chapter 12) in his discussion of such ‘geographic agency’, we should also 
explore how actors ‘define, articulate, and (rep)present themselves and their 
place (their identities, fears, and aspirations) in the world geographically’.
In many ways, then, it is unhelpful to reduce nation states like ‘China’ to 
single actors. The PRC and the region-spanning networks that its BRI are 
currently recalibrating around the world are instead the backdrop before 
which different people and groups make their own politics happen, often 
in deeply idiosyncratic ways. That is what this book is about.
Overview of This Book
In this volume, our contributors offer a theoretically informed, interdiscipli-
nary analysis of China’s BRI in various global, regional, and local contexts. 
The overarching framework is grounded in critical area studies, emphasizing 
that local knowledge and perspectives matter in international affairs. The 
authors come from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, ranging from politics 
and international relations to law, geography, and economics. The chapters 
of this volume provide detail-oriented empirical studies, based on first-hand 
fieldwork and policy analysis. They offer both bird’s-eye views of China’s BRI 
at age seven, as well as important interventions into debates about how we 
might conceptualize agency at a time when Chinese actors seem to be at the 
heart of so many rapidly evolving regional and global networks. Following 
this general introductory chapter, the book proceeds in three parts. The f irst 
provides ‘big picture’ analyses of China’s BRI in international institutions and 
global collaborations. The second part offers analyses of regional dynamics. 
The third part examines individual case studies in specif ic settings.
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Chapter 2, by Ingrid d’Hooghe, examines the connection between the BRI 
and Chinese policies for international cooperation in higher education as well 
as science and technology. It argues that Chinese stakeholders – e.g. various 
government organizations and education and research institutes – make 
the connection work in two directions: the BRI is used as an instrument to 
promote the country’s higher agendas in education as well as science and 
technology and, vice versa, international cooperation in these areas is used 
to promote the BRI. By analysing the roles of state and non-state actors in 
education and science diplomacy, D’Hooghe f inds that efforts to build the 
relationship are primarily state-driven. The chapter ends with a discussion 
of what this development means for China’s position in higher education 
as well as science and technology. Who may benefit and who may lose out?
In Chapter 3, Sampson, Wang, and Mosquera Valderrama examine the 
decisions that inform the BRI’s institution building. The chapter explores 
the tension between strategic and eff iciency-oriented concerns, and it 
traces those tensions across three issue areas: tax, trade, and development 
f inance. As the authors show, in dealing with the challenges, the Chinese 
government lacks an integral governance framework that systemically 
coordinates all the relevant institutions. Instead, it takes varied institutional 
approaches to oversee the operation of BRI projects and mediate disputes, 
ranging from bilateral trade agreements to multilateral f inancial institutions. 
Based on multiple case studies, the chapter illustrates the plurality among 
Chinese actors; it argues that China’s development of tax initiatives for the 
BRI is mostly motivated by eff iciency drivers, its trade agreements with a 
number of key BRI partners by strategic drivers, and its effort in establishing 
multilateral f inancial institutions by both drivers.
In the first contribution to Part II of this book (Chapter 4), Ferchen turns to 
regional dynamics, specif ically to the role of the BRI in relations with Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Prior to 2017, Chinese off icials and scholars 
clearly and directly rejected the idea that these regions were part of the 
BRI. Even though the BRI was geographically expansive, extending as far 
as Africa and Western Europe as parts of both the overland and maritime 
components of the plan, the Western Hemisphere appeared to simply be 
beyond the BRI’s scope. However, in 2017, China started to sign a series of 
BRI Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and BRI-related infrastructure 
and other ‘connectivity’ deals with governments in Central America, the 
Caribbean, and South America. This expansion of the BRI to Latin America 
and the Caribbean took place at precisely the same time that the United 
States was beginning a concerted pushback against Chinese dealmaking 
and influence in regions like Latin America and Africa. Chapter 4 thus 
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offers an overview of the still-short history of the BRI in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, what it means in the broader context of China’s developing 
country diplomacy in the region, and how it is playing out against the 
backdrop of widening US-China strategic rivalry.
In Chapter 5, Links introduces the reader to the African region in relation 
to China and the BRI. She provides an overview of the current f ield of 
China-Africa studies and identif ies common narratives that have enveloped 
these relations. As a cornerstone region, Links sketches Africa’s centrality 
to the BRI while introducing one of the remaining lacunas in the f ield, 
namely the question of African agency. In particular, the chapter looks at 
reasons for the general neglect of the issue of agency in the literature, as 
well as how it is incorporated in the few instances where it is analysed. As 
a region, Links explores Africa’s centrality to the BRI against the backdrop 
of intensifying China-Africa relations, making a case for Africa as a fun-
damental cornerstone of understanding the BRI in both its practical and 
more ideological facets.
Links continues her analysis of the BRI in Africa in Chapter 6, which 
provides an in-depth analysis of the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) and its interaction with China through the BRI. In this 
chapter, Links explores the issue of agency on the part of African actors, 
specif ically the agency exercised by SADC as a regional power that covers 
a vast geographical area. Often overlooked by scholars of China’s BRI in 
Africa, Links’s focus on SADC demonstrates the reach of the BRI as well as 
the relevance of this project for seemingly geographically ‘distant’ locales, as 
seen through the eyes of the ‘users’ themselves. Links employs a deductive 
approach to the issue of agency, whereby agents are placed at the centre of 
analysis and themselves demarcate the bounds of agency. This agent-oriented 
or user perspective circumvents the paternalism of imposed definitions in 
order to place onus and definitional power on the actors themselves. Such an 
approach, Links argues, promises to provide the foundations of an open and 
empowered conversation on matters of international relations more broadly.
Chapter 7 moves the emphasis to the Caribbean, specif ically to Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. Gonzalez-Vicente shows how the BRI’s f inancial 
muscle and infrastructure building have transformed the Caribbean devel-
opmental landscape. Key to this transformation has been China’s capacity 
to launch new projects in otherwise heavily indebted or cash-strapped 
economies. This has been achieved through complex financial arrangements 
that involve China’s diplomacy, policy banks, and construction and natural 
resources-based enterprises. As a result, some of the region’s traditional 
interlocutors, such as the IMF or the EU, have lost their undisputed capacity 
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for influence and coercion. However, Sino-Caribbean relations have also 
contributed to entrenching long-established structural and postcolonial 
impediments to development. The chapter explores broader regional trends 
and illustrates them using the cases of China’s relationship with Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago. Gonzalez-Vicente argues that the BRI represents 
yet another iteration of neoliberal business-centric development, and as 
such it remains unable to foment qualitative socio-economic change in 
the Caribbean.
Chapter 8 by Van der Putten and Petkova constitutes the f irst analysis 
in Part III of this book. It explores the geopolitical signif icance of the BRI 
in the case of Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia. Van der 
Putten and Petkova argue that this region constitutes the geographical 
centre of today’s global great-power rivalry, in which the United States 
and China are the key players. It was in the Indonesian capital Jakarta 
that President Xi Jinping, in 2013, announced China’s ambition to build 
a modern-day version of the maritime Silk Roads. Which economic and 
diplomatic activities constitute the BRI in the case of Indonesia, and what 
is their impact on political relations between Indonesia and China and 
Indonesia’s position with regard to China-United States tensions? This 
chapter focuses in particular on Indonesia’s efforts to maintain strategic 
autonomy and on manifestations of great-power influence on the country’s 
foreign policy-making.
Kuik continues the discussion about Southeast Asian cases in Chapter 9, 
turning to Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand. He asks: Why do China’s BRI 
projects progress relatively smoothly in communist Laos but slowly and 
selectively in military-ruled Thailand and substantially, albeit with volatility, 
in quasi-democratic Malaysia? Kuik argues that differences in political 
systems are only part of the answer. By focusing on the BRI engagement of 
these three nation states, his study highlights the agency of the host countries 
in shaping the patterns of foreign-funded infrastructure cooperation. China 
as a stronger partner will always ‘push the envelope’ in its partnerships. 
Nevertheless, it is the host country, specif ically the ruling elites, who will 
engage China-backed projects based on their need to optimize their respec-
tive pathways of legitimation vis-à-vis the contending elites and masses 
domestically, leading to varying responses.
Chapter 10 also focuses on Southeast Asia. As Ferchen argues, analyses 
of the ‘China model’ of development have until recently focused almost 
exclusively on explanations for, and debates about, China’s own domestic 
economic growth. Yet as China’s global trade, investment, and f inancial 
role has expanded, especially under Xi Jinping and his signature BRI policy, 
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there is growing interest in whether China seeks to export a version of the 
China model abroad. Ferchen shows how state-led forms of development, 
especially BRI-related infrastructure f inance and construction, are only 
one aspect of the export of the China model abroad. Providing case studies 
from Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam (with additional insights from the 
Philippines), the chapter explores how the much less discussed, but just as 
crucial, informal and often illicit aspects of the China model are creating 
complications for the BRI in host countries and for China itself.
In Chapter 11, Ghiasy examines how the BRI has impacted connectiv-
ity and integration in South Asia. More signif icantly and extensively, he 
investigates how academic perceptions and policies have evolved in India and 
Pakistan in response to the BRI since its inception in 2013. These two states 
provide a unique agency, which Ghiasy def ines as the ability to influence 
or resist influence, in the BRI context. The region’s dominant power, India, 
is a staunch critic that refuses to sit at the BRI table. India is exemplary of 
the degree to which a non-partaking actor can counter, or supplement, 
the BRI in its region. The region’s other power, Pakistan, hosts the BRI’s 
f lagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and is the 
single largest recipient of BRI investment. Pakistan provides insight into 
how a deep-seated partaker’s perceptions and policies on the BRI have 
evolved. To permit tailored data collection, Ghiasy draws from a series of 
interviews he conducted with leading Indian and Pakistani academics. His 
work shows how these academics make sense of China in the region, and 
it grants an understanding of the BRI’s interplay with South Asia’s various 
geopolitical f issures.
In Chapter 12, which focuses on the Iranian situation, Forough tackles 
two issues: the f irst is to demarcate in a preliminary fashion the conceptual 
boundaries of what he calls ‘geographic agency’. The second is to apply 
this concept to the case of Iran and its geoeconomic processes. Adopting 
a critical geography approach, Forough unpacks how Iran is reinventing 
itself geographically through certain ‘space-making processes’ and policies 
(such as port modernization, the ‘railway revolution’, or its ‘geoeconomic 
connectivity drive’) and certain ‘space-framing assumptions’ that underlie 
those processes. Forough argues that the country is showing agency at three 
geographical levels: 1) as a nation state, it is systematically representing 
the ‘idea of Iran’ as a ‘civilizational crossroads’; it does so 2) in a region that 
the Iranian government chooses to call ‘West Asia’ (and not the Middle 
East), thereby reconnecting it to Asia, and 3) in an emergent world whose 
organizing trope is that of a ‘New Silk Roads’ imaginary and whose overriding 
logic is more geoeconomics than geopolitics.
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In the final chapter of this book, Chapter 13, Van der Lugt analyses various 
causal relations through which Ethiopian and Chinese actors interact in the 
context of the Digital Silk Road initiative. She contends that, from a Chinese 
perspective, the Digital Silk Road is explained as a serious attempt to narrow 
the gap between underdeveloped and developed countries by improving their 
own capacities. From a Western perspective (Freedom House, Human Rights 
Watch, etc.), Chinese investments in the Digital Silk Road are often depicted 
as unethical support to authoritarian leaders. What is playing out in Africa 
(and other parts of the world) is part of a larger contest between the West 
and China for dominance over the future of technology and global influence. 
Through detailed, formal process tracing, Van der Lugt moves beyond the 
simple dichotomy of good and bad Chinese investments in the digitalization of 
Africa. Instead, her chapter identifies the actors involved in the digitalization 
of Ethiopia and investigates their motives and levels of influence.
Main Findings
The contributions in this volume run the gamut from aerial views of the 
role that Chinese actors play in global institutions and regional networks 
to specif ic case studies that zoom in on BRI dynamics in local contexts. 
Four recurring observations stand out as the main f indings of this book:
1 Geographical context matters: as several of the contributors show (e.g. Van 
der Putten and Petkova), geopolitical and geoeconomic understandings 
of the world shape how actors make decisions in BRI-related contexts. 
In some cases, physical geography functions as an almost ‘static reality’ 
that ‘talks back’ to actors as they go about their activities (as Ghiasy 
illustrates). In other cases, actors exert def initional agency to give 
meaning to geography and turn it into a resource for decision-making 
processes (see Links and Forough). In all of these instances, actors put 
their geographic context to work in the service of specif ic agendas, both 
conceptually and materially.
2 The BRI is a pluralist endeavour: there is no single, unif ied BRI agenda. 
This becomes clear from the various individual cases presented in 
this volume, especially Ferchen’s and Kuik’s comparative analyses, 
but it is also evident from the behaviour of Chinese actors in different 
institutional settings (as illustrated by both D’Hooghe and Sampson, 
Wang, and Mosquera Valderrama). Different contexts require their 
own understanding of the situation, and consequently their own policy 
responses.
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3 Old wine in new bottles: as Gonzalez-Vicente shows, and as the work 
of Sampson, Wang, and Mosquera Valderrama also suggests, BRI ef-
forts often extend rather than challenge existing politics. The PRC’s 
investment, aid, and connectivity projects frequently take their cues 
from institutions like the IMF and World Bank, reproducing both best 
practices and the problematic externalities that have characterized 
these predecessor activities.
4 BRI outcomes depend on local actors: the BRI is shaped by diverse local 
actors who exercise their agency by connecting with Chinese coun-
terparts to achieve their own goals. This is particularly evident from 
the studies of BRI-related projects in Africa (Links, Van der Lugt) and 
Southeast Asia (Ferchen, Kuik). In these cases, local actors integrate 
the PRC leadership’s ambitious plans for cooperation into their own 
developmental frameworks.
In short, the authors represented in this volume each examine context-
specif ic dynamics by following the actors to show how the BRI’s outcomes 
take shape in practice. Practitioners and observers would be well advised to 
similarly approach these complexities on a case-by-case basis, so as not to 
fall into the trap of overlooking or misinterpreting how different people and 
organizations insert themselves into the highly complex decision-making 
and implementation processes that make the BRI a near-global reality today.
In the PRC’s propaganda video on YouTube, Kimi exclaims: ‘The Belt is 
along the old Silk Road and the Road is the Silk Road on the sea!’ While 
the video itself remains campy and awkward, her statement illustrates 
how clever Chinese propagandists have been in at least one regard: their 
branding of the PRC’s foreign development initiative as a direct extension 
of historical cultural and trade relations. Several of the BRI’s core projects 
and institutions now contain the evocative label ‘Silk Road’. The titular 
‘Belt’ and ‘Road’ are off icially called the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and 
‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’, the BRI’s alternative name is the ‘New 
Silk Road’ (see also Pairault 2020), and the authorities have dubbed their 
extension of the BRI into cyberspace with the ‘Digital Silk Road’ (Ghiasy 
& Krishnamurthy 2020; see also Van der Lugt, Chapter 13 in this volume). 
The idea of ancient, far-f lung networks emanating from China informs 
much of the imagination surrounding the BRI (Griff iths 2017: 21). Xinhua’s 
Twitter accounts, for instance, are awash with images that are meant to 
illustrate this: dunes, camels, exotic markets, desert sunrises, peoples in 
colourful ethnic dresses, and so on (for examples and a discussion, see 
Nie 2019: 184).
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The contemporary, modern reinvention of the so-called Silk Roads 
arguably has little to do with the actual historical record of these routes 
(for discussions, see Chong & Pham 2020a; Christian 2000; Hansen 2012). 
Be that as it may, branding the BRI as the ‘New Silk Road’ is ultimately 
an effective marketing strategy (SupChina 2016), designed to invite as 
many stakeholders as possible into projects that promise to jump-start 
past successes and glories, be they real or imagined. The results of these 
projects are often idiosyncratic, and they are at times fraught with risk or 
failures. These outcomes are of course important, but regardless of the BRI’s 
eff icacy, the actors involved in the BRI are recalibrating the world as we 
know it. As more and more actors take up, challenge, revamp, and rework 
these much-evoked ‘Silk Roads’ in diverse situations, we need critically 
minded research that does not shy away from leaning into the complexities 
and nuances of the BRI to unpack both its global ambitions and its local 
instantiations.
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This chapter examines the connection between the BRI and Chinese 
policies for international cooperation in higher education (HE) and sci-
ence & technology (S&T). It argues that Chinese stakeholders make the 
connection work in two directions: the BRI is used as an instrument to 
promote China’s HE and S&T agendas, and international cooperation in 
HE and S&T is used to promote the BRI. The concepts of education and 
science diplomacy are used to analyse the roles of state and non-state 
actors. The chapter f inds that efforts to build the relationship are primarily 
state driven. Finally, the chapter discusses what this development means 
for China’s position in HE and S&T, and for other parts of the world. Who 
may benef it and who may lose out?
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, science and technology, higher 
education, research, cooperation
The development of international cooperation in China’s higher education 
(HE) and science and technology (S&T) plays an important role in China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to Chinese President Xi Jinping, 
this cooperation has ‘helped lay a solid popular and social foundation for 
pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative’ (Xi 2017a). Indeed, in recent years, 
Chinese policies aimed at advancing China’s HE and S&T agendas have been 
developed in close connection with policies serving the broader economic 
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and political goals of the BRI, including China’s aim to become world leading 
in HE and S&T by 2050 (Xi 2017b). This nexus between HE and the BRI is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Educational Silk Road’, but this term has not 
(yet) caught on in international educational circles.
This above aim for world leadership in these f ields already appeared in 
Chinese policy documents before the BRI was launched. However, the BRI 
has given China’s efforts in HE and S&T an extra boost and the country is 
making steady progress in working towards this goal. China’s substantial 
investments in education and research, made throughout the past decades, 
have yielded results. Chinese top universities are rapidly rising in the inter-
national university rankings and China has also become the largest producer 
of scientif ic articles (National Science Board 2019), the largest source of 
international patent applications (WIPO 2020), and one of the leading 
countries in f ields of science such as artif icial intelligence, bio science, and 
engineering (D’Hooghe et al. 2018). However, China’s HE and S&T still face 
many challenges with regard to capacity and overall quality. The country 
has a long way to go before it will become a global leader in these two areas.
This chapter examines the various dimensions of the connection between 
the BRI and HE and S&T, with a focus on HE. It explores how the BRI-HE 
nexus impacts the development of China’s HE, the global HE landscape, 
and the realization of BRI policy goals. It will argue that the connection is 
symbiotic: BRI policymakers have good reason to promote China’s HE and 
S&T internationalization agendas, while China’s HE and S&T policymakers 
benef it from serving the BRI and its goals of achieving China’s overall 
rejuvenation and making China a leading country in the world. It will 
examine these issues through the lens of diplomacy and some of its subsets: 
the BRI is analysed as an instrument as well as a target of China’s science 
and education diplomacy, and international cooperation in HE and S&T is 
analysed as an instrument of BRI diplomacy.
China’s Diplomacy in All Shapes and Sizes
Diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy, aimed at serving state and/
or non-state actors’ interests through communication, negotiation, and the 
provision of incentives. It is an open-ended process that includes economic, 
cultural, social, as well as political forms and functions and where diplomatic 
agency is not limited to the sovereign state. In today’s diplomatic practice 
a wide range of non-state actors from domestic and international civil 
society, epistemic communities, and the private sector have become part 
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of diplomatic networks. These non-state actors matter as they bring to the 
negotiation table in-depth knowledge on specif ic policy areas, such as the 
environment, cyber security, or global diseases. Within these networks, 
non-state actors seek to influence policy and to make global and regional 
governance processes more open and accountable (Lee & Hocking 2011). 
In China, too, broader networks are involved in the country’s diplomacy. 
However, as this chapter will show, the state still dominates when it comes 
to international communication and negotiation.
Diplomacy comes in many shapes, three of which are relevant for this 
study. They are the subsets of public diplomacy, science diplomacy, and 
education diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that seeks ‘to 
influence foreign audiences’ thoughts and mobilize actions to advance a state 
or non-state actor’s interests and values abroad by building and managing 
relationships and developing a mutual understanding of cultures, attitudes, 
and behaviour’ (D’Hooghe 2015: 6). China’s major public diplomacy goals 
are to create understanding, respect, and ultimately support for China’s 
political model and policies; to advance China’s agenda; and to help China 
to win friends and allies.
Science diplomacy is a broad and somewhat fuzzy concept that is seen to 
comprise three elements: 1) using science cooperation to improve interna-
tional relations between countries across various policy areas (science for 
diplomacy); 2) facilitating international science cooperation (diplomacy for 
science); and 3) informing foreign policy objectives with scientif ic advice 
(science in diplomacy) (Royal Society 2010). In this study, only the f irst and 
second elements are relevant; the concept of science diplomacy is used to 
examine how science cooperation helps improve international relations in 
the policy areas of the BRI, HE, and S&T. Advancing BRI policies includes 
making BRI better known and winning support for the realization of BRI 
projects. A similar role can be played by education diplomacy with both 
‘education for diplomacy’, and ‘diplomacy for education’ processes being 
relevant. Through practices such as student and staff exchanges, scholarship 
programmes, joint projects and meetings, and language training, broader 
policy objectives can be promoted. Where science and education diplomacy 
seek to promote knowledge about and win support for the BRI, they can be 
regarded as instruments of public diplomacy.
Agency in these different subsets of diplomacy lies with various Chinese 
state and non-state actors. A primary role is played by the Chinese state: 
actors at the national and subnational level include government leaders 
and institutions like ministries, China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC, a macroeconomic planning agency under the State 
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Council), provincial or municipal governments, and national scholarship 
organizations. The category of non-state actors includes HE institutions, their 
staff and students, and enterprises. Although policymakers and knowledge 
institutions in countries that joined the BRI (hereafter ‘BRI countries’)1 play 
a signif icant role in the processes discussed in this chapter, the focus of this 
research is on Chinese stakeholders.
The Connection in Words
The connection between the BRI on the one hand and HE and S&T on the 
other hand is made in words and deeds. This section of the chapter will 
examine the words by f irst looking at BRI policy documents that discuss 
the role that HE and S&T cooperation can play in promoting and realizing 
the BRI and then also looking at HE and S&T policy documents that refer 
to the importance of serving the BRI.
BRI Policies and the Promotion of International Cooperation in Higher 
Education
Soon after the BRI was launched, its connection with international coopera-
tion in HE and S&T was established. The first elaborate BRI policy document, 
the 2015 ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt 
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ (hereafter ‘2015 Vision and Actions’), 
explicitly pointed to the importance of promoting academic exchanges 
as one of the ‘Cooperation Priorities’ (NDRC 2015). It stated that academic 
exchanges could help ‘win public support for deepening bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation’. It also called for more student exchanges and 
for jointly running schools in BRI countries. The document mentioned 
providing 10,000 government scholarships for students of BRI countries and 
called for actions to improve China’s S&T innovation capability, including 
the promotion of S&T personnel exchanges, the expansion of cooperation 
in joint laboratories, as well as the establishment of research centres and 
international technology transfer centres.
Two years later, in his speech at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, 
President Xi offered more details. He highlighted the need to integrate 
S&T into industries and f inance, and to build a Digital Silk Road through 
1 The term ‘BRI countries’ refers to countries that have off icially joined the BRI by signing a 
BRI MoU with China.
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intensifying cooperation in ‘frontier areas’ such as digital economy, artif icial 
intelligence, nanotechnology, quantum computing, big data, cloud comput-
ing, and smart cities (Xi 2017a). He also announced the launch of a ‘Belt 
and Road Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan’, 
which is currently being implemented (Xi 2017a). This plan maps out a 
broad range of programmes and actions for the period 2017-2022, including 
a ‘S&T People-to-People Exchange Initiative’, ‘Joint Laboratory Initiative, 
Science Park Cooperation Initiative’, and a ‘Technology Transfer Initiative’. 
In concrete terms, under the plan, China will receive 2500 young foreign 
scientists for short-term research visits to China, will train 5000 foreign 
scientists, engineers, and managers, and will set up 50 joint laboratories 
(MOST 2017).
The documents highlighted here are just a few of the many BRI policy 
documents, speeches and plans that include references to international 
cooperation in HE and S&T.2 However, they can be seen as representative of 
the Chinese government’s views on how the BRI should aim to speed up and 
expand the internationalization of China’s HE as well as its views on how 
this endeavour should advance the country’s scientif ic and technological 
agendas.
Higher Education and Science Policies and the Promotion of the BRI
Just as HE and S&T feature extensively in BRI policy documents, the BRI 
features extensively in China’s HE and S&T policy documents. The most 
explicit and elaborate connection is made in the ‘Education Action Plan 
for the Belt and Road Initiative’, which was issued by China’s Ministry of 
Education in 2016 (hereafter ‘2016 Action Plan’). This document stated that 
increased cooperation in HE by the BRI countries will serve the goals of the 
BRI, and also that, in turn, the BRI will support the internationalization of HE 
as it ‘affords immense opportunities for greater openness, further exchanges, 
and deeper integration in education in the regions and countries along the 
routes’ (MoE 2016). The ‘2016 Action Plan’ formulated major policy lines for 
strengthening educational connectivity between China and BRI countries 
and put forward three overall goals: 1) the promotion of people-to-people 
ties, which is explained as deepening the understanding between China 
and BRI countries, in particular where it concerns China’s language and 
culture, and Chinese policies; 2) the cultivation of ‘the much-needed talent 
2 See, for example, the documents listed at the Belt and Road Portal of the Chinese government: 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12731.htm.
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for the Belt and Road Initiative’; and 3) achieving common development 
of education along the BRI route with the goal of building an ‘integrated 
educational community’.
These views and goals, which are elaborated upon below, are repeated 
in most Chinese HE and S&T policy documents. They appear, for example, 
in ‘China Education Modernization 2035’, the country’s blueprint for the 
future of China’s education that was issued in 2019, and in the Ministry of 
Education’s ‘Key Points of Work of the Ministry of Education’s Opening up of 
Education in 2019’ (CC and State Council 2019a; MoE 2019c). These repeated 
references in policy documents underline the continuity of these plans and 
the importance the Chinese government attaches to making the two policy 
domains strengthen each other.
Deepening the Understanding of China and Chinese Policies
A major theme in HE and S&T policies supporting the BRI is deepening the 
understanding of China and Chinese policies, including the BRI, through 
‘fostering closer people-to-people ties’ (MoE 2016). This is also one of the 
major goals of China’s overall public diplomacy. While the instrument of 
‘people-to-people contacts’ seeks to involve non-state actors, the contacts 
are in practice usually strongly guided by government off icials, who define 
the format and content of the exchanges (D’Hooghe 2015, 156). In order 
to achieve the goal of a better understanding of China, the Ministry of 
Education encourages the organization of seminars and research on topics 
related to China. It also encourages education in the Chinese language, both 
in Chinese HE institutions and abroad.
The latter task is where the Confucius Institutes play a role. They are 
explicitly mentioned in the ‘2016 Action Plan’ and are regularly lauded by 
Chinese leaders for their positive role in the BRI (Xinhua 2016). Of the more 
than 525 Confucius Institutes and more than 1113 Confucius Classrooms 
around the world, 154 Institutes and 149 Classrooms are located in 54 BRI 
countries (MoE 2019a). The Confucius Institutes not only teach Chinese 
but also organize lectures, forums, international conferences, and research 
groups on BRI-related themes. Furthermore, Confucius Institutes worldwide 
are called upon to implement the Confucius China Study Plan, which aims 
to recruit more than 250 students and scholars per year to do research or a 
PhD on the BRI. In Thailand a Maritime Silk Road Confucius Institute has 
been established that is devoted to supporting the BRI (Shuto 2018: 133). 
According to the Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), it should 
become ‘the driving force to all the Confucius Institutes of nations along 
“One Belt and One Road”’ (Hanban 2015).
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In order to strengthen their role in the BRI, China aims to optimize the 
global layout of the Confucius Institutes, revise the Confucius Institute 
Charter, and accelerate the professionalization of Chinese deans and teachers 
(MoE 2016). While many universities in the US and Europe are reconsidering 
their cooperation with Confucius Institutes, BRI countries in Asia and 
Africa often welcome the opportunity the institutes offer in terms of free 
language training and scholarships to study in China.
Cultivating and Training Talents
The goal of cultivating and training talents and personnel in BRI countries 
is one of the major aims of connecting international cooperation in HE 
and S&T with the BRI. In order to successfully implement the BRI, the 
Chinese government needs more people with knowledge and skills, not only 
domestically, but also abroad. Studies carried out by Chinese researchers 
have identif ied a lack of the kinds of skilled professionals that are needed 
by Chinese enterprises in BRI countries (MoE 2016). This is where the 
internationalization of China’s HE, in particular in the area of S&T, can 
help. The ‘2016 Action Plan’ and ‘2015 Vision and Actions’ address this issue 
by proposing two policy lines: increasing student and educational staff 
mobility, and expanding China’s vocational training abroad.
The policy aim to increase mobility with BRI countries cannot be 
separated from China’s overall HE goal to expand mobility. Both outgoing 
and incoming student mobility is encouraged, but the primary focus is on 
incoming mobility and realizing China’s goal to receive 500,000 foreign 
students in 2020. To increase the country’s attractiveness for international 
students, policymakers are urged to improve the quality of Chinese HE 
and to create more platforms that can facilitate and accelerate the training 
of high-level international talents. To support this effort the ‘2016 Action 
Plan’ proposes various instruments to enhance two-way student exchanges, 
including BRI scholarship programmes, cooperation in running educational 
institutions and programmes overseas, teacher training, and education 
assistance in the framework of ‘South-South Cooperation’ (MoE 2016).
The second policy line concentrates on encouraging China’s top voca-
tional and technical institutions to establish colleges and training centres 
overseas and to jointly develop educational resources and programmes. In 
this process, the institutions should collaborate in particular with Chinese 
high-speed railroad and telecommunication companies (MoE 2016). This 
way the collaboration will contribute to realizing the BRI goals of meeting 
infrastructure needs and building a Digital Silk Road. A good example of 
how a measure proposed in the ‘2016 Action Plan’ is translated into more 
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detailed programmes is provided by the Luban workshop programme, which 
aims to contribute to the development in foreign countries of vocational and 
technical schools. Judging by the attention given to the Luban workshop in 
publications on the websites of the Ministry of Education and in academic 
articles, the programme is a showpiece of the BRI-HE nexus.
Named after the father of Chinese architecture Lu Ban (4th century BC), 
the programme was developed around 2010 under the auspices of Tianjin 
Municipality. It was then later included in and adapted to BRI plans. It is 
designed to provide technical and vocational training overseas to both 
students and teachers, and to enhance collaboration among vocational 
schools around the world with the f inal goal of ‘serving the purpose of BRI’ 
(Li & Wang 2019). The f irst Luban Workshop was held in 2016 in Thailand 
and in the two years that followed over 2000 students received training 
in engineering practice in the school, enabling them to work at Chinese 
enterprises (Li & Wang 2019). Luban Workshops have been established in 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Cambodia, Djibouti, and two European countries: 
the UK and Portugal. There are plans for more workshops in Africa and 
Asia (Li & Wang 2019).
In addition to expanding vocational training abroad, the Chinese govern-
ment also seeks to further S&T and innovation. According to Minister 
of Science and Technology Wang Zhigang, S&T cooperation with BRI 
countries should realize China’s aims to transform the Belt and Road 
into ‘a boulevard for innovation’ (Xinhua 2019a). This should be achieved 
through the creation of technological innovation platforms, laboratories, 
industrial technology research institutes, and entrepreneurship incubation 
bases, and through the promotion of science exchanges and the sharing 
of resources (MoE 2018).
Building an Integrated Educational Community
The third aim concerns building ‘an integrated educational community’. 
This should be achieved through the coordination of national education 
policies between China and BRI countries. Such coordination can be realized 
by providing advice and policy consultation to BRI countries, establishing 
framework agreements for educational cooperation and mutual recognition 
of dual and joint degrees, simplifying visa application procedures, and 
setting up platforms for cooperation and exchanges. These efforts are a 
part of a more ambitious policy goal of enhancing and increasing China’s 
international influence on education through active participation in global 
education governance and the development of international education rules, 
standards, and evaluation systems (CC and State Council 2019a).
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Actions and Agency in Creating the HE-BRI Nexus: A State-
Driven Approach
Who are the actors driving the development of a closer connection between 
BRI policies and policies with regard to HE and S&T? Looking at the many 
policy documents and guidelines that are put forward by CCP organs and 
major government institutions, and the fact that the government is providing 
most of the funding for the implementation of the policies, it is clear that 
this endeavour is primarily state-driven. Chinese policymakers seek to steer 
and encourage the science and educational diplomacy in the BRI context 
primarily via top-down approaches, both at national and subnational levels. 
Reliance on Chinese public funding will likely continue as most BRI countries 
lack f inancial and other resources (Wu & Chan 2019).
This is not to say that connecting the BRI with the agendas of HE and 
S&T is solely a state affair; universities and enterprises are important 
stakeholders, too. However, it should be noted that in China, universities 
are closely tied to the government and are required to execute government 
and party policy directives. In implementing BRI policies, both universities 
and enterprises are pushed by government directives and/or pulled by 
f inancial and other government incentives.
The Role of the Government at National and Local Level
BRI policy documents emphasize the role of the Chinese government at 
national and local levels. Among the state actors involved are CCP organs 
such as the Central Committee (CC) and a plethora of government institu-
tions. The State Council and the National Development and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC) play a major role in the formulation of overall policies. The 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and Technology develop 
and disseminate more detailed policies and coordinate action plans. In 
addition, organizations such as the National Natural Science Foundation of 
China (NSFC) are also important with regards to f inancing and overseeing 
research programmes (Applebaum et al. 2018; NSFC n.d.).
What stands out in various policy documents is the prominence given 
to the role of provinces and cities, which are tasked with developing their 
own education action plans for the BRI. They should use the advantages 
of their geographical positions and local characteristics but ensure that 
they closely align their own plans with the ‘national master plan’ (MoE 
2016). Many provinces and cities have jumped at this opportunity. Some 
have developed extensive programmes to further S&T collaboration. One 
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example is Tianjin Municipality’s ‘Belt and Road Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Cooperation Action Plan’ (TMSTB 2017). Another example is 
Shanghai Municipality’s ‘Belt and Road International Cooperation Pro-
gramme’ (STCSM 2019). These programmes are extensive; the latter, for 
example, provides funding for six international joint laboratory projects, 
60 young scientist exchanges, and f ive technology transfer projects, all of 
which will be aimed at countries participating in the BRI (STCSM 2019). 
Other provinces have developed more modest programmes (Zhang 2017; 
Fujian Provincial Department of Education 2017). By 2019, China’s Ministry 
of Education had signed memoranda with eighteen provinces to co-build 
education activities in support of the BRI (MoE 2019a).
Policy documents also contain calls for high-level (government) consulta-
tions to promote education and science cooperation in support of the BRI 
through bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms of organizations, 
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Asia-Pacif ic 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting, the various BRI 
economic corridors, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
UNESCO, and many more (MoE 2016). Research shows that policymakers 
do engage actively with these organizations in promoting HE and S&T 
cooperation (King 2019; Cheng 2019).
The Role of Non-State Actors: Knowledge Institutions and 
Organizations
Universities and other knowledge institutions play a key role in translating 
the policy lines put forward by the government and the CCP into the concrete 
programmes and projects that they subsequently implement. They are also 
called upon to work together with Chinese enterprises in exploring opportu-
nities for cooperation in talent cultivation, technology transfer, and linking 
training to employment. The initiatives developed by knowledge institutions 
are innumerable and diverse. In the paragraphs below the activities of only 
a few major stakeholders are discussed to highlight the enormous scope of 
science and education diplomacy and BRI public diplomacy activities that 
Chinese knowledge institutions currently undertake.
Projects and Programmes
A major role in BRI education and science diplomacy is played by the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS). The President of CAS, Bai Chunli, regards S&T as 
‘the core driving force for the BRI development’ (Bai 2018). He has led CAS to 
develop a comprehensive framework of scientif ic cooperation programmes 
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and sectoral multilateral cooperation initiatives in support of the BRI. In 
the period 2013-2018, CAS has provided more than US$268 million for the 
construction of BRI S&T projects. These include the construction of nine 
overseas research and education centres in BRI countries, the implementa-
tion of over a hundred research and development projects, training and 
education of over 5000 individuals from BRI countries, and more than 
20,000 exchanges a year with scientists from BRI countries (Bai 2018). CAS 
has also established the Alliance of International Science Organizations in 
the Belt and Road Region (ANSO) with 37 national scientif ic institutions and 
international organizations, including UNESCO (ANSO n.d.). In addition, 
CAS has launched a Belt and Road Industry Alliance, with more than a 
hundred high-tech enterprises and research institutes, aimed at cooperation 
to serve regional economic and social development.
While the BRI-related activities CAS has developed stand out because of 
their breadth, Chinese universities have also taken up the call to develop 
BRI-related programmes. They have established BRI study units and have 
organized international conferences and workshops on BRI-related themes. 
Some have also developed specific BRI study programmes. Tsinghua Univer-
sity, for example, offers an International Master of Public Administration 
in the Belt and Road Initiative (IMPA-BRI) programme. The programme, 
which is ‘guided’ by a state actor – the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) – is designed to train promising talents for BRI coun-
tries (Tsinghua SPPM n.d.). Also at Tsinghua University, the People’s Bank 
of China School of Finance (PBCSF n.d.) offers a prestigious ‘BRI Finance 
EMBA’ programme, which targets international business leaders from 
China and Southeast Asia and focuses on the role of regional economies 
in the BRI (PBCSF n.d.).
Building Networks
Universities are also active in building networks to either strengthen BRI-
related cooperation or to simply promote the BRI. Some networks bring 
institutions together, whilst others aim to connect individual researchers 
or students. An example of the former is the University Alliance of the Silk 
Road (UASR), which was launched by Xi’an Jiaotong University in 2015. The 
UASR is an international educational platform that aims to build a Silk Road 
Academic Belt through institutional exchanges and partnerships. According 
to its website, the Alliance has been joined by approximately 150 universities 
from 38 countries and regions, including 41 Chinese universities (UASR n.d.). 
The UASR has established sub-alliances that focus on law, management, 
advanced manufacturing, and nanotechnologies. It has also established a 
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Silk Road Economic Belt Collaborative Innovation Center and a BRI Free 
Trade Area Research Institute. A similar initiative has been developed by 
Lanzhou University, which has established the Belt and Road University 
Alliance (BRUA 2016). Meanwhile, Xiamen University has launched the 
University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (UCMSR 2018). 
In addition, universities and other knowledge institutions have established 
smaller institutional networks that focus on one specif ic theme, such as 
engineering (MoE 2019b), nanotechnology, and forensic studies (Rolland 
2019).
It might be asked to what extent these networks result in major new 
collaboration projects that would not have been realized without them. 
These networks’ activities are often limited to a yearly, highly publicized 
meeting of university presidents and a few seminars. This suggests that 
the networks serve as instruments for BRI public diplomacy rather than 
for deepening S&T cooperation.3 Furthermore, the internationalization 
strategies of the universities that are leading these networks are focused on 
developing collaboration with the best international partner universities 
in relevant science f ields rather than with universities in BRI countries 
(Dinah Birch in Baker 2019). They do seek to strengthen their networks by 
urging partner universities to sign up for the BRI platforms regardless of 
whether they are located in BRI countries or not. However, when foreign 
universities decline, it does not affect the (initiation of) joint projects that 
are beneficial to the Chinese side.
Rather than these institutional networks, the building of networks of 
students and scholars may lead to more positive results, given that personal 
connections often play a significant role in the development of international 
projects. An example of such a network is the Belt and Road Studies Net-
work (BRSN), which was initiated in Beijing in April 2019 with the aim of 
providing a mechanism to share ideas and research f indings and facilitate 
academic exchange and cooperation between researchers (BRSN 2019). 
Another example is the Student Association for the Belt and Road Initiative 
(SABRI), which is hosted by Tsinghua University. SABRI provides a platform 
for youth globally ‘to share ideas, hopes, and innovations about the BRI’. 
According to its LinkedIn profile, SABRI has more than 500 members from 
over 70 countries and has chapters already established in countries like 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Nepal (SABRI 2020).
Many of the above initiatives involve the participation of foreign or 
international organizations and universities, but in some cases international 
3 Interview with a Dutch university policymaker, October 2018.
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partners take a more prominent role. One example is the UK-China-BRI 
Countries Education Partnership Initiative, set up by China’s Ministry 
of Education and the British Council. The initiative aims to provide seed 
funding for UK universities to develop multi-country education collaboration 
with institutions from China, and ASEAN and African countries (British 
Council 2019). Another example is the Silk Road Research Grant project for 
international young researchers, which has been jointly set up by China’s 
Ministry of Education and UNESCO (Cheng 2019).
Results and Challenges
This overview of just a few of the innumerable activities that are reported on 
university websites or mentioned in action plans or in the media illustrates 
the enormous scope and wide variety of projects and programmes that have 
been developed by Chinese universities and other knowledge organizations 
in answer to the Chinese government’s call to strengthen the BRI-HE nexus. 
A number of these plans and programmes already existed before the BRI 
was launched but were later given a BRI label. This way universities and 
enterprises show the government and the party that they are aligning their 
plans with national policies. At the same time, it enables them to benefit 
from BRI-related funding. However, it is not always clear to what extent these 
plans are realized and have impact. Some projects seem to exist primarily 
on paper and may not result in much more than good intentions and one or 
two discussion meetings per year. Meanwhile, other activities do produce 
results. The large number of initiatives by stakeholders pose a challenge 
to the Chinese government in terms of coordination and eff icient use of 
resources. This challenge was recognized early on and the government has 
worked to strengthen overall planning and coordination between different 
ministries, provinces, and cities across China (MoE 2016).
The Impact of China’s Investment in BRI Science and Education 
Diplomacy
According to the Chinese government, steady progress is being made with 
regard to strengthening the connection between the BRI, HE and S&T. Many 
tangible results contribute to one or more of the aims laid out in the various 
policy documents: building an integrated educational community, cultivat-
ing talents, furthering S&T and innovation, and deepening understanding 
of China and Chinese policies. The impact is most clearly visible in student 
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and staff mobility numbers, the export of China’s educational institutions 
and programmes, and the training of foreign talents in BRI countries. In 
addition, the developments discussed have multiple indirect and sometimes 
far-reaching implications at the domestic and global level.
Student and Staff Mobility
The Ministry of Education reported in 2019 that the implementation of the 
‘2016 Action Plan’, had led to the following results: the signing of mutual 
recognition agreements for HE degrees with 24 BRI countries, the launch of 
60 overseas schools in 23 BRI countries, and the establishment of seventeen 
joint laboratories along the Belt and Road (MoE 2019a). The 24 mutual degree 
recognition agreements are out of a total of 46 agreements worldwide, 
illustrating that HE and S&T plans focused on the BRI are aligned with 
the country’s overall HE policies. Furthermore, by 2019, China had set up 
70 research projects involving 46 different BRI countries (Peters 2019). 
Meanwhile, think tanks had produced research reports for 66 BRI countries. 
In the period 2017-2019 China jointly held 146 workshops with countries 
participating in the BRI, training more than 2100 science personnel and 
more than 1800 foreign doctoral and master’s students (Xinhua 2019a). The 
export of Chinese vocational training to BRI countries has led to positive 
results, too: in the period 2016-2018, 351 international cooperation projects 
saw nearly 6000 students educated and over 100,000 trained (MoE 2019b). S&T 
research involving BRI countries has also been stepped up. State-level joint 
science parks involving eight BRI countries are currently being developed 
(Xinhua 2019a).
The Chinese government has not disclosed a complete overview of the 
development of student numbers since the implementation of BRI policies 
and scholarships. Available f igures show that in 2016, a total of 310,720 
international students in China came from BRI countries, accounting for 
65% of the total number of foreign students in China (British CoC 2019). 
In 2017, the absolute number had slightly increased to 317,200, but in rela-
tive terms there was no increase, the number again accounting for 65% 
of the total number of incoming students (MoE 2019b). The numbers of 
scholarship-sponsored students from BRI countries accounted for 61% of 
all scholarship-sponsored students in 2016, which was an 8% rise from 2012 
(British CoC 2019). With regard to outgoing mobility, f igures show that in 2017 
a total of 66,100 Chinese students studied in 37 BRI countries. This number 
indicated a growth rate of 15.7%, which was considerably higher than the 
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overall growth rate of Chinese students abroad (11.75%). Of this group a 
small minority of 3679 students were government sponsored (MoE 2019b).4
Based on these f igures, it is not possible to attribute developments in 
student mobility to China’s BRI policies. Many BRI countries are rapidly 
developing and they could have benefitted from collaboration with China 
without their participation in the BRI. Conclusions about the success of BRI-
HE policies are also premature because most BRI scholarship programmes 
have only been being implemented since 2015-2016. However, it is unlikely 
that China’s many BRI programmes, funding schemes, and scholarships 
will have had no results. Educational and research traff ic has grown among 
China and Belt and Road countries and particularly those countries with 
less developed academic systems are benef itting from the programmes. 
Furthermore, anecdotal information about what is driving students from 
less developed BRI countries to go to China for study – scholarships and 
lack of places at domestic universities – suggests that we may see a more 
pronounced influx of students of BRI countries into China in the coming 
years (McCarthy 2018). So far, information about the total government 
budget for the BRI scholarships being offered to international students has 
not been published. It is therefore also unclear to what extent these BRI-HE 
plans are being f inanced by newly earmarked funds rather than funds that 
were already available but are now just labelled as part of the BRI.
Domestic Impact
At the domestic level the BRI-HE nexus leads to a strengthening of exist-
ing policies rather than adding something new. The impact is visible in 
three areas. Firstly, the call to serve the BRI has led to an acceleration of 
China’s efforts to modernize its HE and has contributed to an expansion 
of China’s international cooperation in HE and S&T. The BRI promotion of 
HE has brought more investment and has led to rising demands for quality 
education in China (Linney n.d.). This underpins the Chinese government’s 
longstanding aim of improving the quality of China’s universities and 
vocational schools (CC and State Council 2019a). Furthermore, the BRI 
needs talents trained in areas such as green and smart technologies, 
engineering, and information technology. This has forced the govern-
ment to address the fact that currently the majority of international 
students in China study social sciences and humanities and has urged 
it to develop more capacity as well as policies that explicitly attract 
4 For more f igures, see Kirby and Van der Wende 2019: 131-132.
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students in these f ields (Wu & Chan 2019). The government has already 
implemented policies aimed at changing international students’ study 
choices through scholarship regulations. In 2016, the largest group among 
Chinese government-sponsored international students were enrolled in 
engineering degrees (ibid.).
Secondly, through providing training and technology to BRI countries, 
China is positioning itself as a country that exports and shares knowledge, 
rather than a country that seeks knowledge. This is not to say that the 
Chinese government no longer seeks knowledge abroad, but the advanced 
S&T and innovation it needs is generally found in well-developed countries 
that have not signed up to the BRI. This means that in the short term the BRI 
focus on HE cooperation will not contribute to the Chinese government’s 
goal of becoming a knowledge economy.
The third area concerns the impact of China’s science and educational 
diplomacy on the BRI. First and foremost, China’s vocational and technology 
projects in and with BRI countries are resulting in a growing pool of well-
trained talents. This helps to solve the problem of a lack of local personnel 
for Chinese enterprises working on projects in BRI countries. In this way 
HE cooperation helps China implement BRI infrastructural, digital, S&T, 
and f inancial projects. Secondly many of the BRI-HE actions discussed 
in this chapter can be understood as BRI public diplomacy. They serve to 
positively shape perceptions of the BRI and co-opt academic, professional, 
and business groups into supporting BRI policies. In non-BRI countries, 
BRI public diplomacy in HE has been less successful, as policymakers and 
scholars are not interested in, and in some cases even reluctant to engage 
in, cooperation with China on HE and research under the framework of the 
BRI (D’Hooghe et al. 2018).
Global Impact
Research into BRI-HE actions for this chapter, as well as a scan of Chinese 
academic articles on the BRI in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure 
database (CNKI)5, indicated that in the past years BRI-HE policies have been 
implemented f irst and foremost in the Asian region. BRI-related projects 
in Europe, the MENA region, and Africa are less numerous. This is not 
surprising. In the f irst years after its launch, the overall focus of the BRI 
5 Of the 253 titles in the CNKI database containing the terms ‘BRI’ and ‘higher education’ 
(search executed for the period 2015-June 2020), 39 discussed specif ic cases on international 
collaboration; of these 39 cases, 25 dealt with Asian countries or ASEAN.
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was on Asia, and the majority of BRI economic corridors are located in 
Asia. Furthermore, China’s HE ties with Asia were already relatively strong. 
An additional reason for this focus may have been the wish to reverse the 
trend of dropping numbers of Asian students in China. From 2003 to 2016, 
the percentage of Asian students in the total of international students in 
China dropped from 81.9% to 59.8% (Wu & Chan 2019).
Both China and BRI countries benefit from the BRI-HE policies. However, 
as the aims of the policies are primarily f ine-tuned to China’s needs, it is to be 
expected that China will reap the most benefits, as may be a matter of course 
for the country that develops and f inances the projects. In the long run 
BRI countries run the risk of becoming increasingly dependent on China’s 
HE system and policies, which may reduce their room for making policy 
decisions that counter Chinese interests, not only in bilateral relationship 
but also in multilateral contexts. This would contribute to China’s overall 
global influence in HE and S&T.
Another impact that may be felt worldwide is China’s increasing at-
tractiveness as a study destination. The worldwide demand for students 
is growing, in particular in the hard sciences, and competition for talent 
and funding is becoming increasingly stiff. The growing quality and 
student capacity of Chinese universities, in combination with China’s 
generous scholarship programmes, will likely lead to growing numbers 
of students opting to go to China for study. This means that China will 
increasingly train young foreign talents who, as a result, may develop 
strong ties to China and work in BRI projects in China or in their home 
countries instead of studying and working in other parts of the world. It 
could therefore potentially contribute to a growing shortage of skilled 
workers in other parts of the world. There is currently already a shortage 
of trained personnel in Europe and the US (McGrath 2019) and many 
universities expect a future decline in the number of students (Redden 
2019). If China succeeds in its aim to link study in China to job opportuni-
ties in China or in Chinese projects in BRI home countries, China may 
become even more attractive as a study destination for young people in 
BRI countries.
China’s plans to align the BRI with HE may, in the long term, also have 
an impact on international research collaboration. Collaborative research 
involving China has been growing rapidly over the past decade (Kirby and 
Van der Wende 2019). This is particularly true for research involving various 
BRI countries (Baker 2019). While this growth may be insignif icant in view 
of global research output, it is relevant to note that China is succeeding 
in also developing BRI-HE cooperation with knowledge institutions in 
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non-BRI countries. The fact that the UK has not signed up to the BRI has not 
stopped the British Council and individual British knowledge institutions 
from engaging in BRI-related programmes, as we have seen above. These 
developments will strengthen China’s relative position in S&T and will boost 
global acceptance of the BRI, even if this acceptance is only half-hearted 
and to benefit from the funding and cooperation it brings.
A f inal development with a potentially big impact is China’s success in 
involving BRI countries in building an integrated educational community. 
Through engaging with HE policymakers in BRI countries and providing 
them with advice and funding, China creates opportunities to access and 
shape these countries’ academic systems in ways that support China’s needs 
and views on governance. Further research is needed to learn if China is 
also making use of such opportunities.
Conclusion
The connection between HE, S&T, and the BRI is comprehensive, but it is still 
currently in its f irst phase of development. It is therefore too early to draw 
far-reaching conclusions. However, based on the research presented in this 
chapter, it has been possible to identify several trends and discuss preliminary 
conclusions with regard to the domestic and global impacts of the nexus.
This study shows that the Chinese government is building strong con-
nections between the BRI and HE and S&T, not only on paper, but also 
in practice. It also shows that this relationship is symbiotic: policies and 
actions in the two policy domains strengthen each other. These policy plans 
and actions are numerous, broad and diverse in scope, and are based on a 
long-term and strategic vision. Furthermore, and importantly, they are sup-
ported by funding. This funding is not only an important pull factor for BRI 
stakeholders, but also for Chinese knowledge institutions and enterprises.
At the domestic level, the building of the BRI-HE nexus results in an 
acceleration of the modernization and internationalization of China’s 
HE, a strengthening of China’s positioning as a country that exports and 
shares knowledge, and an expansion of China’s pool of well-trained talents. 
Furthermore, it supports the publicization and realization of the BRI. At the 
global level it leads to an expansion of China’s HE and S&T cooperation with 
BRI countries and to a strengthening of China’s attractiveness as a study 
destination. It also leads to the advancement of the Chinese government’s 
aim of building an education community led by China.
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Agency in building the nexus between the policy areas of the BRI, HE and 
S&T is diverse. Multiple Chinese national-level CCP organs and government 
institutions develop the policies that aim to create and strengthen the 
nexus. Subnational government actors, such as provincial and municipal 
government policymakers, are urged to develop their own plans, but they 
are limited in this role by the requirement to stay aligned with the national 
‘master plan’. Non-state stakeholders such as Chinese universities and 
enterprises are f irst and foremost involved in the development and execution 
of practical policies and plans that closely follow policy guidelines. They are 
pushed by the requirement to respond to government calls for action and 
pulled by f inancial incentives and opportunities that may support their 
own policy goals. The focus in this chapter has been on Chinese agency 
and state and non-state policymakers, but it should be noted that Chinese 
and foreign students, as well as foreign HE and S&T organizations, are 
important actors, too.
Looking Ahead: Challenges and Uncertainties
The impacts and potential consequences discussed above are based on 
the assumption that current trends will continue. However, the COVID-19 
pandemic that erupted in early 2020 may have a profound impact on 
the international HE and S&T landscape. Currently, the pandemic has 
signif icantly affected student mobility and the way HE is organized. It has 
also impacted the implementation of the BRI. Being in the middle of a still 
unfolding worldwide COVID-19 crisis, it is too early to discuss its broad 
and long-term consequences on the developments that are the focus of this 
chapter. It may strengthen the growing apprehension in Western countries 
of China’s increasing global influence in general and the BRI in particular. 
Although scholars and policymakers emphasize the need to collaborate 
with China (LAC 2018), concerns about the lack of academic freedom in 
China and the infringement on research ethics are growing. For example, a 
recent decision by China to limit the free sharing of research f indings with 
regard to the origins of the COVID-19 virus has seriously damaged trust in 
China’s academic system (Cooper 2020). However, in many countries China’s 
COVID-19 diplomacy, which consisted of offering medical supplies to help 
with f ighting the virus and publicizing efforts to develop medicines and a 
vaccine against COVID-19, may strengthen positive perceptions of China’s 
global leadership, paving the way for increased cooperation with China on 
BRI-HE projects.
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3 Trade, Tax, and Development Finance
Understanding China’s Choice of BRI Agreements and 
Institutions
Michael Sampson, Jue Wang and Irma Mosquera Valderrama
Abstract
Chapter 3 examines the decisions that inform the BRI’s institution build-
ing. It explores the tension between strategic and eff iciency-oriented 
concerns, tracing these tensions across three issue areas: tax, trade, and 
development f inance. The chapter shows that, in dealing with challenges, 
the Chinese government lacks an integral governance framework that 
systemically coordinates all relevant institutions. Instead, it takes varied 
institutional approaches to overseeing BRI projects, ranging from bilateral 
trade agreements to multilateral f inancial institutions. This raises the 
question of what is driving China’s development of agreements and 
institutions for the BRI. The chapter argues that China’s development 
of BRI tax initiatives is mostly motivated by eff iciency drivers, its trade 
agreements with key BRI partners by strategic drivers, and its efforts to 
establish multilateral f inancial institutions by both drivers.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, agreements, institutions, trade, tax, 
development f inance
What Is Driving the Belt and Road Initiative?
There has been much academic and policy debate around the factors driving 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in recent years: Is the BRI an attempt by China 
to dramatically improve its power position in Asia? Or is it simply a mechanism 
by which China can support its own economic growth by providing markets 
for exports and returns on its investments? (De Soyres et al. 2019; Rahman & 
Shurong 2017; Wang 2016). This debate has tended to operate at a high level 
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of generality, with less attention paid to precise mechanisms of cooperation 
in specific issue areas. This is partly due to the amorphous nature of the BRI 
project itself and partly due to its relatively recent emergence, rendering it 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions. This chapter provides a framework 
for a more precise resolution of this debate. It shows that strategic factors have 
more relevance in particular issue areas that fall under the umbrella of BRI 
cooperation whilst in other areas economic factors are much more prominent.
In this chapter we provide an analysis of three specif ic issue areas of 
cooperation under the BRI: trade, taxation, and development f inance. 
We develop a new framework to understand why China has adopted the 
particular institutional approaches that it has in each issue area. By doing 
so, we draw more precise conclusions about the future impact of the BRI 
more broadly. We show that Beijing’s approach has often been driven by a 
concern to reduce transaction costs and maximize economic advantage in 
its economic cooperation with BRI partners.1 We refer to these factors as 
the efficiency drivers of China’s approach to cooperation. However, broader 
geopolitical concerns have also played a significant role in Beijing’s approach 
in some instances. We refer to these factors as the strategic drivers of China’s 
behaviour. In the following analysis we show that the priority given to 
each of these types of factors varies across the three issue areas. In the 
area of trade, broader political and strategic concerns are relatively more 
prominent in shaping China’s institutional design choices. In the area of 
taxation, both strategic desires and the need to reduce transaction costs 
are equally important considerations. In the area of development f inance, 
we f ind it particularly interesting that China has recently engaged with 
some multilateral development f inance institutions (MDFIs), despite the 
greater convenience of using existing domestic institutions to f inance and 
coordinate BRI projects, suggesting a hybrid approach in this area. China’s 
behaviour combines strategic considerations with a concern for avoiding 
loss and/or maximizing the return on China’s investments. In the next 
section we introduce the theoretical framework and define both strategic 
and eff iciency drivers of institutional design. We then turn to area-specif ic 
analyses, providing an overview of developments, along with some of the 
challenges presented by cooperation in each area. In every section we draw 
conclusions about the most important factors driving China’s behaviour. 
We then conclude by drawing inferences about the future impact of the 
BRI across these issue areas and more broadly.
1 We use ‘Beijing’ throughout this chapter as shorthand to refer to the central government 
of the PRC.
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Efficiency and Strategic Concerns
In any cooperative endeavour, state behaviour is driven by a mix of strategic 
and eff iciency concerns, which can be thought of as concerns for gains that 
are either relative (how one’s position can be improved vis-à-vis others) or 
absolute (how one’s present position can be improved vis-à-vis one’s own 
past position) (Powell 1991). But whilst recognizing this complex reality, 
we can be more precise about when and where each consideration wins 
out over the other. In the following section we operationalize eff iciency 
(absolute gains) concerns as a desire to reduce transaction costs resulting 
from economic exchange. Transaction costs can be thought of as the costs 
incurred in the process of economic transaction between two or more 
parties or the ‘economic equivalent of friction in physical systems’ (Wil-
liamson 1985: 19). These costs can be reduced by concluding an agreement, 
providing certainty about the future and removing the need for repeated 
bargaining. In general, the more comprehensive the initial institution or 
contract between the parties, the greater the certainty about the future 
relationship. This in turn tends to mean that the costs incurred from each 
iterated transaction are minimized.
Where eff iciency (i.e. the reduction of transaction costs) is not the driving 
concern, the creation and design of cooperative institutions or contracts may 
instead be driven by broader political or strategic considerations. Therefore, 
where an agreement is ineff icient and limited (compared to the available 
and feasible alternatives) we conclude that political or strategic drivers are 
the primary driving force. In practice this means that agreements that result 
in residual uncertainty about future behaviour are more likely to be driven 
by strategic concerns. We def ine these strategic concerns as the desire to 
maximize the relative power position of China vis-à-vis its BRI partners.
In terms of analysing China as an actor, we f ind that the most fruitful 
approach also differs across issue areas. In international trade China can 
often be treated ‘as if ’ it is a unitary actor without loss of specif icity or 
insight, given that policy is largely influenced by two central government 
departments; the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA).2 In f inance, because this is an area in which there 
are a much broader variety of actors and more arm’s-length institutions 
2 In this sense we adopt a unitary actor assumption for China in trade, an assumption which 
whilst not a precise description of reality, does allow the development of useful insights. On the 
relationship between assumptions and description, see Friedman 1953: 8. On the unitary actor 
assumption in international relations, see Wendt 2004.
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operating on behalf of the government, a reduction in theoretical parsi-
mony is warranted in order to capture the relevant factors shaping China’s 
behaviour in this area. In tax meanwhile China’s international tax policy is 
centralized with the main actor being the State Administration of Taxation 
(SAT). SAT has participated actively in OECD-, G20-, and UN-level discussion 
of multilateral tax initiatives to deal with base erosion and profit shifting by 
multinationals. SAT is also responsible for introducing regulations to deal 
with transfer pricing and related tax disputes. China has also created its 
own Belt and Road Initiative Tax Administration Cooperation Mechanism 
(BRITACOM) with BRI countries. The council of the BRITACOM, which 
is the decision-making body, is chaired by the Commissioner of the SAT.
Cooperation in Trade
From the inception of the BRI, it was envisioned as a mechanism to stimulate 
cooperation in infrastructure, development, f inance, social and cultural ex-
changes, and investment and trade (Johnston 2019: 42). Given the centrality 
of trade to the BRI, how should we understand the cooperation occurring in 
this area since the launch of the initiative in 2013? Has China’s institutional 
approach been driven primarily by strategic or eff iciency concerns?
It is important to note that even prior to the launch of the BRI, China 
was party to eleven trade agreements, including a major agreement with 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was also already 
in the process of negotiating a broader regional pact with f ifteen states in 
the Asian Pacif ic, in the form of the Regional Comprehensive Partnership 
(RCEP). Participant countries in these negotiations were Australia, Brunei, 
Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(Baltensperger and Dadush 2019: 2). These agreements are the result of the 
great deal of energy that Beijing has devoted to concluding trade deals since 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, particularly 
with regional partners. Though it remains diff icult to precisely delineate 
which states actively participate in the BRI at any particular time, one 
study suggests that of the 44 countries that either have, or are planning, 
trade agreements with China, 29 also participate in BRI. Of these, sixteen 
are party to completed trade deals or began negotiations before the BRI 
was launched in 2013 (Baltensperger and Dadush 2019: 4-5). In addition 
to the major trade agreement with ASEAN (encompassing ten countries), 
China is party to bilateral trade agreements with the BRI countries Georgia, 
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Pakistan, and Singapore and has concluded agreements with the territories 
of Hong Kong and Macao.
Interestingly, unlike other major trading powers, such as the EU, the US, or 
Japan, which tend to conclude broad and deep trade agreements, China has 
engaged in an ongoing negotiating process to expand and deepen existing 
agreements. This is an approach that decreases the relative eff iciency of the 
negotiating process by increasing the number of negotiations and therefore 
the negotiation costs incurred. This approach also increases uncertainty by 
leaving many details of the initial agreements to subsequent negotiations. 
Therefore, compared to agreements that are comprehensive from the start, 
it is unclear what the implications of the f inal versions of China’s trade 
agreements will be for the economic sectors involved. Such an approach also 
maximizes the opportunity costs of concluding comprehensive agreements 
from the start whilst increasing China’s bargaining leverage over time.3
Alongside the reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers that result 
from these formal trade agreements, improving trade facilitation is also an 
important part of the BRI for China (Wei et al. 2018: 1233). Trade facilitation 
can be broadly defined as an effort to simplify and harmonize international 
trade procedures to increase the eff iciency of cross-border trade. Trade 
facilitation was formalized as part of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 
(TFA), which was negotiated in 2013 and entered into force in 2017. Prior to 
this, a 2015 BRI document titled ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ stated:
Countries along the Belt and Road should enhance customs cooperation 
such as information exchange, mutual recognition of regulations, and 
mutual assistance in law enforcement; improve bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation in the f ields of inspection and quarantine, certif ication and 
accreditation, standard measurement, and statistical information; and 
work to ensure that the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement takes effect 
and is implemented. (NDRC 2015; Johns et al. 2018: 12)
However, not all BRI participant states are party to the TFA because some 
are not WTO members; of 71 BRI countries, 58 are WTO members. Of 
3 As an illustration of this point: China’s trade agreements often initially only entail liberaliza-
tion of trade in goods, with subsequent services agreements concluded some years later. As such 
the benef its of trade cooperation in services during that intervening period are lost – this is 
the opportunity cost. This approach also has the effect of increasing China’s bargaining power, 
given its comparatively higher levels of economic growth and growing dependence of its trade 
partners. See Sampson 2019.
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these members, as of 2018, four have not ratif ied the TFA. As such, there 
remains scope for improvement for BRI participants on this front (Johns 
et al. 2018: 22-24). Trade facilitation initiatives from BRI countries are 
meanwhile also taking place outside of formal trade agreements. Efforts 
to improve transport facilitation have taken place under the auspices of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and as part of the Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) initiative led by the Asian 
Development Bank, China, Pakistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and seven other 
Central Asian countries. A treaty on facilitation of cross-border paperless 
trade in Asia and the Pacif ic was also concluded in 2016 (Ramasamy et 
al. 2017: 14-15).
In addition to multilateral cooperation in trade, there are six main 
economic corridors that constitute the broader BRI: the New Eurasian 
Land Bridge Corridor, the China-Central Asia-West Asia (CAWA) Corridor, 
the China-Pakistan Corridor, the China-Russia-Mongolia Corridor, the 
Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Corridor, and the China-Indochina-Peninsula 
Corridor (Brookings 2019). It would be incorrect to assume that the level of 
trade cooperation and integration in each of these corridors is uniform, and 
in fact there is wide variation. In particular, the China-Pakistan Corridor (the 
only bilateral corridor) and the China-Indochina Corridor are supported by 
pre-existing trade agreements with Pakistan and ASEAN, respectively. In 
the remaining corridors no formal trade agreements exist, and the CAWA 
Corridor is perhaps the least well integrated as a group of countries in terms 
of formal trade institutions (Ramasamy et al. 2017: 18).
With respect to Pakistan, there has been cooperation in trade in which 
China is a crucial export destination and import source for Pakistan. In 
addition to this, China has also made a large number of investments in 
crucial infrastructure projects in Pakistan in recent years. Pakistan’s level of 
dependence is therefore high and continues to grow (Ramasamy et al. 2017: 
30). This asymmetrical relationship is exacerbated by the sequential nego-
tiation of elements of the trade agreement. The agreements on goods and 
services were negotiated separately and eight rounds of trade negotiations 
have occurred under Phase II of the initial agreement. These culminated in 
negotiations to upgrade the deal in late 2016, despite Pakistan’s hesitancy 
regarding deepening the trade relationship further (Haider 2015). Under 
Phase I of the agreement, Pakistan introduced zero tariffs on 35% of China’s 
products, while China has reduced duties to 0% on 40% of Pakistan’s prod-
ucts. Pakistan has requested revision of existing elements of the treaty 
because it argues that the agreement brings few economic advantages 
(Sampson 2019). However, given the deepening strategic relationship between 
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the two states and the importance of China’s investments, it is diff icult 
to see Pakistan genuinely resisting a deepening of trade integration with 
China or resisting the BRI more generally. Indeed, in 2018 Pakistan had an 
annual trade deficit with China of over US$12 billion. This was before the 
second phase of the trade agreement came into effect at the end of 2019 
(Sampson 2020).
Challenges in Trade
One of the driving forces of the BRI was arguably the strategic challenge 
presented by the American-led Trans-Pacif ic Partnership (TPP) (Vines 
2018: 343; Wang 2016). Though this threat to Chinese influence appears to 
have receded, there remain other challenges to the success of the BRI as 
an initiative that serves to expand China’s political influence alongside its 
exports and investments. These challenges can be placed into two categories: 
technical and political.
First, there are a number of technical challenges to the success of the 
BRI. BRI states are becoming increasingly important players in world trade. 
In 2015, they accounted for around 37% of world exports, up from 21% in 
1995. With respect to the global value chain, BRI states tend to be focused on 
exporting mainly intermediate, rather than finished, goods and they account 
for a 42% share of world intermediate exports (Boffa 2018: 5). Yet despite 
the growing importance and interconnectedness of the BRI economies, the 
majority remain developing countries and as such there are still numerous 
technical ineff iciencies that need to be resolved if the BRI is to succeed. 
The customs procedures in many participant countries, for example, are 
still outdated. This is true in all six economic corridors to varying extents. 
In many cases extensive customs documentation is still required for cross-
border trade. This documentation process is also not supported by modern 
ICT infrastructure in a number of locations. In addition, there is a continued 
lack of harmonization of standards both within, as well as between, BRI 
countries (Ramasamy et al. 2017: 42).
Alongside these non-tariff issues, trade barriers between China and many 
BRI participants remain signif icant, particularly in sensitive areas such 
as textiles and agriculture (Cui & Song 2019: 41). The conclusion of further 
trade agreements and increased coordination on trade facilitation will help 
to ameliorate these problems. However, there is still a long way to go in 
this regard. These processes will take time and progress will likely remain 
inconsistent. As an illustration of this, whilst there is evidence that customs 
and border agencies within many BRI countries are improving in terms of 
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eff iciency, performance in some areas has actually declined, specif ically 
on the China-Pakistan and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridors 
(Johns et al. 2018: 31). In all of the main BRI corridors, apart from the New 
Eurasian Land Bridge Corridor, the time that it takes to export and import 
goods is still above the global average. In some corridors, the time taken is 
well above this average (Johns et al. 2018: 29). In terms of eff iciency, trade 
cooperation between BRI countries looks set to lag far behind cooperation 
in North America and Europe for quite some time.
In addition to these tricky and ongoing technical challenges, there are also 
the perhaps more diff icult political and strategic challenges of sustaining 
and deepening trade cooperation between countries with vastly different 
economies, cultures, political systems, and geopolitical interests. There is 
already evidence of pushback in key partner countries such as Pakistan. 
In 2018, for example, Pakistan’s newly elected Prime Minister Imran Kahn 
pledged to renegotiate agreements reached as part of the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) because these ‘unfairly benef it Chinese com-
panies’ (Economic Times 2018).
Driving Factors in Trade
In evaluating the forces driving Beijing’s approach to trade, a distinction 
should be drawn between multilateral cooperation around trade facilita-
tion, which seems to be driven primarily by concerns to minimize the 
transaction costs involved with cross-border trade with BRI partners, 
and China’s bilateral trade cooperation. Particularly in terms of China’s 
bilateral trade agreements, strategic concerns seem to be signif icant, given 
the way in which China’s sequential and drawn out negotiating approach 
increases uncertainty and negotiating costs. China’s agreements often 
do not cover ‘substantially all trade’ with partner countries, and they 
incorporate large lists of exemptions and relatively shallow liberalization 
(Sampson 2019).4 At the same time the negotiations are structured in a 
way that maximizes China’s leverage over time and are often linked to 
security cooperation (the case of Pakistan is a particularly prominent 
illustration of this). If anything, then, China’s trade agreements with BRI 
partners do not substantially reduce uncertainty and often leave much 
to future negotiations.
4 GATT Article XXIV requires that free trade agreements entail ‘duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce […] are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories’.
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Cooperation in Tax
With the BRI, China is strengthening its position as a capital export country 
by facilitating Chinese investment in the countries along the BRI (Europe and 
outside Europe). In order to strengthen this position, China is participating 
in already existing bilateral and multilateral tax initiatives and creating 
new institutional frameworks for BRI countries.
In the past, China focused on attracting investment by multinational 
companies into China, acting as a capital import country. However, the 
benefits of these activities for China’s tax revenue were limited. This was 
due to the excessive number of tax/investment incentives in China and also 
due to ‘base erosion profit shifting’ (BEPS), a term that describes a practice 
where multinationals move their profits to locations with low taxes through 
aggressive tax planning and transfer pricing.
The BRI provides investment opportunities for Chinese companies and 
foreign companies in capital export countries along the BRI. These opportu-
nities are in different sectors such as infrastructure, energy and resources, 
industrial development, and the f inancial sector. These activities will be 
subject to taxation in China and abroad. This means, therefore, that China’s 
network of tax treaties will become relevant to prevent double taxation.
China has concluded more than a hundred bilateral tax treaties to prevent 
double taxation and tax avoidance. Approximately 50 of these tax treaties 
are with BRI countries (Meyer-Nandi et al. 2018). Furthermore, to tackle 
the base erosion prof it shifting (BEPS) practices discussed above, China 
has participated as a member of the G20 in the OECD-G20 BEPS Project.5 
In 2015, the BEPS Project introduced f ifteen Actions to tackle aggressive 
tax planning. These included a ‘Multilateral Convention to Implement 
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Prof it Shifting’ 
(‘Multilateral Instrument’), which has been in force since July 2018. China has 
signed this Multilateral Instrument and has expressed its intention to make 
this instrument applicable to almost all of the bilateral tax treaties that it 
has concluded (102 of 106 of its tax treaties) (OECD 2018a). This Multilateral 
Instrument is still pending ratif ication by China and therefore it has not 
yet entered into force there.6
5 The G20 is a political forum of governments with countries from Asia, North America, the 
Middle East and Europe. Following the 2008 economic crisis, the G20 has set an agenda for a 
higher level of international tax cooperation, e.g. G20 Summits in Los Cabos (Mexico), Washington 
(the United States), London (the United Kingdom) and Pittsburgh (the United States).
6 Status signatories and parties to the BEPS MLI as of 22 July 2020 retrieved 3 August 2020 
from http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf.
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China is also actively taking part in the UN Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters. This committee aims to provide 
solutions to the problems faced by developing countries, including the 
practices of base erosion prof it shifting. In some of the meetings of the 
UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, 
for example, China has indicated that currently it does not have a system 
which quantitatively analyses its base erosion. However, it has also stated 
that: ‘We do f ind, and it is obvious, that the major threat China faces is that 
many [multinational enterprises] have shifted their profits by means of tax 
planning and transfer pricing’ (United Nations 2014: 1).
To address these initiatives in a coordinated way, in 2017 China signed 
a Memorandum of Cooperation (2017) alongside the other member coun-
tries of the BRICS groups of nations.7 The aim of this memorandum is 
to coordinate these nations’ responses in international forums (such 
as the OECD, the United Nations) and to enhance knowledge sharing 
regarding BEPS implementation through the exchange of experiences 
on best practices.
Challenges in Taxation
The following paragraphs will address the challenges faced by China, BRI 
countries, and supranational organizations (such as the EU) in the imple-
mentation of international tax initiatives and BRI. These challenges are 1) 
increasing capacity building of tax administrations to deal with transfer 
pricing and related tax disputes and 2) enhancing transparency and a level 
playing f ield between China and BRI countries.
Despite China’s participation in bilateral and multilateral initiatives, 
China’s tax administration faces challenges implementing measures to 
deal with base erosion profit shifting because of its lack of administrative 
capacities. One challenge is the lack of comparable companies (i.e. a company 
carrying out similar economic/business activities) to make transfer pric-
ing analysis (Avi Yonah & Xu 2017).8 Another challenge is the number of 
tax/investment disputes, leading to uncertainty and unpredictability for 
7 BRICS is an acronym for a group of f ive countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. The main objective is to cooperate to address common problems. Retrieved 3 August 2020 
from https://infobrics.org/.
8 Avi-Yonah and Xu (2017) have stated that ‘Chinese tax authorities makes their judgment 
by auditing MNE groups’ annual f iling and reviewing their contemporaneous documenta-
tion, considering the prof it levels of the industry and comparable companies, and performing 
functional analysis. They then make adjustments as necessary when their judgment is made.’ 
TRade, Tax, and deVeloPMenT FInanCe 69
investment in China (Xu 2018a). In order to address these challenges, the 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT) has introduced new transfer pricing 
regulations and it has created additional resources for dispute settlement 
disputes (MAP and APAs9).
The SAT has introduced a transfer pricing regime that ‘is now a more 
rigorous and comprehensive framework for regulating transfer pricing 
arrangements of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in China, both for 
inbound and outbound activity’ (Cheng et al. 2019; Beng Teoh & Wang 
2019). In addition to this, a third division has been created within the SAT 
to assist in the handling of transfer pricing disputes.10 In this regard, Cheng 
et al. (2019) stated that:
[P]reviously, SAT resources for these matters were stretched, due to 
the commitment of relevant personnel to BEPS meetings from 2013 to 
2015. With the new organizational structure and resources, the SAT has 
begun to deal with a large number of MAP cases as a matter of priority. 
Market intelligence indicates that a number of pending MAP cases have 
been reactivated with the aim of reaching an expedited solution. On the 
APA front, it is expected that the enhanced process introduced by the 
2016 legislation (i.e. Announcement 64) will contribute to more rapid 
programme outcomes; this is important as the number of applications 
continues to increase.
Alongside these changes made by the SAT, to deal with these challenges and 
address the implementation of the BRI, China has launched the Belt and 
Road Initiative Tax Administration Cooperation Mechanism (BRITACOM). 
BRITACOM consists of 34 member countries, eleven countries that are 
observers from different regions (e.g. Asia, Africa, Europe), and one non-profit 
(academic) organization.
However, companies do not disclose the information, and therefore, according to these authors, 
‘it is unrealistic to f ind comparables from the over 2000 listed companies in China’.
9 A mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is a ‘means through which tax administrations consult 
to resolve disputes regarding the application of double tax conventions’. An Advance Pricing 
Agreement (APA) is an ‘arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, 
an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, 
critical assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those 
transactions over a f ixed period of time’. Glossary (OECD 2017: 23, 28).
10 According to Cheng et al. (2019): ‘There had previously been much concern that the backlog 
of MAP cases was affecting the processing of APA applications (MAPs and APAs are dealt with 
by a common team at the SAT level).’
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One of the aims of BRITACOM is to build capacity and to facilitate 
cooperation between the participating countries’ tax administrations. In 
addition, BRITACOM aims to facilitate trade and investment, foster the 
economic growth of the BRI jurisdictions, and contribute to the fulf ilment 
of inclusive and sustainable development as set out in the United Nations’ 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
In April 2019, BRITACOM countries agreed on an Action Plan for 2019-2021. 
According to this Plan, BRITACOM will commit 1) to the dissemination 
of good practices, 2) to identifying emerging issues that require joint ac-
tions, and 3) to seeking innovative solutions through tax administration 
cooperation. Furthermore, BRITACOM will contribute 4) to establishing a 
dialogue with business and 5) to providing more certainty by building a 
knowledge-sharing platform that informs investors of the interpretation 
and application of tax laws. BRITACOM will also 6) conduct research ‘on 
tax certainty to identify problems, seek for solutions, increase predictability 
and consistency in the application of tax laws and tax treaties, as well as in 
tax administration practices’.11
Under the framework of BRITACOM, two new networks have been cre-
ated. The f irst of these is the BRITACOF, which is
a non-prof it off icial event, [which] aims to provide a platform for facili-
tating dialogue, strengthening cooperation in tax administration, and 
improving capacity building for jurisdictions, international organizations, 
academic institutions, businesses and other stakeholders who are willing 
to be involved in tax administration cooperation along the Belt and Road.12
The f irst BRITACOF conference took place in April 2019 and the second will 
take place in May 2021.13
The second network is BRITACEG, which consists of ‘willing Member [tax 
administrations] TAs and Observers of the Council which, making full use of 
their existing training institutions or expertise, are dedicated to conducting 
tax-related training, research and technical assistance programs’.14 Through 
11 Retrieved 3 August 2020 from http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n4260859/c5112272/5112272/
f iles/c0ae127d146f47aab6199320e37aee1d.pdf.
12 Retrieved 3 August 2020 from http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n4154446/common_article.
html.
13 Postponed due to COVID-19. Retrieved 3 August 2020 from http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/
eng/n4260854/c5149476/content.html.
14 Retrieved 3 August 2020 from http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n4154453/common_article.
html.
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this network, training courses, technical assistance, and academic research 
and exchange will be carried out to facilitate tax administration cooperation 
amongst the BRI jurisdictions.
This cooperation established in the Action Plan agreed upon by BRI-
TACOM member countries only started recently (in 2019). It is therefore 
too early to evaluate this framework of cooperation. However, important 
elements addressed in the Action Plan, such as providing certainty for 
investors and facilitating cooperation between tax administrations, also 
need to be reinforced with initiatives to enhance transparency in the 
BRI process for investors outside of China. It is important to consider 
the concerns that have been expressed by the business sector regarding 
bilateral approaches to BRI that can undermine the EU as a business 
partner.
The EU sees the BRI as an opportunity for business in Europe. However, 
there are important changes that need to be made to the BRI in order to 
level the playing f ield between EU and Chinese companies. In an EU-China 
strategic outlook, the EU labelled China
as a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, 
a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to f ind a balance of inter-
ests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, 
and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. (EU 
Commission 2019: 1)
One of the concerns of the EU is with the way in which some EU countries 
have endorsed the BRI. Some EU countries have endorsed the BRI, for in-
stance, under the 17+1 cooperation format signed by twelve EU member states 
and f ive western Balkan states. Others, such as Italy, Poland, and Hungary, 
have endorsed it through the use of a MoU with China.15 The Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) signed between Italy and China, for example, aims 
to advance cooperation in transport, logistic, and infrastructure projects 
in the BRI, to expand trade and investment, and to strengthen bilateral 
communication and coordination on f iscal, f inancial, and structural reform 
policies in order to create a favourable environment for economic and 
f inancial cooperation (Memorandum of Understanding 2019b). However, 
adopting a bilateral position in this way reduces the role that the EU can 
play as a partner when dealing with China in the framework of the BRI (Van 
der Eijk & Pandita Gunavardana 2019).
15 For an analysis of these MoUs, see Okano-Heijmans & Kamo 2019.
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Furthermore, for the EU and business associations there is a general lack 
of transparency in BRI investments that also affects taxation. This was 
highlighted in a recent BusinessEurope report (BusinessEurope 2020). The 
report refers to a 2018 study (Hanemann et al. 2019) that shows how, despite 
the 17+1 cooperation format, ‘Chinese investments in Central and Eastern EU 
Member States have remained low. In 2018, only 2% of all Chinese FDI into 
the EU was invested in Eastern European Member States’ (BusinessEurope 
2020: 151). This report also states that:
A 2018 survey amongst European businesses active in China demonstrated 
that 45% of the businesses do not see any opportunities in participating 
in the BRI. The survey furthermore demonstrated that many European 
companies are excluded from participating in the BRI because of pref-
erential treatment of Chinese contractors, insuff icient information 
available regarding potential projects and a lack of transparency in public 
procurement and tendering. (BusinessEurope 2020: 150)
Following this report, European Commissioner for Trade Phil Hogan 
emphasized the need to reinforce EU competitiveness and to ensure that 
competition is also fair in China and abroad (Hogan 2020). Thus, the benefits 
of the BRI for European business remain to be seen. Therefore, the actual 
commitment to the BRI of those countries that have either signed a MoU 
or endorsed it under a framework of cooperation (17+1) should be closely 
examined.
Chinese companies carrying out BRI activities in the EU can also be 
susceptible to the state aid and (fair competition) tax procedures in the 
EU.16 According to the EU Commission, ‘State aid is defined as an advantage 
in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by 
national public authorities.’17 This advantage may distort fair competition 
and affect trade between EU countries. In 2017, China therefore concluded 
a MoU with the EU concerning dialogue about the state aid control regime 
and the Fair Competition Review System (Memorandum of Understanding 
2019a).
In case that an EU country has provided an advantage to a selective 
group of (Chinese) companies, this advantage will be assessed in light of 
the EU state aid rules. This was the case in 2018, when the EU Commission 
16 For the implications of EU tax rules in China, see Masseglia Miszczyszyn et al. 2020.
17 Retrieved 3 August 2020 from https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/
index_en.html.
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launched a state aid investigation into the Hungarian government’s €45 
million investment aid given to the chemical company BorsodChem Zrt (a 
subsidiary of the Wanhua Industrial Group). In this case, the Commission 
assessed this investment aid based on the Guidelines on Regional State Aid 
for 2014-2020. These guidelines ‘enable member states to support economic 
development and employment in EU’s less developed regions and to foster 
regional cohesion in the Single Market’ (EU Commission 2018). The Com-
mission found that:
Without the public funding, the project would not have been carried 
out in Hungary or any another EU Member State, as it would have been 
cheaper for the beneficiary to continue importing aniline from the group’s 
existing production plants in China. The Commission also found that 
the aid is limited to the minimum necessary to make the project suf-
f iciently prof itable for the company to decide to make the investment. 
(EU Commission 2018)
Blockmans and Hu suggested that with the approval of this investment ‘the 
legal obstacles that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had encountered in 
the single market of the EU were removed to serve the “community interest”’ 
(Blockmans & Hu 2019). They go on to state that:
While the Commission concluded that the investment in BorsodChem 
was not economically sound, it found that the aid would not unduly 
distort competition in the single market but rather help job creation, 
regional development and the attainment of environmental objectives. 
(Blockmans & Hu 2019: 3)
Driving Factors in Tax
China has engaged actively with the OECD and the UN in implementing 
bilateral and multilateral tax initiatives to address international tax coop-
eration. This engagement has included exchanging information, preventing 
double taxation, and tackling aggressive tax planning. These initiatives 
are also of importance in the BRI since investors in the BRI will also have 
to deal with international taxation. Furthermore, in the framework of 
the BRI, China has set up an institutional framework for cooperation 
between BRI tax administrations, namely the BRITACOM and the two 
additional networks BRITACOF and BRITACEG. By contributing to these 
international initiatives and setting up its own institutional cooperation 
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framework, China aims to foster economic growth, facilitate international 
tax cooperation, and assist BRI partners as they build capacities in their 
tax administrations.
Following these developments, it may be argued that China has engaged in 
these multilateral tax initiatives because of eff iciency concerns – to reduce 
transactions costs by increasing cooperation between tax administrations 
participating in BRITACOM, and to increase the administrative capacity of 
the Chinese State Administration of Taxation (SAT) in dealing with transfer 
pricing disputes.
For some researchers and government off icials (Blockmans & Hu 2019), 
the BRI also appears to be a grand geopolitical strategy from China. This 
view holds that China seeks to achieve strategic aims by introducing its 
own mechanisms of cooperation with some EU countries. A number of 
problematic elements of the BRI are highlighted by countries and businesses. 
One is that it is neither clear nor transparent what benefits the BRI provides 
for participating countries. For instance, one concern from the EU regards 
China’s use of MoUs, as well as certain other mechanisms of cooperation 
(such as the 17+1) with some EU countries. This diminishes the role of the 
EU as a partner in the BRI and increases the perception that EU businesses 
participating in the BRI lack an equal playing f ield when it comes to its 
benefits. Therefore, the challenge for China is to demonstrate that the BRI 
does not just bring economic benefits and increased investment for Chinese 
companies but also for foreign companies based in participating countries.
Cooperation in Development Finance
A wide range of development f inance institutions are involved in BRI 
projects. They perform two main functions: f inancing and project manage-
ment. These two functions are not exclusive from each other, because good 
project management ensures f inancial returns, and the two together form a 
sustainable mechanism of development f inance. Several domestic Chinese 
institutions play a key role in f inancing and managing BRI projects. These 
institutions include policy banks and state-owned commercial banks, 
sovereign wealth funds and state-owned investment companies, as well as 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). They are aligned with China’s state strategy 
for the medium- and long-term development and they function as the state’s 
f inancial tools for overseas development projects. Apart from the Silk Road 
Fund, most of these institutions were already active in overseas investment 
before the BRI was announced.
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Meanwhile, China has engaged in new MDFIs in order to strengthen BRI 
cooperation. In 2016, China led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), which focuses on long-term infrastructure develop-
ment in Asia. AIIB projects often share common geographical locations and 
development objectives with BRI projects. In addition, the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance is in the process of establishing the Multilateral Cooperation 
Center for Development Finance (MCDF). This is an institution that supports 
and coordinates BRI cooperation and in which the members (other than 
the ministry itself) are all MDFIs. This raises two questions: First, why does 
China engage with multilateral institutions despite the greater convenience 
of using domestic agencies for achieving BRI objectives through bilateral 
investment? Second, has China’s multilateral institutional approach been 
driven primarily by strategic or eff iciency concerns?
The Chinese policy banks and state-owned commercial banks are the 
most important f inanciers of the BRI. They provide f inance for Chinese 
SOEs and foreign governments and corporations that are involved in BRI 
projects. The China Development Bank (CDB) is the world’s largest develop-
ment bank by total assets, and it is also one of the most active f inancial 
creditors of energy and infrastructure projects under the BRI (Carrai 2018; 
Sanderson & Forsythe 2013). By March 2019, the CDB had directly provided 
f inancing of over US$190 billion for more than 600 BRI projects (Reuters 
2019). Meanwhile, the loans provided by the Export-Import Bank of China 
(Eximbank) for the BRI amounted to a combined value of US$149 billion 
by April 2019 (Xinhua 2019a). Unlike the CDB, Eximbank also provides 
concessional loans and export buyer’s credit for the countries that are 
involved in the BRI (Zhang 2018).
China’s state-owned commercial banks, led by the ‘Big Four’ – the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, 
the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China – are also active 
f inanciers of BRI projects. This is especially the case for the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China and the Bank of China, which by April 2019 
had respectively provided more than US$130 billion and US$100 billion 
for BRI projects (Xinhua 2019b). The Big Four have also initiated varied 
programmes in BRI countries based on their expertise. For example, the Bank 
of China has issued the largest amount of BRI-themed bonds to raise low-cost 
funding for medium- and long-term projects (Zhang 2019; Jiang 2019). The 
Agricultural Bank of China has particularly supported Chinese agricultural 
corporations to ‘go out’ and pursue overseas mergers and acquisitions as 
well as other forms of international cooperation (Trade Finance 2019). The 
China Construction Bank has developed various f inancial products to match 
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the needs of infrastructural projects at different stages of construction. 
Meanwhile, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has initiated 
the Belt and Road Inter-bank Regular Cooperation Mechanism that brings 
together 94 f inancial institutions from 51 countries for co-f inancing and 
other forms of collaboration (Hu at al. 2019).
Another source of f inancing for BRI projects is the Silk Road Fund. This 
is a medium- and long-term development and investment fund, established 
based on the investment from a number of state agencies. The fund carries 
out equity and debt investment for infrastructure, resources and energy 
development, industrial capacity cooperation and f inancial cooperation 
under the BRI and it also invests in other funds. Meanwhile, China Invest-
ment Corporation is a sovereign wealth fund responsible for managing part 
of China’s enormous exchange reserves. It has increased its investment in 
the BRI regions, especially focusing on ‘new infrastructure projects’ such as 
telecommunication and digitalization (China News 2019). A further provider 
of funding for BRI projects is CITIC Group, a Chinese state-owned investment 
company. The company was actively engaged in overseas investment before 
the BRI was announced and it has developed further business interests in 
BRI countries since 2013.
SOEs are technically not development f inance institutions, but they 
channel f inance and operate projects in a wide range of BRI countries. 
They are arguably the most important participants of the BRI. So far, 81 
central SOEs have carried out more than 3400 BRI projects, including more 
than 60% of all the infrastructure projects under the BRI. They are the 
main project operators and investors in large infrastructure and energy 
projects (China Economic Net 2016; Xu 2020). The SOEs’ BRI investments are 
mostly funded by Chinese policy banks and state-owned commercial banks. 
Although private companies are increasingly encouraged to participate in 
BRI projects, SOEs remain the dominant players in these projects thanks 
to their privilege in accessing state support.
The AIIB was proposed by the Chinese government in the same year as 
the BRI, namely 2013. It was initially aimed at mobilizing Asian savings and 
foreign exchange reserves to f ill the gap in Asian countries’ demand for 
infrastructure f inance (ADB & ADBI 2009). As more non-Asian members 
joined the bank, it became a truly global-scale multilateral development 
bank (MDB) that devotes itself to long-term infrastructure development. 
Nevertheless, China remains the dominant shareholder in the AIIB. As 
a multilateral institution, the AIIB does not directly f inance China’s BRI 
projects. These projects are typically sponsored by Chinese agencies, either 
solely or jointly with other government or private investors, and are operated 
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by Chinese companies as primary contractors. However, the projects funded 
by the AIIB have geographical overlaps with the BRI projects and also 
share the common objective of improving infrastructure foundations and 
cross-border connectivity. It is fair to say that the AIIB and the BRI both 
reflect China’s ambition for overseas expansion through infrastructure 
f inancing. China’s participation in the AIIB shows its demand for a larger 
voice in the Asian regional governance of development f inance, especially in 
terms of allocating financial resources and setting up rules for infrastructure 
development. The AIIB is also expected to stimulate a vibrant market and 
active government administrations for development f inance in Asia, which 
would largely benefit the BRI. Other institutions, such as the BRICS New 
Development Bank as well as a potential development bank and fund that 
may be formed under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, are also 
seen as possible supporting multilateral institutions for the BRI (Xinhua 
2018; Carrai 2018).
The MCDF was announced by China’s Ministry of Finance in 2017. It is 
intended to provide a multilateral effort to support and coordinate BRI 
cooperation. So far, eight MDFIs have answered the Ministry’s call and 
signed the MoU for establishing the Cooperation Centre. These include 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the AIIB, the Corporación Andina de 
Fomento, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the World Bank.18 At 
the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, President 
Xi Jinping endorsed the MCDF as a potentially key supporting institution 
for the BRI (You 2019). It has been conf irmed that the AIIB will be the 
secretariat of the MCDF. According to the MoU, the MCDF will have three 
main functions:
1 Information sharing: to facilitate the f low of information across the 
parties and other development partners in order to avoid duplication 
and enhance collaboration.
2 Capacity building: to enhance relevant know-how and institutional 
capacity of development countries and their development partners 
in […] investment climate, transparent and sustainable debt manage-
ment, open procurement, environmental and social frameworks, and 
anti-corruption.
18 Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration on Matters to Establish the Multilateral 
Cooperation Center for Development Finance, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/
partnership/_download/collaboration-on-matters.pdf.
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3 Project preparation: to f inance upstream activities including […] 
pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and environmental and social 
assessment.19
These functions reflect the Chinese government’s desire for better informa-
tion and knowledge about its BRI partners, higher host country institutional 
capacity, and multilateral assistance in project preparation. These things are 
currently inadequate in many of the BRI operations, something that reveals 
the problems and challenges that exist with the BRI’s current development 
f inance mechanisms.
Challenges in Development Finance
As the BRI has grown to become China’s grand strategy for economic 
expansion, its projects have faced increasing challenges that erode their 
f inancial returns. Although the BRI could create signif icant long-term 
benefits for China and its partners, numerous projects are currently facing 
f inancial losses and several have been halted indefinitely (Greer 2018).20 An 
OECD report indicated that, between 2005 and 2018, Chinese investors were 
associated with US$101.8 billion of troubled assets in BRI regions (OECD 
2018b).21 Loans made to several countries could not be repaid and China 
was accused of aggravating these countries’ debt burdens (Abi-Habib 2018; 
Masood 2019; Weinland 2017; Wharton Knowledge podcast 2019; Hurley et 
al. 2018). This has created mounting operational risks for Chinese SOEs and 
f inancial risks for the Chinese banks.22
The challenges faced by Chinese financiers are multifaceted. First, returns 
on investment are associated with host countries’ political, economic, and 
security conditions. These conditions are known to be volatile in many BRI 
countries. The former head of Eximbank, Li Ruogu, warned that many BRI 
host countries were not creditworthy (Li & Wang 2018). Chinese investors 
are often inadequately prepared for the complex political structures and 
problems of host countries. These can include such things as a central-local 
19 Ibid.
20 Greer pointed out that ‘270 BRI infrastructure projects in the region (or 32% of the total 
value of the whole) have been put on hold because of problems with practicality or f inancial 
viability’.
21 ‘Troubled’ means: the collateral value of the investment is below its liabilities; loans are not 
performing; the deal has been cancelled for delays in reviews or political opposition, and so on.
22 CDB’s non-performance loans have increased according to its 2018 annual report. (CDB 
2018).
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division, f ierce competition among local regions, inconsistency between dif-
ferent elected governments, and corruption (Arduino & Cainey 2019). Many 
BRI countries also tend to have weak industrial foundations, for example, 
low labour productivity, energy inadequacy, and low eff iciency. They also 
tend to have poorer investment environments when compared to developed 
economies, as well as large debt issues (Jamal 2017; Arduino & Cainey 2019). 
In 2017, the sovereign debt of 27 of the countries participating in BRI was 
rated as ‘junk’ by the three main rating agencies – Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch Group. Another fourteen participating countries were 
either not rated or had withdrawn their requests for ratings (Deloitte Insights 
2018). Several BRI projects have also been interrupted by security threats in 
the host countries. These features create extra risks. Chinese investors can 
rush into locking in deals, based on a benign diplomatic relationship with 
the host countries, without thorough due diligence or adequate pre-project 
viability analysis. In addition, since the Chinese investors tend to adopt a 
‘non-interference’ approach and distance themselves from host countries’ 
local politics, they may be less responsive to the problems that emerge 
during projects (Russel & Berger 2019).
Second, some BRI projects face strong resistance from the local communi-
ties in host countries. Infrastructure projects often incur negative social 
and environmental impacts, especially regarding land acquisition, migrant 
compensation, and labour abuse (Reed & Hille 2019). In some cases, f inancial 
compensation is inadequate for migrants, who are forced to move and lose 
their means of living and social facilities to infrastructure projects. In such 
cases, Chinese investors’ capacity to carry out environmental and social 
management can be challenged and questioned. Some Chinese overseas 
infrastructure projects have been criticized for lacking environmental and 
social conflict research and management (Russel & Berger 2019; Gransow & 
Price 2018). They have also received criticism for dismissing communication 
with the media, non-governmental organizations, ethnical minorities, and 
the lower strata population in the host countries (Jiang 2014). A report by 
the environmental organization Friends of the Earth International has indi-
cated that the ‘mining, oil and gas, large-scale hydropower and large-scale 
agriculture sectors in which CDB invests carry tremendous environmental 
and social risk’ (Friends of the Earth 2012). Some improvements have recently 
been made to how both Chinese banks and SOEs approach environmental 
and social management, but further measures are needed.23
23 For example, the CDB publishes its environmental policy and performance data, participates 
in international initiatives to improve its environmental and social performance and f inances 
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Third, China’s ambitious BRI, as a grand strategy for the outward eco-
nomic expansion, has caused anxiety in its regional competitors, such as 
India and Japan. India sees China’s BRI projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
and Bangladesh as a threat to its leadership in the South Asian regional 
economic and security orders. It has been sceptical about the BRI from the 
early days and refused to sign a BRI MoU (Kamdar 2019; Economic Times 
2019b). Japan was the sole Asian regional leader in development f inance 
for a long time after the Second World War, as well as the largest regional 
aid provider. Unsurprisingly therefore, the possibility that China may take 
over regional development f inance leadership through the BRI has not 
been well received in Japan and it has refused to join the China-led AIIB 
(Pesek 2019). Territorial disputes with China, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute between China and Japan and the recent disputes between 
China and India near Tibet and on the disputed Doklam plateau, have 
further dissuaded both Asian powers from endorsing the BRI. The BRI 
has also caused uneasiness in the West (Economic Times 2019a; Balding 
2018). US and European governments and companies have criticized the 
Chinese state’s intervention in BRI projects and Chinese SOEs’ dominance 
in these projects on the grounds that they cause unfair competition and 
erode the benefits of non-Chinese partners (Chance 2016). The US is wary 
about China’s rise, especially when this rise is achieved through economic 
links with some of the US-dominated regions, such as the Middle East and 
Latin America. The US has therefore refused to hail the Chinese leadership 
in development f inance and rejected the AIIB. As discussed above, the EU 
sees some potential benefits of the BRI but has been cautious about China’s 
engagement with Central and Eastern European countries and its impact on 
European integration (Kynge & Peel 2017). Overall, tensions between China 
and other great powers have created large obstacles for the BRI.
Last but not least, the growth of the Chinese economy has slowed since 
2008. This slowdown has also been accompanied by mounting corporate and 
local government debts, decreasing foreign exchange reserves, and worsening 
f inancial instability (Bloomberg 2017). The Chinese government tightened 
controls on overseas investment in 2016 as capital f light increased and the 
renewable energy projects (Friends of the Earth 2012). The Chinese State Council now holds 
SOE managers responsible for their bad investment decisions, and disciplinary actions could 
be taken against them even after they retire (Thomas & Price 2017). In November 2017, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission issued its f irst regulations for China’s policy banks, 
emphasizing greater risk controls for their overseas activities (Wu & Jia 2017). In August 2018, 
Beijing issued policy papers to its SOEs involved in BRI projects regarding issues such as due 
diligence, project feasibility and ongoing operations (Deloitte Insights 2018).
TRade, Tax, and deVeloPMenT FInanCe 81
domestic economic slowdown continued (Reuters 2017). Since most of the 
BRI projects are f inanced by Chinese capital, a further economic slowdown 
in China may weaken the state’s capacity to support the BRI. On the other 
hand, this makes good investment decisions and project management 
urgently important for Chinese f inanciers and projects operators (SOEs).
Driving Factors in Development Finance
Based on the examples of the AIIB and the MCDF, China’s engagement with 
multilateral development f inance institutions to smooth BRI cooperation 
is motivated by both eff iciency and strategic concerns.
The MCDF’s institutional design and its functions reveal China’s concerns 
with the eff iciency issues of existing BRI projects. Other than the Chinese 
Ministry of Finance itself, all the other MCDF members are MDFIs. China 
has had satisfactory collaboration with all these institutions. Among oth-
ers, China has signif icantly benef ited from the f inancial and technical 
assistance of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in the past 
four decades. These multilateral institutions have rich experience and 
substantial institutional capacity in dealing with the issues of development 
projects. They hire a large number of development experts to work on project 
preparation and post-investment management. The staff members in these 
institutions move internally between different regional and thematical 
departments, creating a vibrant internal knowledge and expertise mobility. 
Most of the MDFIs also have an in-house research department that focuses 
on in-depth studies of a wide range of development issues and provides 
intellectual support for their policy decisions. Therefore, they have developed 
a rather comprehensive understanding of developing regions, including 
many BRI countries.
The MDFIs have developed advanced practices to ensure the eff iciency 
of development projects. For example, the public procurement guidelines 
of the World Bank and other MDBs encourage the use of competition in the 
allocation of contracts through open tendering, indicate clear evaluation 
criteria for determining the winning bid, and prevent collusion between 
bidders. Compared to the MDB guidelines, China’s domestic Government 
Procurement Law and Bidding Law tend to support the award of BRI con-
tracts to preferred Chinese suppliers (Ghossein et al. 2018), which constrains 
the allocative eff iciency of BRI projects in the long run. Moreover, MDFIs 
often play a leading role in the area of environmental and social manage-
ment. For example, both the World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation have developed industry-specif ic social and environmental 
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guidelines. The Equator Principles, prominent risk management guidelines 
for f inancial institutions, were based on the International Finance Corpora-
tion’s environmental and social policy frameworks. However, the Chinese 
policy banks lag behind their international peers: the CDB and Eximbank did 
not join the Equator Principles and they have not adopted widely accepted 
guidelines for a grievance mechanism either (Suzuki 2007; Gallagher 2016). 
The MDFIs also work more closely with the media and non-governmental 
organizations, whose voices are crucial for a successful development project. 
All in all, the MCDF, through information sharing, capacity building, and 
project preparation, is expected to bring together experienced and capable 
MDFIs to help China f ight the challenges it faces in BRI projects so that 
it can avoid loss and/or maximize the return on investments. Hence, the 
MCDF answers to China’s eff iciency concerns.
In addition, by establishing and participating in multilateral institutions 
like the AIIB and MCDF, China can strengthen its influence in rule setting 
and decision making in the area of development f inance in general and in 
BRI countries in particular. The AIIB’s institutional innovations, such as the 
sole focus on infrastructure development, the non-resident board of direc-
tors, and the simplif ied project preparation procedures (compared to the 
World Bank), reflect China’s preferred alternative approach to multilateral 
development f inance compared to the traditionally Western-led MDBs. The 
MCDF’s institutional set-up, where there are MDFIs instead of sovereign 
states as members, also allows China to avoid direct confrontations with its 
regional and global great-power rivals in discussion of the BRI. The US has 
been vigilant about the World Bank joining China’s multilateral initiative 
for supporting the BRI, but it cannot directly intervene in the interactions 
between the bank and China under the MCDF set-up. Therefore, China’s 
multilateral approach to BRI cooperation, through the AIIB and MCDF, is 
also driven by strategic concerns.
Conclusion
In dealing with the varied challenges of the BRI, the Chinese government 
lacks an integral governance framework that systemically coordinates all 
the relevant institutions. Instead, it has developed different institutional 
approaches in various issue areas. Our analysis shows that Beijing’s in-
stitutional approaches in the issue areas of trade, tax, and development 
f inance are driven by two main concerns: 1) an ‘eff iciency concern’ to 
reduce transaction costs and maximize economic advantages in BRI 
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cooperation; and 2) a ‘strategic concern’ to strengthen China’s strategic 
position in the governance of BRI affairs. By taking a closer look at each 
issue area, we f ind that eff iciency and strategic concerns drive Beijing 
to make different institutional choices even within the same issue area 
(see f igure 3.1).
On the spectrum of factors driving China’s institutional approach, 
we conclude that the design of its various bilateral and regional trade 
agreements is driven primarily by strategic considerations. We reach 
this conclusion for two reasons. First, the BRI itself was at least partially 
devised as a response to the challenge of the Trans-Pacif ic Partnership 
(TPP), which, given its exclusion of China, Beijing perceived as a threat to 
its regional influence. Second, China’s approach to trade deals with BRI 
partner countries, beginning with shallow and limited agreements that 
are subsequently expanded in numerous rounds of negotiations over many 
years, has a number of consequences. It maximizes the opportunity costs 
resulting from the lack of an initially comprehensive deal, it increases 
uncertainty, and it raises negotiation costs. At the same time this approach 
maximizes China’s bargaining power as the dependence of its trade partners 
grows. In contrast, the multilateral cooperation around trade facilitation 
seems to be driven primarily by eff iciency concerns, namely a concern to 
minimize the costs of cross-border trade with BRI partners. The efforts on 
this front, however, are piecemeal and slow, with limited results, largely 
due to capacity constraints in partner countries.
The tax institutions of the BRI meanwhile are driven by the need for 
reduction of transaction costs accompanied by a desire to create a competing 
24 Intra-African trade (def ined as average of intra-African exports and imports) around 2% 
(2015-2017) vs. America (47%), Asia (61%), Europe (67%) and Oceania (7%) – UNCTAD.
Figure 3.1 Dominant drivers of China’s institutional approach by issue area
Source: author’s compilation of data from unCTad.24
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regulatory model that can challenge dominant Western approaches. The 
use of MoUs and cooperation mechanisms (the BRITACOM, and the 17+1 
cooperation in the EU) has shown China’s interest in dealing with the BRI 
in accordance with the needs of China’s businesses. This is mainly due to 
eff iciency concerns. However, there are also some strategic reasons behind 
these choices, since China has chosen to deal directly with EU countries 
rather than with the EU as a whole. This has created uncertainty in the EU 
and among EU businesses about whether the benefits of the BRI are only for 
Chinese investors or also for EU investors. China will need to address these 
concerns and ensure that the BRI provides clear benefits for all countries 
involved.
In the governance of development f inance, China’s engagement with the 
MCDF and the AIIB is motivated by both eff iciency and strategic concerns. 
By establishing the MCDF, Beijing hopes to bring together experienced 
and capable MDFIs. These can help China f ight the challenges it faces in 
BRI projects so that it can avoid f inancial loss and/or maximize return on 
investments. Hence, the MCDF answers to China’s eff iciency concerns. 
Meanwhile, through participating in China-dominated multilateral insti-
tutions like the AIIB and MCDF, Beijing aims to strengthen its inf luence 
in rule setting and decision making in the area of development f inance. 
This ref lects China’s strategic concerns in BRI cooperation. That being 
said, since the AIIB has only been operational since 2016, and the MCDF 
has not yet started operating, their long-term impacts on BRI remain to 
be seen.
Attempts to answer questions about what factors drive China’s approach 
to the BRI have often been too imprecise to be useful. By focusing on specific 
sub-areas within the broader BRI project in this chapter, it is clear that the 
factors driving China’s policy differ in important ways across issue areas. 
We conclude that analyses that fail to recognize this complex reality are 
likely to draw flawed inferences regarding the complex motivations driving 
China’s behaviour when it comes to the BRI.
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4 The BRI in Latin America
New Wine in Old Bottle?
Matt Ferchen1
Abstract
Chapter 4 examines the role of the BRI in relations with Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Prior to 2017, Chinese off icials rejected the idea that 
these regions were part of the BRI. While the BRI was geographically 
expansive, the Western Hemisphere appeared beyond its scope. However, 
in 2017, China started to sign BRI memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and 
BRI-related deals with governments in Central America, the Caribbean, 
and South America. This expansion of the BRI to the region occurred as 
the US began a concerted pushback against Chinese dealmaking and 
influence. This chapter offers an overview of the BRI’s still-short history 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. It analyses what the BRI means in 
the context of China’s developing country diplomacy in the region, and 
how it is playing out against widening US-China strategic rivalry.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, South America, Caribbean, 
Central America, agency
Latin America has been, and continues to be, an outlier in terms of its 
relationship to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, Latin 
America has rarely appeared on the wide array of BRI maps produced inside 
1 Unlike some of the other chapters in this study, the author did not conduct f ield work for 
this chapter. He has, however, worked extensively on the Latin America-China relationship 
since 2008. In addition to publishing academic and policy research on a range of China-Latin 
America issues, he also taught courses on China-Latin America relations and Latin American 
political economy in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University from 2008 
to 2017. The author wishes to thank Lily Sprangers and Florian Schneider for their thoughtful 
feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter and chapter 10 and for support throughout the project.
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or outside of China. Latin America also did not feature in the original rollout 
of the New Silk Road concept or subsequent formulations explaining the 
combination of maritime and land-based corridors. The BRI has become 
known for its geographic expansiveness and overall programmatic ambigu-
ity, inclusive not just of wide swaths of Asia but also Africa and Europe and 
even the Arctic (see the Polar Silk Road). However, the exclusion of the 
entire Western Hemisphere, including Latin America and the Caribbean, 
had long been a clear exception. Since around 2017, however, this has all 
changed. Almost 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
are now at least signatories to BRI memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
and/or are actively exploring BRI-branded projects.2
Yet to understand where the Latin America and the Caribbean region 
f its in the context of the BRI requires taking a step back to the decade 
prior to the introduction of the BRI itself. The diplomatic and commercial 
relationship between China and Latin America and the Caribbean re-
ally took off in the period around 2003-2004, based in no small part on 
a China-led commodity boom that saw the rapid expansion of Chinese 
demand for South American raw materials (Ferchen 2011). The contours 
of the relationship between China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
that were established during that time – the potential, the challenges, 
the disappointments – all set the tone for discussions today of the BRI in 
the region. In particular, concerns about commodity dependence and the 
unsustainable environmental and social impacts of ties between China 
and Latin America and the Caribbean, all of which were already clear well 
before the rollout of the BRI, have only been accentuated by the extension 
of the BRI to the region. At the same time, hopes that China would become 
a stable, long-term development partner for the region have also received 
a boost from the BRI’s arrival.
Therefore, familiarity with the history of Latin America and the Carib-
bean’s relations with China is key to any understanding of how the BRI is 
being rolled out and responded to inside and outside the region. In addition, 
because this history is so foundational to any understanding of where the BRI 
f its into the broader relationship between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, it is also important to ask how the extension of the BRI to Latin 
2 As will become apparent in the body of this chapter, the LAC region’s diversity has important 
implications for trade and investment relations with China. While South America was the 
focal point for most commodity-based trade and investment relations in the period before the 
extension of the BRI to the region, it is largely the Caribbean and Central America where most 
BRI-related activity has been focused in the years since 2017.
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America and the Caribbean does or does not change the broader economic 
and political patterns that had already come to def ine the relationship.
Against this backdrop a key question is: What, if anything, is signif icant 
and new in the relationship between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a result of the introduction of the BRI? The answer is that in 
many ways the introduction of the BRI to Latin America and the Caribbean 
has not fundamentally altered structural patterns already at play since the 
early 1990s. However, the BRI’s introduction to the region has accentuated 
some of these patterns, including a growing wariness of China’s presence 
in the region by the United States.
In a way signif icant to the broader comparative study of the BRI, the 
combination of hope and disappointment about the potential of China’s 
developmental role in Latin America and the Caribbean is mirrored in 
other BRI regions like Africa and South and Southeast Asia. This is no 
coincidence. Prior to the introduction of the BRI, Latin America and the 
Caribbean had already become an important part of China’s broader 
developing-country diplomacy and commercial outreach (Eisenman & 
Heginbotham 2018). Africa, in particular, has been the other core element 
of China’s twenty-f irst-century developing country diplomacy, a region that 
has long been at the heart of China’s longer standing efforts to be seen as a 
leader and representative of the ‘Third World’ (Strauss 2009).3 In this regard, 
key features and challenges of the developmental relationship between 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean, including trade dependency, 
debt sustainability, and environmental and social impact issues, have also 
appeared prominently in the analytical and policy debates surrounding 
the impact of the BRI in regions covered in other chapters of this study. 
One question that emerges from this chapter, then, is: What lessons are or 
are not being learned in a comparative context across BRI countries and 
regions that share similar developmental challenges and aspirations in 
their ties to China?
Relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean: 
The BRI’s Pre-history
At least a decade before the BRI was introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013, 
resource-rich countries in South America had already begun to experience 
3 For an excellent overview of the Mao-era roots of China’s efforts to vie for symbolic and 
revolutionary leadership of the ‘Third World’, see Friedman (2015).
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a boom in exports to China. Even within South America, this trade-based 
take-off in relations with China was concentrated in a relatively small 
number of countries and commodity types. Countries rich in minerals 
such as copper (Chile) and iron ore (Brazil), agricultural resources such 
as soy (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), and fossil fuels such as oil and gas 
(Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela) all quickly saw China become a number 
one or number two export partner in the years after 2003 (Gallagher 2016). 
Booming, commodity-based trade relations were also accompanied by a 
f lurry of high-level diplomatic exchanges, highlighted by then-President 
of China Hu Jintao’s signature visit to Brazil in 2004. These diplomatic 
exchanges were part of a renewed Chinese effort to reinvigorate ties to 
developing countries, including those in Africa and Asia (Eisenman & 
Heginbotham 2018).
Geopolitically, the take-off in China’s commodity-based trade relations 
with South America also coincided with the rise of the ‘New Left’ in some 
of China’s newly rediscovered trade partners. This included, most notably, 
the coming to power of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and of Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela (Schamis 2006). In the decade after 2003, China’s 
rapidly expanding trade and investment ties throughout South America 
were not primarily determined by political considerations. However, China 
did establish especially close bilateral political ties with some New Left 
leaders in the region (for example, Chavez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador) and also played up a kind of emerging market solidarity with others 
(for example, with Brazil and the other countries of the BRICS grouping, 
Russia, India, and South Africa).
Yet this boom in China-South America trade and diplomatic relations 
did not play out in the same way in other parts of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Notably, Mexico and countries in Central America and the 
Caribbean, which did not possess the same kinds of commodity endowments 
as their South America neighbours, did not experience the same kind of 
export-driven trade boom with China. Mexico, the second-largest economy 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, has experienced relations with China 
that have been distinctly more competitive, and less ‘complementary’, than 
those of most of its South American counterparts (Dussel Peters 2015). 
Even though Mexico has signif icant oil resources, its trade relationship 
with China has not been characterized by buoyant commodity exports to 
China, but instead by competition with China for assembly and export to 
third markets, including the United States. Moreover, Mexico’s competitive 
trade relationship with China, including Mexican concerns about a large and 
sustained trade def icit with China, has also limited the kind of diplomatic 
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amity that accompanied the trade-based boom in China-South America 
relations.
Although not as competitive as the Mexico-China relationship, the 
Spanish-speaking countries of Central America, as well as the relatively 
small, diverse countries of the Caribbean, also generally found themselves 
searching for viable sources of goods or services exports to China. This 
was even as they saw both the commercial and diplomatic potential of 
the expanded ties between their South American neighbours and China. 
In part because of the smaller size and relatively lower levels of economic 
development in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as the fact that 
many countries in the region recognized Taiwan rather than the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), China’s stadium and road building, as well as gener-
ally more ‘aid’-based activities, were a distinctive and prominent feature 
of its approach to the region prior to the introduction of the BRI (DeHart 
2018). Overall, then, it is clear that in the years prior to the introduction of 
the BRI, South America was the region of Latin America and the Caribbean 
with the most dynamic economic and diplomatic relations with China.
If much of the dynamism and optimism of the boom years in rela-
tions between China and Latin America and the Caribbean was based in 
commodity-exporting South America, then many of the challenges and 
concerns were also concentrated there. China insisted on the ‘win-win’ 
benef its of commercial ‘complementarity’ (i.e. South America had the 
natural resources China needed). However, at least some South American 
governments and multilateral institutions worried, even during the height 
of the commodity boom, that the trade relationship with China looked 
uncomfortably similar to ‘dependent’ trade relations between Latin America 
and the Caribbean and North America or Europe in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Ferchen 2011; Stallings 2020). Dilma Rousseff, newly 
inaugurated as Brazil’s president in 2011, thus felt compelled to insist that 
Brazil-China relations move ‘beyond complementarity’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2011).
Whereas China’s ability to maintain strong demand for South American 
commodities in the wake of the 2008/2009 f inancial crisis helped the region 
weather the crisis relatively well, the subsequent end of the China-led 
‘commodity super cycle’, beginning around 2013, has meant that at least 
some fears of a boom-bust trade cycle have been borne out (Ferchen 2015). 
Countries such as Venezuela demonstrate this dynamic most clearly: China-
Venezuela trade and diplomatic relations blossomed at the height of the 
commodity boom, but have run into extreme diff iculties in the wake of 
Venezuela’s ongoing post-commodity boom economic and political crisis. 
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Venezuela also highlights how patterns of off icial Chinese state lending 
to some resource-rich Latin American countries at the height of the boom 
presaged some of the broader BRI-related concerns about the sustainability 
of Chinese ‘development’ lending in other regions as well (Ferchen 2018).
Thus, even if the boom years in the South America-China relationship were 
not altogether smooth, then the post-boom period has caused a good deal 
of reflection about what can and should sustain the economic and political 
relationship in a more stable and equitable way. Moreover, if there were 
challenges in the commodity-based, South America-China relationship, the 
countries of the Caribbean (see Gonzalez-Vicente, Chapter 7 in this volume) 
and Central America, as well as Mexico, were still left wondering how they 
could better link their own development and even diplomatic options to 
China. For some, the BRI has emerged as a symbol of a possible path forward. 
However, given the slow and tentative pace of China’s willingness to extend 
the BRI to Latin America and the Caribbean, at least initially, and given the 
already clear and entrenched relationships between China and the region in 
the years directly before the launch of the BRI, the transformational potential 
of the BRI has so far remained limited at best. Yet surprisingly, it is in the 
Caribbean and Central America where the BRI has so far gained momentum.
The BRI Finally Arrives: 2017 and New, Tentative Rollout of the 
BRI in the Americas
For more than three years after the BRI was f irst introduced in 2013, there 
was much speculation among observers of relations between China and Latin 
America and the Caribbean about whether, and when, the initiative would be 
extended to the Americas.4 In September 2013, Xi Jinping introduced what 
would become known as the BRI in Kazakhstan, where it was formulated as 
the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’. Shortly afterward, in Indonesia, Xi announced 
plans for the ‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’. These introductions of the 
BRI highlighted that both the maritime and continental components of the 
BRI would be, at least initially, focused on China’s Southeast and Central 
Asian neighbourhoods. Subsequent formulations of the BRI extended its 
4 Based in Beijing from 2004 to 2017, the author participated in scores of academic, think tank, 
government and business community discussions among Chinese and LAC region participants 
about the China-Latin America relationship. Beginning around 2014, as the BRI concept picked 
up momentum, a common theme at such discussions was whether and when the BRI would be 
extended to Latin America and the Caribbean.
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geographic scope to Africa and then on to Europe, as a f inal destination for 
the convergence of both maritime and continental components. A much-
cited off icial statement, published in 2015 by the National Development and 
Reform Commission and describing the aims of the BRI, stated: ‘The Belt 
and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European 
and African continents and their adjacent seas’ (NDRC 2015). The document 
therefore clearly omits the entire Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, the 
most recent 2016 off icial Chinese foreign policy document, or ‘white paper’, 
on relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean, makes 
no mention of the BRI (State Council 2016). Clearly, as expansive, ambigu-
ous, and often open-ended as the BRI has been, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region appears to at least initially have been seen by Chinese 
off icials as simply beyond the project’s core scope.
Yet in 2017 this all began to change. One important symbolic precursor to 
the rollout of the BRI in the region took place at the inaugural BRI forum in 
Beijing. There, Xi Jinping, speaking with then Argentine President Mauricio 
Macri, noted that the Latin America and Caribbean region was a ‘natural 
extension’ of the Maritime Silk Road (Barrios 2017). Similar off icial Chinese 
statements began to note that some countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean could be important ‘nodes’ in the BRI network. Such comments 
were further bolstered by a ‘Special Declaration on the Belt and Road’, which 
was signed by off icials from China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
at the f irst China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) Ministerial Summit in January 2018.5
These symbolic, yet often still vague, statements indicated that both China 
and some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were beginning 
to consider forms of participation under the rubric of the BRI. However, 
the truly catalytic BRI activities in the region began with a series of BRI-
themed diplomatic and commercial agreements in Central America and 
the Caribbean. What is taken as inclusion in the BRI, or whether a country 
is considered as being ‘in’ or not, is still a largely nebulous and disputed 
category. However, one measure that has come to serve as a proxy is the 
signing of MoUs or other forms of BRI-themed ‘cooperation agreements’.6 
5 The China-CELAC forum is similar in conception to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) but is newer and less institutionalized.
6 For instance, the Chinese government’s off icial English language ‘Belt and Road Portal’ 
(https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/index.htm) lists ‘partnership’ countries def ined as ‘countries along 
the Belt and Road and countries that have signed cooperation agreements with China on Belt 
and Road Initiative’. This categorization is so expansive, though, that over 140 countries appear 
on the list.
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Panama was a bellwether: in June 2017, it switched its diplomatic recogni-
tion from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China and in November of 
the same year it also signed the f irst Latin American and Caribbean BRI 
MoU with China (Zhang 2018). In 2018, the Dominican Republic and El 
Salvador both followed suit by changing their diplomatic recognition and 
the Dominican Republic also signed a BRI MoU (Ellis 2018). Altogether, 
between 2017 and 2019, at least nineteen countries, the majority in Central 
America and the Caribbean, signed BRI MoUs or joint statements promoting 
BRI cooperation.7 In many of these cases, not only did Latin American and 
Caribbean countries make generally supportive statements about the BRI, 
but they also announced new infrastructure and commercial cooperation 
deals. Regardless of whether any of these deals are ‘off icially’ designated 
as BRI projects by either the host government or by China (many of them 
are still on the drawing board or only partially completed), the symbolic 
connection between the MoUs and the announcement of projects such as 
ports, highways, and industrial parks is clear.
As such, 2017 was a turning point at least in terms of a series of BRI-themed 
MoU signings and associated infrastructure deals between China and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. But what are we to make of the relevance of 
this trend, especially in light of the history of relations between China and 
Latin America and the Caribbean that has been outlined above? One element 
that stands out is the concentration of Caribbean and Central American 
countries in the BRI-themed MoUs and related commercial deal announce-
ments. As noted above, the real weight and momentum of the relationship 
between China and Latin America and the Caribbean has largely been with 
the commodity-rich countries of South America. One explanation for the 
relative concentration of BRI-themed announcements and dealmaking in 
Central America and the Caribbean is simply that those regions had untapped 
potential, especially in the area of highway and port infrastructure (see 
Gonzalez-Vicente, Chapter 7 in this volume). At the same time, because the 
BRI has a firmly established reputation as Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy 
project, governments in Latin America and the Caribbean have likely been 
willing to sign MoUs and brand certain projects as part of the BRI out of politi-
cal as much as economic calculation. For the countries of Central America 
and the Caribbean that had long sought more commercial opportunities 
with China, signing on to the BRI may appear a low-cost gesture to facilitate 
Chinese lending and investment that had hitherto been in short supply.
7 See the following website for an unoff icial listing of BRI MoUs to date: https://www.beltroad-
initiative.com/memorundum-of-understanding-belt-and-road-initiative/.
The BRI In laTIn aMeRICa 105
Regarding those countries in South America such as Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Bolivia that have also signed BRI MoUs, such signings f it with these 
countries’ close, and often politicized, diplomatic ties to China (Liévano 
2019).8 They too are likely to have calculated that the signing of BRI agree-
ments would, on balance, offer more dealmaking opportunities. Venezuela 
President Nicolas Maduro may also have hoped that signing BRI agreements 
would be of help in his efforts to retain China’s diplomatic recognition and 
forbearance given Venezuela’s limited ability to meet its debt and oil-export 
obligations to China. Of course, as notable as which countries have chosen 
to sign BRI-themed MoUs or deals is which ones have not. Neither Brazil 
nor Mexico, the two biggest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
nor many of the South American countries at the core of commodity-based 
ties to China (with the exceptions of Chile and Peru), have signed such 
statements. For such countries, it may not be obvious what the benef its 
of signing BRI MoUs or BRI-themed infrastructure deals are, especially 
compared to similar previous efforts. In fact, doing more infrastructure 
deals has long been on the table in relations between China and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. While some of that cooperation has indeed 
come to fruition (even if attended by controversy), many other deals have 
been left on the table or scuttled altogether (Myers 2018).
Whatever the motives that lead Latin American and Caribbean countries 
to engage in, or refrain from, BRI-themed dealmaking with China, one clear 
element of what is new about the relationship between China and the region 
since 2017 is the attitude taken by the United States towards dealmaking 
between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries. The entrance, 
or extension, of the BRI into Latin America and the Caribbean since 2017 
has coincided with a much more critical US government attitude towards 
China’s role and influence in the Americas. It may be pure coincidence that 
the Trump administration came into off ice in 2017 at the same time as the 
Latin American and Caribbean BRI-themed MoUs and deals in that year 
were announced. However, what is clear is that the United States has taken 
a dim view of at least some of this BRI-themed dealmaking, especially in 
places like Panama. In Panama, the BRI MoU and related Panama Canal 
upgrade deals with China were also accompanied by Panama’s change from 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan to recognition of the PRC. US Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo, in a visit to Panama in October 2018, made clear 
US concerns about China’s role in the country (Wong 2018). Just a month 
8 Peru also signed a MoU in 2019, although its ties to China have not been part of the ‘New 
Left’ foreign policy that has characterized some of its Andean neighbours.
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before that visit, the US temporarily recalled its top diplomats from Panama, 
as well as the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, over their decisions 
to withdraw diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (Webber 2018). While 
Venezuela’s troubled ties to China were in place well before the BRI was 
born or Venezuela signed any BRI MoUs, the United States has in recent 
years highlighted Venezuela as one of the Latin American countries where 
Chinese f inancial deals have led to insalubrious results (Gunia 2019). While 
the BRI per se is not the reason for, or primary focus of, heightened US-China 
strategic competition in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is a potent 
symbol of China’s presence and a lightning rod in the increasingly heated 
US-China great power competition.
Beyond the renewed diplomatic and dealmaking activity with China in 
Central America and the Caribbean, and a growing US pushback against 
China’s presence in the region, there are a few other answers to what is 
‘new’ in the relationship since the BRI’s at least partial expansion to the 
region. Chinese-backed infrastructure development, while on the table for 
many years, has seen an uptick in recent years. Port developments in the 
Caribbean are one example, while electricity infrastructure deals, including 
in Brazil’s electricity grid, are another (Myers 2018). Again, some of those 
transport infrastructure deals in the Caribbean and Central America are 
tied to BRI MoUs or otherwise branded as BRI projects by host governments 
and China, while energy grid deals in Brazil do not bear any obvious BRI 
stamp (Andreoni 2019).
In addition to transport and energy infrastructure deals, two additional 
elements of BRI ‘connectivity’-themed developments merit mention in any 
assessment of what is ‘new’ in relations between China and Latin America 
and the Caribbean in recent years. The f irst component is activities branded 
as part of China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’. In addition to transport infrastructure 
like roads, railways, and ports, as well as energy infrastructure like dams, 
coal-f ired power plants, and energy grids, Chinese off icials have been keen 
to include digital infrastructure and digital connectivity as part of the BRI 
(Eder et al. 2019). In the case of South America, a f ibre-optic cable across the 
Atlantic from Africa to Brazil has been at least partially f inanced, built, and 
operated by Chinese f irms. A similar cable across the Pacif ic from China to 
Chile was under discussion until the contract was given to a Japanese f irm 
(Huawei Marine 2018; Hirose & Toyama 2020).
A second and more recent development is renewed discussion about the 
role of a ‘Health Silk Road’. First proposed in 2015, China’s National Health 
and Family Planning Commission formulated a plan to build health coopera-
tion (Bing 2020), including ‘infectious disease prevention and control’, into 
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the overall BRI framework. While largely focused on neighbouring countries 
in Southeast Asia, the Health Silk Road concept has gained new life, and 
attracted new controversy in light of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. The 
relevance for relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
of cooperation under the rubric of the New Health Silk Road, as a kind of 
supplement to the BRI, has yet to be seen beyond an initial public diplomacy 
push and potential donations or sales of personal protective equipment, 
testing kits, and medical machines (Escobar 2020).
Conclusion
This overview of the BRI in Latin America and the Caribbean underscores 
how relatively new and partial the extension of the BRI, per se, is in the 
region. It also underscores how, even with the arrival of the BRI, much 
remains unchanged about the nature and dynamics of relations between 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean. Questions remain about 
the sustainability and equality of trade relations, especially commodity-
dependent exports from South America and concerns about trade def icits 
in Mexico. In other words, structurally, the relationship contains many 
elements of Latin American commodity dependency on Chinese demand 
(Stallings 2020). This is especially a concern in the wake of the COVID-19 
crisis given that it is unlikely that China will be able to play the role of 
demand-side saviour for South American commodity exports during the 
global economic downturn that has already begun.9 As the chapter on 
the China-Caribbean relationship by Gonzalez-Vicente (Chapter 7 in this 
volume) highlights, China’s role in the region has complicated many of the 
longstanding and unresolved questions about sustainable foreign investment 
and f inancial relations. Overall, China’s role in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, including through the recent introduction of the BRI, has had 
contradictory impacts on the region’s development prospects.
How the BRI underscores such longstanding contradictions is also borne 
out in other aspects of the relationship between China and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. For instance, academic and civil society discussions 
about whether the BRI will or will not change corporate social responsibility-
type (CSR) concerns about environmental and local community impacts 
9 Media commentary that China is gaining geopolitical ground in Latin America and the 
Caribbean through its ‘mask diplomacy’ in the wake of the Corona crisis miss these bigger 
structural challenges. For example, see Stott (2020).
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of Chinese investments in the Amazon or the Andes are little different 
today from the era when the BRI had not yet reached the Americas (Ray et 
al. 2017). Even the US pushback against China’s role in Latin America and 
the Caribbean seems less about the BRI per se and more about longer-term 
structural shifts in US-China relations.
Yet pondering the role and relevance of the BRI in Latin America and 
the Caribbean does offer an opportunity to place questions of learning 
and lesson-sharing in a comparative regional and historical perspective. In 
many ways, discussions about the role of the BRI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean demonstrate the combination of enthusiasm and anxiety that 
has characterized views from countries across the region since the early 
2000s. In the early days of the relationship, there was both Chinese and Latin 
American and Caribbean regional enthusiasm (not to mention politicized 
boosterism) about the arrival of China in the region as a new commercial and 
diplomatic partner. As noted above, though, questions soon emerged about 
the quality and sustainability of those partnerships, questions that were 
tested and answered in different and sometimes contradictory ways after 
the 2008/2009 f inancial crisis and in the wake of the end of the commodity 
boom after 2013. In some ways, the entry of the BRI into the region has 
stoked similar questions about what new dimensions the BRI could bring 
to a relationship with well-entrenched patterns, challenges, and problems.
One theme that was always present throughout these pre-BRI years was 
the extent to which Latin American and Caribbean countries were passive 
or active players in relationships in which it almost always seemed to be 
the Chinese side that had proactive commercial or diplomatic strategies 
for regional or bilateral ties. As a Chinese initiative, the BRI has prompted 
similar questions with similar answers; as a region, Latin America and the 
Caribbean has not presented itself as a coherent actor. The consequence has 
been that the region is almost always a passive or divided player compared 
to China. Yet the reality has almost always been more complex. On the 
Chinese side, different Chinese government banks or f irms, not to men-
tion private f irms, have adopted tailored approaches depending on the 
country or economic sector in which they are lending or investing. On the 
Latin American and Caribbean side, different countries have long adopted 
different approaches to diplomatic and commercial ties to China. On the 
ground, Latin American and Caribbean businesses, civil society actors, 
and researchers have been keen to learn and adapt to the opportunities or 
challenges they have seen with China’s rising presence in the region. The 
BRI offers a new framework in which these long-established patterns will 
continue to play out.
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One last note on the linkage between agency and learning regards 
the question of whether or not, and how, different Latin American and 
Caribbean actors have learned from one another or from counterparts 
in other regions about China-specif ic challenges and opportunities. It is 
often striking how many government, business, civil society, or researcher 
discussions about relations between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries sound like echoes of similar conversations, either in 
neighbouring countries or in other regions, such as Africa or Southeast 
Asia (Ferchen 2020). Who are the Chinese banks or companies involved 
in a package loan-for-infrastructure deal? Are Chinese businesses and 
government bureaus learning from past experience on CSR environmen-
tal or local community impact issues? Do the experiences gained from 
regional groupings such as ASEAN, 17+1, and FOCAC offer lessons for the 
relatively new China-CELAC regional forum (see Jakóbowski 2018)? The 
potential for academic and policy ‘learning’ would be greatly enhanced 
through ever more comparative research addressing these and similar 
questions.
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5 Ascertaining Agency
Africa and the Belt and Road Initiative
Stacey Links
Abstract
Chapter 5 introduces the African region in relation to China and the 
BRI. It provides an overview of the current f ield of China-Africa studies 
and identif ies common narratives that have enveloped these relations. 
The chapter highlights one of the f ield’s remaining lacunas, namely the 
question of African agency, looking at reasons why the issue of agency has 
been neglected in the literature and how it is treated in the few instances 
where it is analysed. The chapter also explores Africa’s centrality to the 
BRI against the backdrop of intensifying China-Africa relations. It makes 
a case for Africa as a fundamental cornerstone of understanding the BRI 
in both its practical and more ideological facets.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, agency, China, Africa, China-Africa 
relations
[T]he African Express Rail now connects all the capitals of our former states, and 
indeed they will be able to crisscross and see the beauty, culture and diversity 
of this cradle of humankind. The marvel of the African Express Rail is that it is 
not only a high-speed train, with adjacent highways, but also contains pipelines 
for gas, oil and water, as well as ICT broadband cables: African ownership, 
integrated planning and execution at its best!
– African Union Commission Chairperson Nkosazani Dlamini Zuma, 
‘AU Email from the Future’ (2014)
The quote above is an excerpt from the African Union (AU) Commission 
Chairperson’s ‘Email from the Future’. This is an email envisioning what 
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463727853_ch05
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Africa will look like in the year 2063. This hypothetical email, dated 24 Janu-
ary 2063, has been produced by the African Union Commission to reflect 
the goals that are set to be achieved through its agenda ‘Africa 2063: The 
Africa We Want’ (Zuma 2014). A palatable theme in the hypothetical email 
is the promise of an integrated and interconnected Africa, underpinned by 
‘state of the art’ infrastructure that serves the people.
The centrality of development is a logical goal for the African continent 
given the twin and interrelated challenges of persistent poverty and chronic 
underdevelopment. This is not only a goal held by the continent’s leaders 
but is also supported at an international level through the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals, for example. Beyond this email from 
the Commission, the idea of African development as a way through the 
impasse of widespread poverty is reflected as a core objective of the African 
Union more broadly (African Union Commission 2015). It is also reflected 
in international law, included in documents such as the Declaration on 
the Right to Development (UN General Assembly 1986). The continued 
economic dependence of the African continent on so-called ‘core’ states is 
most famously reflected in Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory 
as well as dependency theories that emphasize the international division of 
labour as the source of Africa’s persistent underdevelopment (Wallerstein 
1974; Wallerstein 2004; Rodney 1972). Thus while the continent has formally 
become independent from the clutches of political colonial rule, economic 
independence remains an unfulfilled continental goal. Equally, the promises 
of following a neoliberal paradigm to escape from the poverty trap have 
remained problematic when considering the diff iculties developing econo-
mies face in structurally upgrading and climbing up the global value chain 
(see, for example, Noman and Stiglitz 2012; Taylor 2016). Africa’s economic 
activity continues to be dominated by the supply of natural resources, and 
there are few industrial strategies to escape this commodity dependency. 
Economically speaking the continent remains trapped in the perennial 
‘resource curse’ despite efforts to break this cycle.
Understanding the relations between China and Africa from this point 
of departure is essential if we are to grasp the internal logic and contours 
of this engagement. China-Africa relations have increasingly become the 
focus of policy, international politics, and academic scholarship, over the past 
decade in particular. Despite the long timespan in which there have been 
relations between Africa and China, the deepening engagement between 
China and the continent, particularly economic engagement, has become 
a topic of international interest (and, some would argue, ‘concern’). These 
deepening relations present the world with an arguably ‘new’ and seemingly 
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unwavering form of cooperation. Emblematic of what scholars term South-
South cooperation, China-Africa relations have also become a focal point 
for understanding a ‘rising China’. Despite areas for concern, China-Africa 
relations seemingly enjoy considerable support across the African continent 
(Gadzala & Hanusch 2010; Hanush 2012; Lekorwe et al. 2016; Maru 2019). To 
shed light on why this is the case, it is paramount to understand how the 
relationship works and specif ically how a project such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) is ‘received’ on the continent.
The BRI has emerged as a key interest area and presents an active 
dimension of China-Africa relations that is worthy of exploration. In a 
world where China’s impact is increasingly tangible and consequential, 
ascertaining the BRI’s functioning across a range of regions is all the more 
important. The BRI’s off icial goal of fostering development through global 
interconnectivity is particularly relevant given the African development 
agenda that has been outlined above (Xi 2019). If any one aspect of Chinese 
engagement on the continent is of particular interest, then the BRI is an 
obvious contender. However, Africa was given a relatively marginal role 
in the initial conceptualization of the BRI when it was launched by China 
in 2013. This means that ascertaining the current importance of the BRI 
in the African context requires insight into both the BRI and China-Africa 
relations more broadly. This chapter therefore aims to shed light on the 
BRI in Africa by taking into account the broader China-Africa engagement.
Analysing relations between Chinese and African actors raises the ques-
tion of agency. Agency matters in that it provides insight into how actors 
behave. From an international relations perspective, it gives nuance to ideas 
about the drivers of, as well as constraints on, the behaviour of different 
actors. Naturally then, discussion of China-Africa relations, and the BRI in 
particular, is enriched if we are able to uncover the ways that actors navigate 
challenges, opportunities, and relations with each other. In this way, agency 
is also often relational and inter-subjective. An actor’s agency does not stand 
alone but interacts with the (in)actions and intentions of others. Moreover, 
agency is closely related to power. Who has power, and in what ways, has 
become a central point of contention in debates about relations between 
China and Africa, particularly given the power differentials between China 
and individual African states. One assumption made about ‘agency’ and 
‘power’ is that the actor with more power also has relatively more agency. 
However, within the context of this chapter, agency is def ined as both the 
act of holding specif ic interests and goals as well as the capacity that actors 
possess to set agendas, negotiate, and act in accordance with their specif ic 
interests and goals. Power then, is not a focal or def ining characteristic of 
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agency but is closely related to structure. This is a point that will be further 
explored.
This leads to the crux of this chapter, namely the intersection between 
African agency and the BRI. Importantly, commentary on the BRI in Africa, 
as well as China-Africa relations more broadly, often presumes little to 
no room for African perspectives in dealings with China (French 2014; 
Mourdoukoutas 2018; Risberg 2019). Common narratives of ‘neo-imperialism’, 
‘neocolonialism’, as well as tropes of the ‘dragon in the bush’ or the ‘bear and 
the honeypot’, reflect a widely held assumption that Africa remains a mere 
object in these relations (Marton & Matura 2011). Questions around power 
and agency in this context are therefore frequently centred on China and 
its relative power/dominance vis-à-vis African actors. This chapter seeks to 
move away from reductive assumptions and instead outlines the need and 
ways in which the BRI can be understood through the lens of African agency.
The chapter proceeds as follows: It starts with an introductory overview 
of China-Africa relations and the BRI in Africa in particular. It does so with 
the question of African agency in mind and sets out issues for consideration 
in this often-overlooked area of research. It also raises the question of why 
understanding African agency in the context of the BRI is important. In 
doing so, it provides a foundational outline, which is then build upon in the 
subsequent chapters that examine the cases of the Digital Silk Road in Ethiopia 
and agency in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Emergence of China-Africa Relations on the International 
Agenda
Engagement between Africa and China has garnered signif icant attention 
in recent years. Despite a long history of engagement, recent relations were 
shaped by the f irst ever Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a 
ministerial conference that took place in 2000. Broader relations between 
Africa and Asia date much further back to cooperation at the Bandung 
Conference of 1955. The historical relationship also includes China’s political 
support for independence movements across the African continent dur-
ing decolonization. However, the 2000 forum provided the f irst coherent 
framework within which China-Africa cooperation could operate in a 
‘new’ era. This new era has coincided with China’s period of unprecedented 
economic growth and visibility on the international stage. The growth of 
China has therefore led to the deepening of China-Africa cooperation and 
engagement formally and informally.
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In 2006, the third ministerial conference and the f irst Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit were held in Beijing. These events 
garnered signif icant scholarly attention, in part due to the sheer number of 
African representatives in attendance as well as Hu Jintao’s pledge of US$5 
billion of concessionary loans to the continent (King 2007; Naidu 2007).1 
However, it was the f ifth ministerial meeting, which was held in Beijing in 
2012, combined with China’s swift economic rise, that really placed China’s 
engagement in Africa on the international agenda. This was exemplif ied 
by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who launched what has been 
termed a ‘veiled attacked’ on China’s engagement on the continent (Ghosh 
2012; Smith 2012). It was at this point that China-Africa relations entered into 
the public’s international political discourse and were no longer confined 
to scholarly inquiry.
However, China-Africa relations are far more multifaceted and complex 
than is often assumed. Their engagement includes off icial diplomatic rela-
tions, concessional loans, gift giving, business relations and investment, 
and people-to-people exchange (Brautigam 2009). In 2018, two-way trade 
between China and the African continent totalled US$185 billion. Meanwhile 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to the continent has been steadily 
increasing since 2003. In 2014, Chinese FDI exceeded that of the US, which 
has been declining since 2010 (CARI 2020). Similarly, Chinese foreign aid 
to the continent has increased from US$631 million in 2003 to US$3.3 bil-
lion in 2018. With the exception of rebounds in most sectors between 2016 
and 2018, it would seem Chinese economic involvement on the continent 
has steadily expanded. While traditional partners remain important to 
countries in Africa, the Chinese presence has been notable and visible. This 
has led ‘third-party’ states to ask what this presence means for their own 
engagement. While economics are important, geopolitical implications and 
influence are undoubtedly also a consideration. The current situation has 
been described by some as a ‘new’ Cold War, or a ‘new’ scramble for Africa 
(Marton & Matura 2011). In this way, the ‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’ activities on 
the African continent have frequently been presented in competitive terms.
Despite increased knowledge about China-Africa relations, because 
of the amount of largely speculative reports about their nature, scholarly 
investigation has concerned itself primarily with the task of ‘myth-busting’ 
incorrect ideas about them (see Hirono & Suzuki 2014). The vast circulation 
1 Several research and interest groups were created around this time, such as the Chinese 
in Africa /Africans in China Research Network (CA/AC), Sino-Africa Joint Research Centre 
(SAJOREC), China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI), and the China Africa Project (CAP).
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of such speculative reports has highlighted the need for rigorous research in 
what continues to be a highly politicized area of inquiry. The ever-increasing 
number of China-Africa institutes and research agendas reflects continued 
interest in the relations between China and the continent. The topic of 
China-Africa cooperation has also become of interest to policymakers who 
have focused on the implications of these relations for the international 
economic, political, and normative order(s) (see, for example, Chin & Thakur 
2010; Du Plessis 2016; European Parliament 2008).
While a large part of the challenge of disentangling myth from reality 
in China-Africa relations is empirical, there exists an equally pressing 
conceptual challenge. In many respects China-Africa relations challenge 
the very way in which international relations are traditionally theorized 
and thought about. Questions about whether self-interest primarily drives 
relations with African states, about the neocolonialist nature of these 
relations, and about whether some of these relations constitute forms 
of foreign aid all speak to popular assumptions about these relations. 
Similarly, the concept of agency that this chapter discusses, requires careful 
and critical analysis if we are to move away from simply reproducing 
reductive accounts of China-Africa relations. This chapter seeks to move 
beyond a baseline or universal def inition of agency, as the capacity to hold 
specif ic interests or goals, in order to highlight the specif ic considerations 
of African agency (vis-à-vis the BRI). In its consideration of these specif ici-
ties, the chapter broadly f its with the approach taken by constructivist 
international relations theory. However, it also adopts innovative and 
critical perspectives that seek to reconcile the structure-agent debate 
(see Klotz 2006). The objective is therefore not to give a detailed account 
of all things China-Africa, but rather to give an overview of China’s BRI in 
Africa and reflect on the challenges and considerations of African agency 
within this context.
China’s BRI in Africa
Since its inception, China’s BRI has grabbed international attention for its 
scope, ambition, and novelty.2 In part due to its sheer magnitude, this global 
project is under considerable scrutiny from onlookers. Some have touted 
it as China’s tool for global domination and hegemony (Cavanna 2018; Ellis 
2018; Sharma 2019). Others have noted its mixed effects, both positive and 
2 Novelty despite it being premised on the old ‘Silk Roads’.
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negative (China Power Team 2017; De Cremer et al. 2020). Meanwhile others 
have gone further to provide detailed and nuanced accounts (Zhang 2018).
Described as the twenty-f irst-century Silk Road, the BRI has been en-
visioned to connect landmasses from China through to the Middle East, 
Africa, and Europe, largely mimicking the original silk trade routes (see 
Sarwar 2017; Chan 2018; Ling 2020). Nevertheless, over time it has become 
an umbrella term under which a variety of Chinese developmental projects 
focused on regional connectivity and infrastructure have been placed. 
Geographically, then, the project has become global in scale and is not 
bound to a single uninterrupted route as was initially envisioned when 
the initiative was launched with the name ‘One Belt One Road’ or OBOR. 
While the initial route remains the core of the initiative, the ‘opening up’ of 
the BRI has enabled the inclusion of disparate parts of the world that were 
previously not directly linked in the core trajectory.
Extending the Silk Roads ‘into Africa’
An area that has been subsumed under the BRI is Africa, most notably 
East Africa. As a result, the BRI has become an additional ‘facet’ of broader 
China-Africa engagement. The inclusion of Africa into the core trajectory 
of the BRI has been straightforward and has resulted in a range of projects. 
To this end the BRI has provided a way forward for greater connectivity 
and integration, for example, that in the East African region. It has thus 
been largely welcomed across the continent (EAC 2020). Examples of BRI 
projects in Africa include the construction of a port in the East African state 
of Djibouti, which has developed into a BRI hotspot. Another BRI project 
is the Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway, connecting the cities of Mombasa 
and Nairobi. However, of signif icant value has been the way in which the 
BRI has tapped into the intra-regional ‘connectivity’ market in Africa. This 
involves cross-border infrastructure projects such as the Lamu Port South 
Sudan-Ethiopia Transport corridor (LAPPSET) and the Standard Gauge 
Railway that connects Addis Ababa to the Port of Djibouti (Eom et al. 2018: 
2). These projects have inadvertently kick-started much-needed intra-African 
trade that advances the goal of pan-African development. In a similar way, 
the Digital Silk Road, which is a part of the BRI focused on information 
technology, has seemingly f it the needs of regional digital networks and 
telecommunication development. As is noted by the China-Africa Research 
Initiative (CARI), while it is increasingly known that China-Africa coop-
eration is diverse, the BRI is set to accelerate existing infrastructure and 
industrial cooperation, expanding cooperation even further (Chan 2018).
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From a f inancing perspective, the China Development Bank and the 
Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) are the key lending sources of 
BRI projects, alongside the Silk Road Fund. While the Eximbank provides 
67% of loans to Africa (Chan 2018: 1), it is specif ically mandated to provide 
BRI f irms, or Chinese f irms and state-owned enterprises, with low-interest 
credit, tax incentives, and customs-free exports of Chinese goods and 
machinery that may be necessary for projects (ibid.: 2). It is important to 
note, however, that the BRI has not been established as an altruistic aid 
project, but as an economic project that acts in part as a conduit for China’s 
domestic industrial overcapacity (Van Staden et al. 2018). In addition, 
though concerns related to the economic viability and sustainability of 
BRI projects remain, it is noteworthy that China is not a major contributor 
to debt distress on the continent despite trends of heavy borrowing (Eom 
et al. 2018).
The BRI’s focus on infrastructure that supports cross-border trade and 
integration is seen as a panacea for African development and thus attractive 
to African states and regional organizations, such as the African Union. It 
should therefore not come as a surprise that the lack of viable alternatives 
to addressing these developmental challenges is often presented as a driver 
for continued cooperation (see Dahir 2018; Phiri & Mungoma 2019).
Due to the vast scope of the projects included under the BRI, as well as 
the common practice of retroactively labelling projects BRI projects, the BRI 
has come to include a wide and diverse range of different kinds of projects 
(ibid.). Thus, while Africa was marginal within the BRI’s initial geographic 
scope, the expansion of the initiative to an all-encompassing global project 
of connectivity and development has made Africa as relevant as any other 
region to discussions about the global impacts of the BRI.
One aim of this chapter is to examine African agency in relation to the 
BRI. Related to this topic, Van Staden et al. (2018) have highlighted the 
various complexities and diverse levels of African agency vis-à-vis the BRI. 
An important distinction that is directly related to agency is that while ‘the 
BRI is Beijing-directed’ it is ‘not necessarily Beijing-controlled’ (ibid.: 23). This 
will be further demonstrated in the chapter that follows after this, which 
looks at the case of Ethiopia. In this case, BRI projects have enabled direct 
connectivity between East Africa and Europe, despite the characterization 
of the BRI as an exclusively ‘Chinese initiative’. This kind of outcome from 
the BRI is often attributed to the responsive nature of China-Africa relations. 
However, such examples also point to the agency exercised by African actors 
to instrumentalize the BRI to their benef it – a point that I will return to 
below (Demissie 2018; Jian 2018; Wissenbach 2020).
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Geographically speaking, North and East Africa have by far been the 
central focus of the maritime and overland ‘Silk Roads’ of the BRI. However, 
the initiative has far wider reach on the African continent (see Eom et 
al. 2018; Dollar 2019). Other parts of the continent, not directly linked to 
the BRI’s core trajectory, have mostly been subsumed under memoranda 
of understanding (MoUs) that place them within the BRI or BRI-funded 
projects. One such region is Southern Africa, which arguably is of little 
direct appeal or consequence to the BRI’s core route. For this reason, it 
has remained largely on the outskirts of analysis of the BRI. Nevertheless, 
due to the BRI’s expansion as a broader global project, Southern Africa, 
like other regions, has been included, albeit from a distance (Breuer 2017). 
To this end, the BRI has become, or is at least on its way to becoming, an 
all-encompassing (geographic) project, transcending the boundaries of the 
‘original’ silk routes.
Regional Synergies: China’s BRI and the Continental Goals
Not only does China’s BRI include Africa in a geographic sense, but it equally 
includes it in a discursive sense. The BRI fits into the broader regional agenda 
exemplif ied by the African Union’s Agenda 2063. The synergies between 
these two projects were already noted in 2015, during gatherings such as the 
One Belt One Road and a Prosperous Africa Conference, convened by the 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa. In particular, the 
BRI and Agenda 2063 are seen as complementing each other in their goals 
of infrastructure development, industrialization, and peace and security 
(Ndzendze & Monyae 2019). Scholars such as Ndzendze and Monyae (2019) 
note the synergies, convergences, and linkages between the African Union’s 
agenda and the BRI. They also underscore the BRI’s ability to strengthen the 
African Union’s agenda (ibid.: 1). From this perspective, the overall tone of 
discourse is one where the BRI presents an opportunity for the continent in a 
number of key issue areas. According to the African Union, it is the ‘prospect 
for development of many poor countries’ that appeals to the continent as well 
as the idea that ‘aspirations are […] intertwined and mutually achievable’ 
(African Union Commission 2015: 1). Addressing Africa’s infrastructure 
def icit through the BRI is seen as having a ‘multiplier effect’ for Africa’s 
growth plans (Ehizuelen & Abdi 2017: 299). In this vein, ‘the OBOR initiative 
is anticipated to stimulate African growth by snowballing infrastructure 
development’ (ibid.: 300) – an issue that has long been on the African agenda.
As Dollar (2019) concludes, this position seems to trump the projec-
tions about the negative impact that the BRI might have on the continent. 
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Curiously, despite the known risks and social impacts of specif ic projects, as 
well as questions about environmental and economic sustainability, Africa 
is reportedly the region of the world with the most positive perception of 
the BRI (García-Herrero & Jianwei 2019: 4). This warm reception of the BRI 
undoubtedly plays a role in its success on the continent (and the desire to see 
it succeed). Thus, although many unknowns remain and a cautious approach 
is increasingly visible on the part of African actors, the initiative continues 
to enjoy overall (off icial) support. Flexibility in Chinese engagement on the 
continent could be indicative of why, despite challenges and in some cases 
failures, the initiative maintains momentum (Brautigam 2009).
Two broadly dominant and opposing accounts have emerged regarding 
the BRI in Africa. They are both connected to the question of African agency. 
These categories are not normative categories by any means but instead 
merely denote their respective views of agency. On the one hand, there are 
those that hold that the BRI’s success will ‘depend on how recipient developing 
economies, in particular Africa, utilize China’s investor interest for their own 
sustainable development’ (Johnston 2016: 1). In this scenario, the onus is placed 
on African actors and governments to utilize Chinese investment (whether 
BRI or otherwise) to further their domestic/regional goals. This implicitly 
assumes a degree of agency on the part of African actors and can be seen as 
affirming agency. On the other hand, there are those who view China-Africa 
relations as constituting a zero-sum game. This view can be categorized as 
denying agency. For those who hold this view, while agency may be gleaned 
from synergistic agendas, at its core the BRI lulls African actors into a false 
sense of complacency that in essence hides serious long-term sustainability 
challenges of these projects – particularly as far as debt is concerned. Placed 
at two opposite poles, these positions demonstrate the range of ideas related 
to agency in China-Africa relations and the BRI specif ically.
The focus of the BRI on infrastructure is not only necessary for broad-
based development and poverty eradication in Africa but also complements 
the recent establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (Af-
CFTA). At its core the AfCFTA is regarded as ‘a critical response to Africa’s 
developmental challenges’ (Mene 2020) and has provided increased impetus 
to make the BRI ‘work’ for Africa (Phiri & Mungoma 2019). The infrastructure 
def icit that the continent faces not only challenges the free movement of 
people and goods but also hinders the possibility of intra-regional trade. 
When compared to other world regions for example, Africa lags a long way 
behind in its portion of intra-regional exports, which in 2018 stood at a mere 
18% of total exports as opposed to intra-Asian exports and intra-European 
exports, which stood at 59% and 69%, respectively (Sow 2018).
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In the broader China-Africa context, while Africa may not be of primary 
economic signif icance for an international heavyweight such as China 
(Pairault 2020), the BRI in particular presents Africa with the opportunity to 
build some of the pieces that are critical for solving the intra-African trade 
and pan-African development puzzle. The way that the BRI can contribute 
this to African development, coupled with the way it f its with Africa’s broad 
industrial goals, are both features of President Xi Jinping’s characterization 
of China-Africa relations as a ‘win-win’ (see ADB 2019).
These synergies, along with various bilateral projects, are evidence of 
the BRI’s increasing traction on the African continent. More recently, in 
July 2019, the Belt and Road Fund for Africa was created. This fund is chaired 
by Dr. Iqbal Surve, who is the former chair of the South African chapter 
of the BRICS Business Council. While the fund remains in its infancy, its 
creation speaks to the deepening of cooperation under the BRI banner 
beyond a mere MoU. All of these instances, taken together, demonstrate 
the various areas of compatibility between African developmental agendas 
and the BRI as a global project.
This convergence of agendas has led to the characterization of the rela-
tions between Africa and China as being ‘win-win’. This would denote a 
situation where agency is evenly distributed amongst the actors. If, however, 
3 Intra-African trade (def ined as average of intra-African exports and imports) around 2% 
(2015-2017) vs. America (47%), Asia (61%), Europe (67%) and Oceania (7%) – UNCTAD.
Figure 5.1 Intra-regional Trade per Region (2015-2017)
Source: author’s compilation of data from unCTad.3
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the relationship is characterized otherwise, agency is attributed differently. 
For example, those that are sceptical about the degree to which Africa ‘wins’ 
in its relations with China implicitly or explicitly locate agency with China 
as a unitary actor and def ine agency largely in terms of material power. 
Relative gains potentially won by African counterparts seem minimal, and 
critics cite Africa’s dependence on China as indicative of an imbalanced 
relationship (Tillerson 2018; Al Jazeera 2020). This imbalance, or ‘win-lose’ 
scenario, inadvertently characterizes these relations as zero-sum. Any 
‘wins’ on the part of Africa are seen as relatively insignif icant vis-à-vis 
potential future losses – especially loss of independence. The threat of an 
overly dependent relationship on the part of Africa looms visibly behind 
much of the commentary concerning the ‘value’ of Chinese engagement 
(investment) for the continent. Thus, while some may recognize the op-
portunities presented by the BRI, many question the ability of African 
states, institutions, and organizations to fully harness these to the benefit 
of the continent, and/or to mitigate/offset potential negative effects. It is 
this apparent (in)ability to ‘steer’ relations that is often tied to the notion 
of agency. This is related to the issue of structural constraints that, while 
real, can be overcome through creative uses of agency. I will explore this 
issue more below.
Far too often, however, zero-sum accounts are premised on a simplistic 
understanding of agency. In order to move beyond this a contextual approach 
is required; one that considers the contours and specif icities of African 
agency. The following section unpacks the issue of agency and particularly 
African agency to uncover some of the specific challenges for consideration.4
China in the Driver’s Seat? Power and Agency
For the most part, analyses of China-Africa relations have problematized 
the obvious power imbalances between a global ‘heavyweight’ like China 
and the African continent, which is made up of diverse states, communities, 
and interests. A common perception is that the power differentials seen 
4 While the focus of these chapters are on BRI ‘recipient states’, it should also be noted that – as 
much as China’s BRI is presented as an outright ‘win’ for China – the lack of conditionalities 
presents risks (albeit calculated) for China itself (Ehizuelen & Abdi 2017: 303). Challenges such 
as governance, corruption, social and political tensions, as well as the effects of climate change 
across a large continent with often few resources to absorb such shocks render BRI projects not 
always an outright win. As Chinese engagement in the continent has already demonstrated, 
challenges exist and will persist despite idealized visions.
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between China and most African states inevitably place the former in the 
driver’s seat and give the latter little to no negotiating power (Gomes 2007; 
Castillejo 2013; French 2014). These accounts have a direct effect on where 
agency is located and how it is seen to operate. These assumptions run rife 
through both public and scholarly reports about China in Africa. They in 
essence strip African actors from having any kind of agency. These accounts 
equate agency with material power and thus place agency solely with China 
as a unitary actor.
Dominant discourses on China-Africa relations have often relied on 
binary understandings of these relations that reduce representations to 
Africa as victim and China as perpetrator. These narratives have also fed into 
the idea that African actors are somehow without agency in China-Africa 
engagement. As highlighted by Fisher (2020), agency is often interchangeably 
used with ‘influence’, ‘power’, or ‘ownership’. This has led, problematically, to 
an analytical imprecision about the concept of ‘agency’ itself. These narrow 
understandings of agency have routinely overlooked the existence of agency 
outside of hard or material power. They have not looked at how actors deal 
with or creatively bypass structural constraints. This has limited the depth 
of analysis on China-Africa relations. Similarly, while material structural 
constraints evidently impede agency to a certain degree, structural con-
straints do not begin and/or end with material power but likewise relate to 
structures of knowledge, ways of doing, and ways of being in international 
relations. Instead of these narrow understandings of the concept, questions 
concerning agency should be addressed by drawing on scholarship about 
China-Africa relations that has underscored the multidimensional, complex, 
and mutually constitutive nature of these relations.
The characterizations of relations between China and Africa that have 
been discussed above ref lect an understanding of agency that is often 
discursively linked not only to power but also to the idea of a ‘China threat’ 
(i.e. the idea that China’s agency, as equated with power, results in debt trap 
diplomacy, poor infrastructure, human rights abuses, negative effects on 
local markets and the displacement of local labour) (see Brautigam 2009; 
Sun et al. 2017). This also results in the assumption that China’s relative 
power (and thus agency) necessarily negates any semblance of African 
agency. This assumption is in part normative in that it often equates African 
agency with vocal or explicit condemnation of China’s engagement (i.e. 
agency as resistance). Importantly, however, agency need not preclude 
that engagement be beneficial to other actors (i.e. China). A central aspect 
of these ‘China threat’ narratives of China-African relations is the idea 
that China necessarily strong-arms African actors into cooperation. Along 
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with this, these narratives also often express the idea that cooperation is 
characterized by self-interested, power-hungry elites who exercise agency 
only for themselves. While these kinds of normative accounts of agency may 
hold some degree of truth, they often cloud the ability to ‘uncover’ agency 
as a value-neutral concept that can be exercised independent of material 
power and/or nefarious gain.
Evidently, the issue of African agency in China-African relations cannot be 
understood in isolation but is deeply connected with a range of assumptions 
on the nature of China-Africa engagement as well as with actors’ identities. 
While some of these assumptions may hold various degrees of empirical 
truth, others reflect politicized accounts of these relations.
Others have pointed to instances of African actors driving agendas 
for cooperation, engagement, or exchange with China. This evidence is 
contrary to the idea that engagement is solely driven by China. Research has 
shown that requests at the behest of African actors characterize relations 
to a greater degree than assumed (Van Staden et al. 2018). This drive does 
not preclude China’s interest in Africa – nor do China’s interests in Africa 
preclude agency on the part of African actors, once again reaff irming the 
idea that agency is both multidimensional and mutually constitutive. So 
while China may hold relatively more structural power, African actors have 
in fact exercised agency in so far as shaping and steering engagement are 
concerned.
Some researchers have argued that the agency of African actors is 
compromised in China-Africa relations because of the (long-term) ‘hidden’ 
costs of engaging with China, which include such things as debt and the 
long-term sustainability of projects (MinBuza 2019; Gavas & Timmis 2019; 
Lorenz & Thielke 2007; Harris 2018). However, these long-term effects 
are arguably not so much an indicator of agency as a simple projection 
of the consequences of choices. Embedded in these arguments is a set 
of assumptions about rationality as objective. The actors are assumed to 
necessarily act in their own best interest, which is assumed to correlate with 
a universal objective rationality. It is overlooked however that rationality 
is subjective.
These kinds of conceptualizations of agency are common in commentary 
on China-Africa relations. They have come at the cost of acknowledging and 
exploring the contours of African agency. They have overlooked the range 
of examples of African agency that can be seen over time. These include the 
continent’s anti-colonial struggles, the African Union’s prominent criticism 
of NATO intervention in Libya and its continued impact in intervention 
discourses, as well as the continent’s near-jeopardization of the International 
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Criminal Court.5 These cases alone should give us pause to reflect on agency as 
a concept as well as how it is understood in China-Africa relations. However, 
there have been some works that have sought to address the multifaceted 
nature of African agency in China-Africa relations from a largely value-neutral 
perspective. These include studies by Mohan and Lampert (2013), Gadzala 
(2015), and Soulé-Kohndou (2016). These works have demonstrated the exist-
ence of multiple agencies (plural) that operate on and across multiple levels. 
They challenge the misperception that China-Africa relations are chiefly 
driven by Chinese interests and/or nefarious African leaders.
The aim of the rest of this chapter is not to devise an overarching universal 
concept of agency. Instead, it seeks to highlight the contours of agency within 
the African context as it relates to engagement with China and the BRI. This 
will provide a glimpse into the complex dynamics and interactions of agency.
African Agency
Africa has long occupied a unique place in international relations. Because 
it is considered a concentrated site of colonial ambitions both past and 
present, it has often been treated as an object upon which ‘high’ international 
relations has an impact or effect. As such, it has all too frequently been acted 
upon, spoken for, and talked about. This treatment has left no room for 
discussions of African agency. Its position as object has therefore rendered it 
a conundrum for international relations or as a continent ‘non grata’. Imagery 
of African victims has been juxtaposed with leaders as ‘perpetrators’. The 
narrative of African populations as voiceless victims has contributed to the 
idea of a continent without agency.
While the ability of ‘Africa’ to exert agency in the international system is 
limited by structural constraints, the idea of an agent-less Africa undoubtedly 
served political purposes during the colonial era and the Cold War. This idea 
now arguably continues to serve political purposes in the ‘China threat’ era. 
Placing African states and actors ‘as serious objects of study […] stands in 
sharp contrast to the standard approach to analysing Africa’s international 
relations’ (Brown 2012: 1890).
Scholars such as William Brown have tackled the idea of African 
agency and noted that multiple agencies exist, requiring a multidimensional 
5 This is not to say that African agency alone resulted in these events but rather that they 
played a signif icantly important role in combination with other factors, such as the declining 
economic viability of colonialism.
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approach to understanding the concept. As well as the existence of multiple 
agencies, Brown emphasizes the different dimensions of agency in its various 
forms. In the case of Africa both state and non-state actors are important 
sites for agency. Moreover, the role and place of state leaders has been key 
in def ining and articulating state preferences in the African context.
For Brown, the importance of spotlighting African agency is related to the 
continent’s role and position ‘as actor not just acted upon, historical agent not 
just history’s recipient’ (2012: 1889). The focus on African agency has become 
synonymous with a move to ‘decolonize’ traditional international relations 
frameworks so as to better reflect the range of actors and their realities in 
the international landscape. This is of importance not only at a conceptual 
level, but also because of international relations’ inextricable link to policy. 
Expanding, reassessing, and reformulating concepts such as agency can 
have tangible implications for foreign policy. Stimulating the need to act 
with others, and not upon them, is a goal towards which the African foreign 
policies of different states should strive. These are particularly important 
considerations for third-party states, such the countries of Europe, in light 
of growing China-Africa relations and broader South-South cooperation.
An integral and perhaps obvious component of agency is an agent – or 
actor. According to Professor Ryo Osiba, actors in international relations 
are def ined
as the entities which have the following three features: (a) They should 
have the autonomous capacity to determine their own purposes and 
interests; (b) They should also have the capability to mobilize human 
and material resources to achieve these purposes and interests; (c) Their 
actions should be signif icant enough to influence the state-to-state rela-
tions or the behaviour of other non-state actors in the global system. 
(Kan 2010: 234-235)
At this very basic level, Africa, like all world regions, is made up of a host 
of actors that have specif ic interests. Key considerations, however, are 
that agency is not necessarily or only def ined by whether or not interests 
are successfully achieved and that attempts to pursue these interests are 
often hindered by (structural) constraints. As Brown notes in relation to 
Africa, ‘a f lexible conceptualization of agency is needed to locate agencies 
in the complex dialectical interplay with the structural contexts from 
which they arise and in relation to which they operate’ (Brown 2012: 1890). 
For African actors, interests are often both linked to, and shaped by, the 
goal of dismantling structures that constrain agency in the f irst place. Put 
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differently, if necessity is the mother of invention, then structural challenges 
to Africa’s agency necessitate innovative solutions.
By taking these considerations into account, we are able to avoid equating 
agency directly with material power. Thus, while scholars such as Colin 
Wight view agency as ‘the faculty or state of acting or exerting power’, it is 
important to note that power can be defined outside of material hard power. 
By broadening the idea of power, we are able to extend the idea of agency 
to a wider range of actors that are not dependent on hard material power 
to enact agency. Power in this context therefore denotes a range of actions 
or expressions that are related inter alia to intentionality, agenda setting, 
and influence (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 7; Fisher 2020: 4; Wight 2006: 187).
Nevertheless, one cannot speak of African agency without noting the 
existence of ‘seemingly immovable structures of international inequality’ 
(Brown 2012: 1889). This inequality exists f irstly in the realms of poverty 
and underdevelopment. However, it also exists in the realms of politics and 
knowledge, which position Africa on the ‘outskirts’ of international relations 
as an object to be acted upon. Agency is inevitably impacted by structural 
constraints of this nature. This leads to African actors’ focus on overcoming 
structural injustices not only through international representation but 
arguably more importantly through continental development. The pursuit 
of economic development is therefore seen not only as a means of combat-
ing the ills of chronic poverty and underdevelopment that the continent 
faces, but also as the key to unlocking the continent’s potential and, most 
importantly, power. Here again, power is tied to agency in which ‘full’ agency 
is not limited by structural constraints but can be exercised freely.
A wide range of approaches exist for tackling questions of African agency. 
Instrumentalist frameworks, for example, position African agency as the 
ability of actors to secure their own interests by leveraging support from 
key states or partners in the international arena. Other approaches have 
instead located agency in African actors challenging the premise of Western 
engagement. Moreover, agency is equally visible in non-state actors and 
their ability to steer agendas, cooperate, collaborate, or block initiatives. 
In this sense agency is also often tied to activism. Here, agency is seen to 
be the challenging of authority or power and is seen as an answer to the 
question of how this is done.
Other approaches recognize the way in which agency operates at all 
levels, allowing states and business communities to leverage opportunities 
to their advantage and for their interests. A key facet of almost all these 
approaches to agency – and often seen in the idea of circumventing structural 
constraints – is the idea of a connection between agency and intentionality. 
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Here, intentionally means pursuing courses of action (which can include 
inaction) in order to further one’s interests. Fisher (2020: 1), for example, 
notes the multilevel nature of African agency and the way in which these 
agencies have their own interests/rationales and processes/mechanisms. 
He maps the overlapping, diverging, and diverse nature of African agency, 
pointing to the need for expanding what is meant by ‘Africa’ beyond the state. 
He proposes that when analysing what is meant by ‘agency’ we must also 
consider the ‘structural constraints imposed on Africa by global economic 
and political inequalities’.
Being open to a multiplicity of ‘agencies’ is evidently crucial to understand-
ing agency in the African context. This means that, as will be demonstrated, 
histories, internal logics, aims, and discourses are important contextual 
factors to consider when interrogating African agency vis-à-vis the BRI and 
China, more broadly speaking.
African Agency and the BRI: Points for Consideration
As outlined above, African agency and the BRI bring together a vast range 
of issues and considerations. Exploring the nexus of the two therefore 
requires regard for both the unique attributes of African agency – and thus 
a contextual approach – as well as a holistic understanding of the BRI in 
the African regional context.
Important considerations are:
‒ the multifaceted nature of African agency (disaggregation);
‒ a value-free approach to understanding agency (what I term ‘de-centring’ 
normative frameworks);
‒ the interplay of structure and agency, most notably the structural confines 
within which African agency is performed or f inds itself;
‒ agency beyond hard power (creative agency);
‒ BRI synergies with African (developmental) agendas;
‒ Chinese engagement (BRI) as responsive and flexible (short term, long 
term to be seen);
‒ ‘structural focus’ of the BRI;
‒ pressures (domestic) and sustainability (debt);
‒ the BRI as Beijing-directed and not Beijing-controlled;
‒ African demands.
Notably, part of the ‘problem’ is discussing both ‘Africa’ and ‘China’ as unitary 
actors. This research recognizes these limitations and like other scholarship 
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sees analytical value in the ‘concept’ of Africa. Nevertheless, from an IR 
perspective, the state – as the primary unit of analysis as well as a set of 
intergovernmental institutions – is an important ‘agent’ to explore. This 
is not to discount other actors, but rather to narrow the scope of study. 
Equally, however, it is important to note that in the context of the BRI a 
range of actors are inevitably involved, from the Chinese state to private 
Chinese transnational corporations and independent Chinese entrepreneurs 
(Mohan & Lampert 2013). It is important, then, for any study of agency to 
clearly def ine the units of analysis in order to contextually shed light on 
how agency operates in various cases by various actors.
A noteworthy general point to consider relates to the position of third 
parties in interaction between Africa and the BRI. Because of misperceptions 
about Africa’s relatively ‘weak’ position vis-à-vis China, third parties have 
intervened on behalf of Africa and sought to ‘warn’ Africa about ‘doing busi-
ness with China’. While these warnings are in many instances warranted, the 
underpinning rationale that drives these prescriptions often comes from a 
paternalistic narrative that, for Africa, is far too well known. African actors 
have (in most part) recognized the risks that they run and the consequences 
that they may face. Negating African agency in relations between China and 
Africa, and in African engagement with the BRI in particular, places Africa 
in a voiceless position where the continent very quickly becomes ‘spoken for’. 
Similarly, assuming a lack of agency on the part of African actors has led 
to an ‘interventionist’ approach to China-Africa relations from third-party 
states that position themselves as neutral arbiters. It is important to caution 
against this paternalistic approach. This is especially so considering the his-
torical position that Africa has occupied in the international system, which 
has rendered many an African actor particularly sensitive to unsolicited 
‘advice’ or attempts to ‘save’ them from threats. The way third-party states 
understand how Africa conducts its international relations and the various 
actors, agents, and structural constraints involved, necessarily impacts the 
way these states then relate to Africa. It is important that we also understand 
what makes China-Africa relations ‘tick’. These relations can be seen as a 
form of South-South cooperation that is increasingly taking centre stage 
in international politics. These relations are becoming the ‘new’ grounds 
upon which the international system is being built. Understanding such 
cooperation therefore helps to understand and forecast the future trends 
of international relations and the central issues, challenges, and areas for 
cooperation and synergy that may come into play.
As a f inal consideration: In a world where global challenges such as the 
recent COVID-19 pandemic have demonstrated the need for coordinated 
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regional responses, it has become all the more important to grasp the 
interaction of regional actors with initiatives such as the BRI. Actors across 
diverse regions exercise agency in various ways, while often facing structural 
constraints. These are important considerations when formulating construc-
tive policy. Considering the goals of increased connectivity presented by the 
BRI, the current pandemic presents a new reality from which to assess these 
goals, their desirability, and their viability. In order to assess these things, 
the nuances of regional actors should be closely examined. Recent events 
will undoubtedly have an impact on the direction of the BRI (particularly 
the challenges and opportunities of increased connectivity), making it all 
the more important to understand regional agency in its multiple forms.
Conclusion
This introductory chapter has endeavoured to move away from conventional 
analyses of China-Africa relations and Africa’s engagement with the BRI. 
In doing so, it has sought to highlight some of the key considerations and 
challenges of studying African agency. Understanding agency at its most 
basic level as the act of holding specif ic interests and goals by a range of 
actors allows for a non-normative approach to investigating a wide range 
of actors, interests, and processes. Considering these avenues for exploring 
African agency, this chapter has aimed to interrogate African agency from 
a value-free position. It does so by not assuming that agency is necessarily 
a form of resistance.
Importantly, when exploring African agency vis-à-vis the BRI, the interests 
of actors are key. This requires dismantling assumptions about the desir-
ability of the BRI as a project. It also requires challenging assumptions 
about the ‘power’ or ‘hold’ that China may have over Africa and assumptions 
that there is a lack of agency on the part of African actors. This ought to be 
explored as part of the frequent neglect of Africa as an active player in the 
geopolitical power struggles between the ‘West’ and ‘China’. Africa is often 
caught in the middle of this ‘new Cold War’. Instead, taking seriously Africa’s 
role, position, and contribution towards the BRI may help us illuminate 
what African agencies look like, how they are enacted, and their potential 
consequences. Therefore, drawing conclusions about whether engagement 
in the BRI or relations with China are ‘good’ for Africa should not be the 
main concern.
The following chapters will look at two cases of relations between Af-
rica and the BRI. The f irst will look at the Southern African Development 
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Community (SADC) as a regional organization. It will provide an overview 
of how this community conceives of agency and whether or not it is seen to 
exercise agency. The second chapter takes the case of Ethiopia and examines 
specif ic actors within this case and their projects that are connected to 
the BRI. As these chapters show, African agency exists and is exercised 
albeit in ways that may not always reflect the assumed responses to ‘China 
in Africa’. These multiple agencies demonstrate the need to contextually 
understand agency while having equal regard for the structural barriers 
with which agents often grapple. Locating agency in the African context 
is therefore an exercise in uncovering the multiple and creative ways in 
which agency exists.
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6 Parameters and Pathways




Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC) and its interaction with China through the BRI. 
The chapter explores the agency of African actors, specif ically the agency 
of SADC as a regional power. The chapter’s focus on the often-overlooked 
SADC demonstrates the reach of the BRI as well as the relevance of this 
project for seemingly ‘distant’ locales. The chapter takes a deductive 
approach to agency where agents are placed at the centre of the analysis 
and themselves demarcate agency. This agent-oriented perspective cir-
cumvents the paternalism of imposed def initions, placing def initional 
power with the actors themselves. The chapter argues this can provide 
the foundations of an open and empowered conversation on international 
relations.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, agency, Africa, Southern 
African Development Community, SADC
At this stage, the main focus should be on just maybe speaking up about 
opportunities in terms of what is it that we as SADC can benef it from strong ties 
[sic] with the Chinese and what is it that the Chinese can benef it if they get into 
formal ties with SADC in terms of cooperation.
– SADC interview respondent (2019)
Much of the research into China and Africa relations to date has focused on 
the characteristic bilateral relations between individual African states and 
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463727853_ch06
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China. Though this constitutes a large part of China-Africa engagement, 
this focus has overshadowed the study of the relations between collective 
bodies and China as well as the multilateral engagements of African actors 
with China. Exceptions are studies looking at the African Union (AU) and 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Delgado 2015; Eom et 
al. 2018; Ukeje & Tariku 2018). This bilateral focus in part reflects the most 
dominant and visible form of China-Africa engagement. However, it also 
relates to the scholarly goal of disaggregating China-Africa engagement. 
While generalizable claims about China-Africa relations from a macro 
perspective have their merits, particularly from the perspective of broader 
continental commonalities, scholars have underscored the importance of 
looking at a wider range of actors in order to more holistically ascertain 
the range of agendas, relations, and interactions that exist beyond the 
state level (Brautigam 2009; Mohan & Lampert 2013). This has led to an 
expansion of research agendas to include the analysis of the relations that 
African cities, local communities, civil society, the media, and business 
have with China and Chinese actors (Rebol 2010; Samy 2010; Mohan and 
Tan-Mullins 2009). These inquiries often present a lens through which either 
support or opposition, and most usually opposition, to increasing Chinese 
presence on the continent is gauged (Lee 2009; HRW 2011). Though far from 
complete, this expansion of the types of unit being analysed has contributed 
to demystifying (or myth-busting) public discourses on these relations.
Despite this incremental inclusion of actors across the political, economic, 
and social landscape, less attention has been paid to engagement at the 
supra-national level – with the notable exception of studies looking at the 
African Union. Supra-national structures such as regional bodies have been 
noticeably absent from discussions on China-Africa relations, despite their 
important role as coordinating bodies for regional integration and develop-
ment on the continent. This absence might be attributed to the relative 
lack of power and success that these actors enjoy vis-à-vis the state in the 
African context. It might also be attributed to a dearth of knowledge about 
these bodies outside of specialized scholarship and expertise on regional 
bodies and/or Africa’s political economy (for overviews of regionalism in 
Africa, see Söderbaum 2009: 487-489; Postel-Vinay 2007).
A further focus of this chapter is agency. As discussed in the previous 
overview chapter, the specif ic question of African agency is frequently 
neglected or wholly absent in policy and scholarly f ields of international 
relations (Fisher 2018; Brown 2012; Shaw 2015). This is in part attributable to 
the Eurocentric nature of IR scholarship, which has treated African actors 
as mere objects of inquiry as opposed to agents in their own right (ibid.; 
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Seth 2011; Jones 2006). This trend is also visible in prominent perceptions of 
China-Africa engagement, where the emphasis has been placed on China 
as the all-powerful actor (singular) that acts upon an agent-less Africa 
(Quinn 2011; Van Mead 2018; US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
2011). Equally, the idea of Africa as victim to the ‘China threat’ is embedded 
in similar assumptions. Taking seriously critical IR scholarship, this chapter 
seeks to remedy the partial and Eurocentric nature of IR (and subsequent 
understanding of China-Africa relations) by reinserting African actors and 
their agency(ies) in scholarly analyses.
This chapter sets out to f irst establish the relationship of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) with China and the BRI more 
specif ically, and then, secondly, to assess from the agent’s perspective what 
agency entails. This study does not seek to present an imposed definition 
of agency that is traced through various processes. Instead, the chapter is 
focused on exploring agency from the perspective of the agent. This means 
that while it adopts a base def inition of agency as the ability of actors to 
take decisions in the interest of goals, this def inition is engaged loosely in 
order to leave room for alternative iterations of the concept.
Thus, while states remain indispensable players in China-Africa relations 
their dominance in analyses has overshadowed the range of actors that 
are noteworthy of attention. Equally, though African agency is undoubt-
edly challenged by structural constraints, as has been discussed in the 
overview chapter, the range of agencies at work has also been neglected, 
which has simplif ied analyses. This chapter seeks to tackle these superficial 
and simplistic characterizations of both actors beyond the state and the 
role of agenc(ies) in discourses on China-Africa relations. It does this by 
investigating the engagement of SADC as a principal Regional Economic 
Community, with China and the BRI.
There is a lack of knowledge about the Southern African Development 
Community’s relations with China and the BRI when compared, for example, 
with the East African Community (EAC). This lack of knowledge renders it 
a specif ically interesting case from which to investigate the issue of agency. 
Given the synergies of the BRI’s aims and the Southern African Develop-
ment Community’s regional integration goals, it is hoped that this case 
can provide insight into how agency is conceptualized and exercised at the 
African regional level. It specifically seeks to ascertain the Southern African 
Development Community’s agency since the release of the BRI white paper 
in March 2015. The chapter’s analysis is based on f ield research interviews 
conducted at the Southern African Development Community’s headquarters 
in Gaborone, Botswana, as well as complementary expert interviews with 
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individuals from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 
in Johannesburg, South Africa, which were conducted in October 2019.
China, the BRI, and Africa’s Regions
As has been covered in the preceding overview chapter, Africa was incor-
porated relatively late into China’s BRI. A notable development, however, 
has been the change in the wider continent’s previously relatively marginal 
role to the BRI since the release of China’s 2015 white paper. This white 
paper broadened the BRI project to encompass regions beyond the initially 
outlined geographical ‘confines’ (NDRC 2015). Given the common practice 
of retroactively including projects, the scope for the BRI in Africa widened 
(Breuer 2017). The result has been the signing of MoUs across the continent 
under the auspices of the BRI. South Africa – arguably the furthest away 
from the ‘traditional’ map – signed a MoU in 2015. Egypt signed one in 2016. 
Then both Kenya and Ethiopia signed MoUs in 2017 (Alden et al. 2017).
Relations between China and Africa’s regional organizations were previ-
ously evident (for example, the relations China has with the African Union, 
Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of 
West African States, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa). However, the BRI has brought the regional dimension of China-Africa 
engagement into greater relief and contributed to what Davies has termed 
‘China’s commercial positivism towards African economies’ (Davies 2008: 
152). Within the context of the BRI, East Africa stands out as a regional focal 
point, most notably because of its inclusion as an indispensable geographical 
node of the ‘original’ One Belt One Road map. Demissie (2018) describes the 
East African region as the foremost beneficiary of the BRI in Africa, where 
projects have focused on transregionalism and include ports, naval bases, 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and rail connectivity (ibid.: 74). In this area, 
for example, it is noted that economic integration has already increased 
between Ethiopia and Djibouti because of cooperation (ibid.: 75). Despite 
these successes, the broader experiences of African states with new SEZs 
on the continent have highlighted that ‘African governments have failed 
to think ahead to how SEZs can improve either their contribution to global 
trade or create links with global supply-chains’ (Okere 2019). These mixed 
results display the continued challenge of productive regionalism on the 
continent and raise questions about avenues for African development.
Along with other challenges of China-Africa cooperation, much of the 
onus to harness the opportunities presented by Chinese investment and the 
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BRI has been placed on African states and actors. Implicit in these perspec-
tives is the idea that China’s investments do in fact provide opportunities 
for the continent (Lin and Wang 2014; Kaplinsky 2013; Samy 2010). These 
observers suggest that while challenges persist regarding Chinese-African 
cooperation, the opportunities have not been effectively or adequately 
harnessed by all actors (Chen 2016; Ndzendze & Zumbika-Van Hoeymissen 
2018; Okere 2019). It is this assumption regarding the failure of African 
actors to harness opportunities that leads to the central question of this 
chapter. Specif ically, this question is: Why have actors such as the Southern 
African Development Community not harnessed the apparent opportunities 
provided by China despite China’s continued reiteration of the need for 
African ownership of relations?1 Undoubtedly a host of factors contribute 
to the success of China-Africa engagement and hinge upon how actors 
themselves def ine ‘success’ in relation to their diverse goals. This chapter 
takes the assumption that all actors hold agency (as has been elaborated 
on in the overview chapter) and takes the base def inition of agency as the 
capacity to hold specif ic interests or goals. Based on this, the chapter seeks 
to understand the Southern African Development Community’s agency by 
exploring its specif ic interests and goals as well as how the achievement 
of these is navigated through its engagement, or lack of engagement, with 
China. The chapter will also pay attention to how both structural and 
agent-related variables are seen by the agent to play a role in their exercising 
of agency.
Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
Within the African context regional economic communities (RECs) present 
vehicles through which regional integration is pursued. It is hoped that such 
integration will ‘enable the continent to negotiate more effectively with other 
economic actors in the global economy’ for the goals of poverty alleviation 
and broad-based development (Uzodike 2009: 28). Regional configurations in 
Africa such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) have featured in African political, social, and economic 
1 See, for example, Sun et al. (2017: 53), who cite a Chinese diplomat underscoring that ‘we have 
been clear on how we’d like to see our relationships in Africa evolve. What would be tremendously 
helpful for us is if we could get that same level of clarity from our African counterparts.’ Owner-
ship in this context therefore refers to the extent to which African actors drive the terms and 
conditions of relations.
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research, policy, and debate. However, many outside of Africa, or outside of 
specialized fields of African political economy and African development, are 
not necessarily aware of their existence or prominence. These RECs share 
common goals, all seeking to deepen regional cooperation and develop-
ment. However, they are trying to achieve these goals in different ways (for 
example, through either free trade, common markets, or customs unions) 
and have had varied levels of success as well as equally varied challenges 
(language, political systems, conflict, level of development) (Uzodike 2009; 
De Melo 2013; Anyanwu et al. 2014; Bronauer & Yoon 2018).
Despite the dominance of bilateral relations within China-Africa engage-
ment, BRI initiatives and close relations with China have also been harnessed 
at a multilateral regional level. This has been carried out most notably by 
the East African Community (EAC), which has geographical proximity 
to the ‘new Silk Road’. At the time of research, however, markedly absent 
from discussions about China’s engagement at the regional level (and from 
discussion about the BRI) was any discussion of the Southern African 
region and the Southern African Development Community in particular. 
At least, this was the case in public discourse. Despite countries in the 
region having strong bilateral relations with China (with the exception of 
Swaziland), anecdotal discussions revealed that not much was or would be 
happening between the regional body of the Southern African Development 
Community and China or the BRI. This f it the general assumption that 
China’s engagement on the continent (and the BRI more specif ically) is 
focused on areas with direct interest to China, despite evidence to the 
contrary (see Brautigam 2009). The lack of visible or notable engagement 
between the Southern African Development Community and China or 
the BRI has therefore been assumed to be the result of the region’s relative 
lack of direct interest to the BRI, when compared with the East African 
region. This is despite the fact that the Southern African Development 
Community is one of the largest regional economic communities with 
f ifteen member states. In light of the signif icant cooperation between 
China and regional economic communities such as the East African Com-
munity, this chapter was prompted to explore the reasons why there is a 
seeming lack of engagement between the Southern African Development 
Community and China, despite China’s strong bilateral ties with states in 
this region. More specif ically it was driven by the impetus to understand 
the role of agency (defined as the ability of actors to hold interests/goals) in 
this apparent lack of engagement and in turn to question how the Southern 
African Development Community’s interests and goals are supported or 
not supported by its relations with China and/or the BRI.
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Contested Agency
In the context of China-Africa relations, agency has frequently been equated 
with a normative ‘good’. This has meant much of the focus has been on an 
approach that is a form of activism and equates agency with grassroots 
movements and local communities (thus sub-state actors). This approach 
seeks to counter large-scale Chinese projects and Chinese influence on 
the African continent more broadly (whether this be with regard to non-
consultative projects that impact livelihoods of communities and drive 
communities out, or with regard to uprisings against unfair labour practices). 
The result has been that agency has become synonymous with activism 
that is against Chinese presence in Africa and broader anti-Chinese senti-
ment (HRW 2011; HRW 2006). Conversely, if and when agency is seen to be 
successfully harnessed by African actors in popular discourse, it is often 
directly related to the exercise of absolute or hard power. For this reason, 
agency is characterized as almost only ever being successfully exercised by 
corrupt and power-hungry elites. This take has become commonplace in 
analyses of China-Africa relations (French 2014; Heydarian 2015; Taylor 2008).
At the same time, there have been normative evaluations of agency that 
have interpreted all cases of African agency as a moral ‘win’ against the 
powers that be. Van Staden et al. (2018) note this, writing that
there is a belief that any act of agency by weaker actors within a system 
dominated by global powers is a normative good, because that necessar-
ily challenges the lopsided power hierarchy. This outlook complicates 
the analysis of African agency because it ascribes moral purpose to the 
conduct of African actors because they occupy a weaker position compared 
to major powers. (7-8)
In the same vein, Murray-Evans (2015: 1847) has stated that:
Much of the recent African agency literature conceptualizes agency as 
the ability of African actors to have a signif icant impact on international 
political processes. This literature also often equates African agency with 
resistance to externally imposed policies and ideas and perhaps even with 
the ability to bring about progressive or emancipatory structural change.
All these cases demonstrate the couching of agency in normative frame-
works, further complicating precise and conceptually clear research on 
agency. This reductive and often normative or political understanding of 
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agency is eschewed in this chapter, which looks at agency in as neutral a light 
as possible. It does so inductively, by using an agent-oriented approach, which 
views agency from the position of the agent. In so doing it does not presume 
a f ixed definition or normative stance on how, and to what end, agency is 
exercised. Instead, by taking an open-ended approach, the agent is placed 
at the centre of understanding how agency operates, underscoring agency 
as a context-bound variable that resides largely in the ‘eye of the beholder’.
This chapter considers the complexities, as well as the specificities, of Afri-
can agency(ies). These complexities, which include structural constraints, the 
centrality of identity, and history, have also been discussed in the overview 
chapter of this volume about the BRI and the African continent as a whole. 
For the examination of agency, regional economic communities (RECs) 
provide an interesting case of how actors with limited power (relative to 
the state) exercise agency in potentially creative and/or strategic ways. The 
question as to how the Southern African Development Community holds 
agency and what its constraints are is asked in an open-ended manner to 
allow for as wide as possible an understanding of agency. An agent-focused 
approach complements this inductive framework. In this way, it is hoped that 
the chapter can shed new light on how agency is perceived and exercised.
The Southern African Development Community’s Interests, 
Goals, and Challenges
This chapter def ines agency as the ability of an actor to hold interests and 
goals. It is therefore necessary to briefly discuss these interests and goals as 
they relate to the Southern African Development Community. Moreover, by 
adopting an agent-oriented perspective these interests and goals are limited 
to how the Southern African Development Community as an organization 
presents these itself. Equally it is necessary to caveat the discussion of the 
Southern African Development Community by pointing out some of the 
foremost challenges faced by the body that impact its autonomy.
Founded in 1992, the Southern African Development Community rep-
resents one of the largest regional economic communities (RECs) on the 
African continent (after the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Community 
of Sahel-Saharan States). The Southern African Development Community is 
comprised of sixteen member states. Its primary objectives are stated to be 
achieving development and economic growth, poverty alleviation, improve-
ment of life standards, as well as supporting socially disadvantaged groups all 
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through a process of regional integration (SADC 2012). The Southern African 
Development Community secretariat is thus the region’s coordinating 
body with a mission to ‘provide strategic expertise and co-ordinate the 
harmonization of policies and strategies to accelerate Regional Integration 
and sustainable development’ (ibid.: Vision, Mission & Mandate).
A key agenda is the Southern African Development Community’s Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which represents the opera-
tional framework for achieving specific goals set out in the Common Agenda. 
Importantly, the RISDP has a f ifteen-year span (2005-2020), concluding in 
2020. It sets out milestones and targets across a number of listed priority areas 
such as poverty eradication, infrastructure support, and environmental/
sustainable development (amongst others). Aside from the specif ics laid 
out in the RISDP, the Southern African Development Community’s focus on 
regional integration is best captured in its f ive directorates or themes, which 
are 1) Industrial Development and Trade; 2) Finance, Investment, and Customs; 
3) Infrastructure & Services; 4) Food Agriculture & Natural Resources; and 
5) Social & Human Development; all are supported by the Southern African 
Development Community’s specific policies and strategies (see ibid.: Overview, 
Common Agenda). Beyond regional integration, one of the goals of the South-
ern African Development Community is to develop the region to the degree 
that it can be competitive in international relations and the world economy. 
Regional integration, the establishment of a vision of a shared future, and 
the creation of a regional community are cited as necessary components to 
achieve this broader goal (SADC 2012: Vision, Mission & Mandate).
Specifically, the Southern African Development Community ‘has identified 
infrastructure as one of the major contributing factors for economic growth 
and poverty reduction in the region. The present state of infrastructure as 
well as the infrastructure gap between the Southern African Development 
Community region and the more developed countries constitutes a serious 
handicap to the region’s production and competitiveness’ (ibid.: Project 
Preparation Financing). This is captured in the Regional Infrastructure 
Development Master Plan (RIDMP) of 2012. This plan underscores the impor-
tance placed on infrastructure development as a fundamental cornerstone 
of regional integration (ibid.: RIDMP Executive Summary).
Interviews
In the following section, the chapter provides a thematic discussion of the 
key concepts that emerged in the range of open-ended interviews conducted 
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with off icials from the Southern African Development Community as 
well as experts at the South African Institute of International Affairs in 
October 2019. The interviews were open-ended to give interviewees the 
broadest possible scope to address issues related to relations between China 
and the Southern African Development Community, to discuss challenges 
faced by the Southern African Development Community, as well to speak 
about the question of agency. The four main themes focus on the Southern 
African Development Community’s interests, the nature, and modes of 
engagement between the Southern African Development Community and 
its partners, and structural considerations.
Interests
As a point of departure, the Southern African Development Community 
off icials that were interviewed felt it necessary to extensively outline the 
organization’s structure and priority areas. They underscored that industri-
alization, infrastructure, peace and security, social and human development 
were the main focal points. They mentioned that the organization was in the 
process of developing strategies for after the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan ends in 2020 that would maintain the same priorities 
for the region. The interviewees stated that infrastructure was unique in its 
nature, being particularly capital intensive and thus requiring signif icant 
f inancing. However, they suggested that this capital-intensive nature of the 
sector was not particular to the Southern African Development Community 
region, but was an industry-wide reality. One of the respondents noted 
that ‘we give a lot of importance to infrastructure development’ and the 
idea of ‘infrastructure in support of regional integration’ (SADC interview 
2019). They further indicated the centrality of this area to the Southern 
African Development Community’s interests. The overlapping interest in 
infrastructure of Chinese investments in Africa and the Southern African 
Development Community was mentioned, underscoring the importance 
attributed to common interests. Despite this overlap, the respondents 
mentioned that for any project to qualify for f inancing, it ‘must link with 
the priorities of the region […] in a way that benefits the region’ (ibid.). The 
fact that this was reiterated on several occasions shows the importance 
that SADC places on seeing that its interests are fulf illed.
The importance of quality support was also emphasized by several of the 
interviewees. This perhaps relates to the commonly held belief about the 
poor-quality projects deriving from China (Farrell 2016). The kind of quality 
control that is carried out on new projects includes resource mobilization 
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checklists and involves a technical review of support and legal units, as 
well as a review of the resource mobilization allocation framework. The 
interviewees noted that at the Southern African Development Community: 
‘we have a very structured engagement mechanism’ (ibid.). They reiter-
ated that not just any project would be taken on but that strict guidelines 
had to be followed. They stated that the Southern African Development 
Community would not sign off on engagements that did not meet their 
very stringent needs. These decision-making capacities and forms of ac-
countability arguably allow for agency to be asserted vis-à-vis powers like 
China and provide the organization with a framework within which to 
pursue their interests. The weight given to this issue by the respondents 
emphasized that China is unable to ‘buy’ or ‘intercept’ the priorities of the 
Southern African Development Community. This was captured in a state-
ment made by one of the interviewees, who said: ‘If it’s not aligned to [the 
Southern African Development Community’s] priorities, the cooperation 
would be aborted’ (ibid.). These regulatory frameworks guide the Southern 
African Development Community’s projects and should in theory allow 
for the pursuit of specif ic goals and interests. However, the reality of how 
this pans out in the context of cooperation between the Southern African 
Development Community and China remains to be seen. Nevertheless, these 
statements give insight into how the agent (in this case the Southern African 
Development Community) emphasizes the importance of both interest and 
mutual interest. As will be discussed later, despite this initial optimistic 
and arguably simplistic understanding, the interviewees also noted the way 
that effective collaboration depends on the interests of funders themselves.
In demonstrating their drive for cooperation, respondents tended to 
express their position in terms similar to the following: ‘What is it that 
we as [the Southern African Development Community] can benefit from 
[through] strong ties with the Chinese? And what is it that the Chinese 
can benefit [from] if they get into formal ties with [the Southern African 
Development Community] in terms of cooperation?’ (ibid.). These kinds of 
statements display an approach that focuses on what each party can get out 
of cooperation. This ‘win-win’ focus – though never explicitly mentioned 
as such – was evident throughout the discussions. Statements relating to 
this revolved around the importance of ensuring that both parties see 
their interests met. This indicates that the Southern African Development 
Community sees their relations with China as being mutual cooperation, 
as opposed to being zero-sum. The interviewees therefore challenged the 
idea that African actors are worse off in their cooperation with China. 
Instead, these interviewees reiterated the importance of seeing the benefits 
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of cooperation for African actors: ‘At this stage, really, it would be more 
useful to focus more on the opportunities’ (ibid.).
In relation to the issue of interests, the interviewees also remarked that 
it was no longer feasible to simply bring funds into Africa. They said that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) now also needed to contribute to socio-
economic development. It might do this, for example, by linking African 
small- and medium-sized enterprises into investors’ value chains. While 
it remains too early to tell whether or not China-Africa cooperation will 
contribute to socio-economic development in this way, the fact that the 
interviewees raised this point relates to the idea of agenda setting through 
the articulation of interests. This agenda-setting role was mentioned by the 
interviewees as central to agency. One of the experts interviewed remarked 
that the African continent and the Southern African region are at a critical 
juncture, where structural factors such as ‘rapidly expanding markets, 
maturing middle classes [and the new] continental free trade agreement’ 
(expert interview 2019b) are being leveraged. This allows for greater agency. 
The fact that Africa is going through a critical period, combined with the 
fact that the markets of Europe, North America, and increasingly Asia are 
highly saturated, has placed the region in a better negotiating position, 
creating increased room for African actors to exercise agency. In this way, it 
might be argued that global structural shifts are demonstrating the impact 
of structural change on agency.
Modes of Engagement
The Southern African Development Community respondents placed a strong 
emphasis on the priorities, resource mobilization strategies, and processes 
of the organization. However, they also mentioned that ‘China is more open 
in terms of modalities, unlike the other partners [where] you have a lot of 
rules to follow, and processes’ (ibid.). They therefore suggested that they saw 
relations with China as offering a degree of f lexibility, or at least a range 
of options that would seemingly give the Southern African Development 
Community room to manoeuvre. What precisely these modalities would 
entail and look like in the context of engagement with China (given the 
Southern African Development Community’s own regulatory frameworks) 
was, however, not clear, in part due to the fact that relations are still in a 
relatively early stage.
The interviewees mentioned that coordination between the Southern 
African Development Community and China ‘is still young in terms of 
achievements […] [but we have] strong ties with the Chinese partners, with 
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Chinese stakeholders, and the Chinese government’ (ibid.). The relative 
newness of these relations means that, while more combative assertions of 
agency grounded in competing or incompatible interests could character-
ize future engagement, this early stage of engagement has thus far only 
dealt with seemingly superf icial compatible interests. When probed for 
possible points of incompatibility, the interviewees made clear that it was 
not productive to focus on the challenges as they had not experienced 
any to date. Instead, they were far more optimistic and focused on the 
opportunities that China and the BRI could bring to the project of regional 
integration.
Despite the recent nature of engagement, and in contrast to the assump-
tion that the Southern African Development Community and China have 
no f irm relations to speak of, the interviewees noted that a memorandum 
of understanding (MoU) between the two parties had been in the making 
since 2016. More importantly, the establishment of relations and this MoU 
has been a process largely driven by the Southern African Development 
Community and not by China. The interviewees suggested that the apparent 
lack of commitment, and the fact that a MoU had not yet been signed, was 
a consequence of logistics rather than the existence of conflicting views, 
troubled negotiations, or a lack of interest on the part of the Southern African 
Development Community. This contrasts with the perception that the 
Southern African Development Community has been lacklustre in harness-
ing the potential opportunities that Chinese investment and cooperation 
provides. One interviewee, underscoring the drive to cooperate on the part 
of the Southern African Development Community, remarked that ‘once the 
MoU is signed off icially, then we will start aggressive engagement with 
China’ (ibid.). While a MoU is meaningful to signal cooperative intent, how 
engagement concretely plays out will also be signif icant.
One of the experts interviewed noted differences in how the BRI was 
conceptualized, as either predominantly commercial or strictly political, 
suggesting that these differences necessarily ref lected the interwoven 
nature of business and politics in China (expert interview 2019a.). This way 
that the BRI combines business and politics was seen by some interviewees 
as having a bearing on agency. In this view, China-Africa relations (under 
the BRI and beyond) have come to represent a unique form of engagement, 
different to Africa’s engagement with traditional platforms or partners 
such as the European Union. Though international relations will always 
consist of a mixture of politics and business, China is seen as qualitatively 
distinct from traditional partners, particularly because of its avoidance 
of political reform in the form of political conditionality. This different 
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political approach by China arguably affords a greater degree of agency for 
actors such as the Southern African Development Community in Africa. 
However, whether or not the Southern African Development Community is 
able to leverage this greater potential for agency, considering the structural 
impediments (as will be covered in the following section), is another question 
altogether. It is a question that the interviewees largely felt was too early 
to answer, given the relative silence on the issue of the Southern African 
Development Community and China at the time of the interviews. Thus 
far it would seem the biggest assertion of agency has been the initiating 
of relations by the Southern African Development Community in order 
to pursue their own agenda and goals. This is contrary to the widely held 
assumption that China-Africa relations are initiated and driven by Chinese 
actors and interests (Mohan and Lampert 2013).
Interestingly, after f ield research interviews were conducted, there 
was a new development in the relationship. The Chinese government 
pledged the continuation of development cooperation with the Southern 
African Development Community after f inalizing the Southern African 
Development Community and China Framework Agreement, which was 
signed in October 2019 (SADC 2019). Beyond the Framework Agreement, 
which serves as a MoU, the Chinese delegation notably ‘extended an annual 
grant amounting to US$100,000 to the Southern African Development 
Community Secretariat to support its operational needs and implement 
activities that are in line with [Southern African Development Community] 
priorities’ (ibid.). While this contribution is towards the operational needs, 
it will be interesting to see what, if any, Southern African Development 
Community projects are f inanced by China in the future. It will be also 
interesting to watch how these arrangements differ, if at all, from those 
with traditional partners. How these are negotiated will reveal more 
about the Southern African Development Community’s agency vis-à-vis 
China and the BRI.
Although limited, these initial engagements have an important bearing 
on the question of the Southern African Development Community’s agency. 
They speak to a degree of ‘action’ on the regional body’s part. Despite the 
recent nature of relations, the initiation and pursuit of cooperation from 
the Southern African Development Community reflects the way in which 
the body has taken initiative in asserting its interests and agenda vis-à-vis 
China. Moreover, the Southern African Development Community’s apparent 
unif ied position in approaching China (which would require consent from 
its diverse and wide-ranging member states) speaks to a degree of active 
agency on the part of the regional body.
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Structural Considerations
The interviews also sought to explore the range of challenges faced by the 
Southern African Development Community as an organization. It was hoped 
to reveal ideas around constraints to agency. What emerged was a range of 
challenges mostly related to structural constraints – the limitations inherent 
to regional bodies, regionalism, and the process of coordinating regional 
integration. These limitations include such things as the need for a consensus 
between member states, as well as the often-cumbersome pipelines with 
regards to project preparation – from identif ication to bankable stages 
(ibid.). The interviewees mentioned the challenges presented by the scope 
of cooperation: ‘There will always be too much ground that needs to be 
covered’ (SADC interview 2019). These challenges are evidently more related 
to the intrinsic challenges of coordinating regional projects for integration 
and development. Projects that would fall under the category of cooperation 
with ‘China’ or the BRI appear to be no different in this regard. However, the 
interviewees did mention that China was ‘more open’ to different modalities. 
What precisely these different modalities were and how they would either 
complicate or ease processes was not clear, partially because of the young 
nature of these relations.
The biggest challenge that the off icials noted was the sustainability of 
programmes in relation to f inancing:
[The Southern African Development Community] is a member-state-
driven organization. We receive contributions from our member states 
to run the organization. But those contributions are mostly for the [the 
Southern African Development Community] secretariat coordination, 
not to implement our programmes. […] [M]ost of our programmes are 
still supported through donor support, which is not sustainable. (Ibid.)
From the discussions it was made clear that although the Southern African 
Development Community has its own set of priorities (not set by external 
partners), the sources of f inancing (i.e. f inanciers) in part dictate what 
money is spent. In terms of funding the main partner of support remained 
the EU, which is followed by German cooperation, and then there is the 
rest, which includes China (ibid.). The interviewees also mentioned that 
adequate interest from both sides was needed to set up a given project, again 
reiterating the centrality of compatible interests. The idea that China and 
the Southern African Development Community’s goals were complimentary 
was presented by the interviewees as an opportunity where both parties’ 
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interests could be met. A more in-depth comparison of EU and Chinese 
funding would be needed to assess if there is a difference in amount of 
room these two sources of funding provide for African agency. At f irst 
glance, however, it would seem that cooperation between China and the 
Southern African Development Community may provide more room for 
manoeuvrability than cooperation between the EU and the organization, 
or a different kind of agency. The cooperation between the EU and the 
Southern African Development Community is often constrained by the 
dictates of donor approaches (Buzdugan 2013; Hurt 2012).
The experts interviewed noted numerous structural challenges relating 
to the Southern African Development Community’s agency. These can be 
divided into three broad areas, namely historical legacies that the continent 
(and an organization like the Southern African Development Community) 
face, resource constraints, as well as the very nature of regional integration 
as a project itself (which was also mentioned by the interviewees from 
the Southern African Development Community). The issues presented by 
historical legacies were noted by the interviewees as being a continent-wide 
challenge. This is particularly with regards to the legacies of colonialism 
that have continued to have tangible effects on the pursuit of regional 
integration and continental development. It was mentioned that, particularly 
in infrastructure, different systems inherited from different colonial powers 
persist in countries across Africa. This presents structural and logistical 
challenges such as differing railway gauges, different legal systems, and 
different regulators (expert interview 2019b). As one interviewee noted, 
‘the whole concept of regional infrastructure is a massive challenge [in 
Africa]’ (ibid.). Agency on the part of a body such as the Southern African 
Development Community is thus inherently limited by the configuration of 
the African political and historical landscape. Historical factors were also 
highlighted as a key difference in the levels of success of the East African 
Community and the Southern African Development Community. The East 
African Community’s emergence was largely economically driven, in contrast 
with the Southern African Development Community, which emerged from 
very specif ic political rationales that initially sought to relieve the region 
of its dependence on apartheid South Africa. Corroborating this, another 
interviewee noted that the Southern African Development Community still 
has to ‘deal with the legacy of its creation’ (expert interview 2019d). This 
legacy presents a further structural impediment to the effective exercise 
of agency.
This ties into other distinct structural constraints of the region, when 
compared to the East African Community for example. The Southern African 
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Development Community constitutes a much larger geographic region with 
a wider mix of disparate economies and countries. The countries in the 
region range from states that are small and landlocked (such as Lesotho, 
Malawi, Swaziland), to states that are large but arguably unconsolidated 
(such as the Democratic Republic of Congo), to states that are large but with 
low population density (such as Namibia and Botswana), and f inally to a 
series of small island states (expert interview 2019c, 2019d). The dominance 
of the regional hegemon South Africa also presents a structural challenge, 
especially given the challenges that South Africa itself faces. Thus, while 
South Africa may enjoy a relatively diversif ied economy, the socio-economic 
challenges of unemployment and poverty remain a more immediate priority 
for the country. A challenge to the Southern African Development Com-
munity’s exercising of agency lies in the serious developmental and political 
challenges that each member state faces. Bilateral engagement with China 
and/or the BRI therefore remains valuable, whereas the ‘broader continental 
[or regional] dividend’ remains a structural challenge (expert interview 
2019c). Given the relative underdevelopment of regionalism in SADC, it 
is no surprise that pressing national concerns are often prioritized over 
regional agendas.
Another interviewee noted that the Southern African Development Com-
munity’s constrained resources were also a potential structural barrier to 
agency (expert interview 2019c). This relates largely to the lack of personnel. 
The result is a largely understaffed secretariat with an exorbitantly high 
workload (ibid.). This has made coordinating integration incentives between 
the middle- and low-income countries that make up the continent and the 
region even more cumbersome. Perhaps surprisingly, the interviewees did 
not see the Southern African Development Community’s need to f inance 
itself as a constraint. Instead, they pointed to the lack of human resources 
and appropriate expertise need to provide project preparation (expert 
interview 2019b). This undoubtedly hampers the organization’s ability to 
pursue and achieve its goals.
Equally relevant, the interviewees also mentioned that regional blocs 
such as the Southern African Development Community were challenged 
by their limited mandate and the accompanying limitations on decision-
making power (ibid.). The very nature of the Southern African Development 
Community secretariat, which is a purely coordinating body, therefore 
presents a structural challenge to its agency. Nevertheless, if maintaining 
cordial relations and respecting member states’ wishes is in the organiza-
tion’s interests, then arguably the limited role of the secretariat does not 
necessarily impact the Southern African Development Community’s agency 
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to the degree assumed. This highlights the way that the competing interests 
of an actor may be an obstacle to effective agency.
One thing that was not mentioned by the off icials, but which was reiter-
ated by the experts interviewed, was that the agency of a body like the 
Southern African Development Community when engaging in the BRI should 
be considered in combination with the structure of the BRI or the lack of 
such structure. The BRI is a very ‘loose idea’ with ‘loose framing’ (i.e. not 
having a secretariat or headquarters) (expert interview 2019a, 2019d). This 
looseness means that the structure of the BRI does not act as either a major 
constraining or an enabling factor for the Southern African Development 
Community’s agency. This will also be affected by any changes to the BRI 
and its functioning.
The specif icities of the African context were also noted as relevant to the 
Southern African Development Community’s agency. Interviewees noted 
that agency in Africa is often shaped by a lack of structural power and 
thus exclusion that can result in a ‘Global South version of agency’ (expert 
interview 2019a). An important takeaway was that:
[t]here will always be something with structural constraints. So one would 
need to def ine agency in relation to how it’s exercised in the context of 
constraints. […] one model that immediately comes to mind is a tactics 
and strategy kind of model. To a certain extent, this kind of global south 
agency always has a strong practical element. (Ibid.)
This form of agency also involves the idea of ‘strategic non-compliance’ or the 
ability to ‘block’ actions that are being taken. Here, agency has as much to 
do with ‘action’ as ‘inaction’. The above quotation points to the wide array of 
ways in which agency may be exercised, particularly in the face of structural 
barriers (expert interview 2019c). The interviewees made a similar point 
about the assumption that a ‘lack of coordination, unif ied governments, or 
lack of articulating what cooperation would look like necessarily means a 
lack of agency’ (expert interview 2019a). Instead, they suggested that these 
things might not mean a lack of agency. They indicated that the strategic 
choice of when to use institutional architecture to further particular interests 
‘itself could be seen as an exercise of agency or decision making’ (ibid.). 
From interviews with off icials from the Southern African Development 
Community it appeared that off icial frameworks would be used to ensure 
engagement suited the organization’s interests. However, as has already 
been mentioned, the type of arrangements made remain to be seen. These 
could very well be different from what traditional partners have pursued.
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Despite these constraints, all respondents reiterated that China and 
the BRI present a great opportunity for the region’s development. The 
preeminent challenge to agency would be the very nature of the Southern 
African Development Community’s secretariat with its limited mandate 
and authority:
[I]f we can agree on a very specif ic way that we want to trade with each 
other, and we as a region want to trade with the rest of the world, then I 
think we can start talking about real agency developing; agency in the 
sense of influencing the development dividends, the way we articulate 
our particular positions, the way we articulate our expectations, and the 
way we can insist that our expectations are met. The question for me is 
whether the SADC secretariat can play that role. (Expert interview 2019c)
In part, then, the call is for a ‘much stronger regional integration body’ that 
is able to move beyond the structural limitations of a coordinating body 
and this secretariat’s lack of independence – something which was also 
highlighted as an obstacle (expert interview 2019d). However, a question 
is whether this is possible, given the structural challenges that exist in the 
individual member states and have been described above. This remains a 
fundamental question and one that is not specific to relations between China 
and the Southern African Development Community. The main issue is not 
the dominance of bilateral engagement between China and states in the 
region, but rather diverging priorities between member states themselves. 
If the BRI and Chinese cooperation with the Southern African Development 
Community, given its focus on infrastructure development and structural 
transformation, is able to successfully incentivize national governments 
to prioritize and coordinate regional projects, then the Southern African 
Development Community, as a regional body, could be inadvertently 
strengthened. This however remains highly speculative.
Discussion
The interviews conducted for this research provided numerous key insights 
with regards to the main tenets of agency as conceptualized by off icials 
from the Southern African Development Community secretariat as well 
as experts in the f ield. Common concepts related to agency were leverage, 
influence, interests (and their articulation), as well as agenda-setting and 
decision-making power. The Southern African Development Community 
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itself emphasizes its interests as central to any engagement, supporting 
the idea that agency at its very fundamental level is the ability of an actor 
to possesses goals and interests. In relation to its engagement with China, 
the interviews reflected an active pursuit of interests, related to the task 
of exercising agency.
What is clear from the interviews is that beyond the formulation, articula-
tion, and pursuit of interests, there exists a strong relational component to 
understanding the Southern African Development Community’s agency. 
Most notably, the different nature and modes of engagement between Africa 
and China, when compared to Africa and traditional powers, results in differ-
ent types or expressions of agency, as either conflicting, complementary, or 
a mix of both. At this stage, China is presented by those participating in the 
cooperation as holding (mostly) complementary goals and interests, which 
has resulted in a more inconspicuous form of agency. This relational dimen-
sion of interests and their compatibility emerged from the interviews as a 
key consideration in understanding agency. The tendency within research 
to overlook how agency might still be being exercised when the interests of 
actors are synergistic, or overlap, has narrowed the understanding of agency. 
A preliminary hypothesis for future research would be that overlapping 
interests, such as the interests which lie behind Chinese BRI investments and 
the Southern African Development Community’s goals, present greater scope 
for agency, particularly on the part of the more structurally constrained 
actor, which in this case is the Southern African Development Community. 
This arguably affects the effectiveness of agency positively. The inverse would 
be that more disparate and conflicting interests, such as the interests of 
the EU and the Southern African Development Community’s goals, when 
in combination with structural constraints, act to limit the effectiveness 
of agency, particularly on the part of the structurally constrained actor.
Furthermore, the interviewees discussed at length numerous structural 
factors that impede scope for exercising effective agency. There are various 
kinds of structural constraints. However, what emerged as an interesting 
point is the way in which China’s engagement (through the BRI) could 
potentially alleviate some of these constraints. While it remains too early 
to tell, future engagement will demonstrate how effectively the Southern 
African Development Community’s agency has worked to secure its goals 
and interests. Here the BRI may contribute to achieving these goals through 
its focus on key priority areas such as infrastructure. Equally, because of 
the loose nature of the BRI itself, this platform may provide increased room 
for the Southern African Development Community to effectively achieve 
its goals.
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Important aspects, mentioned in both the interviews with the Southern 
African Development Community off icials and the experts, were f inanc-
ing and agenda setting. While the EU remains the largest funder of the 
Southern African Development Community, how this funding differs 
from that provided by other funders, as well as the specif ics of relations 
between the EU and the Southern African Development Community, are 
key considerations in understanding the Southern African Development 
Community’s ability to exert effective agency. An equally important 
consideration is the nature of relations and the conditions of engagement/
funding between the Southern African Development Community and its 
funders. Part of this relates to the very nature of the Southern African 
Development Community’s regionalism project. This project is one that 
is grounded in economic liberalization (Hurt 2012). In the interviews with 
off icials, however, there was little reflection on the origins of the Southern 
African Development Community’s interests as well as the inf luence 
of partners on its model of regionalism. An interesting question now is 
whether, and if so how, engagement with China and the BRI will steer 
the organization or certain projects in a different direction. A related 
question is whether the Southern African Development Community’s goals 
and interests will be compromised in considering alternative pathways. 
Evidently, a degree of mutual interest is required in order for cooperation 
between the Southern African Development Community and its partners 
to be successful. However, to what degree this need for mutual interest 
differs amongst partners and how that affects the effective exercising 
of agency on the part of the Southern African Development Community 
remains to be seen.
A notable contribution that this research has made is to conf irm the 
existence of formal relations and the intention for greater cooperation 
between the Southern African Development Community and China (as well 
as the BRI). During the research for this chapter, the experts interviewed 
were not aware of the impending MoU. However, the interviews with of-
f icials from the Southern African Development Community came at an 
opportune time, just as the MoU was being f inalized. The fact that there 
is increasing cooperation between the Southern African Development 
Community and China contradicts the preliminary assumption that the 
Southern African Development Community has been apathetic towards such 
cooperation. It has been found that during this stage the Southern African 
Development Community has largely driven and instigated cooperation 
with China demonstrating an active pursuit of interests and thus agency. 
However, it remains to be seen to what extent the MoU is actionable, and, 
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more importantly, whether a truly regional dividend can emerge from 
this kind of cooperation. This, in part, will reflect the effectiveness of the 
Southern African Development Community’s agency. However, it needs to be 
assessed in the context of the many structural challenges the organization 
faces. This point was emphasized by one interviewee, who stressed the 
need for the Southern African Development Community to have a ‘very 
clear [and] tangible agenda or even a very concrete implementation plan’ 
with ‘very clear benchmarks’, considering the infrastructure def icit in the 
region (expert interview 2019c).
Beyond descriptions of how the Southern African Development Com-
munity works and what the main challenges to its interests are, the 
interviews were also insightful regarding how to best research agency. 
A noticeable challenge, however, was found with asking off icials about 
agency directly. When asked there seemed to be a conflation of the idea 
of agency as ‘the capacity for an actor to act in its interest’ with agency as 
‘an organizational body or branch’. This ref lects an evident gap between 
‘scholarship’ on agency and how agency is understood in ‘practice’ by the 
agent themselves.
The biggest divergence in the interviews was on the issue of f inancing 
as an impediment to agency. The experts interviewed did not mention 
financing as a significant challenge, whereas the officials from the Southern 
African Development Community did. That being said, the latter qualif ied 
the challenge presented by f inancing, saying that this was the challenge of 
satisfying the interests of f inanciers. Meanwhile, the experts interviewed (in 
particular, expert interview 2019b) focused on the issue of project prepara-
tion and the limited resources in this phase. The interviews with off icials 
from the Southern African Development Community relayed the various 
f inancing mechanisms and their respective challenges. Certain pathways 
for f inancing were highlighted as more restrictive with regards to agency, 
while others were seen to provide more leeway. Evidently, this has been 
recognized as a challenge by the secretariat and is a mechanism through 
which room for manoeuvre can be created.
One topic worth further exploration that emerged was the relationship 
between agency and effectiveness, or the question of how one might measure 
the effectiveness of agency. Important considerations and questions are 
1) formulating points to achieve/interests, 2) a seat at the table, 3) to what 
extent can one shape the agenda, and 4) to what extent can one take this 
beyond just an agenda item (expert interview 2019d). The issue therefore 
is not whether agency exists, but rather to what degree it is functional and 
effective, given structural limitations.
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Despite structural challenges related to the ‘form’ of the regional body 
itself, the current setup did not appear to hamper the ability of the Southern 
African Development Community secretariat to articulate its interests and 
set agendas. It would seem that ‘frequently there is an underestimation of 
who the African actors are, and particularly the fact that all these African 
actors are exercising agency in different ways and on different levels’ (expert 
interview 2019a). This also seems to be consensus among experts with 
regards to the Southern African Development Community and its engage-
ment with China and the BRI. If harnessed strategically, the BRI presents a 
vehicle through which structural challenges to the region’s development can 
be addressed, thereby complementing the Southern African Development 
Community’s interests.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the importance of an agent-oriented approach 
to understanding agency in the African context. Considering the dearth of 
research into actors beyond the nation state and their relations with China, 
it has specif ically focused on the supra-state level by looking at a regional 
body, the Southern African Development Community. By shifting the unit 
of analysis beyond the state, it has uncovered the range of considerations, 
opportunities, and obstacles that such regional bodies face in the realm 
of agency. Moreover, by using an inductive approach to agency, certain 
facets have emerged as central. These are the importance of interests and 
their articulation through agenda setting. A regional body such as SADC 
that pursues its interests by actively seeking collaboration with potential 
f inanciers such as China, demonstrates a degree of effective agency. Added 
to this, it emerged that, from the perspective of the agent, agency is shaped 
(constrained and enabled) by structural and relational factors that are 
context dependent.
Moreover, the particularities of agency within cooperative spaces and 
coinciding interests emerged as an often-overlooked area of agency. This 
is notable in the context of relations between China and Africa, and in the 
case of relations between the Southern African Development Community 
and China and the BRI that have been examined in this chapter. Relations 
between Africa and China provide alternative foci and thus alternative 
pathways to fostering collaboration when compared with relations between 
Africa and traditional donors. Highlighting the space for cooperation and 
complementarity, the Southern African Development Community’s agency 
164 STaCey lInkS 
in terms of its relations with China and the BRI is at this early stage limited 
to cooperative engagement.
This chapter has also highlighted the importance of conflicting and 
complementary interests as central to understanding agency. These aspects 
underscore the need to obviate normative judgements on what agency 
ought to look like if one is to truly ‘ascertain’ or locate agency. It concludes 
that alongside the question of whether agency is exercised there is also an 
altogether separate question that must be asked. This is whether agency 
is effective, that is, whether agency achieves intended goals or secures 
interests (such as in the priority area of infrastructure development). This 
chapter has illuminated why agency has not been explicit or apparent (i.e. 
complementary interests). However, it has also noted that the effectiveness 
of this agency remains to be seen.
This chapter has also identif ied the centrality of structure to the 
discussion of agency in Africa and in the Southern African Development 
Community specif ically. In this way, the chapter has provided a basis from 
which to further analyse the potential for China’s engagement with the 
Southern African Development Community, within and outside of the BRI, 
to contribute to structural transformation in the region. More specif ically, 
the ability of these new partnerships to contribute to the achievement of 
the Southern African Development Community’s goals and interests, which 
are regional integration through development, specif ically in the area of 
infrastructure, are areas worth exploring more. This will further advance our 
discussion of how effective the Southern African Development Community’s 
agency is. Equally interesting is the question of whether the eff icacy of 
agency in the case of the Southern African Development Community is 
dependent on shared interests.
This chapter has served as an introductory and exploratory investiga-
tion into the possible dynamics of agency within the Southern African 
Development Community and between the Southern African Development 
Community and China and the BRI. Shedding light on the parameters 
and pathways of agency is becoming increasingly relevant for how ac-
tors in Africa, in China, and in third-party states engage one another. 
Misconstruing agency not only obfuscates the complexities of how regional 
actors engage the powerhouse that is China and its BRI, but it also runs 
the risk of oversimplif ication. This chapter has hopefully managed to 
underscore the value of an agent-oriented, contextual, and relational 
approach to agency.
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7 Over Hills and Valleys Too
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Caribbean
Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente
Abstract
Chapter 7 focuses on the Caribbean, specif ically on Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago. Taking these two states as cases, it shows how the BRI’s 
f inancial muscle and infrastructural building capacity have transformed 
the Caribbean developmental landscape. Key to this transformation 
has been China’s capacity to launch new projects in heavily indebted or 
cash-strapped economies. It has resulted in some of the region’s traditional 
‘partners’, such as the IMF or the European Union, losing their undisputed 
capacity for influence and coercion. However, Sino-Caribbean relations 
have also helped entrench long-established structural and postcolonial 
impediments for development. The chapter argues the BRI represents 
another iteration of neoliberal business-centric development in the region 
and so does not produce qualitative socio-economic change.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, agency, Caribbean, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago
Few regions in the world can claim relations with China that are as mul-
tifaceted and complex as those currently held by the Caribbean. Despite 
its small population of just about 46 million inhabitants, scattered around 
sixteen sovereign states and seventeen dependent territories, the Carib-
bean contains not only exporters of natural resources, economies with a 
manufacturing base, and world-class tourism destinations, but also a mix 
of high-, mid- and low-income economies. It is also home to f ive states 
that do not off icially recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC); one 
of the few remaining communist regimes in the world; and the two major 
destinations for Chinese investment in the world, if we exclude Hong Kong, 
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463727853_ch07
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the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands.1 Consequently, the region 
occupies a curious position in relation to China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI)2: commercially, it is an almost insignif icant periphery, albeit one full 
of infrastructural investment opportunities following decades of economic 
impasse; f inancially, it is at the core of many crucial operations, channelling 
Chinese investments and guarding the fortunes of Chinese elites; geopoliti-
cally, it is an area of logistical importance due its proximity to the Panama 
Canal, and is also a potential minefield right at the centre of the unilaterally 
designated ‘backyard’ of the United States; diplomatically, it represents 
China’s last frontier in the battle with Taiwan over international recognition.
In this chapter, I will focus on China’s relations with the fourteen sov-
ereign states that are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 
I choose this focus because the diversity of relations would make it too 
complex to cover all of the Caribbean within one cohesive in-depth analysis. 
From this vantage point, the chapter argues that the BRI has signif icantly 
shifted the hierarchies of development in the Caribbean, but it has done so 
without necessarily altering the region’s broad developmental trajectory. In 
particular, the BRI has allowed regional economies to triangulate beyond a 
few traditional Western ‘partners’ (a generous word in this context) in search 
of better f inancing deals. However, despite broadening the developmental 
landscape, the BRI has also contributed to a narrow developmental hori-
zon. The BRI’s infrastructural focus has done little to reverse the region’s 
structural dependence on the world market, the unequal postcolonial 
socio-economic order within Caribbean societies, or the prevalence of 
neoliberal business-centric understandings of development among local 
political elites. Whereas these are issues that can be attributed to the 
historical preconditions and contemporary political agency within the 
region, BRI projects have helped to perpetuate these trends by discouraging 
transparent, accountable, and participatory development approaches. This 
chapter also contends that the failure of the BRI projects to broadly improve 
socio-economic conditions in the Caribbean has resulted in an increased 
backlash from a wide range of social actors in precisely those countries where 
the BRI has been most successful in advancing Chinese business interests.
1 Forty per cent of all the assets managed in the British Virgin Islands are traceable to Chinese 
and Hong Kong capital, including rerouted investments of state-owned enterprises and offshore 
dealings by Chinese top off icials and business elites (Donovan 2018; Robertson 2019).
2 Rather than studying the BRI as an institutional initiative that requires countries to become 
formal signatories, I refer to the BRI more f lexibly as a political economic stage in China’s 
developmental trajectory characterized by the internationalization of the country’s construction 
sector in response to issues of domestic overaccumulation.
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This chapter draws on f ieldwork conducted over a period of more than 
f ive years in nine Caribbean countries, Taiwan, and the PRC. During this 
time, I conducted 83 interviews on China-Caribbean relations, held meetings 
with a number of local stakeholders, participated in regional fora, and 
collaborated with colleagues at the University of the West Indies to track 
and analyse China’s variegated engagements in the region. The chapter is 
organized as follows. The f irst section briefly reviews the history of (under)
development in the Caribbean to contextualize contemporary Chinese 
activities in the region. The second section provides a panoramic view of the 
different Chinese economic activities in the Caribbean, giving particular 
attention to the different stages of engagement, the relevant actors, and 
the preponderant types of investment driving the relationship. After this, 
the next two sections explore BRI activities in two countries: Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. A conclusion then summarizes the chapter’s f indings 
and core arguments.
Antecedents: A Drama in Three Acts
The developmental outcomes and geopolitical repercussions of BRI activities 
in the Caribbean cannot be properly assessed without considering the 
context in which they take place. A proper understanding of the Caribbean 
context needs to assess the repercussions of the colonial, neocolonial/
dependent, and neoliberal periods that are found within the region’s con-
temporary social configuration and international links.
These processes can be traced back to the incorporation of the Caribbean 
into the European colonial system in the f ifteenth century. They found 
particular salience in the eighteenth century, when European empires 
crafted a system of international production centred around Caribbean 
sugar. For Eric Williams, Caribbean plantation economies represented the 
f irst instance of globalization in the modern world, comprising slave labour 
brutally uprooted from Africa, European finance capital, trans-Atlantic trade 
routes, along with Caribbean production and European consumption (Wil-
liams 1984). Going far beyond the trade relations that different parts of the 
world had previously held, this complex commercial apparatus represented 
the world’s f irst attempt at globalized production. For the Caribbean, this 
resulted in a process of ‘passive incorporation’ into the world economy as 
plantation societies. This ‘passive incorporation’ would have fundamental 
repercussions for the Caribbean both in terms of its outward relations with 
the rest of the world and its domestic social configurations (Girvan 2009). It 
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would be impossible to review here all the different ways in which colonial 
history has shaped the postcolonial trajectory of Caribbean societies, but it 
would also be misguided to ignore the many living legacies from the colonial 
past. Amongst these legacies, three should at least be mentioned briefly. 
The f irst is how Caribbean sugar economies remained largely monocultural, 
dependent on external markets, and very vulnerable to external economic 
fluctuations following formal decolonization (Gumbs 1981). The second is 
how a sort of ‘epistemic dependency’ developed in relation to the imperial 
powers that had designed and managed the colonies from afar (Beckford 
1972). The third is the way in which domestic societies were, and in some 
cases still are, stratif ied following racial patterns (Bissessar & La Guerre 
2013).
Many of these features survived in more or less similar forms into the 
post-independence period. Indeed, critical scholars from the region and 
post-independence leaders clearly identif ied many of the impediments 
to development that had prevailed during the colonial years (Gonzalez-
Vicente & Montoute 2020). However, the various attempts to break away from 
structural and epistemic dependency encountered formidable opposition 
and were short-lived. The result was a perpetuation of said dependency 
into the post- or neocolonial period. In general, many newly independent 
states experimented with import-substitution strategies in the 1960s and 
1970s (ECLAC 2000). Some of these countries, such as Barbados, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago, developed a manufacturing base but were overall 
unable to truly substitute imports. Perhaps more radically, other countries, 
such as Jamaica, Guyana, and Grenada, experimented with indigenous 
forms of socialism. These experiments either ended up becoming something 
different (as in the case of Guyana’s economic nationalism under Forbes 
Burnham) or were crushed by the pressures of transnational investors 
or direct military invasion by the United States (as in Grenada in 1983) 
(Stone 1986). The oil crisis of 1973 also affected the f inances of many oil-
importing countries in the region. Meanwhile the debt crisis of the early 
1980s decimated the entire region, pushing many governments into the 
hands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It was therefore in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the neoliberal era 
began in the Caribbean. Jamaica, for example, signed its f irst two agreements 
with the IMF in 1977 and 1978. This initiated a profound restructuring of 
the Jamaican economy in the 1980s, which included currency devaluation, 
reduced government expenditure, and liberalization of prices and imports 
(Lundy 1999). While the IMF was initially able to force the region into 
a market-oriented trajectory (Kirton & Ferguson 1992), increasingly the 
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unfolding of neoliberalism would also rely on compliant regional leaders 
who saw no ‘viable alternatives’ to the new market consensus (Levitt 2009: 
192). This is curious, as the switch to neoliberal orthodoxy was not able to 
reduce the levels of indebtedness in most countries in the region, which 
instead soared and would soon top world rankings of debt relative to GDP 
despite the close attention these countries had paid to IMF guidance (ECLAC 
2018). Jamaica, for example, had repaid more than it had ever lent by 2013, 
but high interest rates kept the country among the most heavily indebted 
in the world. By 2009, interest costs consumed as much as 50% of Jamaican 
tax revenues, while this f igure has remained at around 30% since then 
(Clarke 2019). As a result, Jamaica’s budgets for education, healthcare and 
poverty eradication shrank (Dearden 2013). In general terms, discontent with 
IMF conditionalities and their impacts has continued to grow throughout 
the Caribbean (Black 2001). Yet the region has also been increasingly tied 
by debts and policy commitments that have effectively meant that the 
economic plans of many countries in the region have been actively drafted 
and supervised by international f inance institutions (Girvan 2012). Today, 
the economies of the region stand out for their high degrees of openness, 
dependence on a few export-oriented natural resources sectors and tourism, 
and reliance on foreign markets. This, on the whole, renders the region 
particularly vulnerable to exogenous economic shocks. It has also reduced 
the region’s international negotiating capacity as a block, despite the efforts 
of the Caribbean Community, which remains marred by a minimalist 
intergovernmental approach and a broad neoliberal allegiance (Payne & 
Sutton 2007; Grenade 2011).
All of this means that the Caribbean that China encounters in the twenty-
f irst century is one that in terms of external links remains structurally 
vulnerable to external shocks and is dependent on foreign markets. It is one 
where epistemic dependency is still apparent in the way in which regional 
economic policies are devised by Washington, DC-based institutions. Many 
countries in the region have attained middle-income status or above, often 
on account of enclave sectors such as tourism and natural-resource extrac-
tion. However, this status actually runs counter to their possibilities of 
accessing bilateral and multilateral development grants. Internally, the 
inability to develop economically has resulted in high levels of inequality, 
poverty, and vulnerability, with high unemployment rates also leading to 
a worrying rise of violence throughout the region (Pantin 1996; CDB 2016). 
The Caribbean is therefore a region that after decades of neoliberal ortho-
doxy seems ready to engage new partners willing to entertain unorthodox 
economic alternatives.
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The China Connection: A New Stage?
The relationship between China and the English-speaking Caribbean can be 
traced to 1806, when a vessel of the East India Company arrived in Trinidad 
with 192 Chinese immigrants brought to complement the then waning 
influx of African slave labour (Look Lai 1998: 22). The arrival of indentured 
Chinese workers would intensify following the abolition of chattel slavery 
in the British West Indies in the 1830s. As the Asian community grew, many 
of its members went on to play important roles in the development of the 
region throughout the twentieth century. Notable examples in high politics 
include Solomon Hochoy, the first Governor-General of Trinidad and Tobago; 
Arthur Chung, the first President of Guyana; and Eugene Chen, a Trinidadian 
lawyer who would befriend Sun Yat-sen to later become the foreign minister 
of the Republic of China. Beyond politics, Chinese descendants also left an 
imprint in Caribbean culture. Jamaican-Chinese producers like Vincent 
Chin and Leslie Kong helped to popularize reggae music, while artists like 
Edwin Ayoung succeeded as prominent calypsonians in Trinidad and Tobago. 
However, the links covered in this chapter are more recent and relate to the 
internationalization of Chinese capital since the start of the new millennium.
Just like many other regions in the developing world, the Caribbean 
started experiencing the rise of China in an indirect way. Through the 1990s 
and the f irst decade of the twenty-f irst century, global value chains started 
to re-centre around China, attracted f irst by an almost unlimited pool of 
inexpensive labour, but also gradually by the country’s logistical capacity 
and increasingly qualif ied workforce. This dealt a death blow to those 
Caribbean economies that still aspired to develop a manufacturing base – 
with the possible exception of the Dominican Republic. Competition from 
China became insurmountable, particularly following its ascension to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 (Bernal 2000; Padilla Pérez & Hernández 
2010). In parallel, China’s industrialization and its relentless urbanization 
process, the largest in world history, would increase the demand for natural 
resources and subsequently raise their prices, which facilitated a decade 
of economic growth in countries that export natural resources during the 
resource boom of 2003-2013. These two trends combined and pushed the 
Caribbean region to further retrench to its comparative advantages in a 
number of natural resources sectors and the tourism industry – two of 
the only niches in which it could remain globally competitive in a world 
economy that increasingly tilted towards China.
However, it was the arrival of Chinese capital in the Caribbean that f irst 
signalled an epochal change in the eyes of many observers. Chronologically, 
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we can distinguish three periods of Chinese investment and f inancial activ-
ity in the Caribbean. The first period, running up until 2007, involved limited 
activity, most of which was in relation to the PRC’s battle for diplomatic 
recognition with Taiwan. As part of its ‘dollar diplomacy’, the Chinese 
government granted concessional loans and gifts to persuade countries that 
still held diplomatic relations with Taiwan, like Grenada and Saint Lucia, 
to switch their allegiance. Saint Lucia switched back its ties to Taiwan in 
2007, much to the chagrin of Beijing. A number of Chinese construction 
f irms landed in the region to build stadiums for the 2007 Cricket World Cup. 
These projects could still be considered part of China’s ‘dollar diplomacy’, but 
they also marked the start of a second period in the relations. This period 
coincided with a general increase in Chinese outward investment throughout 
the world at the height of the ‘Go Out’ strategy, when a large number of 
Chinese companies internationalized in search of markets, technology, and 
resources (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011). In the case of the Caribbean, a region 
with small markets that are heavily dependent on foreign technology, 
commodities were the main pull factor. Attracted by the availability of 
natural resources, a number of Chinese companies came to the region. 
They invested, for example, in Trinidad and Tobago’s oil sector in 2009, in 
Jamaica’s sugar industry in 2010, and in Guyana’s bauxite mining in 2012.
These trends continued in the third period of the relationship. However, 
this third period stands out for the way in which the BRI has financed a large 
number of infrastructural projects since 2013. Some of these projects are 
linked to traditional sectors such as tourism (e.g. resorts and hotels in the Ba-
hamas and Barbados). Others have targeted the expansion of transportation 
infrastructure (e.g. Antigua, Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica), the development 
of government buildings (e.g. Antigua, Trinidad and Tobago), the erection of 
convention centres (e.g. Antigua, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad), or more recently 
plans to develop industrial parks (e.g. Antigua, Jamaica, and Trinidad). Typi-
cally, infrastructure works are f inanced by Chinese policy banks such as the 
Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank. These have 
given loans totalling over US$6.6 billion in the broad Caribbean region, with 
Trinidad and Tobago (US$2.7 billion) and Jamaica (US$2.1 billion) standing 
out as the largest loan recipients (Gallagher & Myers 2020).3
The investment strategies behind these various projects involve both geo-
political, developmentalist, and market rationales. To unpack these strategies, 
it is useful to first consider the different actors involved and then to consider 
the types of investment. Larger actors, such as the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
3 Some estimates put the total amount at 8.9 billion since 2000 (Minto 2019).
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Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, as well as China’s policy banks and a few 
major state-owned enterprises, decide their investment strategies based on both 
economic and political considerations. As discussed above, a great geopolitical 
driver of China’s relations with the Caribbean is the One-China policy. Through 
diplomatic manoeuvring and economic incentives, Beijing aims to ensure 
that those Caribbean countries that do not recognize the PRC (Belize, Haiti, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) 
switch their allegiance. Two developmentalist considerations – intertwining 
political and economic goals – are also relevant. First, Chinese policy banks 
have actively subsidized the internationalization of Chinese companies since 
the deployment of the ‘Go Out’ strategy in order to increase the competitiveness 
of Chinese firms. With the launch of the BRI, these banks have also extended 
loans to regional governments in order to create new markets for Chinese 
construction firms that are currently facing a crisis of overaccumulation within 
the Chinese market (Jones & Zeng 2019). Second, a number of major Chinese 
state-owned firms in commodity sectors understand resource procurement 
as both a market imperative and a state goal in relation to the use value of 
strategic resources such as bauxite in the Chinese economy (Lu 2020). Finally, 
other Chinese state-owned and private firms in sectors such as construction 
see their role as eminently market-driven, and their ‘logics of accumulation’ 
are in this sense quite similar to those of global private capital (Lee 2017).
A second way of unpacking the transformative potential of Chinese invest-
ments in the region is by analysing their distinct impacts and the ‘mecha-
nisms of accumulation’ required to set them in motion (Gonzalez-Vicente 
2020). From this perspective, we can distinguish three types of investment 
(Gonzalez-Vicente & Montoute 2020). First, we encounter investments that 
have a cumulative impact on regional development trends. These involve 
projects in sectors such as tourism or consolidated industries that export 
natural resources and so require little transformative activity and merely add 
to existing trends. Secondly, we have a number of Chinese companies that have 
ventured into sunset industries across the Caribbean, such as bauxite refining 
and sugar in Jamaica. The reasons why companies like the Jiuquan Iron and 
Steel Company (JISCO) in Jamaica can invest in sectors deemed unproductive 
by other transnational companies include their access to cheap credit from 
Chinese policy banks and the logics of accumulation described above that 
allow them to see some natural resources not just from the perspective of 
exchange value but from that of use value. Other reasons are that they have 
a different time logic as they are not tied by the immediate pressures to 
generate shareholder value, as well as their capacity to cut labour costs with 
the use of Chinese workers who are paid lower wages and work longer hours.
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Third, the quest for markets for Chinese construction firms that drives the 
BRI has introduced an innovative ‘mechanism of accumulation’ in the region 
(Gonzalez-Vicente 2020). China’s ‘state-coordinated investment partnerships’ 
combine the various business and political rationales described above 
(Gonzalez-Vicente 2019). These arrangements involve the diplomatic branches 
of the Chinese government that negotiate with their local counterparts, 
policy banks that extend credits to host countries, a Chinese state-owned 
construction company that gets paid to complete the project, and sometimes 
a second company that will manage the project or circulate the resources 
used to pay for it. Crucially, these arrangements allow host governments 
to pay for the projects with a variety of arrangements. They might pay for a 
project, for example, with the future production of a resource or with conces-
sions of land. Former Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding explained 
how this has allowed heavily indebted economies to undertake necessary 
infrastructural works without increasing their debt burden or needing to 
agree to onerous macroeconomic conditionalities (Golding 2018). In this 
way, the arrival of Chinese investors in the Caribbean has created room 
for regional leaders to triangulate between economic partners, expanding 
investment despite the high debt burdens of many regional economies.
However, Chinese investments have also been the subject of critique. 
Scholars, the media, opposition politicians and a number of civil society 
actors have raised questions about the low levels of transparency in Chinese 
negotiations and the mounting debts that Caribbean economies now face 
after taking numerous Chinese loans. They have also raised concerns about 
poor labour standards, incomplete or low-quality projects, environmental 
impacts, and the prospects for broad socio-economic development on the 
back of an infrastructure-focused blueprint. The issue of low transparency 
has been a matter of concern throughout the Caribbean, as the type of 
government-to-government agreements promoted by Chinese policy banks 
entails high degrees of secrecy, sidelines debates on the need for BRI projects 
in the f irst place, prevents civil society scrutiny, and puts the procurement 
process under the control of a foreign entity (Raymond 2014). Piling debts 
are also a thorny issue in a region that has been held back by debt repay-
ments for decades. A crucial question here is whether new investments in 
infrastructure can act as multipliers and generate enough economic activity 
to make up for their costs and interest rates.
When it comes to labour standards, two issues stand out. On the one 
hand, some Chinese companies in the region have ignored previous labour 
agreements and customs that, although not protected by law, had come 
to be expected. This has been the case in places like Jamaica, which I 
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shall discuss in more detail below. On the other hand, the large numbers 
of Chinese workers that have been brought in to complete projects have 
limited the number of jobs available for locals, while also helping Chinese 
contractors to bypass local customs and regulations on wages and working 
conditions.
Delays and problems in the construction of projects are not unique to 
Chinese contractors, but those incurred by Chinese companies stand out due 
to the sheer size and relevance of some of these infrastructural endeavours. 
For example, in 2016 the project to build the Baha Mar resort in the Bahamas, 
the largest in the Caribbean, needed to f ile for bankruptcy after years of 
delays and problems with ‘shoddy construction work’ (Cohen 2016). The 
project had received a US$2.5 billion loan from the Export-Import Bank of 
China, and had China State Construction Engineering as its main contractor. 
With a f inal cost of over US$3.5 billion, the project would eventually be 
acquired and resurrected by Hong Kong’s Chow Tai Fook Enterprises, but 
the case still features prominently in many debates about the reliability of 
Chinese projects in the region.
Questions have also been raised about the environmental impacts of 
Chinese projects. Despite a number of controversies, there is no data to 
indicate that the environmental standards of Chinese companies are lower 
than those of other local or transnational f irms in the region. However, 
because they focus on the development of infrastructure and on the exploita-
tion of natural resources, the environmental footprint of BRI activities in the 
Caribbean is inevitably a matter of contention. In the broader perspective 
of regional development, it is also not yet clear how much socio-economic 
progress can derive from large infrastructural works. In other words, it is 
not clear how much the lives of average Caribbean citizens can improve on 
the basis of the BRI’s infrastructural blueprint for development.
In order to examine these issues further, the following two sections 
analyse the deployment of the BRI in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
the two largest economies in CARICOM. The two cases contain a variety 
of projects and as such they cannot be seen as an ideal type of any singular 
trend. There are overlapping trends in both countries that can also be 
observed in other regional economies. However, the case of Jamaica offers 
the opportunity to study in some detail the prospects of Chinese investments 
in productive sectors and logistics. Meanwhile, the Trinidad and Tobago 
case contains more examples of infrastructural projects associated with the 
hospitality industry, as well as the culture and sports sectors. In both cases, 
I focus on the trajectories of Chinese investments and the ways in which 
these are shaped by different types of local agency. The question of agency 
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has been extensively debated and documented in the literature on China’s 
overseas investments (Levy 2015). Scholarship has typically focused on 
identifying the actors that mould China’s global footprint, be these Chinese 
business and state actors or host governments and civil societies. Going 
beyond this, I contend that in analysing the forays of Chinese investments 
in the Caribbean it is also necessary to appraise the agency of other actors. 
We need to examine, for example, the role of actors such as the IMF and 
others that through decades have played a role in delineating the policy 
alternatives available to Caribbean states and crafting the political economic 
environment in which Chinese companies now operate. As such, agency 
is seen here as the capacity to shape developmental trajectories vis-à-vis 
contextual constraints, and in negotiation and conflict with the ideas and 
interests of other relevant actors.
Jamaica: Not an Easy Road
Perhaps more than any other in the Caribbean, the relationship between 
China and Jamaica has been shaped, and continues to be shaped, by the 
neoliberal era that preceded it. For decades, Jamaica has been crippled by 
one of the highest debts per capita relative to GDP and sluggish economic 
growth. The IMF’s structural adjustment plans did little to lift the island 
out of its situation of underdevelopment. Instead, the privileging of debt 
repayment over other social priorities has been identif ied as a main cause of 
the low economic growth, high unemployment rates, inequality, and vulner-
ability that Jamaica has suffered (Johnston 2013). Therefore, when Chinese 
companies came to the island at the beginning of the twenty-f irst century, 
Jamaica was a country desperate for new sources of funding to address a 
number of socio-economic maladies. However, a decade after deepening the 
relationship with China, Jamaica has not overcome its developmental im-
passe. While Chinese f inance and investments have reshaped the country’s 
international outlook, many of the problems developed in Jamaica’s recent 
history remain, and new challenges have emerged in the Sino-Jamaican link. 
To understand these trends, I will f irst assess BRI projects in Jamaica by the 
yardstick of their own business success, asking whether they have achieved 
what they originally intended to. After that, I will review the limitations and 
promises that such projects carry from a critical development perspective. 
Then I will ref lect more broadly on the geopolitical and developmental 
trajectory of Jamaica under Chinese influence.
182 RuBen Gonzalez-VICenTe 
From the perspective of business success, the BRI in Jamaica offers a 
mixed track record. First, there have been a number of projects that have 
not managed to lift off. An early investment of US$260 million by China’s 
Pan-Caribbean Sugar Company encountered a series of social and cultural 
barriers that hindered its bid to revitalize the sugar sector. Productivity 
remains low and company managers have floated the idea of closing down in 
the face of competition from countries like Thailand (Jamaica Gleaner 2017). 
Plans by the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) to build a trans-
shipment terminal in Goat Island were aborted on account of civil society 
pressures and concerns over environmental impacts (Jamaica Observer 
2016). This remains one of the few cases of successful societal organization 
against a Chinese project in the Caribbean. As such, it should not be seen as 
a failure in itself, but an exemplary case of how civil society can mobilize 
to shape developmental trajectories.
Second, there have been a number of projects that have been completed 
but remain underutilized. One of these is the North-South Highway, which 
is a centrepiece of China’s infrastructural campaign in Jamaica. The ‘Beijing 
Highway’, as the project is sometimes known, was successfully completed 
by CHEC in 2016 with a US$457 million loan by the China Development 
Bank. However, the highway is operating at limited capacity, as the toll prices 
charged by CHEC are unaffordable for a majority of locals (Foxcroft 2019). The 
utility and economic viability of other projects has also been questioned. For 
example, the Montego Bay Convention Centre, which was built with a US$45 
million concessional loan from the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank), 
is said to remain underutilized and has incurred significant losses after its 
construction (Radio Jamaica News 2012). The case of JISCO’s investment in the 
Alumina Partners of Jamaica |(Alpart), which operates a bauxite refinery, is 
more ambiguous. JISCO was able to reopen the plant, generate employment, 
and significantly revitalize economic activity in the Saint Elizabeth area of 
the island. However, the refinery operations have been suspended for a period 
of at least two years since September 2019, when the company presented the 
government with plans to expand and modernize the plant. This has also put 
on hold plans to develop an industrial park in the surrounding area. JISCO’s 
business success will therefore depend on whether the modernization of the 
plant allows it to cope with the issues of low productivity encountered by 
previous investors, particularly against the backdrop of low aluminium prices 
(Aluminium Insider 2019). All in all, from a business perspective, Chinese 
f irms have had relative success in the delivery of infrastructure. However, 
they have encountered problems when trying to put this infrastructure into 
use and when attempting to revitalize natural resources industries.
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If we go beyond measurement of the projects according to their stated 
goals, assessing them instead on their broad developmental impacts, a 
different type of question needs to be asked. Regarding labour, Chinese 
companies have generated a signif icant number of jobs, particularly in the 
construction sector. While this has helped to address problems of unemploy-
ment and exclusion, the quality of Chinese jobs has helped to perpetuate 
trends of exploitation. This is clear in JISCO’s operations in Saint Elizabeth. 
The Nain area of Saint Elizabeth had lain semi-abandoned for almost a 
decade until operations restarted in the plant under Chinese ownership. 
JISCO rehired 700 local workers to operate the plant. However, the plan to 
make the refinery productive included signif icant cuts in labour costs. This 
involved the casualization of local workers, who unlike in the past are now 
hired with f lexible short-term contracts and salaries that are lower than 
those received in 2009. A signif icant contingent of Chinese workers joined 
the operation. Chinese workers live in compounds next to the ref inery, 
receive lower salaries, and are possibly the main targets of exploitative 
labour practices.
A similar case is found on Chinese construction sites. Chinese infrastruc-
tural projects often require the creation of ‘spaces of exception’ that allow 
the transfer of Chinese labour practices into Jamaica (Gonzalez-Vicente 
2019). For example, Chinese workers are often paid Chinese salaries into 
Chinese accounts, bypassing local labour regulations. Meanwhile, Chinese 
companies benefit from levies on equipment duties and other taxes. Jamai-
can workers have also complained about wages that are lower than those 
provided by other local contractors. However, not all labour problems can 
be traced back to a uniquely Chinese way of running business. It is indeed 
the case that Chinese companies do not follow the salary scales negotiated 
between the Incorporated Masterbuilders Association of Jamaica and trade 
unions in the sector. Yet, in choosing to ignore these agreements, Chinese 
contractors are adhering to IMF-promoted f lexible labour laws, which 
impose no sector-specif ic minimum wages but a cross-sectoral minimum 
wage of about US$50 per week. As indicated above, the impacts of the BRI 
on labour issues in Jamaica have very much been shaped by preceding 
decades of neoliberal orthodoxy.
More broadly, Chinese investments have also generated debates about 
environmental sustainability, local agency and participation, transparency, 
and the ultimate developmental potential of infrastructural works. JISCO’s 
activities have been a key concern for environmentalists in Jamaica. Lo-
cal residents in the Nain area have been affected by dust blown from the 
ref inery’s disposal area, although long-term observers such as Richard 
184 RuBen Gonzalez-VICenTe 
Bernal have noted that ‘the residue from bauxite plants [has] been here 
since they were established 50 years ago by Canadian and American f irms’ 
(Foxcroft 2019). From an environmental perspective, Chinese f irms in 
Jamaica have mostly had a cumulative impact and do not stand out as the 
main drivers of environmental damage. However, when it comes to issues 
of local agency, participation, and transparency, Chinese investors do stand 
out for their poor performance. Despite allowing the Jamaican government 
to overcome its dependence on Western institutions and investors, the 
government-to-government, closed-door deals produced by the BRI have 
cemented a top-down, elite-driven approach to development. The agency 
and leverage devolved to the Jamaican central government has been used 
in ways that undermine participatory development. As a consequence, the 
adequacy of BRI infrastructural projects in Jamaica has not been properly 
debated (Gonzalez-Vicente & Montoute 2020). Central government elites 
have rushed to sign agreements with China, pressed by the urgency to 
create jobs and generate economic activity. Few of these projects seem to 
have signif icantly improved the lives of targeted benef iciaries. Chinese 
infrastructure has also not acted as a multiplier that has been able to generate 
economic activity beyond the construction sector itself.
All in all, the BRI has not offered Jamaica an easy road out of its 
decades-long developmental impasse. Chinese f inance and investment 
have boosted economic activity on the island and generated much-needed 
jobs in the construction and natural resources sectors. Yet these jobs are 
often precarious, and despite that fact that Jamaica’s debt to China has 
increased significantly, the country has not significantly addressed any of its 
structural and socio-economic challenges. From a geopolitical perspective, 
there is little evidence to suggest that Chinese companies act as Beijing’s 
political envoys. Instead, what we observe is substantial Chinese state 
support for the expansion of Chinese capital, in the form of soft loans and 
diplomatic efforts. This confirms the view that the BRI is driven by a crisis 
of over-accumulation in China and implemented by both state agencies that 
pursue a developmentalist goal and businesses that respond to a commercial 
mandate (Gonzalez-Vicente 2019; Jones & Zeng 2019).
However, despite the concerns expressed by US diplomats, Jamaica’s 
growing relationship with China has not drawn it away from its traditional 
allies. For example, Prime Minister Andrew Holness recently joined other 
Caribbean leaders at Donald Trump’s private club in Palm Beach to dis-
cuss a potential change of regime in Venezuela – a move that the Chinese 
government would be unlikely to endorse. More recently, in the midst of 
the coronavirus crisis, Jamaica once again applied for IMF loans. Finally, a 
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somewhat paradoxical result of the growing relations between Jamaica and 
China has been a relative decline in China’s soft power. On the one hand, 
political elites within the country have been very open to the immediate 
economic gains – and subsequent political capital – granted by an increased 
engagement with Chinese banks and companies. On the other, however, the 
very visible growth of Chinese activity in Jamaica has triggered an anti-China 
discourse that unfortunately has also at times translated into xenophobic 
attitudes by the general public and some media. If China’s growing economic 
might in Jamaica does not result in improved life standards for a majority 
of the country’s population, it is possible that increased engagement will 
lead to resistance rather than the embrace of a new hegemony.
Trinidad and Tobago: Ready for the Road?
Unlike Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago is a resource rich, high-income 
economy that ranks high in the UN’s human development index (UNDP 
2019). However, the country’s dependence on its oil and gas sectors has 
been traditionally associated with high levels of inequality, unemployment, 
problems diversifying the economic basis, and recurring vulnerability and 
poverty (Auty 2017). In the case of Jamaica it could be said that the BRI has 
a mixed track record on a project-by-project basis and has proved overall 
unable to lift the country from its developmental impasse. Meanwhile, in 
Trinidad and Tobago what we observe is a mismatch between what the BRI 
has offered to date and what the country would need in order to tackle its 
various developmental shortcomings. BRI funding has been directed at 
the construction of a number of buildings scattered throughout Trinidad. 
These have great visual impact but have not truly had a clear developmental 
function, whether from an economic or a broader social perspective. The 
recent plans to use Chinese capital to develop the Phoenix Park Industrial 
Estate in southern Trinidad seek to address some of the shortcomings of 
earlier Chinese investments. However, these plans have not yet come to 
fruition and there are precedents that suggest a cautious appraisal of the 
Phoenix Park’s developmental prospects. In order to further understand the 
relationship between China and Trinidad and Tobago, I will f irst evaluate 
the success of Chinese projects in delivering their intended outcomes. 
Then I will go on to reflect on whether these projects tackle the needs of 
the twin-island state.
The assessment of Chinese business success in Trinidad might begin 
by looking at a series of natural resources-focused investments that have 
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contributed to perpetuating the role of the country as an exporter of natural 
resources. One of these was a US$850 million investment by the China Invest-
ment Corporation to acquire a 10% share in Atlantic LNG in 2011. Another 
was an agreement in 2018 to export asphalt from Trinidad’s Pitch Lake to 
pave the runways of the Beijing Daxing International Airport (Ellis 2019). 
These are investments in sectors in which Trinidad has been traditionally 
competitive. As such they have run relatively smoothly. A second group 
of investments are those in the construction sector which successfully 
delivered what they had promised. Here we can include the construction of 
the National Cycling Velodrome, the National Aquatic Centre, the National 
Tennis Centre, the Prime Minister’s Official Residence (built with an interest-
free loan) (Stallings 2017: 81), the Port of Spain Waterfront, the Ministry of 
Education Tower, and the restoration of the Knowsley Building. All of these 
projects were completed by the Shanghai Construction Group (SCG), which 
is without a doubt the most active Chinese company in Trinidad.
SCG has, however, encountered challenges in some of its other projects. 
For example, the Couva Children’s Hospital remains emblematic of the 
BRI’s emphasis on physical infrastructure rather than content. The hospital 
needed to be repurposed as a ‘multi-training facility’ after encountering 
staff ing problems and other shortcomings related to the project’s design 
(Khan 2020). Some other announced projects have failed to come to fruition. 
These include, for example, a contract awarded to the China Gezhouba Group 
(CGG) to build 5000 ‘low-cost’ apartments. Trinidad’s cabinet revoked the 
contract after media and activists took issue with the costs of the project, 
with estimates putting the total cost at US$800 million – 30% above the 
rates usually charged by local contractors (Raymond 2019). Commentators 
also lamented the lack of transparency in the negotiations and the fact 
the agreement privileged a foreign investor over local contractors, with 
tax exemptions, an agreement to grant 600 working permits for Chinese 
workers, and full f inancial guarantees on the payment to CGG (Wilson 2019). 
Another interesting case is the scrapping of plans to develop a f ive-star 
Sandals resort in Tobago. The project would have involved China’s HNA 
Group, but was dropped by Sandals under allegations that the conflicts 
between Trinidad and Tobago’s two main political parties contributed to 
a discouraging business environment (Bridglal 2019).
These last two cases shed light onto a pattern that has emerged around 
Chinese investments in Trinidad. The mechanisms of accumulation 
advanced by the BRI have allowed the two main parties to engage in a 
battle to surpass each other’s infrastructural legacy. The NAPA-SAPA saga 
illustrates this trend quite well. The National Academy for the Performing 
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Arts (NAPA), an imposing structure adjacent to Port of Spain’s Queen’s 
Park Savannah, was commissioned by the Patrick Manning government 
(People’s National Movement, PNM) and completed by the SCG in 2009. The 
Figure 7.1  Interior of Trinidad’s National Academy for the Performing Arts during 
an event in January 2020, with the Queen’s Park Savannah and the hills 
of Port of Spain in the background
Source: author
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United National Congress (UNC) had been a vocal critic of the project, which 
incurred costs overruns and involved a potential case of embezzlement by 
the former chairman of the Urban Development Corporation of Trinidad and 
Tobago (Oosterveld et al. 2018). Soon after reaching power in 2010, the Kamla 
Persad-Bissessar administration (UNC) closed down the NAPA, claiming 
problems with the original design. In the meantime, the UNC inaugurated 
the Southern Academy for the Performing Arts (SAPA), an equally imposing 
structure in the city of San Fernando. San Fernando lies close to the central 
plains of Trinidad, where UNC votes have been concentrated since the 
1960s (Premdas 2004). SAPA was also built by the SCG, and as had been 
the case with NAPA, it was a top-down project developed without properly 
consulting local artists (Newsday 2010). NAPA would reopen in 2015, once 
the PNM returned to power, although only after the building was repaired 
at a signif icant cost, with parts of the compound, such as a 53-room hotel, 
still underutilized.
Projects such as NAPA and SAPA indicate that Trinidad and Tobago 
has not made the best possible use of BRI f inancing, privileging legacy 
infrastructure over potentially meaningful projects. For example, Trinidad 
experiences serious traff ic problems, with a deficient public transportation 
system and daily two-hour traff ic jams to get in and out of Port of Spain. 
Yet the possibility of harnessing Chinese loans towards improvements in 
public transportation has not been discussed, despite Chinese companies’ 
expertise in this area. The BRI has also done little to tackle perennial 
structural problems, such as lack of economic diversif ication and high 
unemployment rates. Following the shutdown of Petrotrin, one of the main 
employers in San Fernando, the government came to an agreement with 
the Beijing Construction and Engineering Group (BCEG) to develop the 
Phoenix Park Industrial Estate and a dry dock in La Brea for a cost of around 
US$600 million (Ellis 2019). If these plans materialize, the park will host 
ten Chinese f irms in sectors such as air conditioning, food processing, 
building materials, and communication equipment, and could generate up 
to 4,500 jobs (News.gov.tt 2018). However, despite a number of ceremonies 
to announce the project, construction work has been virtually halted. 
In interviews conducted for this chapter, local experts speculated that 
the government’s urgency to announce the plan had more to do with the 
August 2020 general election than with actual progress in planning the 
project, particularly given the urge to appease the population in southern 
Trinidad following the shutdown of Petrotrin.
All in all, the BRI has not truly addressed Trinidad and Tobago’s devel-
opmental bottlenecks, while the country’s debt to China has risen after 
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receiving loans for US$2.7 billion. The responsibility for many of the missed 
opportunities lies with the local government and its inability to direct 
Chinese f inance towards meaningful projects. This highlights the relevance 
of local agency. However, the BRI, as an infrastructure-focused campaign, 
also has limited potential to address Trinidad’s needs for diversif ication 
and for the creation of long-term sources of well-paid qualif ied jobs. The 
plans to develop the Phoenix Park could signal that Trinidad and Tobago 
and China are moving along the learning curve in their relationship, if the 
project delivers the 4,500 jobs promised. However, the precedents are not 
encouraging. It also remains unclear how Trinidad and Tobago will boost 
its competitiveness in sectors not related to or subsidized by the country’s 
energy sector.
Conclusion
The Belt and Road Initiative has generated a new wave of economic activ-
ity in the Caribbean, a region that had experienced an arduous cycle of 
debt and sluggish growth in the decades building up to its engagement 
with China. Some Chinese investments have gone into traditional sectors, 
and as such have had a cumulative impact. Others have helped to at least 
temporarily revitalize some sunset industries. However, the majority of 
Chinese investments have gone into the region’s infrastructural sectors, 
and have been facilitated by loans provided by China’s policy banks at a 
market rate. Overall, the projects that have seen the most success are those 
that have built into the region’s already existing strengths in the tourism 
industry and some natural resources sectors. Other infrastructural projects 
have become white elephants, in part due to a tendency by some regional 
governments to endorse projects that generate immediate economic activity 
and short-term jobs without seriously considering their long-term prospects 
vis-à-vis rising debt.
Importantly, Chinese f inance has allowed regional economies to seek 
sources of f inancing that do not impose the type of neoliberal conditionali-
ties promoted by institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank. While this 
could in principle suggest a potentially unorthodox development partner-
ship, this chapter’s f indings suggest that the BRI instead encourages an 
elitist and business-centric developmental rationale that dovetails with 
other predominant socio-economic trends in the region. The BRI eschews 
participatory approaches and relies on opaque government-to-government 
agreements, which has prevented Caribbean civil societies from playing 
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an active role in deciding what are the regional priorities or in designing 
projects that take into consideration the needs of communities. Thereby, 
despite its distinct format, the BRI in the Caribbean remains a campaign 
to open markets for Chinese investors, and its goals are hence remarkably 
similar to those of other transnational investors and Western-based institu-
tions. As such, the BRI has not been a panacea for the Caribbean and has 
instead helped to perpetuate the structural constraints that have historically 
characterized the region’s developmental trajectory.
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8 The Geopolitical Relevance of the BRI
The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway in Indonesia
Frans-Paul van der Putten and Mirela Petkova
Abstract
Chapter 8 explores the geopolitical signif icance of the BRI in the case of 
Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest country. It argues this region constitutes 
the geographical centre of today’s global great-power rivalry, in which the 
US and China are the key players. It was in the Indonesian capital, in 2013, 
that China f irst announced its ambitions for the Maritime Silk Road. This 
chapter asks which economic and diplomatic activities constitute the BRI 
in the case of Indonesia. It then asks what impact these activities have on 
China and Indonesia’s political relations as well as on Indonesia’s position 
with regard to China-US tensions. The chapter particularly focuses on 
Indonesia’s efforts to maintain strategic autonomy and on manifestations 
of great-power influence on the country’s foreign policy-making.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed 
Railway, Indonesia, geopolitics, strategic autonomy
Background1
The Chinese government envisions that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
will make a significant contribution to global development (NDRC 2015). The 
geographic scope of the BRI is correspondingly very broad and comprises 
most of the world’s regions. A particular aim of the Chinese government is to 
employ the BRI as a framework for international cooperation in the f ield of 
1 The authors are grateful to Nanto Sriyanto, Lidya Christin Sinaga, Hayati Nufus, Ardhitya 
Eduard Yeremia Lalisang, Evan A. Laksmana, Anita Prakash, Siswo Pramono, Shafiah F. Muhibat, 
Firman Noor, Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Simon Tan, Lily Sprangers, Florian Schneider, Richard Ghiasy, 
Nicholas Olczak, and Aljosja van Dorssen for their valuable support.
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463727853_ch08
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infrastructure improvement as a way to support the developmental policies 
of other countries. Given the high costs typical of many infrastructure 
projects and the fact that Chinese f inancial institutions are major funders 
of BRI-related activities, BRI infrastructure projects can potentially create 
long-term f inancial relations between China and developing countries. 
This, in turn, may have a geopolitical impact.
A major feature of the contemporary international order is the geopolitical 
rivalry between China and the United States. They are two very influential 
actors in international economic, diplomatic, and military affairs. For the 
purpose of this study the concept of geopolitics is defined as the balance of 
power between two or more states as measured by their influence relative 
to third actors or spatial domains. A key feature of the struggle between 
China and the US is that it also affects the two countries’ relationships with 
third countries and their involvement in other territorial, maritime, cyber, 
or space domains. These relationships which China and the US have with 
third countries and other domains can also, in turn, affect their relations 
with each other. Given the relevance of the BRI for China’s bilateral relations 
with a large number of developing countries, the question may be asked 
whether, and how, the BRI affects the dynamics of Sino-US geopolitics.
This chapter addresses this question through analysis of one case study. 
This case study concerns the role that Indonesia’s largest BRI project, the 
construction of a high-speed railway between Jakarta and Bandung, plays 
in China-US-Indonesian geopolitical dynamics. The Jakarta-Bandung High-
Speed Railway (HSR) project is the main BRI-related project in Indonesia, 
both in f inancial terms (involving a US$4.5 billion loan from the China 
Development Bank) and in terms of visibility (other relevant projects are 
either highways or power plants). Indonesia is just one of many countries 
where Chinese actors engage in large-scale infrastructure projects in ways 
that create new financial ties with China. However, from a geopolitical point 
of view Indonesia is more relevant than many other countries since it is by 
far the largest country in Southeast Asia, which is a region where Sino-US 
geopolitical rivalry is highly visible (especially in the South China Sea).
The region became a main stage for Sino-US geopolitical competition on 
23 July 2010. During a visit to Vietnam, the then US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton announced that the United States would henceforth play an active 
role in security matters in the South China Sea. She made this statement 
both behind closed doors, at a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs where 
China and all Southeast Asian countries were also represented, and publicly, 
during a press conference after the meeting (Asia Society 2012). In subsequent 
years, the US and China have stepped up both their military presence in the 
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South China Sea itself and also their activities towards several Southeast 
Asian countries. A notable feature of the Chinese government’s approach 
is its attempts to signal to Southeast Asian counterparts that they should 
not bring in the US as a party in security issues that play a role in relations 
between China and themselves, such as the maritime and territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea. Under the Obama and Trump administrations, the 
US government has been making strong efforts to convince Southeast Asian 
counterparts that they should do the opposite and help the US to play such 
a balancing role (Landler 2016).
The Indonesian government’s response to these conflicting geopolitical 
pressures is relevant for the region as a whole. This is because Indonesia is 
the most influential actor within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), of which nearly all regional states are members. While ASEAN 
is not a security alliance, the organization is an important mechanism for 
regional diplomatic cohesion in relation to external actors (Egberink & 
Van der Putten 2010).
Indonesia is not a military ally of the US (unlike Thailand and the Philip-
pines; meanwhile, China does not have any military allies in the region). 
Indonesia is also not as diplomatically close to China as some other South-
east Asian countries (notably Cambodia and Laos). According to Damian 
Wnukowski, Indonesia belongs to a category of ASEAN member states 
that support the BRI but do not do so unconditionally (PISM 2019). Other 
countries in this group are Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand. 
Together they constitute a middle position, between strong supporters of 
the BRI (namely Cambodia and Laos, and also Brunei) and those sceptical 
towards the BRI (namely Vietnam and the Philippines).
In order to assess the geopolitical signif icance of the BRI in the case of 
Indonesia and the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, this chapter focuses on two ques-
tions. The f irst question is: Does the Jakarta-Bandung HSR enhance China’s 
leverage over Indonesian foreign policy-making? To answer this question, the 
analysis will explore whether the project makes the Indonesian government 
more dependent on Chinese actors (such as f inancial institutions) in ways 
that could enable the Chinese government to influence Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. A key aspect of this is the conditions under which long-term financial 
relations between China and Indonesia have been evolving in relation to 
the railway-building project. Also key is the role played by governmental 
and private actors on both the Chinese and Indonesian sides.
The second question is: In foreign policy, has Indonesia’s positioning in 
relation to the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China changed in 
recent years in ways that suggest a role either for the Jakarta-Bandung HSR 
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or for the BRI in general? In addressing this second question, it is necessary 
to look at the attitude of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards 
reliance on the US as a counterbalance to Chinese regional influence, as 
well as to look for potential signs that this attitude results from concerns 
over an increase of Chinese influence through the BRI.
The f irst and second parts of the chapter, respectively, discuss these 
two questions. The chapter’s main argument is that, in the case of the 
Jakarta-Bandung HSR, the BRI has not had a significant geopolitical impact. 
However, as the concluding section will argue, the factors relevant to the 
lack of a geopolitical impact are particular to Indonesia and may not apply 
to other countries.
This study is based mainly on desk research through the use of publicly 
available policy documents and secondary sources. These sources were 
accessed in order to collect insights into BRI-related activities in Indonesia, 
their f inancial dimensions, the roles played by relevant Indonesian and 
Chinese actors, and policy-making within the Indonesian government in 
relation to US-China geopolitical rivalry. The desk research was comple-
mented by interviews conducted during a visit to Jakarta in January 2020.2
The BRI as a Potential Source for Political Chinese leverage
There is no list of BRI activities in Indonesia that are formally acknowledged 
as such by both the Indonesian and the Chinese governments. In fact, the 
Indonesian government has been reluctant to classify even the largest 
projects as part of the BRI (Cheang 2019). For the purpose of this analysis 
we assume that the BRI comprises all activities that are aimed at operating 
2 The interviews were conducted with six experts on Indonesian foreign policy and/or on 
Indonesian-Chinese relations (three at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), two at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and one at Universitas Indonesia), one 
expert on ASEAN and regional international relations (at the Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)), and one off icial at the policy-planning division of the Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These experts were selected on the basis of their extensive knowledge 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy with regard to China and/or of Indonesia’s position towards US-China 
geopolitical rivalry. The interviewees were asked to provide their views on the relevance of the 
BRI for Indonesia, and the perceptions and policy responses by the Indonesian government. 
The interviews were conducted in English and were not recorded. Instead, notes were taken 
that were later incorporated in the research. The aim of these interviews was to acquire insights 
into local factors so as to help the authors to better understand and assess data derived from 
the desk research that formed the main basis for this study. No ethical considerations feature 
in the way the interviews are used in the present study.
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or improving transport, energy, or communication infrastructure and in 
which Chinese actors are involved.3 As can be seen in Table 8.1, the largest 
Sino-Indonesian infrastructure projects initiated between 2013 (when the 
BRI was f irst announced) and early 2020 include one transport project and 
two energy projects.4
Table 8.1  Infrastructure projects in Indonesia with Chinese financial investment 
of at least US$1 billion initiated from 2013 to early 2020
Project Sector Value of Chinese Investment 
Java 7 Coal Plant (Java) energy uS$1.8 billion
Batang Toru hydroelectric dam (Sumatra) energy uS$1.7 billion
Jakarta-Bandung high-Speed Railway (Java) Transport uS$4.5 billion
Source: author’s compilation
These three projects, as well as some smaller projects in Indonesian energy 
and transport infrastructure,5 involve Chinese actors at three distinct levels. 
First, in most cases construction works are partly or entirely carried out by 
Chinese contractors. Second, ownership of the infrastructure assets itself 
(a coal plant, dam, road or railway) is usually in the hands of a consortium 
that involves both Chinese and Indonesian companies. Third, f inancing 
is provided either partly or entirely by Chinese banks, often the China 
Development Bank (CDB) or the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank).
Among the three projects in table 8.1, the Jakarta-Bandung HSR project 
stands out. Not only is the size larger, but the type of investment is different. 
3 While activities aimed at supporting processes of urbanization or industrialization, as well 
as instances of medical, educational and cultural cooperation, are also often labelled as part of 
the BRI, these remain outside the scope of this study.
4 Chinese actors are also active in the Indonesian communication infrastructure. Two Chinese 
companies, ZTE and Huawei, have sold equipment to Indonesia’s telecommunication providers. 
However, there is no indication that this has led to new long-term f inancial ties between China 
and Indonesia.
5 Four smaller infrastructure projects with Chinese involvement initiated since 2013 are the 
construction of three toll roads – the Manado-Bitung Toll Road (Sulawesi), the Cisumdawu Toll 
Road (Java), and the Balikpapan-Samarinda Toll Road (Kalimantan) – and the construction of 
one coal-f ired power plant (Tenaga Listrik Bengkulu Coal Plant (Sumatra)). The size of Chinese 
funding for the toll roads ranges between US$65 and US$225 million. In all three instances, 
f inancing has been provided by Eximbank, but solely for the Chinese section. None of the 
projects has yet been completed, and projected dates point to either 2020 or 2021. The value of 
the Bengkulu power plant, which is majority-owned by a Chinese company, is US$360 million 
(China.org.cn 2019; Eximbank 2018; Indonesia Investments 2017).
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The Batang Toru Dam and the Java 7 power plant are owned by consortia in 
which a Chinese entity has a majority stake. In the case of the Batang Toru 
Dam this is Zhefu Holding Company (also known as Zhejiang Fuchunjiang 
Hydropower Equipment Company). For the Java 7 power plant, the control-
ling shareholder is Shenhua Group. Because of this ownership structure, 
both the Batang Toru Dam and the Java 7 power plant qualify as subsidiaries 
of Chinese enterprises and are instances of direct Chinese investment. 
The loans provided by Chinese f inancial institutions are therefore loans 
to Chinese companies. The loan for the Batang Toru Dam is provided by 
Sinosecure and Bank of China, while that for the Java 7 power plant is 
provided by the China Development Bank – all of these f inancial institu-
tions are state-owned (SCMP 2018; Benar News 2020; Sumatran Orangutan 
Society 2018). These loans do not constitute a transfer of Chinese money to 
Indonesian enterprises or to the Indonesian state.
This is different in the case of the Jakarta-Bandung HSR. The entity that 
owns and will operate the railway, PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia-China (KCIC), 
is 60% owned by a consortium of four Indonesian state-owned enterprises 
(Kereta Api Indonesia, WIKA, Perkebunan Nusantara VIII, and Jasa Marga) 
and 40% owned by China Railway Construction Corp (CRCC), a Chinese 
state-owned enterprise. The Indonesian government appears to regard 
foreign involvement in the transport sector as more sensitive than in the 
energy sector. Domestic legislation sets out that foreign f irms can control 
no more than 49% of transportation-related projects, which presupposes 
ownership through a joint venture. In contrast, foreign control in energy 
plants can be up to 100% (President of the Republic of Indonesia 2016).
As a result of the ownership characteristics of KCIC, the US$4.5 billion 
loan made by the China Development Bank (CDB) to KCIC is a loan to an 
Indonesian entity. The Indonesian state, via the involvement of Indonesian 
state-owned enterprises, is ultimately responsible for this debt. The loan is 
to be repaid over a 40-year period, at an annual interest rate of 2%, with a 
ten-year grace period (i.e. repayment does not start until ten years after the 
signing of the loan agreement) (Negara & Suryadinata: 75). The loan agree-
ment was signed in May 2017, during a visit by the Indonesian President Joko 
Widodo (Jokowi) to Beijing. As a result KCIC is to repay the sum of US$4.5 
billion plus interest to the China Development Bank by the year 2067. Since 
both KCIC and the China Development Bank are state-owned entities, this 
railway project means that the Indonesian and Chinese governments have 
indirectly entered into a long-term f inancial relationship.
The Jakarta-Bandung HSR will cover a distance of 142 kilometres and 
connect the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, with the city of Bandung. The train 
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will travel at a speed of 350 kilometres per hour and there will be several 
stations along the way. The railway’s potential economic impact is therefore 
not just reduced travel times between Jakarta and Bandung, but also the 
development of urban areas along the track. However, this potential broader 
economic effect does not necessarily benef it KCIC itself. The Indonesian 
government expects KCIC to repay the debt to the China Development Bank 
out of the railway’s operational revenues. In 2015 there was a heated debate 
within the Indonesian cabinet about the project as proposed by the Chinese 
actors involved. The Finance Minister strongly doubted whether the railway 
would attract suff icient travellers for the relatively expensive high-speed 
train service to be able to repay the debt. In spite of the opposition of several 
cabinet members, President Jokowi decided to support the project (Negara 
& Suryadinata: 76-77).
This decision was made against a background of f ierce lobbying that was 
carried out not only by Chinese entities, but also by a Japanese consortium. 
Both sides were eager to build the railway. The main difference between 
the Chinese and Japanese bids was that the Chinese one did not require any 
guarantee from the Indonesian government (Harding et al. 2015; Negara & 
Suryadinata: 75). The Japanese bid included a demand for a guarantee for 
50% of the loan, which was to be repaid in 40 years. Although the Japanese 
loan was cheaper, at an annual interest rate of only 0.1%, it was less attractive 
because it involved a substantially higher risk. Based on the agreement 
with China Railway Construction Corp (CRCC) and CDB, the Indonesian 
government refers to the Jakarta-Bandung HSR as a business-to-business 
project since the government does not guarantee repayment of the debt.
As a result, the China Development Bank has provided KCIC with a 
substantial amount of money without obtaining any form of guarantee. The 
fact that China Railway Construction Corp (CRCC), a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise, owns 40% of KCIC does not eliminate the risk for the Chinese 
state since CRCC does not have a controlling stake. The decision made by 
the CDB and CRCC, and presumably the Chinese central government, to 
get involved in the Jakarta-Bandung rail project is all the more noteworthy 
because of the sense of uncertainty that existed in 2015, at least among 
several Indonesian ministers, regarding the ability of KCIC to repay its debt.
After several years of delay, caused mainly by the legal procedures that 
KCIC needed to go through to obtain the land needed for the construction 
activities, work on the tracks, stations, tunnels, and bridges is currently 
under way. Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, construction 
work was expected to be completed in 2021. It is currently unclear how 
much pandemic-related travel restrictions for Chinese workers will delay 
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the work. The construction work is being conducted jointly by Indonesian 
and Chinese contractors in order to facilitate the transfer of technology and 
know-how from the latter to the former (Marburn 2016).
The construction of the Jakarta-Bandung HSR is widely regarded as the 
BRI’s f lagship project in Indonesia (interviews with Indonesian experts, 
Jakarta, January 2020). There are only a few other signif icant BRI-related 
projects in Indonesia, amongst which the larger ones are instances of direct 
investment. Only in the case of the Jakarta-Bandung railway has the Indone-
sian state, indirectly through state-owned entities, entered into a long-term 
f inancial obligation with the Chinese government of a substantial size.
It seems unlikely that by itself this project will provide the Chinese 
government with political leverage over Indonesia’s foreign policy-making. 
Indonesia had a GDP of US$1,119 billion and government revenues of US$140 
billion in 2019 (Insider Stories 2020). This makes the US$4.5 billion loan from 
the China Development Bank too small to be an instrument of influence. 
The absence of any collateral means that if KCIC, at some time in the future, 
proved unable to repay the loan, the Chinese government would still not 
have an instrument of influence.
This factual analysis of potential mechanisms of influence is only part 
of the story. It is not only because of Sino-Japanese competition over the 
Jakarta-Bandung rail project that the BRI has so far provided the Chinese 
government with limited means to exert influence on Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. This also appears to be the result of a deliberate approach by both 
the Indonesian and Chinese governments. While no government welcomes 
foreign political interference, the Indonesian government has been very 
cautious to avoid even situations in which Chinese interference appears to 
exist (Storey 2000). This means that in the future the Indonesian government 
is likely to limit the number, size, and impact of BRI-related projects.
Understanding the perspectives of the Indonesian and Chinese govern-
ments regarding the issue of Chinese interference requires an insight into 
the history of Sino-Indonesian relations. In particular, it requires recognition 
of the relevance of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population – numbering 2.8 
million according to a 2010 census (SCMP 2019). Events that took place as 
long ago as the thirteenth century established a historical point of refer-
ence that continues to be relevant to Sino-Indonesian relations today. In 
1293, a combined Mongol and Chinese army invaded and tried to conquer 
Java (Turnbull 2003). Despite the fact that the attack failed, and also that 
China was ruled by the Mongol Yuan dynasty at the time, the story lives 
on in Indonesian school textbooks and is seen as evidence of ‘Chinese 
“expansionism”’ (Laksmana 2011: 29).
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More recently, in the 1950s and early 1960s, shared anti-colonial senti-
ments fostered close diplomatic relations between the two countries. At the 
same time, conservative segments within Indonesian society were suspicious 
of China’s communist government and its ties with Indonesia’s sizeable 
ethnic Chinese population, as well as being suspicious of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Zhou 2013). The Indonesian military’s violent purge 
of the country’s Communist Party in 1965 led to a rupture in diplomatic 
relations with China two years later. Indonesia abandoned its strategy of 
keeping distance from the great powers and established close security and 
economic ties with the United States (Wicaksana 2019; Roberts et al. 2015). 
This did not change even after the stabilization and normalization of Sino-US 
relations in the 1970s. During the 1980s, China and the US were strategic 
partners in their geopolitical struggle against the Soviet Union. China also 
tried to keep Vietnam from becoming dominant on the Southeast Asian 
mainland by briefly invading Vietnam in 1979 and providing military aid to 
Khmer Rouge guerrillas during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 
Although China and Indonesia’s geopolitical interests had been converging 
since the 1970s, bilateral relations were only restored in 1990 when the Cold 
War came to an end (Sukma 2009). The 1998 eruption of mass violence 
against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis was 
a reminder that these sensitivities continued to exist even in the absence 
of Chinese interference (HRW 1998).
The image of China as a communist (i.e. atheist) expansionist power 
continues to exist in Indonesia (interview with experts, Jakarta, Janu-
ary 2020). There is widespread suspicion about the intentions of the Chinese 
government, as well as about its perceived ability to exert influence through 
Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population and through the use of military 
power (Sukma 2009). The current government, under President Jokowi, 
is vulnerable to accusations from opposition parties that it is too close to 
China (interview with experts, Jakarta, January 2020). This provides the 
government with an additional motivation to stay at some distance from 
BRI-related projects, or at least to be seen as doing so.
The Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut 
Binsar Pandjaitan, has stated that the government prefers business-to-
business cooperation with China over government-to-government coopera-
tion (Saat & Negara 2019). The model set by the Jakarta-Bandung railway 
is therefore also to be used for future projects. Moreover, not just Chinese 
f inancial influence but also the more visible presence of Chinese workers 
at construction sites is a sensitive issue in Indonesia’s public opinion. The 
Indonesian government therefore encourages foreign labour only if there is 
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no possibility to use the domestic labour force (Hardiyan 2018). It is relevant 
to note that the effects of the traumatic events of 1965 work both ways. 
The Chinese government has experienced setbacks in its relationship with 
Indonesia due to the domestic instability there. This means that the Chinese 
government is likely to avoid creating a situation where it is seen to be 
interfering in Indonesia’s political affairs.
The political sensitivity of China’s involvement in Indonesia may help 
explain why there is no major Sino-Indonesian project in the area of maritime 
infrastructure. This is remarkable because Indonesia is an archipelago. It is 
also remarkable because China’s President Xi Jinping chose Jakarta as the 
location where, in October 2013, he launched the ‘21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road’ (the maritime component of the BRI). Since 2013, the Maritime 
Silk Road has hardly involved Indonesia. Instead it has emerged primarily 
through port constructions in South Asia and Africa, direct investment in 
European container terminals, and in China’s growing influence in global 
maritime shipping.
Although both the Chinese and Indonesian governments are cautious due 
to the sensitivities relating to Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese, economic relations 
between the two countries are flourishing. China is Indonesia’s largest trade 
partner (Badan Pusat Statistik 2019). It entered the top ten direct investors in 
Indonesia in 2015 (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board 2016). By 2019, 
China had become the source of 16% of the total investment in Indonesia, 
making it the third-largest investor after Singapore and Japan (Indonesia 
Investment Coordinating Board 2020). Against this background, BRI-related 
activities may have a considerable impact on Indonesia’s economy. A report 
by Moody’s estimated that without the BRI, in the 2018-2038 period, the 
Indonesian economy would grow by 4.6%. However, with BRI, Indonesian 
growth could be between 5.8% and 6% (Kong et al. 2019).
The expectation of such long-term effects from BRI may be relevant to 
policymaking. This expectation could encourage the Indonesian government 
to remain open to increased BRI-related cooperation with China. In 2019 
the Indonesian government announced 28 infrastructure and economic 
development projects worth around US$91 billion. In relation to these plans 
the Indonesian government welcomes Chinese investment, on Indonesian 
terms, in four economic hub regions: 1) North Sumatra, as a logistical hub in 
the Malacca strait; 2) North Kalimantan, due to its hydro power resources; 
and the regions of 3) North Sulawesi and 4) Bali, due to their appeal to 
Chinese tourists (Yuniarni 2018).
Given the circumstances discussed above, the BRI is not suited to being 
a tool through which the Chinese government can exert influence over 
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Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, there is still a possibility that it could 
alter the geopolitical dynamics in China-US-Indonesia relations. This would 
be the case, for instance, if the Indonesian government responded to poten-
tial US concerns about Indonesian involvement in BRI. The following section 
will look into Indonesia’s positioning towards Sino-US geopolitical rivalry.
BRI and Indonesia’s Position in Relation to Sino-US Rivalry
Indonesia’s capacity to conduct globally oriented foreign policy is limited. 
Recognizing this, the country has positioned itself as a regional power with 
selective foreign involvement that gives priority to issues directly related 
to Indonesia’s national interests (Karim 2018). At the international level, 
China poses a security threat to Indonesia due to conflicting maritime 
claims in the South China Sea. Indonesia is not a claimant in the South 
China Sea and has no claim over the highly contested Spratly and Paracel 
Islands. Consequently, it was not directly involved as a territorial claimant 
in the arbitration case brought by the Philippines to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (Laksmana 2016a). Rather, Indonesia’s strategic aims in the South 
China Sea and broader Indo-Pacif ic maritime space are twofold: 1) control 
over the Natuna Islands and the adjacent 200 nautical miles of exclusive 
economic zone; 2) preventing exclusionary or hegemonic tendencies. ASEAN 
has served as a platform for Indonesia to promote its view of the South China 
Sea. Indonesia played a leading role in preparing the 2019 ‘ASEAN Outlook 
on the Indo-Pacif ic’. This promotes an ASEAN-centred Indo-Pacif ic space 
that does not exclude China (ASEAN 2019).
Given these aims, Indonesia has an interest in the ability of the US to coun-
terbalance China’s growing geopolitical role. At the same time, however, the 
Indonesian government retains its longstanding tradition of non-alignment 
with great powers and its focus on the role of ASEAN. Indonesia’s perception 
is that great power alignments foster liabilities rather than serving as assets, 
undermining policy independence and regime legitimacy domestically 
(Laksmana 2016b). In that regard Indonesia’s management of great power 
relations resembles that of other developing economies. It carries out a 
balancing act between strategic autonomy and deeper engagement with 
either of the two external actors. Indonesia has had a strategic partnership 
with China since 2005, and a comprehensive strategic partnership since 2013. 
However, it also established a comprehensive partnership with the US in 2010, 
and a strategic partnership in 2015 (US Department of State 2020). Because 
the US is still seen as the main guarantor for regional stability, Indonesia 
208 FRanS-Paul Van deR PuT Ten and MIRela PeTkoVa 
has supported a stronger US regional military presence in Southeast Asia. It 
has conducted frequent bilateral military exercises and other engagements 
with the US, totalling approximately 240 a year (White House 2015; Cronin 
& Burke 2019). US and Indonesian observers also largely share strategic 
concerns. The incursions of Chinese f ishing boats, China’s extensive island 
and base building, and the growing maritime capabilities of China are seen 
as an attempt to dominate the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the foreign 
ministry is not willing to support any moves or statements that would put 
Indonesia on a collision course with China or fuel US-China competition 
(Kurlantzick 2018).
There are also other issues that affect US-Indonesian relations, such as 
human rights concerns and trade imbalances. The US has openly criticized 
Indonesia’s past military actions in East Timor on human rights grounds. For 
a considerable time, it halted cooperation with the Indonesian Army’s Special 
Forces Command (Kopassus) (Jones 2003). Even more importantly, under 
President Trump the US has targeted Indonesia as one of the countries that it 
wants to address its trade imbalance (Hermansyah et al. 2017). This is at the 
same time as China is increasing the economic interdependence between 
itself and Indonesia. The US government has declared that it is studying 
whether to impose import tariffs on 124 Indonesian products. Currently, 
the goods are imported under the generalized system of preference, which 
aims to support developing countries by reducing import duties and taxes 
(Indonesia Investments 2018).
Overall, from an Indonesian perspective, China is more relevant to its 
economic and developmental considerations than the US. The US, however, 
offers strategic cooperation at the international level. In terms of trade 
and direct investment, the US cannot replace China (interview with an 
Indonesian expert, Jakarta, January 2020). Bilateral cooperation between 
Indonesia and the US has revolved around issues such as counterterrorism 
and trade deficits (Laksmana 2018). Indonesia has no military alliance with 
the US. It has tried to steer strategic engagement with China towards either 
ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum, as they have been deemed more 
effective instruments (Sukma 2009).
Even though US-China geopolitical rivalry in Southeast Asia has intensi-
f ied since 2010, there is no indication that the Indonesian government has 
taken steps to abandon its policy of non-alignment and ASEAN centrality or 
that it is preparing to do so (interviews with experts, Jakarta, January 2020). 
So far, Indonesia’s government has been capable of resisting pressure to 
choose sides. It responds f irmly to perceived illegal incursions by Chinese 
f ishing boats in the economic zone of the Natuna Islands. However, at the 
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same time, the Indonesian government separates this issue from its economic 
relations with China (interview with an expert, Jakarta, January 2020). 
BRI-related activities have not been a factor in a geopolitical repositioning 
of Indonesian foreign policy because such a change of direction has not 
occurred.
Conclusion
The Indonesian government’s attitude towards the BRI has been open 
but cautious. The Jokowi administration is strongly focused on domestic 
economic development. BRI-related activities, such as the building of 
transport infrastructure or energy plants, f it very well into this agenda. 
As such, Chinese BRI-related investments are welcomed provided they are 
on Indonesian terms. The (informal) f lagship project in Indonesia under 
the BRI is the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, which involves a loan for which the 
risk lies primarily with the Chinese side. The well-established position of 
Japanese f inanciers and contractors in Indonesia helped the bargaining 
position of the Indonesian government in this case, but the domestic political 
context is also relevant. The room to manoeuvre for both Indonesia and 
China is limited due to the presence of a large ethnic Chinese community 
in Indonesia. The country’s public opinion is generally suspicious of China 
and potential Chinese inf luence through ethnic Chinese Indonesians. 
China therefore cannot be too forceful or too visible in its approach to the 
BRI, nor can the Indonesian government afford to appear to be trading 
away Indonesian sovereignty in return for economic benefits. One reason 
why there are no major port-related BRI projects in Indonesia seems to 
be that the country is careful not to allow too much Chinese influence in 
such strategically important assets. As Indonesia is an archipelago country, 
with a colonial past, seaports free from foreign interference are important 
symbols of national sovereignty. The potential for China to use the BRI as 
a source of leverage over Indonesia is very limited.
The military and diplomatic presence of the US in the region forms a 
welcome counterbalance to China’s growing influence. Because of Indone-
sia’s wariness about China’s potential to become a regional hegemon and 
sensitivities resulting from its ethnic Chinese population, the Indonesian 
government will not side with China against the US. However, due to the 
benefits of economic relations with China, and its geographic proximity, 
Indonesia also does not want to take sides with the US against China. The 
leverage of the US is limited since it is unable to match China’s importance 
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in terms of trade and investment. Although US troops visit Indonesia on a 
rotational basis, the two countries are not military allies and Indonesia’s 
national security does not depend on the presence of US troops in the way it 
does in Japan or South Korea. BRI-related activities do not constitute a major 
element in US-Indonesian relations, and there is no indication that they 
have had any notable effect on Indonesia’s positioning on Sino-US rivalry.
In the case of Indonesia the BRI does not appear to constitute a major 
geopolitical factor. This may be seen as a success for Indonesia’s strategy. It 
is generally not to the benefit of third-party countries to become entangled 
in great power competition. Indonesia’s ability so far to steer clear of such 
entanglement may have been enabled by a very specif ic combination 
of factors. In the case of the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, the involvement of 
Japanese f inancial institutions and companies as a countervailing force 
in infrastructure construction played a role. For BRI-related projects in 
general, political sensitivities resulting from the presence of a large ethnic 
Chinese population are an important factor, as they limit the room for both 
the Indonesian and the Chinese government to allow displays, or even hints, 
of Chinese interference.
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9 Elite Legitimation and the Agency of 
the Host Country




This chapter discusses Southeast Asian cases, turning to Laos, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. It asks why China’s BRI projects progress relatively smoothly 
in communist Laos but slowly and selectively in military-ruled Thailand, 
and substantially, albeit with volatility, in quasi-democratic Malaysia. 
The chapter argues that differences in political systems are only part 
of the answer. Focusing on these three countries’ BRI engagement, the 
study highlights the agency of host countries in shaping the patterns of 
foreign-funded infrastructure cooperation. China as a stronger partner 
will always ‘push the envelope’ in partnerships. Nevertheless, it is the host 
country (specif ically the ruling elites) that engages China-backed projects, 
based on its need to optimize its respective pathways of legitimation, 
leading to varying responses.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, 
elite legitimation
As China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gains ground globally, much has 
been written about the motivations, approaches, and impact of its economic 
statecraft (Goh 2016; Ferchen 2016; Rolland 2017; Li 2020; Ye 2020). Likewise, 
the number of scholarly works focusing on the responses of smaller states to 
the BRI has also increased (Liu & Lim 2019; Ba 2019; Kuik 2020). While the 
vast majority of such studies, which are either single country or region-wide, 
provide useful insights into host countries’ responses to the BRI, there is still 
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463727853_ch09
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a dearth of comparative research that theorizes about this international 
phenomenon.
This chapter addresses this research gap by answering the question 
of why smaller states in the same region respond to big-power economic 
inducement differently. It focuses on Southeast Asia and compares the 
patterns of BRI engagement in Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand. Why focus on 
Southeast Asia and why these three countries? Southeast Asia is a region that 
is being prioritized in China’s BRI statecraft. BRI-related projects have been 
making progress across the region, even during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In March 2020, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a 
whole replaced the EU as China’s largest trading partner. The three ASEAN 
countries have been selected because they represent three different patterns 
of BRI engagement in Southeast Asia (and for that matter, other regions as 
well): enthusiastic embrace (Laos), partial participation (Thailand), and 
intense but occasional turbulent involvement (Malaysia). These differing 
patterns provide analytical space to consider why similarly situated smaller 
states have responded to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s BRI-related 
inducements differently. Methodologically, this study is based on f irst-hand 
interviews, f ieldwork research in all three countries, and open-source data, 
including media, scholarly work, off icial statements, and policy reports.
Malaysia’s involvement with the BRI, which includes an industrial park, 
port cooperation, rolling stock production, e-commerce, and rail projects, 
is widest in terms of scope. In comparison, Thailand’s BRI partnership is 
limited to high-speed rail cooperation. Meanwhile Laos is involved with 
constructing a high-speed rail connection from its capital, Vientiane, to the 
northern town of Boten, close to the border with China. It is also cooperating 
on industrial parks, as well as hydropower and mining projects. In terms 
of scale of BRI partnerships and speed of project cycles (from initiation to 
negotiation and implementation), Malaysia, overall, also represents the 
highest and fastest of the three case studies (see table 9.1).
These variations in the patterns of these smaller states’ BRI engagement 
are primarily a function of their domestic politics, specif ically, their ruling 
elites’ legitimation. In all three cases, development-based performance 
legitimation is the primary pathway that drives the smaller Southeast Asian 
states to participate in the BRI and leverage China’s infrastructure-based eco-
nomic statecraft. However, this impetus has been supplemented, softened, 
or balanced by other pathways of justif ication (socialist authoritarianism 
in Laos, Thai identity discourse in Thailand, as well as ethnic balancing 
and democratic legitimation in Malaysia). Such optimization of legitima-
tion pathways has shaped and limited the respective states’ receptivity to 
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foreign-funded partnerships. As the extent of these partnerships has been 
further f iltered by the varying degrees of domestic power diffusion in these 
states, differing patterns of BRI engagement have emerged.
By focusing on elite legitimation as the key explanatory variable, this 
chapter thus unpacks the agency of the host country in shaping the progress 
and prospects of such foreign-funded infrastructure projects as the China-
backed BRI. This approach challenges the prevailing view in the existing 
literature, which appears to over-emphasize – explicitly or otherwise – the 
power of China as the provider of capital and technology in infrastructure 
connectivity partnerships in smaller states. The research f ieldwork and 
f indings of this study indicate that the situation is much more complex. 
Despite their strengths, China’s state-linked investors and entities do not 
always have the upper hand. Indeed, the varying patterns and pace of the 
three selected Southeast Asian countries’ BRI engagement – from enthusi-
astic and smooth to selective, partial, and protracted – evidently highlight 
the agency of host countries, particularly their respective ruling elites. 
Whether, to what extent, and in what ways a foreign-backed infrastructure 
connectivity project progresses in a desired direction depends largely on 
the elites that are in power in the host country. These elites seek to advance 
their authority and interests by optimizing their legitimation pathways 
vis-à-vis contending elites and sociopolitical actors at home.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. The f irst presents a theoretical 
discussion of elite legitimation as a shaper of agency in the host country 
in managing foreign-funded infrastructure connectivity cooperation. 
The remaining sections identify and explain the different patterns of BRI 
engagement in Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand, respectively. These sections 
analyse the impact of elite legitimation-optimization on the scope, scale, 
and speed of these countries’ engagements with China’s BRI-related projects, 
as illustrated in table 9.1.
Analytical Framework: Legitimation and the Agency of the Host 
Country in Infrastructure Cooperation
This section develops a theoretical framework to explicate elite legitimation 
as a shaper of the agency of the host country in determining smaller states’ 
responses to foreign-backed infrastructure connectivity cooperation such 
as the BRI-related projects. By ‘agency’, I refer to the capacity of unit-level 
actors to translate their own preferences into a desired outcome despite 
asymmetric power structure. They exercise this agency either by active 
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actions of initiating, influencing, and renegotiating, or by passive actions of 
denying, delaying, or distancing from a stronger power’s initiative. Agency 
is thus conceived here as an intermediary between micro-processes and 
macro-structures (Parsons 1951; Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992; Wight 2006). 
By ‘elite’, I mean a small group of actors who exercise disproportionate 
Table 9.1  Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand’s BRI engagement with China
Rail Projects Non-rail Projects




*** expected completion: 
december 2021
Industrial Parks
Mohan-Boten economic Cooperation 
zone








East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)
* 640 km
** uS$10.56 billion (RM44 billion)
*** Signed 2016; Suspended July 2018; 
Resumed april 2019
CRRC Rolling Stock Centre @ Batu 
Gajah
** RM251 million




Digital Free Trade Zone (DFTZ), 
including eWTP
CGN Edra Solar Power Plant




*** Construction of the 1st phase 
started in december 2018




*** expected completion: 2023
Source: author’s compilation
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power and influence over a given society on the grounds of governance 
authority, coercive capacity, wealth possession, and/or ideational excellence 
(Bottomore 1964; Lipset & Solari 1967; Parry 2005; Axelrod 2015). This study 
focuses on governing elites or political class.
I hypothesize that it is elite legitimation – def ined here as a process 
through which the ruling elites seek to justify and consolidate their authority 
before their targeted constituencies – that explains individual countries’ 
differing patterns of BRI engagement and differing forms of agency. All 
elites claim their ‘right’ to rule by appealing to certain ideals, constructing 
substantial or substantiated narratives, and resorting to corresponding 
pathways. They do this in order to justify, enhance, and consolidate their 
domestic authority vis-à-vis other contesting elites and wider society (Kuik 
2013; Lampton, Ho & Kuik 2020). These legitimation pathways include 
multiple manifestations of development-based performance legitimation 
(e.g. ensuring growth and delivering development fruits, managing nation-
wide problems). The pathways also include identity-based, particularistic 
legitimation (including nationalist sentiments, ethnic and religious appeals, 
personal charisma), and ideology-based procedural legitimation (e.g. demo-
cratic values, social justice). No ruler relies on one single pathway to rule. In 
practice, all rulers resort to a combination of legitimation pathways – with 
different degrees of emphasis and mobilization – for their inner justif ication 
(Weber 1947; Weber 1978; Beetham 1991; Alagappa 1995; Gilley 2009). The 
combinations of pathways and degrees of emphasis matter because they 
determine the direction and prioritization of major state policies, both 
internal and external.
Given this chapter’s focus on the responses to BRI-related projects in 
Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand, I concentrate on a state’s relative emphasis on 
development-centred performance legitimation vis-à-vis other inner justifica-
tions (i.e. particularistic and/or procedural legitimation).
All things being equal, governing elites who emphasize performance 
legitimation more than other pathways of justif ication are more likely to 
embrace external investment, assistance, and partnerships that can boost 
their country’s economic growth. Hence, the above-named Southeast Asian 
countries are relatively receptive because they see the BRI as an opportunity. 
Vietnam is a major contrast. While Vietnamese Communist Party elites 
attach importance to performance legitimacy, they also resort to nationalist 
legitimation much more than other state elites in the region. The centrality 
of nationalist legitimation colours the Vietnamese perceptions of Chinese 
power, driving them to view Beijing-backed projects more suspiciously than 
other countries in the same region. Hence, it can be inferred that the more 
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the ruler emphasizes development performance over other pathways of 
legitimation, the more receptive they will be towards external partnerships, 
and the reverse is also true (in the case of Vietnam).
Nevertheless, this receptivity is also subject to the degree of power diffu-
sion. In the one-party states of Laos and Vietnam (and to some extent, polities 
with one dominant political actor, namely, Cambodia, Singapore, Brunei), 
the ruling elites’ authority and decisions are rarely openly contested, chal-
lenged, or criticized. Because the state is strong (in cooption and coercion) 
and society is weak (in mobilization and opposition), elite contestation 
usually takes place within rather than outside the establishment, with few 
instances of policy changes that are attributable to bottom-up constraints 
or societal pressure. This is in contrast to other Southeast Asian countries, 
such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and, to some extent, 
Myanmar. Power diffusion is the most dominant political feature in these 
countries, where the ruling elites’ authority and decisions are not only 
contested and challenged publicly, but also constrained persistently.
The next three sections illuminate the complex political and develop-
mental logics underlying the responses to the BRI from Laos, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, respectively.
The Case of Laos: Legitimation in a Landlocked Communist 
Country
Laos’s engagement with the BRI is openly receptive, and it has gradually 
intensified, albeit also being quietly contentious. Laos had collaborated with 
China on infrastructure development well before the BRI. It enthusiastically 
embraced the BRI when Chinese President Xi Jinping launched it in 2013. In 
addition to the 414-kilometre Vientiane-Boten High-Speed Railway (HSR), 
which is considered China’s signature BRI project in Laos, the bilateral 
connectivity cooperation has gradually extended to special economic zones 
and other sectors, with intense but unequal partnerships in hydropower, 
mining, and agricultural projects.
The Lao-China HSR project is unique and signif icant in numerous ways. 
Its origins had more to do with the agency of small-state pull than big-power 
push. Contrary to the widespread impression that China pushed the HSR 
idea to its small neighbour, it was Laos that took the initiative to partner with 
China for its most ambitious infrastructure development project. In the early 
2000s, Lao leaders proposed to their Chinese counterparts that they should 
collaborate in building a railway line in the land-locked country (personal 
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communications with Bangkok-based and Vientiane-based researchers, 
June 2019 and January 2020). This coincided with Beijing’s ‘going-out strategy’ 
(zouchuqu zhanlüe [走出去战略]), which included encouraging Chinese 
f irms to invest overseas, promoting intra-regional links, and accessing 
natural resources. China subsequently undertook a feasibility study of the 
Laos rail project. Eventually, in 2009, Laos and China agreed to pursue 
the project. At the same time, Laos launched its very f irst railroad line (in 
collaboration with Thailand) – a 3.5-kilometre track from the Lao capital, 
Vientiane, to Nong Khai, a city in northeast Thailand.
Laos and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
7 April 2010. The Laos-China Railway Company was formed, with 30% 
owned by Lao state railway and 70% by Chinese state-owned f irms. China 
agreed to provide Laos with a long-term loan of about US$4 billion. Another 
MoU was signed later that year after the Chinese Railroad Minister Liu 
Zhijun visited Laos and held further talks with Lao authorities regarding 
the railway construction (Radio Free Asia 2010).
The Laos rail project is also signif icant because it is, thus far, the only 
China-related high-speed railway (HSR) venture in Southeast Asia that is 
undergoing construction with a specif ic date of completion for the entire 
project. In comparison, only a small stretch of the first phase of the Thailand-
China HSR is under construction, with no f irm date set for the second phase 
(from Nakhon Ratchasima to Nong Khai). In Malaysia, the planned Kuala 
Lumpur-Singapore HSR was delayed after the Mahathir-led Pakatan Harapan 
(PH) came to power in May 2018. In Indonesia, although the authorities had 
set 31 December 2021 as the completion date for the Jakarta-Bandung HSR 
(after years of delay), at the time of writing the ongoing coronavirus crisis 
was compelling the authorities to consider extending the completion date 
(Wahyudi 2020). In Laos, despite the coronavirus situation, the rail project is 
still scheduled to be completed and opened for service in December 2021. The 
Laos-China Railway Company has been carrying out epidemic prevention 
measures, while aiming to complete sub-rail civil engineering and start 
track engineering this year (The Star 2020).
Another unique aspect of the Laos-China rail project is that its importance 
extends beyond national development and bilateral ties. When completed, 
the 1.435-meter standard-gauge railway will be the f irst and only modern 
rail line directly linking Southeast Asia and China. It will connect Laos, and 
eventually also other Southeast Asian countries, to China’s vast high-speed 
railway network via the Yuxi-Mohan railway, a project linking the city of 
Yuxi in the centre of China’s Yunnan Province with the town of Mohan 
on the border with Laos (Lampton, Ho & Kuik 2020). Once the Laos line 
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extends southward, crossing the Laos-Thailand border and linking with 
the Beijing-backed Sino-Thai HSR from Vientiane to Bangkok, it will be 
the f irst cross-border railway running through the heart of Southeast Asia 
to Bangkok, a regional transportation hub (see f igure 9.1). If, and when, 
this trans boundary HSR line extends further southward and crosses into 
Malaysia and Singapore, it will result in the actualization of the ‘Central 
Route’ of the planned Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL), which has been 
envisaged since the mid-1990s.
Its significance notwithstanding, the US$7 billion Laos-China rail project 
has attracted criticism from the beginning. For years, critics have pointed to 
the dual long-term risks of debt and dependency. Others have highlighted 
the problems associated with transparency, resource mobilization, labour 
management, displacement of people, compensation for land acquisition, 
environmental sustainability, etc. (interviews with Lao academics, Vientiane, 
January 2020). There are also fears about large-scale migration of Chinese 
workers into the tiny Southeast Asian country, which has a population of 
less than 7 million. A report by National Public Radio (NPR) in the United 
States cited a local from Luang Prabang, the ancient capital of Laos, about 
midway along the rail route from the Mohan-Boten border station in the 
north to Vientiane: ‘I worry that when the trains are completed, there will 
be many, many Chinese [moving] in from China to live in Laos and they 
will take the job[s] from local people’ (Westerman 2019).
Given these risks and challenges, it has puzzled many observers that 
Laos, which is a small and underdeveloped country, has proceeded with 
this f iscally and politically costly megaproject. Several signs indicate a 
diff icult negotiation process with China and an arduous decision-making 
process within the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). One 
sign was the lengthy period from the inking of the MoU to the beginning 
of construction. Although the two MoUs were signed in 2010, it took the 
LPRP regime about two years to approve the project, and then another three 
years to have the ground-breaking ceremony in December 2015, only to have 
the ceremony postponed to December 2016. Some of the problems were 
disagreements with Chinese f irms over the project arrangements, including 
workers, social and environmental impact, and loan details such as the 
interest rate (Doig 2018: 33; personal communications with Lao researchers, 
June 2019). These disagreements must have sparked internal debates among 
the ruling LPRP elites. According to scholar Vatthana Pholsena (2012: 62), 
there were ‘hiccups in the decision-making process’ that took place behind 
closed doors regarding a party decision in 2011 to delay the high-speed rail 
project. The project was suddenly postponed to a later date, supposedly 
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because there were ‘concerns at the highest levels’ of the party ‘over the 
terms of the contract, which included the hiring of a massive number of 
Chinese labourers’.
Nevertheless, the project was eventually given a f irm go-ahead in 2016 
and has been progressing without disruptions and delays since (unlike 
the cases of Malaysian and Thai BRI engagement). Its progress despite the 
aforementioned concerns, perceived risks, and internal debates, indicates 
there are strong political imperatives at play. I would argue that the two 
most paramount political imperatives are a robust performance justif ication 
and a low power diffusion in the one-party country.
The LPRP’s performance legitimation has been tied to a national narrative 
that speaks of transforming Laos from a ‘land-locked’ to ‘land-linked’ nation 
in order to bring the Lao people out of their generations-long poverty. This 
political justif ication – and the associated discourse mobilization – is rooted 
in the geographical and socio-economic realities of Laos. Laos is one of the 
poorest countries in the region. As its neighbours have slowly opened and 
developed their economies, Laos – where subsistence agriculture constitutes 
half of its economic output – has remained on the list of ‘least developed 
countries’ (LDCs) according to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). This is primarily because Laos is the only 
land-locked nation in Southeast Asia and also because of such structural 
problems as weak infrastructure, inadequate labour, lack of skilled workers, 
low technological capabilities, and a low ranking in the business-enabling 
environment (Vilavong 2016).
To overcome these problems, the Lao government has emulated the de-
velopmentalist strategy of fellow communist countries China and Vietnam, 
of striking ‘a balance between economic and social development’, while 
drawing inspiration from non-communist regional economic powerhouses, 
most notably Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Forbes & Cutler 2005; Howe 
& Park 2015). Laos has undertaken ambitious projects in hydroelectricity 
and mining, embraced regionalist policies, and perhaps, most importantly, 
endeavoured to build better international connectivity within its region 
(Forbes & Cutler 2005).
Constructing a north-south railway, which can connect Laos with China 
and the developed ASEAN markets, is thus a central component of such a 
development strategy and the legitimation-driven ‘land-linked’ discourse. 
Lao leaders view the railway as an ‘iron river’ that can transform the eco-
nomic future of Laos by improving transport connectivity, attracting invest-
ment, and stimulating growth in multiple sectors (interview with senior 
policy off icial, Vientiane, June 2017). The former Deputy Prime Minister of 
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Laos, Somsavat Lengsavad, who reportedly played an instrumental role in 
negotiating hydropower dam deals on the Mekong, as well as promoting the 
high-speed railway deal and pushing through a special session of the Lao 
National Assembly in 2012 to approve the deal, has said that the rail project 
‘will boost the Lao economy because many investors are now looking for 
a production base [in Laos]’. He added that the railway would help ‘reduce 
their transportation costs’, thereby making Laos ‘more attractive to investors’ 
(Doig 2018: 30-33).
According to Laos’s 8th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development 
Plan (2016-2020), part of the national strategy to elevate Laos out of being 
a ‘least developed country’ (LDC) involves the construction of large-scale 
infrastructure projects, particularly railways, hydropower dams, and mines 
(Tappe 2018: 169). At the ground-breaking ceremony of the railway project, 
which took place in the city of Luang Prabang in December 2016, the Lao 
Minister of Public Works and Transport, Bounchanh Sinthavong, remarked: 
‘Once completed, the railway will benefit Lao people of all ethnic groups, 
facilitate and reduce costs of transportation, stimulate the development 
of agricultural and industrial sectors, tourism, investment and trade, as 
well as generate income for Lao people and the country’ (Chengliang 2016). 
His Vice Minister and the Chairman of the Laos-China Railway Project 
Management Committee, Lattanamany Khounnivong, stressed that the 
railway ‘will facilitate Laos’s ability to transport goods around the region 
faster and “about three times cheaper” than today’ (Reed & Hille 2019). 
The train, which can travel at up to 160 kilometres per hour (100 miles per 
hour), is expected to cut travel time between the capital, Vientiane, and the 
northern border town of Boten from three days to three hours.
Beyond the high-speed railway, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
(LPRP) elites have also partnered with China on developing economic 
zones (namely, the Mohan-Boten Economic Cooperation Zone and the 
Vientiane Saysettha Development Zone). They have also cooperated on 
building hydropower dams, as part of the government’s long-term vision 
to make Laos the ‘battery of Southeast Asia’. Key dam projects include: the 
US$1.3 billion Nam Ngum 3 hydropower projects in the mountainous central 
Xaisomboun Province and the US$308 million Nam Khan 2 Dam project in 
Luang Prabang Province. Both of these projects are operated by Sinohydro 
of China (personal communications with Lao researchers, Vientiane and 
Bangkok, January 2020 and April 2020).
These development benef its are central to the party’s legitimacy, as 
the ‘Lao party-state (phak lat)’ relies on continuous economic growth and 
growing prosperity for the ‘Lao multi-ethnic people’ (Tappe 2018: 172). Mega 
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infrastructure projects such as the railway and the hydropower dams are 
viewed as key to bringing economic prosperity to Laos.
Low power diffusion explains why, once the top-down decision was made 
by the ruling elites, the high-speed rail project has progressed relatively 
smoothly without disruptions. As a communist-ruled country with no 
independent media and very limited civil society groups, the Lao one-
party political system is characterized by high power concentration and 
low authority diffusion. Under such a system, the party’s authority and 
the government’s key policy decisions are rarely challenged openly. This 
neither means that there is no policy disagreement among party elites and 
government off icials, nor that there is no bottom-up resentment from the 
society. Rather, policy disagreements among party elites and off icials are 
usually aired behind closed doors, as has already been noted. Bottom-up 
sentiments and misgivings are typically contained and at times suppressed, 
with individual interests often sacrif iced for the sake of social stability. 
A Vientiane resident reportedly told a foreign reporter that, despite local 
misgivings, ordinary people ‘cannot go against [the railway project] because 
it’s already been decided by the top people and we just have to accept [it]’ 
(Westerman 2019).
The Case of Malaysia: Legitimation in a Multiethnic Quasi-
democratic Country
Among the Southeast Asian cases, Malaysia’s engagement with China’s 
BRI has been the most receptive and regionally transformative. However, 
it has also been repeatedly recalibrated according to changing political 
circumstances. Malaysia’s case displays the agency of the host country in 
multiple manifestations: mostly in the forms of proactive initiation and 
active involvement (driven largely by elites’ performance and particularistic 
legitimation), but periodically also in the forms of passive recalibration 
and active renegotiation. The latter recalibration and renegotiation occur 
especially when inter-elite contestation and bottom-up resentment combine 
to increase the imperative for democratic procedural legitimation, compel-
ling the government of the day to recalibrate the country’s BRI involvement 
while correcting the terms of cooperation.
Malaysia’s receptivity towards the BRI is evidenced by the extensive 
presence of China-backed connectivity projects in the multi-ethnic Southeast 
Asian country. As shown in f igure 9.1, Malaysia’s BRI engagement covers 
a broad scope of infrastructure and connectivity projects, including rail 
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transport and port development, industrial park and manufacturing invest-
ment, and solar energy and digital connectivity cooperation. Most of these 
projects are of large f inancial and operational scale. Many were initiated 
and implemented at a speed faster than other regional cases.
Malaysia-China connectivity cooperation is not only the most extensive, 
it is also among the earliest, predating the BRI. Interestingly, the earlier 
projects were all initiated by the host country Malaysia, rather than China. 
These include the Second Penang Bridge project, which was proposed during 
the Abdullah Badawi premiership (2003-2009), and the Malaysia-China 
Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), which was initiated under Najib Razak 
(2009-2018). In late 2006, during a closed-door meeting with his Chinese 
counterpart Wen Jiabao, Abdullah proposed securing a loan to build the 
23-kilometre bridge in his home state Penang. In a matter of months, the 
two governments had signed a deal paving the way to their f irst bilateral 
infrastructure cooperation. In this deal, China provided a US$800 million 
loan, reportedly the largest loan ‘for any single project given to a foreign 
country by China’ at that time (Wong 2007; Mazwin 2007). The interest 
rate was set at 3% for 20 years, and China waved the 7% insurance usually 
applied to developing countries and handled by Sinosure (China Export & 
Credit Insurance Corporation, a state-funded and policy-oriented insurance 
company) (personal communication with Abdullah Badawi’s senior aide, 
Figure 9.1 BRI-related projects in Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand
Source: author’s compilation
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who was directly involved in Malaysia’s dealing with China on the project, 
30 April 2020).
The Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park was also proposed by Ma-
laysia. In April 2012, Najib mooted the idea when he was in China launching 
the Qinzhou Industrial Park (QIP) in Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region. 
He suggested to his counterpart Wen Jiabao establishing a ‘sister industrial 
park’ in Kuantan, the capital of his home state Pahang on the east coast of the 
Peninsular Malaysia. The proposal came to fruition in less than a year, when 
the two governments off iciated it in February 2013. The Malaysia-China 
Kuantan Industrial Park and the Qinzhou Industrial Park, known as the 
‘twin industrial parks’, are probably the only BRI-linked ‘sister industrial 
parks’ in the region.
The two countries have since forged more infrastructure and connectivity 
projects. Some of these projects – such as the China Railway Rolling Stock 
Corporation (CRRC) rolling stock centre, and the controversial East Coast 
Rail Link (ECRL) – will be regionally transformative. Because of Malaysia’s 
geographical centrality in Southeast Asia (between the continental north 
and the maritime south, and between the Indian and the Pacif ic Ocean 
regions), many of the infrastructure connectivity projects in the country 
have cross-border regional implications, with planned or potential links 
extending into neighbouring countries. Besides the Malaysia-China Kuantan 
Industrial Park-Qinzhou Industrial Park port city links, several other China-
backed projects in Malaysia also have a signif icance that extends beyond 
the bilateral. There are the rail links that will cross northward to link with 
Thailand and southward with Singapore. There is also a bilateral ‘port 
alliance’ that may evolve into a regional network. Then there are the rolling 
stock manufacturing centre and an Alibaba-backed e-commerce hub that 
are being established in Malaysia but eyeing ASEAN markets. A growing 
number of Chinese f irms, such as Huawei, China Railway Group (CREC), 
China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), and Alibaba, are opening their 
regional headquarters or hubs in Malaysia.
Despite Malaysian leaders’ early embrace of China-backed infrastructure, 
the BRI has not always been smooth sailing in the country. Far from it, a 
number of the BRI-linked projects have been reviewed, revised, and even 
revoked by the Malaysian authorities in recent years, after the stunning 
return to power of Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003, 2018-2020) following 
the May 2018 general election. In fact, as early as 2016, Mahathir, who fell 
out with Najib and formed the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM), had 
already openly criticized Najib’s various deals with China, warning that 
they ‘may end up threatening Malaysia’s sovereignty’ (Malaysiakini 2016). 
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His attacks intensif ied during the election campaign period. Once back to 
off ice, Mahathir displayed the agency of the host country by announcing 
his Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition government’s decision to review and 
eventually suspend three controversial, China-funded, big-ticket deals, 
namely the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and the two pipeline projects in 
Sabah and Malacca.
Many observers were quick to opine that Malaysia under Mahathir 2.0 
was ‘pushing back’ against Beijing’s BRI, ‘confronting’ China’s assertiveness 
in the South China Sea, and ‘resisting’ Chinese hegemony in the region. 
These views are too simplistic. In reality, Mahathir’s policy was more 
complex than widely perceived. Despite his decision to suspend the three 
projects, Mahathir allowed many other China-related projects, such as the 
Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park and the Digital Free Trade Zone 
(DFTZ), to continue. He also repeatedly stressed Malaysia’s support for both 
the BRI and Chinese investments. To underscore these points, he chose to 
make an early off icial visit to China in August 2018 (a few months after 
assuming off ice), and opted to visit the headquarters of the Chinese tech 
giants Alibaba and Zhejiang Geely (which owns a 49.9% stake of Proton, 
the Malaysian national car maker) in Hangzhou before f lying to Beijing. 
While in China’s capital, Mahathir raised the ‘unfair deals’ and loan issues 
with Chinese leaders, but put all the blame on Najib’s Barisan Nasional (BN) 
government for the country’s debt (Jaipragas 2018; Teoh 2018).
Mahathir’s moves were part and parcel of his active ‘renegotiation’ with 
China. This renegotiation was not only regarding the controversial contracts 
but also the two countries’ bilateral relations. This exercising of agency is 
an extension of, and not a departure from, Malaysia’s China policy during 
Mahathir’s f irst tenure (Kuik 2013). It is less about a maverick leader reject-
ing Chinese power, but more about a smaller state’s pragmatic posturing 
to renegotiate its asymmetric relations with the increasingly powerful 
neighbour at a time of growing uncertainty. In addition to seeking to reduce 
the costs and correct the terms of China-funded projects, as was expected by 
many voters who supported his coalition during the 2018 election, Mahathir 
was also leveraging Malaysia’s decades-long diplomatic cordiality with 
China and also its geographical advantages for a more favourable, long-term 
relationship with Beijing.
Such a recalibration is part of the ruling elites’ legitimation-optimization 
efforts, through which they seek to strike a balance between performance, 
particularistic, and procedural pathways of justif ication.
Since the early 1970s, performance and particularistic legitimation 
have motivated Malaysia’s development and foreign policies, including its 
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longstanding and multifaceted ties with China. Indeed, engaging China 
and ensuring a stable, productive, and balanced bilateral relationship has 
been a central component of the country’s pragmatic external posture. 
This pragmatism is due in part to China’s economic importance, in part to 
China’s geopolitical clout, and in part to Malaysia’s demographic structure: 
69% of the Malaysian population are ‘Bumiputera’ (‘sons of the soil’, a term 
used to refer to Malay Muslims and indigenous peoples), 23% are Chinese, 
7% Indians, and others. As most local ethnic Chinese are today much more 
conscious of their national identity as Malaysians (and have a shrinking 
identity attachment to their ancestral motherland), the growing economic 
and geopolitical signif icance of China has become the more important 
determinant driving Malaysia’s policies towards China, rather than identity 
politics. Indeed, this has become the principal driver behind the successive 
ruling elites’ deepening of Malaysia’s pragmatic policy vis-à-vis China.
China has been Malaysia’s largest trading partner since 2009. It has 
also emerged as one of Malaysia’s top investors since 2014. This reverses 
the earlier pattern of bilateral investment ties, when Malaysia was one of 
the earliest investors in China after Deng Xiaoping launched the ‘Reform 
and Opening-up’ policy in 1978. Since the launch of the BRI in 2013 by Xi, 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Malaysia has increased steadily 
and grew by over 1000% between 2012 and 2015, spreading over almost 
every state of the federal country (Ngeow forthcoming; Wan Saiful 2017; 
Gomez et al. 2020). Chinese investments cover diverse sectors, including 
manufacturing, real estate, infrastructure, transport, edible bird’s nests, 
and e-commerce (Tham 2018).
A deepening and widening economic engagement with China – including 
a closer BRI partnership – is politically important to Malaysian ruling 
elites’ development-based performance legitimation and patronage politics. 
Signif icantly, it is also a boost to the elites’ identity-based particularistic le-
gitimation. Although Malaysia’s identity politics have long been constructed 
and contested along race-based grounds, this does not necessarily extend to 
external relations. Indeed, Malaysia’s BRI engagement, and broader Malaysia-
China economic ties, are shaped less by a simple Malay-versus-Chinese 
equation and more by a complex political dynamic. That is, Malaysia-China 
infrastructure ventures are driven and dominated by politically connected 
forces surrounding leader-centred interest coalitions, e.g. Najib’s BN coali-
tion, the Mahathir-led PH bloc, and now (since the political coup in late 
February 2020) Muhyiddin Yassin’s Perikatan Nasional (PN) government. 
Accordingly, Malay elites – and those politically connected to them – are 
the principal benef iciaries and key promoters of China-backed projects. 
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The local ethnic Chinese are subordinates, partners, or executors of Malay-
dominated interests and ventures.
These Malay-dominated, identity-based power contestations and the 
successive ruling polities’ patronage politics have combined to push 
Malaysia to lean towards, not distance itself from, China’s economic 
inducements over the past few decades. Interestingly, the identity-based 
particularistic legitimation does not just converge with the BRI-related, 
development-based opportunities horizontally (across ethnic groups, at 
least at the elite level), but also vertically along federal-state relations. 
Because the key BRI projects (the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park, 
the Kuantan Port expansion, and the East Coast Rail Link) are located in 
or pass through the east coast states (populated predominantly by the 
Malays), and because these state governments are all supportive of the 
infrastructure development projects, the successive federal governments 
in Putrajaya have viewed these ventures as a platform to pursue both 
developmental and political purposes (some of these state governments 
are from the opposing coalition).
The convergence of performance and particularistic justif ications aside, 
Malaysia’s BRI engagement is also shaped by procedural legitimation. This 
distinguishes Malaysia’s case from Laos and several other states that have 
embraced the BRI, where democratic, procedural ideals only play a marginal 
role. Of course, in semi-democratic Malaysia, procedural justif ication is not 
always at the forefront. However, if and when inter-elite struggle escalates 
and when the public mood swings against nationwide problems that tran-
scend ethnic-based concerns, procedural legitimation would become the 
centre of political contestation.
This happened during the run-up to the 2018 general election, when the 
Mahathir-led opposition mobilized grassroots anger against Najib’s 1Ma-
laysia Development Berhad (1MDB) f inancial scandal and certain policies, 
including the China-backed East Coast Rail Link project, as has been noted 
above. Once Mahathir won the election and announced the suspension of 
the three China-funded projects, he made clear to China that renegotiation 
of those projects was necessary because of Malaysian people’s resentments 
over the excessive debt, the lack of transparency, and other unfavourable 
terms. The renegotiated deals signed by the two governments in April 2019, 
which reduced the cost and altered the terms of the East Coast Rail Link 
while restoring Bandar Malaysia (a China-funded project suspended during 
Najib years), conferred some procedural legitimacy on the BRI ventures in 
Malaysia. Thus, democratic sentiments can provide leverage for small states 
to exercise agency in bargaining with a major power.
elITe leGITIMaTIon and The aGenCy oF The hoST CounTRy 233
The Case of Thailand: Legitimation in a Military-Ruled Kingdom
Thailand’s partnership with China on BRI-related projects is highly selective, 
slow, and swiftly swayed by major domestic political vicissitudes such as 
regime change. Whenever there is a different government in Bangkok, key 
elements of previously agreed upon arrangements are amended.
Unlike Laos and Malaysia, which maintain BRI partnerships with China 
that cover several sectors, Thailand’s BRI engagement is confined to only 
one area: high-speed railway (HSR) cooperation. This is manifested primar-
ily in the Bangkok-Nong Khai HSR. Although some would consider the 
inter-airport HSR (linking Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang international 
airports in the capital with U-Tapao airport in Rayong) as another BRI-
related project, most Thai off icials and researchers would reject this label, 
insisting that this – a component of the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) – is 
Thailand’s own national project (personal communications with Bangkok-
based off icials and researchers, January and March 2020). The inter-airport 
HSR is being developed by a consortium led by a Thai conglomerate, the 
Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group, which owns a 70% stake. The China Railway 
Construction Corporation (CRCC) holds only a 10% stake in the consortium.
Thailand’s BRI involvement is not only limited and selective in scope 
but also comparatively slow in implementation. Unlike the Laos-China 
high-speed railway that has been progressing as planned with a def inite 
completion date of December 2021, the Thailand-China high-speed railway 
has been marked by a long and protracted process of on-again, off-again 
bargaining, renegotiations, and delayed implementations (Aiyara 2019; 
Sawasdipakdi forthcoming; Kuik forthcoming). Bilateral talks started under 
Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), progressed through Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-
2014), and accelerated – but later dragged on – under the coup-installed 
Prayut Chan-o-cha government (2014-present). After dozens of rounds of 
negotiation over the past few years, the high-speed rail project has thus far 
resulted in the construction of a 3.5-kilometre section of phase one of the 
project, which is intended to cover the 253-kilometre route between Bangkok 
and Nakhon Ratchasima, the gateway to Isan, the country’s northeast region. 
Negotiations are still ongoing for the second phase, the 350-kilometre route 
between Nakhon Ratchasima and Nong Khai on the Thai-Laos border (see 
f igure 9.1), with no concrete date set for the completion of the overall project.
This protracted process is attributable to the third feature of Thailand’s 
BRI engagement: its progress is directly affected by the country’s periodic 
domestic political turmoil. The 2019 general elections did not change this 
pattern. Whenever there is a change of government, some core components of 
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previously negotiated arrangements are altered or abandoned. For instance, 
the Abhisit administration’s 2010 framework for Thailand-China high-speed 
rail cooperation called for three routes: the f irst connecting Nong Khai to 
Bangkok, the second going from Bangkok eastwards to the industrialized 
Thai Eastern Seaboard, and the third going from Bangkok southward to the 
Thai-Malaysian border at Padang Besar (AsiaNews 2010). Under the present 
military-led regime, the f irst route was retained, the second adapted, while 
the third was ignored. The regime similarly dismissed Yingluck’s ‘rice for 
high-speed rail’ programme (Meyer 2014).
Thai patterns of BRI involvement can be puzzling if we consider the key 
contextual factors that underpin Sino-Thai relations. First, Thailand is a 
close partner of China, with longstanding bilateral political cordiality and 
broad cooperation. During the Cold War, the two countries were de facto 
allies against Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. Their strategic partnership 
has extended into the post-Cold War era, with expanding areas of bilateral 
cooperation ranging from commerce and tourism to military and security 
domains. Thailand, despite its status as one of the two US treaty allies in 
Southeast Asia, is the f irst ASEAN country to have maintained security 
consultative mechanisms and bilateral military exercises with China. 
Second, Thailand has been active in promoting intra-regional integration 
and connectivity building in the ASEAN region and beyond, for example, 
through the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and the Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC). Thailand has considered China as a key 
partner in nearly all of these endeavours (except perhaps in the Mekong, 
where China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation [LMC] is regarded by Thai elites 
as a rival initiative to its own Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic 
Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) (personal communications with Thai 
senior off icials and researchers, Bangkok, March 2020). Given the centrality 
of Bangkok’s geographical location, a railroad connecting Thailand with 
south China and various parts of Southeast Asia will further position it as 
an indispensable hub for the envisaged Kunming-Singapore rail route and 
the wider pan-Asian railway networks. Third, Thai elites have generally 
been receptive to forging rail partnerships with China and this political 
will converges with development logic on the ground. Given that Isan is 
one of the less developed areas in Thailand, constructing a rail line linking 
Isan with Bangkok and northwards to southern China makes long-term 
developmental sense.
Thai elites’ receptivity towards rail cooperation with China can be traced 
back to the Abhisit years. In a 2017 interview, the former Prime Minister 
recalled that when his government began negotiations with China on the 
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project, what China already had in mind was a regional rail network – a 
high-speed railway from Yunnan through Laos and Thailand and south-
ward to the Thai-Malaysian border. Abhisit met with the Chairman of the 
China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) during his visit to China in 
November 2009. Abhisit found the idea of linking south China to Singapore 
‘an attractive one’. His government began negotiations with the Chinese 
government but they were not completed by the time he left office (interview 
with Abhisit Vejjajiva, 30 May 2017).
Considering these converging political and development reasons at vari-
ous levels, why then is the high-speed rail project still undergoing prolonged 
negotiation with several rounds of postponed dates?
I would argue that the prolonged negotiations are a result of the Thai 
elites’ continuous attempt to optimize two competing pathways of inner-
justif ications, namely performance legitimation and particularistic justif ica-
tion. The former necessitates that the Prayut regime forge closer ties with 
China for both developmental and diplomatic gains (showing that the regime 
is not isolated internationally, and offsetting Western pressure). Meanwhile, 
the latter demands that it projects an image of being independent and 
preserving national autonomy. The more the perceived dependence on China, 
the greater the need for the regime to project the kingdom’s autonomy. As 
a result, Thailand exercises passive agency by delaying and limiting its BRI 
engagement.
Like Laos and Malaysia, performance legitimation has been a driver 
motivating Thailand’s successive governments’ decisions to engage with 
China in high-speed rail construction. Indeed, the fact that the military junta 
called off most of the Yingluck administration’s key policies but decided to 
reinstate the Thai-Chinese rail project is indicative of strong development 
and political logic, where legitimation drives policy choices. Thai scholar 
Pavin Chachavalpongpun observes that the military junta ‘is eager for the 
legitimacy that comes with large-scale infrastructure investment from 
China at a time when relations with traditional Western partners, especially 
the US, are strained’ (World Politics Review 2017). Another analyst notes 
that because of the widespread impression that the junta has to look to 
China for diplomatic and strategic support in the face of the US and EU’s 
criticisms over the military’s suspension of democracy, the ruling elite had 
faced politicized criticism for not driving a harder bargain vis-à-vis Beijing, 
a not-so-subtle insinuation that the country has grown overly dependent 
on Chinese succour under his military rule’ (Crispin 2016).
Elite legitimation is almost always pursued through multiple routes, 
particularly for General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the army head who launched a 
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coup d’état and seized power in May 2014. As Prayut’s military government 
lacks a democratic mandate, he has considered multiple ways to compensate 
for the deficit in procedural legitimacy. Projecting developmental aspirations 
and preserving national autonomy have been the principal pathways to 
providing inner justification for Prayut and his now defunct National Council 
for Peace and Order (NCPO). His government has sought to accomplish 
this through the ambitious 20-year National Strategy (2017-2036) and Thai-
land 4.0 policy, which involves, among other things, investing in quality 
infrastructure and leveraging Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies 
to transform the Thai economy. At the same time, however, the Prayut 
administration has also turned to identity-based particularistic legitimation. 
It has sought to resonate with and mobilize the unique ‘Thainess’ identity 
and its associated values of autonomy, which have been a salient source of 
the kingdom’s external conduct (Kislenko 2002; Funston 1998), in order to 
use these as an additional basis of political authority and legitimacy before 
the domestic audience.
To optimize and balance between performance legitimation and 
autonomy-based particularistic justif ication, the military government 
has therefore been cautious. It has engaged China for developmental gains 
but without being too compliant vis-à-vis Beijing’s preferences. Being too 
compliant would have further eroded the junta’s domestic authority. As 
such, the Thai negotiators for the Thailand-China high-speed rail project 
have taken a cautious and f irm stance on a number of politically sensitive 
issues, including f inancing arrangements, land use, and labour. According 
to Arkhom Termpittayapaisith, the Transport Minister who led the Thai 
negotiation team for the project, ‘the Chinese wanted everything, just 
like in Laos’. He added: ‘They wanted the right to use the land, the right to 
develop the station[s] and to import the labour[ers], but what we started 
with was – this is Thailand, so we will do our part’ (Janssen 2018, emphasis 
added).
Thailand refused China the rights to develop land along the planned 
route. It rejected the management of the proposed line by Chinese f irms. 
The two countries also disagreed on the interest rate of the loan and the 
total costs of the project. China put the total costs at 468 billion baht, but 
Thailand estimated these costs at only 369 billion baht (US$10.31 billion) 
(Temphairojana & Dhanananphorn 2015). As a sign of disagreement between 
the two sides on the f inancing plan, Prayut announced in March 2016 that 
Thailand alone would f inance the 250-kilometre Bangkok to Nakhon Ratch-
ashima section through domestic loans, but would use Chinese technology, 
equipment, and construction f irms (Bangkok Post 2016).
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The long-drawn-out delay must have irritated China, leading to China’s 
‘non-invitation’ of Thai leaders to the BRI Summit in Beijing in May 2017. The 
move was described by a Thai scholar as China’s ‘shame offensive’ (Busbarat 
2017). Beijing’s pressure seemed to have worked. The following month, Prayut 
exercised his executive power, invoking Article 44 to push through the rail 
project by waiving legal restrictions, allowing the employment of Chinese 
engineers for the project and bypassing normal procurement procedures 
to hire a Chinese state f irm to do design work and construction consulting. 
In the language of legitimation, the government claimed that the special 
treatment was necessary to clear many legal obstacles faced by the project 
and in order ‘to deepen the bilateral relationship and bring great benef it 
to people’ (Tan 2017).
To strike a balance between the twin pathways of performance and 
particularistic justif ication, Thailand’s responses to China-related ventures 
have been selective and uneven. This is discernible when one compares 
the junta’s protracted approach to negotiating the Bangkok-Nong Khai 
line discussed above with the regime’s more decisive push in advancing 
the inter-airport high-speed rail in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). 
Although the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) mega-project was only 
launched in mid-2017, Prayut’s cabinet and the parliament have fast-tracked 
the US$20 billion worth of EEC-related infrastructure, pushing through the 
ambitious plan before the 2019 election (Janssen 2018). In November 2018, the 
Thai government awarded the contract to a Charoen Pokphand Group-led 
consortium. The China Railway Construction Corporation, which holds 
a minority stake in the consortium, is helping the Charoen Pokphand 
Group enter the rail business by f illing the gap in critical rail technology 
(Kishimoto 2019). Since the consortium is led by a Thai conglomerate, the 
development- and autonomy-based pathways converge. Compared to the 
relatively swift and smooth process in advancing the Eastern Economic 
Corridor high-speed airport rail link, the junta’s approach to the Sino-Thai 
high-speed rail project – particularly regarding the second phase, the Nakhon 
Ratchasima-to-Nong Khai portion of track – appear more cautious and 
selective.
The junta’s more concerted and focused efforts in promoting the Eastern 
Economic Corridor as its ‘f lagship program to broaden the drivers of eco-
nomic growth’, for instance, may have to do with the fact that the military 
government views it as ‘low-hanging fruit’. It is seen as a relatively easy and 
fast way for the junta to project its output legitimacy, by promising more 
tangible progress on the ground (interview with a Thai scholar, Bangkok, 
2017). Indeed, the Eastern Economic Corridor – which covers the eastern 
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provinces of Chachoengsao, Chonburi, and Rayong – is already among 
Thailand’s best-developed areas, thanks to the successful implementation 
of the Eastern Seaboard project in the same region two decades ago (Janssen 
2018.). It includes Thailand’s largest port of Laem Chabang. Further upgrading 
key infrastructure in the area, especially through the high-speed airport rail 
link, will be crucial to the junta’s goal as part of the Thailand 4.0 agenda of 
attracting advanced, added-value industries like aircraft, robotics, and next-
generation automobiles to Rayong and its surroundings (Kishimoto 2019).
Conclusion
This chapter analyses the agency of the host country in foreign-funded 
infrastructure connectivity partnerships. Different forms and degrees of 
agency result in different manifestations of connectivity cooperation. It 
contends that the patterns of smaller states’ BRI involvements are a function 
of their ruling elites’ respective legitimation-optimization efforts. These 
elites pursue multiple narratives and approaches of inner justif ication, sup-
plementing and optimizing them in ways that enable the elites to consolidate 
and broaden their authority at home. The primary pathway of legitimation is 
crucial because it sets the direction through which ruling elites pursue the 
corresponding prioritized ‘national’ goals. It determines the country’s relative 
receptivity towards foreign-backed projects, as evidenced by how successive 
Lao, Malaysian, and Thai leaders have decided in favour of forging BRI 
connectivity cooperation with China. Nevertheless, this pathway alone does 
not explain: 1) why BRI-related projects proceed more smoothly in certain 
countries (e.g. Laos) than others; 2) why policy reviews or recalibrations 
might occur among originally enthusiastic countries (e.g. Malaysia under 
Mahathir 2.0); and 3) why some project negotiations are more protracted 
than others, and why some partnerships are more limited than anticipated, 
despite their developmental benefits and bilateral cordiality (e.g. Thailand).
The f indings of this study indicate that it is legitimation-optimization 
processes amid power diffusion that explains the varying patterns and pace of 
the three countries’ BRI engagement. While Lao, Malaysian, and Thai elites have 
all relied on development-based performance legitimation as their primary 
pathway of domestic justification, there are important distinctions as to how 
they pursue this pathway in tandem with differing supplementary, augmenting 
approaches. In Malaysia and Thailand, where power is more diffuse across the 
state and society, such legitimation pathway-optimizing processes are moulded 
and manipulated by inter-elite contestation and the associated grassroots 
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mobilization. In Laos, where the power structure is highly centralized, the 
process is shaped almost exclusively by inter-elite dynamics behind the scenes.
Future studies may further examine to what extent and in what way 
inter-elite dynamics are a key determinant of host country agency in shaping 
the prospect and progress of foreign-backed connectivity partnerships. 
The preliminary observations from this study suggest that the variable 
can interrupt the functioning of governance and democratic processes 
(especially those which are inadequately or inappropriately institutional-
ized), either by strengthening or weakening the checks and balances on a 
given connectivity project. The greater the power diffusion, the greater the 
inter-elite narrative competitions and mobilizations, and the higher the 
likelihood of a project being reviewed, recalibrated, and even disrupted 
or terminated. More research should be conducted on examining power 
diffusion at multiple levels, i.e. how political power is distributed among the 
political elites, between the state and society, and within society, in order 
to further unpack the relations between elites’ legitimation-optimization 
and the country’s patterns of involvement in connectivity cooperation.
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10 The Two Faces of the China Model
The BRI in Southeast Asia
Matt Ferchen
Abstract
Chapter 10 argues that while analyses of the ‘China model’ of develop-
ment have until recently mainly focused on China’s domestic economic 
growth, as China’s global role has expanded, especially under Xi Jinping 
and his signature BRI policy, there is growing interest in whether China 
seeks to export the China model abroad. Looking at Southeast Asia, the 
chapter shows that state-led forms of development, especially BRI-related 
infrastructure f inance and construction, are only one aspect of the export 
of the China model. The chapter provides case studies from Cambodia, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam (with additional insights from the Philippines) 
to explore how informal and often illicit aspects of the China model are 
creating complications for the BRI in host countries and for China itself.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, Southeast Asia, China model, Cam-
bodia, Myanmar, Vietnam
This chapter aims to shed new analytical light on how governments, busi-
nesses, and civil society organizations in a select number of continental 
Southeast Asia countries understand and respond to the challenges and 
opportunities presented by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 
particular, this chapter focuses on a set of Southeast Asian case studies 
that explore how the BRI is playing out against the broader background of 
China’s economic and political relations with Cambodia, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam. For purposes of comparison, these cases were chosen because 
these three countries cover a range of ties to China, and responses to the BRI, 
that span from close embrace (Cambodia) to on-again, off-again patterns 
of engagement and antagonism (Myanmar), to frosty reception (Vietnam). 
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463727853_ch10
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This chapter and its f indings are meant as a complement to other chapters 
in this volume, in particular those by Frans-Paul van der Putten and Mirela 
Petkova (Chapter 8) as well as by Richard Ghiasy (Chapter 11), who analyse 
Indonesia and South Asia, respectively.
The f ieldwork and background research for this chapter revealed two 
distinct faces of the ‘China model’ in these Southeast Asian countries.1 The 
f irst aspect of the China model is characterized by the prototypical and 
increasingly well understood, state-led components of the BRI, including 
Chinese policy bank lending for transport and energy projects that are 
often then built by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).2 This is the 
‘state capitalism’ version of the China model that has come to dominate 
perceptions of large Chinese-led infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia 
and elsewhere, as well as being an important part of the reality of these 
projects. Yet the other, often far less recognized but nonetheless crucial, 
aspect of the China model is its ‘informal’ dimension. This is characterized 
by small-scale, often non-state, businesses, entrepreneurs, and sometimes 
outright criminals, who engage in a range of trade, investment, and other 
speculative commercial ventures that border between the legal and the 
illegal.
In the context of this volume’s shared interest in questions of ‘agency’ 
involving different geographic and substantive aspects of the BRI, this 
chapter’s analytical focus on these two ‘faces’ of the China model offers some 
key insights. In terms of agency, the basic distinction between the state-led 
version of the China model and the more informal version highlights a 
fundamental but still general distinction between different types of Chinese 
agency.3 Within each of these two categories, a variety of actors aim to 
use or appropriate the BRI for material gain or to signal their loyalty to 
their superiors. The BRI has therefore opened up multiple channels for 
1 Fieldwork for the project consisted of four to seven days of interviews in Cambodia (Phnom 
Penh) and Myanmar (Yangon and Mandalay) in October of 2019 and in Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh City 
and Hanoi) in October 2019 and January 2020. The author wishes to thank Cheng-Chwee Kuik for 
insightful, early feedback on the author’s initial musings for this chapter and for introductions 
in Hanoi. He also wishes to thank the Politikoffee group in Phnom Penh for inspiration for the 
‘two faces of the China model’ theme, which came from a talk with that title that the author 
presented to the group in October 2019.
2 The focus here is on physical infrastructure in the form of transport and energy projects, 
but another important aspect is digital infrastructure.
3 For the purposes of this chapter, my focus on ‘agency’ distinguishes between different types 
of actors and different perceptions of who or what a ‘Chinese’ actor is. This conceptualization 
of agency also applies to the wide range of host country actors, although most of the focus here 
remains on Chinese actors.
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agency, including a wide range of behaviours that are not sanctioned by or 
in the interest of the Chinese central government and Communist Party 
authorities that are overseeing the BRI. In host countries, multiple actors, 
including government off icials, businesses and civil society organizations, 
also interact with these two ‘faces’ of the China model. It is often a major 
challenge for these host country actors to understand, let alone regulate or 
change, the behaviour of their Chinese counterparts.
In order to more closely explore these issues, this chapter f irst offers an 
overview of the BRI and the ‘China model’. This includes the domestic politi-
cal economy background to both of these perspectives and the controversies 
attending them. The chapter then moves on to the specif ic case studies, 
analysing how the two faces of the China model matter for the BRI and 
broader ties between China and Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The 
chapter then concludes by assessing how the two-faces framework, as it is 
applied in the main case studies, helps us understand broader questions of 
agency and development linked to the BRI and China’s changing global role.
The China Model and the BRI: Debates and Gaps
Debates about a state-led versus more grassroots ‘China model’ of eco-
nomic development go back nearly a decade before the BRI was introduced 
(Ferchen 2013). At least in the Anglosphere, the roots of such debates were 
Joshua Cooper Ramo’s 2004 musings about a ‘Beijing consensus’ that had 
supposedly emerged to challenge ‘Washington Consensus’ ideas about 
economic development best practice and global leadership (Ramo 2004). Such 
discussions, which in some ways overlapped with ongoing Chinese debates 
about the proper role of the state in managing China’s ongoing ‘reform and 
opening-up’ process, then morphed into broader discussions about whether 
there was an identif iable ‘China model’ of development. Such discussions 
picked up steam in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 f inancial crisis because 
they highlighted questions and controversies about the roots of China’s own 
economic growth and whether China’s experience was applicable to other 
(mostly developing) countries (Naughton 2010).
One of the key fault lines in such debates about the Beijing consensus or 
China model was whether or not China’s own rapid economic development 
since the 1980s was best explained by state-led policies or by non-state 
forces like markets and entrepreneurs (Huang 2008; Kennedy 2010). While 
most Chinese leaders were hesitant to publicly proclaim the merits or 
even existence of a ‘Beijing consensus’ or ‘China model’, they were keen to 
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emphasize that Party and government leadership allowed for a pragmatic 
mix of market and state forces that led to ‘stable’ but dynamic growth. Such 
advocacy of ‘pragmatic’ leadership belied heated debates among Chinese 
scholars and policymakers about whether it was the more state-led or the 
more market-driven aspects of China’s post-Mao development experience 
that should guide the way to future ‘reform’ policies (Ferchen 2013)
In the years prior to the announcement of the BRI in 2013, most discussions 
of the China model were focused on China’s domestic economic develop-
ment experience and its (still largely theoretical) contribution to other 
developing countries. However, in the decade before the rollout of the BRI, 
and in part building on the ‘Go Out’ policies announced in 1998, China was 
already becoming a major actor in trade, investment, and f inancial ties to 
developing country regions like Africa and Latin America, as well as with 
neighbouring regions like Southeast Asia (Eisenman & Heginbotham 2018). 
Against this background, it was again the 2008/2009 f inancial crisis that 
spurred interest and controversies focused on China’s commercial and 
political ties to developing countries. In particular, ideas such as ‘state 
capitalism’ and ‘authoritarian capitalism’ were coined to describe, and 
critique, China’s growing role as a partner, and potential role model, for 
developing countries that at least since the end of the Cold War had often 
looked to the United States or Europe for policy guidance (McGregor 2012). 
Applying the concept of ‘state capitalism’ to China, analysts such as Ian 
Bremmer highlighted linkages with discussions about the China model by 
arguing that it was the state-led nature of China’s own development path 
that explained China’s continued economic growth and its broader appeal 
as a commercial and political actor on the global stage (Bremmer 2009).
Thus, by the time of the introduction of the BRI, there was already a well-
established lineage of ideas, critiques, and debates about the strengths and 
weaknesses, benefits and threats, of China’s state-led version of economic 
development. With the introduction of the BRI, such debates and concepts 
came to be grafted onto the BRI itself (Ferchen 2016). From the outset, the 
rhetoric and policies that Chinese off icials have employed in support of 
the BRI have been state-led. Chinese President Xi Jinping has personally 
promoted the BRI and it is now widely seen as his signature foreign policy 
initiative. And whether the BRI is seen largely in symbolic terms through 
the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) or primarily as an 
effort to f inance and build infrastructure abroad, all such efforts include 
state-to-state dealmaking and involve a central role for Chinese policy 
banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Whereas less than a decade 
ago Chinese off icials were largely reticent to tout a statist, China model of 
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development as part of China’s foreign policy (Ferchen 2013), much of the 
public diplomacy behind the BRI rests on implicit or explicit claims that 
China’s own state-led effort to build infrastructure at home offers a model 
for development promotion in BRI partner countries.
Even though Chinese authorities go to great efforts to portray the BRI 
in a positive light, emphasizing that it is sanctioned at the highest levels 
of the party-state and relying on project implementation by state banks 
and f irms, the state-led nature of the BRI is also at the heart of many 
critiques levelled at it from outside of China (Rolland 2017). Such critiques 
often build on earlier concerns levelled at state capitalism, arguing that 
China’s state-led BRI project is a vehicle for China’s broader, mercantilist 
approach to economic development at home and abroad (Friedberg 2018). 
In this portrayal, the involvement of Chinese state banks and SOEs, 
not to mention the state-to-state nature of BRI-linked infrastructure 
dealmaking, leaves little room for non-Chinese f irms to compete in project 
f inancing or construction. Moreover, it is often the state-led nature of 
Chinese-backed transport and energy projects (whether or not tied to the 
BRI) that is also linked to concerns about lax environmental and labour 
standards on such projects (Saha 2019). But at a broader, geopolitical 
level, one of the most important critiques of the BRI to gain traction in 
recent years is that it is a ‘geoeconomic’ project in which China, under 
the guise of ‘development’ and commerce, is seeking to build political 
and strategic leverage over its Southeast Asian neighbours and other BRI 
participants (Ferchen 2017).
The focus on a state-led China model, whether in its domestic guise or 
in its BRI instantiation, has always had its weaknesses and blind spots. 
As mentioned above, the original debates about the domestic version of 
the China model pitted those who argued for the virtues and necessity of 
state-led growth against critics who argued that it was the unleashing of 
non-state forces, including market forces, migration, and entrepreneurs, 
that explained much of China’s economic growth and dynamism in the 
1980s and 1990s (Huang 2008).
However, such ‘state-versus-market’ debates (which at the time were 
framed as New Left versus Neoliberal) always failed to account for the 
role of more ‘informal’ actors and behaviours. In fact, the willingness of 
many market and state actors to ignore, bend, or bargain over the rules and 
regulations created vast opportunities for behaviours and activities that 
have long been prevalent in China’s domestic economy. From street vendors 
to knock-off clothing, pharmaceuticals to gambling and speculative real 
estate investment, a key but often overlooked part of the China model has 
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always included behaviours that skirt the line between the legal and the 
illegal, the regulated and the unregulated, and the orderly and disorderly 
(Ferchen 2008).
While such debates about the China model were never fully resolved, the 
conventional wisdom today has coalesced around the overriding importance 
of the state in China’s domestic and foreign political economy (Economist 
2020). However, one key ingredient, which was both missing from the earlier 
China model debates and is almost completely absent from current discus-
sion of the BRI or of China’s broader global economic impact, is the role of 
these ‘informal’ actors beyond China’s own borders. The f ieldwork for this 
project has highlighted that it is in fact a combination of both state-led 
actors and the more informal actors also important to China’s own domestic 
political economy that are crucial for understanding challenges faced by 
Southeast Asian countries as well as China. The state-led nature of the 
BRI and the critiques levelled against it almost completely overlook the 
importance of the challenges posed by these more informal actors.
The Two Faces of the China Model in Southeast Asia: Evidence 
from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar
Three case studies from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar will help to 
better illustrate how the two faces of the China model, the more state-led 
and the more informal, are shaping China’s ties to a subset of countries 
in continental Southeast Asia. Although the research for this chapter 
and these case studies began with the explicit intent of analysing under-
standings and responses to China’s BRI in the region, it is this important 
distinction between the more state-led and more informal aspects of 
China’s role in each country that stood out. While most interviews for 
this project began with a focus on the BRI, discussions almost all led 
quickly into the more specif ic dimensions and challenges illustrated in 
the following case studies.
Ultimately, though, the BRI does provide a link between the two aspects 
of the China model. As the research for this chapter shows, Chinese state-led 
projects and government-to-government ties on the one hand, and more 
informal kinds of dealmaking on the other, are often linked in sometimes 
unexpected ways to the BRI. For example, if the symbolic heart of the BRI is 
largely focused on transport infrastructure projects, it is tempting to simply 
label any Chinese-backed railway, highway, or port project as a BRI project. 
Yet most smaller-scale projects, including many energy deals, cannot be 
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found on any off icial BRI project list, but are sometimes nonetheless be 
portrayed as BRI projects by supporters or critics alike. Indeed, it is the 
broader policy and diplomatic framework created by many of the more 
state-led aspects of the BRI that sometimes creates the space and incentives 
for more informal, and even less well-regulated, types of dealmaking. In other 
words, the high-profile, state-led nature of the BRI can create opportunities 
for a wide range of Chinese and host country actors to use and manipulate 
the name and symbolism of the BRI for a wide range of more informal and 
illicit aims.
Cambodia and China: Close Ties at the Top, Disruptive Speculation 
Below
As with other countries in Southeast Asia, the forces that shape political, 
commercial and people-to-people ties between Cambodia and China far 
precede, and overshadow, the BRI (see Mertha 2014). Certainly Cambodia, 
more than any other country in the ten-member Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), has embraced the BRI symbolically through the 
signing of MoUs and high-level attendance at China’s BRI forums, among 
other obvious signals of approbation (Heng and Chheang 2019). If Chinese-
backed infrastructure projects are also the symbolic heart of the BRI, then 
the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in the Cambodian coastal 
city, and the planned expressway from the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh 
to Sihanoukville, certainly underscore the willingness of both countries 
to promote high visibility, BRI-type projects (Kha 2019). Indeed, on the 
Cambodian side at least, the SSEZ is clearly claimed as ‘a landmark project 
on [the] “Belt and Road” Initiative’ (SSEZ n.d.).
Yet symbolic and substantive cooperation on the BRI and BRI-like 
projects is just a part of a more comprehensive, state-to-state, and 
leader-to-leader relationship between Cambodia and China. Under the 
personalistic leadership of Hun Sen, who has been Cambodian Prime 
Minister since the 1980s, Cambodia has adopted a foreign policy position 
aligning itself closely with China. In doing so, Cambodia stands out from 
the majority of its ASEAN neighbours, most of which have adopted a more 
balanced approach to ties with China and the United States (Goh 2016). 
Cambodia, maybe only second to Pakistan, has adopted a diplomatic 
approach toward China meant to signal a deep and abiding camaraderie 
if not alliance. Assessments that Cambodia is a ‘client state’ of China 
certainly underestimate Cambodia’s own strategic decisions while also 
underestimating China’s ‘geoeconomic’ inf luencing prowess (West and 
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Po 2019). Yet the reality of close, state-to-state, Cambodia-China ties, 
and personalistic links between Hun Sen and Xi Jinping, are nonetheless 
frequently touted by each side.4
Such close, high-level relations between Cambodia and China have 
facilitated a f lood of dealmaking. Again, the most high-prof ile, ‘off icial’ 
BRI project is in Sihanoukville, which is a comprehensive ‘special economic 
zone’ that includes a port and hosts a wide range of businesses, including 
factories as well as casinos. However, high-level political ties have also 
facilitated a broad spectrum of China-f inanced and China-built projects, 
including both transport infrastructure (such as roads and bridges) as well as 
energy infrastructure (such as dams and power plants). In addition to larger 
scale and off icially sponsored projects, the China Chamber of Commerce, 
with branches in different cities, including Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville, 
has played an active role as a go-between for Chinese business and projects 
around the country (interviews, Phnom Penh, March 2016).
Large-scale Chinese f inanced and built transport and energy infra-
structure projects have elicited no shortage of concerns from Cambodian 
and international civil society organizations, especially those focused 
on environmental and local community impacts (Tower 2017). There 
are also broader concerns about the f inancial and debt sustainability 
of China-backed projects in Cambodia. Such concerns share much in 
common not just with those raised in other countries in the Mekong region 
and in Southeast Asia, but also in resource-rich parts of Latin America 
and Africa (see Ferchen on China and Latin America, Chapter 5 in this 
volume). Notably, high-prof ile infrastructure projects are generally the 
focus of both Chinese and host country efforts to highlight their support 
for the BRI, but they are also the subject of criticism and pushback by local 
citizens, international NGOs, and other countries. Yet in Cambodia it is 
not necessarily the state-led, high-prof ile elements of Chinese BRI and 
BRI-type activities that are turning out to be most disruptive or drawing 
the most ire and criticism.
In fact, more than any country in this research project, the more informal 
side of the China model is on full, and highly disruptive, display in Cambodia. 
Again, Sihanoukville stands out in this regard as by now the most well-
known and increasingly infamous example of the potentially destabilizing 
outcomes of ‘Chinese’ investment in Cambodia. For example, prior to a 
Cambodian government crackdown in August 2019, much of the Chinese 
4 See the symbolism of Hun Sen’s recent visit to China during the height of China’s battle 
with the Coronavirus (Bong 2020).
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economic activity in Sihanoukville was focused on gambling – both online 
and in casinos – an activity that is illegal in China itself but that had been 
allowed in Cambodia (Murg 2019). Linked to the gambling activities, real 
estate speculation by Chinese citizens in Sihanoukville had also led to a real 
estate bubble, which burst in the aftermath of an August 2019 crackdown 
(Hutt 2020). While not as directly or obviously linked to semi-licit gambling 
activities, a great deal of real estate investment and construction in Phnom 
Penh has also been driven by the speculative activities of Chinese f irms 
and individuals (interviews, Phnom Penh, 24-25 October 2019; Heijmans 
2018). Ultimately, the August 2019 crackdowns on online gambling in places 
like Sihanoukville and border towns like Bavet, mandated by Hun Sen but 
supported by Beijing, were linked to a growing sense that such speculative, 
semi-licit or outright criminal behaviour was also a threat to Chinese citizens 
and China’s reputation (Murg 2019). Yet such speculative, borderline illegal 
behaviour by Chinese citizens and f irms in Cambodia has also had the 
effect of creating a rising sense of anti-China and anti-Chinese sentiment 
in Cambodia (Dunst 2019).
In order to understand the implications that derive from the impact of 
the two faces of the China model in Cambodia, both in terms of percep-
tions and responses, it is important to understand the linkages between 
them. Unlike the other two countries explored for this project, Myanmar 
and Vietnam, Cambodia does not share a border with China. Yet it is the 
high-level, close diplomatic and political relationship that has not just 
led to the promotion of BRI signature projects like the Sihanoukville 
Special Economic Zone, but has also paved the way for the wide range of 
more speculative and semi-legal behaviour that has f lowed in its wake. 
In Cambodia, close, high-level, state-to-state relations have led to the 
branding of Sihanoukville as a BRI project and unleashed forces on both 
sides that have been highly disruptive in ways that an exclusive focus 
on just the state-led aspects of the BRI and China model would miss. 
Certainly, many other forces are at play in determining why Cambodia 
has promoted such an unregulated, open-door policy for a wide range of 
Chinese actors and why so many ‘Wild West’ and insalubrious Chinese 
speculative activities have found such fertile ground in Cambodia. Primary 
among the latter is Cambodia’s dollarized economy, yet the outcome of 
such a confluence of interests and incentives is that both Cambodia and 
China f ind themselves confronting a situation that is potentially explosive 
and diff icult to regulate. Only by understanding both faces of the China 
model, and in this case how the BRI is a bridge between the two, can we 
fully make sense of these challenges.
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Vietnam: Giving the BRI the Cold Shoulder?
If Cambodia is generally seen as the Southeast Asian country with the 
cosiest relationship with China, including the Cambodian government’s 
off icial willingness to support the BRI rhetorically and in practice, then 
Vietnam is generally seen as the polar opposite. As with Cambodia, the 
underlying reality is far more complex, as the f ieldwork for this chapter 
revealed. Like all of China’s Southeast Asian neighbours, history, culture, 
and the structure of economic and political relations between Vietnam 
and China are crucial background to understanding how the BRI is playing 
out in Vietnam. Even though there is indeed a reluctance on the part 
of the Vietnamese government to voice anything like full support for 
the BRI, and even though Vietnam-China ties are often noted for their 
frostiness or even outright confrontational nature, Vietnam is not a vocal 
critic of the BRI per se. As in the case of Cambodia, the details of what 
is taking place below the surface of formal diplomatic ties as well as 
more complex on-the-ground outcomes reveal a range of dealmaking 
and related challenges.
As with the other countries explored in this chapter, the BRI is often but 
a marginal element in a more variegated set of political and economic issues 
that shape the Vietnam-China relationship. As f ieldwork revealed, despite 
Vietnam’s sceptical-but-not-confrontational approach to the BRI, aspects 
of the more informal side of the China model also play an important, and 
increasingly disruptive, role in the Vietnam-China relationship. In particular, 
Chinese-financed and/or built coal-f ired power plants, which are associated 
with the BRI elsewhere (Saha 2019; Gallagher 2017), are f illing a demand for 
energy to fuel Vietnam’s dynamic economy (Wang 2020). Yet crucially, in 
Vietnam, these deals are part of more informal, unregulated dealmaking 
with various unintended and unwanted outcomes.
At the level of formal diplomatic and political ties, and despite being two 
of only a small handful of remaining countries ruled by communist parties, 
Vietnam-China relations have long been far from smooth. Such tensions 
have deep historical roots, both of the older and more recent varieties. Yet 
if Cambodia is seen (over-simplistically) as a client state of China, then 
Vietnam is often seen as China’s primary Southeast Asian geopolitical 
antagonist. Undoubtedly tensions over the South China Sea have long played 
a central role in diff icult Vietnam-China relations (Hayton 2015). Given this 
image of often-tense bilateral relations with China, it would be reasonable 
to expect Vietnam to be the leading Southeast Asian critic of the BRI and 
to reject outright any association with it.
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Yet the reality is more complex: Vietnam has not so much rejected 
or sought to directly set itself up as a critic of the BRI (in contrast with, 
say, India, for instance). Instead, it has chosen to ‘slow-walk’ its response. 
Interviews (Ho Chi Minh City, October 2019; Hanoi, January 2020) revealed 
that at least at the diplomatic level, Vietnamese foreign policy off icials felt 
that choosing an assertively critical stance toward the BRI may exacerbate 
existing tensions in the relationship, including over the South China Sea. 
Interviews also highlighted that while certainly not embracing the BRI 
in rhetoric or practice, Vietnam has adopted a two-pronged approach to 
infrastructure cooperation with China. The first prong involves a willingness 
to highlight rail transport infrastructure networks connecting parts of 
Northern Vietnam with Guangxi and Yunnan Provinces in China. The other 
is green-lighting a few high-prof ile, China-linked infrastructure projects 
in Hanoi itself, including part of the Hanoi subway.
Yet neither the northern railway links nor the Hanoi subway project are 
explicitly listed as BRI projects. Moreover, especially the Hanoi subway 
project has turned into a bit of a debacle as it is late, over budget, and seen by 
many Vietnamese in the capital as unsafe (interview, Hanoi, 14 January 2020; 
Duy 2019). And while these northern projects might at least give a sense 
of BRI-type cooperation on transport infrastructure projects, in Ho Chi 
Minh City in the south there is a clear and symbolic embrace of Japanese 
alternatives, including in city subway projects (interview, Ho Chi Minh 
City, 4 October 2019). Moreover, Chinese efforts to try to promote special 
economic zones (SEZs) designed to facilitate ‘industrial capacity cooperation’ 
in various parts of the border have triggered concerns that such projects may 
be threats to Vietnamese sovereignty (interviews, Hanoi, 13 January 2020).
Whilst at the more state-to-state level Vietnam has adopted a non-
confrontational approach to BRI engagement with China, even while 
dragging its feet in actual transport infrastructure dealmaking, there has 
been more active dealmaking in the area of energy infrastructure. Yet such 
dealmaking has not principally been of an off icial state-to-state nature, like 
much of China’s energy f inancing elsewhere in BRI and non-BRI settings 
(Kong and Gallagher 2017). Instead, it has consisted of more small-scale, 
informal dealmaking in response to rapidly expanding Vietnamese energy 
demands. While certainly different from the scale and nature of gambling 
and speculative real estate deals in Cambodia, Chinese involvement in 
coal-f ired power plant deals in Vietnam has also often been semi-licit. It has 
also frequently been in violation of Vietnamese environmental regulations or 
national strategies for capping fossil-fuel power generation while promoting 
more sustainable energy generation (Malczyk & Robinson 2019). At the same 
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time, interviews (Ho Chi Minh City, October 2019; Hanoi, January 2020) 
highlighted that some of this semi-licit or outright illegal dealmaking for 
coal-f ired power plants has been facilitated by Party or government contacts 
at national and local levels. Interviews also revealed a growing sense of 
displeasure about such Chinese-linked dealmaking among a Vietnamese 
society already leery of its larger neighbour.
Thus, while clearly not part of the BRI in a formal sense, coal-f ired power 
plant deals between Chinese and Vietnamese counterparts reveal the 
important, responsive (to demand and/or poor regulation), but potentially 
disruptive outcome of the more informal part of the China model. The same 
sort of entrepreneurial spirit that has long been at play in reform-era China 
and Vietnam (Abrami et al. 2013), which has included a willingness by some 
businesses as well as off icials to skirt, bend, or bargain over the rules, is 
in many ways a more prominent part of the China-Vietnam infrastructure 
relationship than the more formal, state-to-state part. That said, it seems 
clear that the kind of unregulated free-for-all that defines important parts 
of the Cambodia-China relationship is not at play in the Vietnam-China 
relationship. This is despite the fact that China and Vietnam share a long 
border whereas China and Cambodia share none. In fact, when asked about 
this issue in particular, interviewees (Hanoi, January 2020) noted that, as a 
result of the generally sceptical attitude of the Vietnamese government and 
population toward China, the Vietnamese security services kept generally 
close tabs on the behaviour of Chinese citizens in Vietnam.
Myanmar and China: Challenge of the Two Faces
If Vietnam and Cambodia have adopted contrasting off icial reactions to 
China’s BRI, yet both confront regulatory and political challenges tied to 
the more informal aspects of the China model, then Myanmar falls squarely 
in between. At the level of formal, diplomatic relations, Myanmar-China 
ties have been on a roller coaster since at least 2011, but certainly far before 
that as well (Steinberg 2009). Myanmar’s off icial responses to the BRI have 
been conditioned by the vicissitudes of this often-rocky diplomatic relation-
ship and by criticisms and controversies surrounding Chinese mining and 
energy infrastructure investments that predated the introduction of the 
BRI. Moreover, Myanmar’s long and complicated experience with the more 
informal side of the China model also places it somewhere between the 
Cambodian and Vietnamese examples.
In 2011, and just prior to the introduction of the BRI in 2013, Myanmar-
China relations came in for a course correction. It was around this time that 
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momentous domestic changes in Myanmar’s military junta-led government 
were taking place as the military gradually began to open up the political 
system as well as to move the country away from semi-autarky and inter-
national pariah status. Prior to 2011, China was a rare source of diplomatic 
support for the Myanmar military regime and Chinese government off icials 
and businesses built on these ties with the Myanmar military to develop 
a range of mining and energy investment projects in Myanmar (Steinberg 
2009). Yet as the domestic and foreign policy reforms picked up pace around 
2011, China’s previously privileged diplomatic and investment positions in 
Myanmar became a liability and source of friction. At least in geopolitical 
terms, there was a sense that Myanmar had become overly dependent 
on China economically and diplomatically. It was the Chinese-invested 
Myitsone Dam project, which the Myanmar government put on hold in 
2011 (Fuller 2011), that symbolically kicked off Myanmar’s foreign policy 
recalibration away from this perceived overdependence on China and toward 
more openness in general, including improved diplomatic and economic 
ties to the United States and Europe, in particular.
It is against this background that any symbolic or substantive cooperation 
on, or criticism of, the BRI and BRI-like projects has played out in Myanmar. 
Critics of Chinese claims that the BRI is merely a commercial or develop-
ment project, and those who point to underlying strategic calculations, 
often cite evidence from Chinese-led projects in Myanmar. For example, 
both the oil and gas pipelines crossing Myanmar into China’s bordering 
Yunnan Province and a project for a large port and special economic zone 
(SEZ) on Myanmar’s Andaman coast are often cited as examples of China’s 
geostrategic designs behind large infrastructure projects in the region 
(Marston 2020). The latest grand project, the China-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor (CMEC), is seen in a similar light and sometimes compared to the 
similarly named China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Yet for all the 
strategic calculations that might factor into the off icial support given by 
Myanmar and China to such projects, interviews (Yangon and Mandalay, 
October 2019) revealed that the perception that these projects are a clear sign 
of an unproblematic return to close political and geostrategic cooperation 
between China and Myanmar misses a far messier reality.
First, while the Myanmar government has recently signalled various 
forms of support for the BRI at a diplomatic and symbolic level (Reed 2020), 
actual BRI-branded deals are few and far between. None of the major projects 
listed above are off icially BRI projects, at least not from the Myanmar 
government’s off icial point of view. Moreover, previous or ongoing Chinese-
backed gas and oil pipeline and port projects have run into a range of similar 
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challenges to smaller-scale mining and dam projects. Namely, corporate 
social responsibility-type (CSR) issues, such as unsustainable environmental 
and local community impacts, have elicited civil society organizations’ 
criticism and efforts to change or halt various deals (interviews, Yangon, 
March 2016 and October 2019). Concerns about environmental and local 
community impact in the still-unresolved conflict over the Myitsone Dam 
were directly tied to such CSR issues. Moreover, energy and transport projects 
that are designed to run from Myanmar into Yunnan confront the challenges 
of investing in, and building projects through, active conflict zones along 
Myanmar’s border with China or in Rakhine State (Tower 2017). Recently, 
concerns about debt sustainability have come to play a role in discussions 
about the Kyaukpyu Port and special economic zone project in Rakhine 
State (interviews, Yangon, October 2019). So, from very bottom-up, civil 
society concerns to broader questions of project f inance or even sovereign 
debt sustainability, it is not obvious that proposed Chinese infrastructure 
projects or other kinds of investments in natural resources will proceed 
smoothly or at all.
Many of the issues that have long troubled Chinese investments in 
Myanmar’s infrastructure and natural resources are in some sense typi-
cal of the kinds of problems that similar Chinese state-led projects have 
run into in other developing countries in regions like Latin America and 
Africa. Concerns about unsustainable environmental, social, and debt 
impacts linked to Chinese projects are a frequent theme, especially among 
researchers and civil society organizations focused on Chinese BRI-type 
infrastructure investments and construction projects in these regions. Yet 
Myanmar has also long been a kind of ground zero for concerns about the 
more informal aspects of the China model.
Long before the inauguration of the BRI or the controversy about the 
Myitsone Dam, a key facet and trouble-spot in Myanmar-China relations 
was illicit border trade. Since the late 1990s, researchers, journalists, and 
social activists from China and beyond have focused on the proliferation 
of the cross-border trade in jade, teak, heroin, and exotic animals, to name 
just some. Ruili, in China’s Yunnan Province, which borders with Myan-
mar, has long been notorious as a trans-shipment point for such products 
and synonymous with lax border restrictions (Aspinwall 2019). To what 
extent such semi-licit or illicit trade was a product of ‘Chinese’ presence 
in Myanmar was always diff icult to separate from the often-shadowy and 
historically complex connections between military leaders in Myanmar’s 
‘cease-f ire’ zones along the border with China and the Chinese military or 
local government off icials or traders. Adding to the infamous reputation 
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of such ‘Chinese’ dealmaking in the border region is the reputation that 
Myanmar’s second-largest city, Mandalay, has as a kind of Chinese outpost 
(Perlez 2016). Perceptions of Chinese ‘domination’ of Mandalay were around 
well before the emergence of the BRI. However, they have taken on a different 
dimension as plans for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor envision 
Mandalay square along its path (to Kyaukpyu as the envisioned end point) 
(interviews, Mandalay, October 2019).
The realities and perceptions of the more informal aspects of Chinese 
commercial presence in Myanmar, either with respect to illicit border trade 
or Chinese control or domination of Mandalay, have always been linked 
to the complexities of identity, immigration, and politics in the region. 
The basic question of who is ‘Chinese’ in the more informal types of trade 
or investment relationships with Myanmar is often assumed rather than 
more closely explored by many in Myanmar as well as by outside observers 
(Gordon n.d.). Are border traders who have long gone back and forth between 
Yunnan and China just as ‘Chinese’ as the central or even provincial level 
state-owned enterprises making some of the bigger infrastructure deals 
(Scott 2010)? Are Mandalay traders and investors of Chinese background 
or ethnicity, going back potentially hundreds of years, to be understood in 
the same light as the Chinese citizens or speculators who are doing real 
estate and online gambling deals in Cambodia?
Despite the complexity of the answers to such questions, in Myanmar the 
public reaction to ‘Chinese’ commercial presence and political influence in 
the country has often involved a conflation of the more informal and more 
formal ‘faces’ of the China model. At the same time, some PRC citizens, as 
well as others with more tenuous connections to China or ‘Chineseness’, 
have found opportunities to leverage the ambiguity and popularity of the 
BRI to promote their more informal or outright illegal activities as part of 
the BRI. In fact, one of the key players in the online gambling activities in 
the Cambodian city of Sihanoukville, She Zhijiang, has already moved to 
Myanmar, and has often argued that his activities as the chairman of Yatai 
International Holding are part of the BRI (Nachemson 2020).5 Myanmar, as 
much as any country in Southeast Asia or the world, has long been on the 
front lines of the two faces of the China model. As such, it has been a kind 
of ongoing experiment in what forms ‘agency’ takes. In all three cases here, 
it is the off icial, state-led face of the China model and of the BRI that makes 
5 The She Zhijiang case is ongoing as of the time of this writing and the Chinese government 
has issued a high-prof ile and rare rejection of She and Yatai’s connection to the BRI. See Frontier 
Myanmar (2020) and Tang, et.al. (2020).
260 MaT T FeRChen 
it possible for a wide range of informal actors, be they Chinese citizens or 
not, to portray themselves or be perceived as ‘Chinese’. In this context, the 
BRI underscores what a complex, shifting, and increasingly politicized 
concept ‘agency’ has become for all those attempting to understand China’s 
global role and impact.
Conclusion
This chapter has proposed that there is analytical and practical value to the 
‘two faces of the China model’ conceptual framework. The BRI is most often 
promoted (by China) and understood (by many outside of China) as a foreign 
policy initiative, or strategy, that has been formulated and implemented 
by a unitary Chinese state. In this sense, the BRI is a symbolic distillation 
of a kind of conventional wisdom about Chinese ‘state capitalism’ that 
predated the BRI itself. This wisdom held that China is a strategic, unitary 
actor. However, the case studies presented here highlight that whether or 
not the BRI per se is central to the kinds of commercial and diplomatic 
relations with China’s continental Southeast Asia neighbours, the actors or 
agents associated with ‘China’ come in at least two, quite different forms. 
Those actors linked to the state, such as China’s policy banks or state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), have by now been quite well scrutinized if not always 
fully understood. However, the more informal actors and behaviours that 
have played such a key role in China’s own political economy during the last 
40 years have generally not been included in scholarship or policy analysis 
of the China model or the BRI, in particular.
This chapter has also highlighted that the two faces of the China model 
can come together in important and unexpected ways that impact how 
we understand questions of agency. Under the rubric of the BRI, for ex-
ample, semi-legal Chinese online gambling operations in Cambodia can 
be promoted by unscrupulous entrepreneurs/criminals as part of the BRI. 
Prohibitions on the development of coal-f ired power plants in Vietnam 
can be avoided through under-the-table arrangements between Chinese 
and Vietnamese government off icials and business people. Or, in the case 
of Myanmar, the very question of who is and is not ‘Chinese’ can impact 
government and citizen responses to both major infrastructure projects as 
well as smaller-scale, illicit boarder trade. However, it is in Cambodia, where 
close political relations and state-to-state BRI infrastructure dealmaking 
seem to facilitate economically and socially disruptive and poorly regulated 
informal activities, where the regulatory challenges for all involved are 
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most daunting. Ultimately, how the Chinese and host governments and 
societies understand these two distinct, but related, aspects of the China 
model will have a decisive impact on how they regulate those actors and 
on subsequent developmental outcomes.
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Chapter 11 examines how the BRI has impacted South Asia. It investi-
gates how academic perceptions and policies have evolved in India and 
Pakistan in response to the BRI since 2013. These two states provide a 
unique agency, def ined as the ability to inf luence or resist inf luence, in 
the BRI context. The region’s dominant power, India, is a staunch critic 
that refuses to sit at the BRI table. The region’s other power, Pakistan, 
hosts the BRI’s f lagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), and is the single largest recipient of BRI investment. Through 
interviews with leading Indian and Pakistani academics, the chapter 
shows how they make sense of China in the region, providing under-
standing of the BRI’s interplay with South Asia’s various geopolitical 
f issures.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, South Asia, China, India, Pakistan, 
agency
This chapter explores how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has impacted 
connectivity and integration in South Asia. Following this, it investigates 
how academic perceptions and policies have evolved in the region in 
response to the BRI since its inception in 2013.1 Most countries in the 
1 Academic perceptions tend to trickle down into policy advice and making. However, this 
chapter does not describe in which instances exactly this may have been the case.
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region are discussed but the emphasis is on India and Pakistan.2 These 
two states provide a unique agency, in this chapter the ability to influence 
or resist inf luence, disparity in the BRI context. The region’s dominant 
power, India, is a staunch critic that refuses to sit at the f igurative BRI 
table. India is exemplary of the degree to which a non-partaking actor can 
counter, or supplement, the BRI in its region. The region’s other power, 
Pakistan, hosts the BRI’s f lagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC), and is the single largest recipient of BRI investment. 
Pakistan provides insight into how a deep-seated partaker’s perceptions 
and policies on the BRI have evolved. Moreover, this chapter grants an 
understanding of the BRI’s interplay with South Asia’s various geopoliti-
cal f issures. To permit tailored data collection, the author conducted a 
series of interviews with leading Indian and Pakistani academics on a 
non-attributive basis.3 Reference to these interviews is made where due. 
The next section will explore three critical regional realities signif icant 
to the initiative.
South Asia’s Three Critical Realities
Strategically South Asia, together with Southeast Asia, is the most 
important expanse to the BRI. For China, both regions are terrestrial 
gateways to the Indian Ocean. South Asia is also economically the world’s 
fastest-growing region, growing at an average of 7% since 2014 (Song 2019). 
To understand the impact of the BRI on South Asia, and corresponding 
perceptions and policy responses, it is essential to f irst contemplate 
three critical regional realities signif icant to the initiative: 1) South Asia’s 
distinct geography; 2) the region’s deep-rooted geopolitical landscape; 3) 
the underpinnings of Indian-Chinese political ties. These realities are 
partially interrelated.
2 Myanmar is analysed by Matt Ferchen in his chapter on Southeast Asia (Chapter 10) in this 
volume. Neither is Bhutan part of the analysis, though there is a sporadic reference. Bhutan’s 
foreign and defence policies are closely coordinated by India, as evidenced by the 2017 Doklam 
standoff between India and China. Bhutan has no diplomatic ties with China and is not part of 
the BRI. China tried to woo Bhutan to join the BRI in July 2018, to no avail.
3 Semi-structured non-attributive interviews with leading Indian academics from ten dif-
ferent institutes were conducted in New Delhi in September 2019. A series of non-attributive 
semi-structured interviews with leading Pakistani academics from f ive different institutes 
were conducted through Skype in September-October 2019.
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Distinct Geography
South Asia’s distinct geography is a ‘static reality’. Certainly, border conflicts 
characterize the region, but India’s setting in the region is unlike any other 
in Asia. Like a monolith, India sits right at the centre of the region across four 
dimensions: geographic, political, economic, and historical/cultural. India 
borders four of the f ive regional, continental states: Bangladesh, landlocked 
Bhutan, landlocked Nepal, and Pakistan (see f igure 11.1). The exception is 
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the island states of the Maldives and Sri Lanka 
are situated closer to India than any other continental South Asian state.
Remarkably, none of the South Asian states border a regional state other 
than India. The region’s states are therefore highly dependent on India 
for intra-regional (land) connectivity. Pakistan also borders Afghanistan, 
but landlocked Afghanistan is considered as the crossroads of South and 
Central Asia. Meanwhile, Bangladesh borders Myanmar, but Myanmar is 
an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member and is more 
often classif ied as part of that region.4 The geographic centrality of India, 
the regional hegemon, limits smaller states’ agency. It is something that 
makes South Asia stand out when compared to Southeast, Central and 
West Asia (the Middle East). Kaplan (2013: 228-254) and Marshall (2019: 
189-216) elaborate on this in more detail. Besides India, the region’s other 
common neighbour and geographic reality is China, the only country that 
is contiguous to every subregion of Asia.5 Except for Bangladesh, all of the 
continental states in South Asia border China. Therefore, both literally and 
figuratively, South Asian states sit between an emerging India, a more swiftly 
re-emerging China, and these two powers’ diverging visions for connectivity.
A Deep-Rooted Geopolitical Landscape
The region’s other reality, somewhat more fluid than its distinct geography, 
is that South Asia is rife with geopolitical tensions that intermingle with the 
BRI. These tensions and divisions have extended and continue to extend 
extra-regionally. China still sides with Pakistan, while the US has shifted 
away from Pakistan and towards India to counter China in the Indo-Pacif ic. 
4 Afghanistan was considered part of the Greater Middle East (as is Pakistan in that clas-
sif ication) in US policies at the time of the George W. Bush administration. Regarding Myanmar, 
despite being an ASEAN member, major authorities (such as the World Bank in its Data series) 
exclude it from South Asia. Neither is the country geographically part of the Indian subcontinent.
5 If indeed Afghanistan is considered a part of the Greater Middle East, see also the previous 
footnote.
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The deep geopolitical acrimony between the nuclear-armed actors India 
and Pakistan continues to hold regional integration hostage.7 Low-intensity 
interstate (border) conflict frequently erupts between India and Pakistan, 
6 Note that this map does not depict disputed areas comprehensively or in detail.
7 For a detailed record of the partition of India and the acrimony that has since characterized 
India-Pakistan relations, see Parts 1 and 2 of Ramachandra Guha’s monumental work India after 
Gandhi (2017).
Figure 11.1 India’s unique geographic centrality in South Asia
Source: Image in the public domain, via the united nations6
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as it did again in and over Kashmir in 2019. Pakistan also has very testing 
ties with its other neighbour, Afghanistan.8 The geographic centrality of 
India and these testing ties with Afghanistan result in Pakistan having no 
strategic depth to speak of. Moreover, ethnic and sectarian tensions are 
scattered through South Asia. As a result, this is where some of the world’s 
most severe traditional and non-traditional security challenges congregate. 
These security challenges are ones with which the BRI needs to deal.
However, the largely impoverished region is also strikingly disconnected. 
This is partly because, between the 1950s and the start of the 1990s, India 
deliberately pursued disconnection policies to insulate itself from foreign 
influences. The trip to Sri Lanka in 2015 by the current Prime Minister of 
India, Narendra Modi, for example, was the f irst such off icial bilateral 
visit by an Indian Prime Minister since 1987 (Xavier 2020: 12).9 Naturally, 
smaller states’ regional connectivity, which was overly dependent on Indian 
geographic centrality and policy, was affected by these disconnection poli-
cies. As such, intra-regional trade still remains relatively negligible. Xavier 
demonstrates this well by pointing out that India’s land-based trade with 
neighbour Myanmar is about the same as India’s total trade with distant 
and tiny Nicaragua (2020: 7).
Since it began implementing economic reforms in 1991, India has been 
pursuing greater connectivity with and beyond the region – albeit sluggishly. 
For comparison, intra-regional trade in East Asia is around 50% of the 
region’s total trade, while in South Asia that f igure is only 5% (World Bank 
2018). Still, this pursuit has put India at the centre of regional connectivity 
initiatives and the pace has picked up under the current, more strategic, 
Modi administration. India, like any other state, requires a buffer of stability 
and prosperity in the region for its national security. The BRI’s growing 
footprint is affecting Indian national security on the Indian subcontinent 
and in the Indian Ocean region.
Underpinnings of Indian-Chinese Political Ties
Third, and tied to the f irst two critical realities, perceptions of the BRI have 
to be understood in the broader context of India-China relations. India and 
China have had a complicated political relationship since the second half of 
the twentieth century. During India’s partition, China sided with Pakistan. 
8 Barf ield 2010 grants a well-researched historic background to these testing ties.
9 Though it should be noted that there have been several bilateral state visits to other South 
Asian states during that time.
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Strategic distrust has persisted in Indian military, policy, and academic com-
munities since a brief war with China in 1962. The war, which India lost, was 
over a border dispute between the two states. In addition, border disputes 
with China linger, and then there is China’s all-weather friendship with 
India’s arch-rival Pakistan. In 2010, Grant correctly concluded that ‘Indians 
are much more nervous about the rise of China, New Delhi’s foreign policy 
and defence establishments, in particular,’ than the other way around (Grant 
2010: 1). The BRI’s expansion in South Asia, and a perceived encirclement 
by China, have amplif ied this Indian distrust of and nervousness about 
China (Sibal 2014). This plays a prominent role in the region’s geopolitical 
landscape. For China on the other hand, India forms a massive geographic 
wedge in its terrestrial access to the Indian Ocean.
Irrespective, China is India’s second-largest trading partner after the US. 
However, the balance is vastly tilted in China’s favour, amounting to US$87.07 
billion on average in 2018-2019 (Times of India 2020). The two countries have 
rather similar stances on global issues such as climate change and they strive 
for a multi-polar global order. They frequently meet at fora such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa (BRICS) summit. India is also the second-largest stakeholder 
in the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 
largest beneficiary of its concessional loans (Sachdeva 2018: 289). Moreover, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi have already met eighteen 
times since Modi became the Indian Prime Minister in 2014.10 These examples 
demonstrate that the relationship is also characterized by high-level political 
consultation and economic cooperation, just not under the BRI banner. This is 
a paradox partially sustained by a hunger for foreign investment and lax Indian 
regulation on Chinese investment. It should be noted that at the moment of 
writing Indian policies on Chinese investment in sectors that are deemed 
vital to national security, particularly tech, are becoming more stringent.
The establishment of these three regional realities present in South Asia 
enables a more nuanced exploration of BRI impact on South Asia.
BRI Regional Impact
This section provides an analysis of how, since its inception, the BRI has im-
pacted connectivity and integration in South Asia. First, it briefly examines 
10 This number includes visits to each other’s countries and meetings on the sidelines of 
international summits.
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Chinese strategic interests in South Asia. Following this, it explores the 
BRI’s impact on connectivity and integration.
Chinese Interests
Why is China so interested in South Asia at large and Pakistan, in particular? 
China’s push in South Asia, carried out through the BRI, pursues greater 
autonomy. It seeks to diversify and secure China’s supply chains in the 
Indian Ocean, including energy imports from Africa and the Middle East. 
From a BRI perspective, South Asia’s geography is of considerable strategic 
value. The two components of the BRI, the land-based ‘Silk Road Economic 
Belt’ (hereafter the ‘Belt’) and the maritime-based ‘21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road’ (hereafter the ‘Road’), connect in South Asia. It is important 
to remember that the Belt and Road should not be seen as two distinct 
components, but as a mutually synergizing whole that helps China achieve 
strategic goals through conflict-evasive means (Ghiasy 2018). Also, the size 
and potential of investment and consumer markets in South Asia, in contrast 
to Central and Northeast Asia for example, is tremendous.
Furthermore, by means of the BRI, China’s west, specif ically the land-
locked Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, can connect with the Indian 
Ocean via Pakistan. Meanwhile, the equally landlocked Yunnan Province 
in China’s south-west, and Tibet Autonomous Region in the south, can 
connect with that same ocean through Myanmar. In turn, Pakistan is 
the only country in South Asia through which China can bypass the US 
Navy-patrolled straits in and around Malacca. That grants China supply 
lines to and from the Indian Ocean directly overland without needing to 
trespass a third country. Indeed, China’s strategic interests in the region are 
undeniable. China’s interest in the region is shown by the way it has made 
investments in ports across South Asia, for instance in Gwadar (Pakistan), 
Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Chittagong (Bangladesh). From an Indian 
defence perspective such investments in its sphere of influence, and the 
prospect of the dual-use of these ports, is deeply worrisome (interview, 
Delhi, September 2019). However, China is not the only actor to become 
more active in the security affairs of the Indian Ocean region: this region 
is gradually becoming a multipolar security space (Brewster 2016).
A Connectivity Catalyst in a Disconnected Region
BRI regional impact on South Asia can be viewed along two strands: coopera-
tion on connectivity, and competition for connectivity. The BRI has provided 
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an impetus to connect11 in a fragmented and disconnected region that is 
home to 1.8 billion citizens or 24% of humanity (World Bank Data 2020).12 In 
the region, the concept of connectivity has now taken on a new importance, 
and a spirit of development coordination has gradually emerged (Ghiasy 
et al. 2018). On balance, the region, bar India, has benef itted from better 
national and extra-national connectivity owing to the BRI (Samaranayake 
2019). Examples of projects that have directly or indirectly contributed to 
this include rails and roads in Pakistan, ports such as Chittagong and an 
industrial zone and international exhibition centre in Bangladesh, cities 
such as Colombo Port City in Sri Lanka, airport upgrades and a prominent 
bridge in the Maldives, and hydropower projects in Nepal. However, it should 
be noted that infrastructure on its own does not lead to better connectiv-
ity per se. Equally important are the design and enforcement of policies 
that stimulate closer regional integration, or so-called ‘soft connectivity’. 
This, however, is not in China’s hands, but a matter of local leadership and 
enterprise.
To India, the BRI has acted as a trigger for a blossoming of regional and 
extra-regional connectivity initiatives. Since the launch of the BRI, India 
has initiated f ive major connectivity initiatives (which will be elaborated 
on in the specif ic subsection on India). Indirectly, the BRI has also pushed 
Japan, the US, and the EU, through its Connectivity Strategy, to allocate 
more infrastructure investment to South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. 
Although none of these alternative connectivity initiatives carry the BRI’s 
f inancial and diplomatic clout, the BRI has acted as a game-changing push-
and-pull factor. This role can be labelled a positive side effect.
At the same time, however, the BRI has also intensif ied historic geo-
political competition over inf luence and security between China and 
Pakistan on the one hand, and India on the other. Smaller states in the 
region are caught in the middle. They now need to attempt to balance 
Chinese and Indian interests. India is a closer geographic reality and 
power than China. However, substantial factions in many of these states 
(with the exception of Afghanistan and Bhutan) have been or are still 
wary of India’s dominance and so welcome China’s re-emergence in the 
region (Pakistani interviewees based in Islamabad, September 2019, via 
Skype). With China more active in the region, these states can better 
11 Moreover, BRI gains should not merely be judged in their hard infrastructure manifestation. 
Benef its are also derived from adjustments to institutional, legal, and market frameworks that 
increase overall trade (Fengler & Vallely 2019).
12 Statistics exclude Myanmar.
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balance India’s dominant role, attract investment, and can gain bargaining 
power vis-à-vis India. In this regard, smaller states have gained agency 
in South Asia.
An example of how this increased competition in the region between 
China and India might benefit smaller states was seen in 2016. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) central government committed a US$38 billion 
economic package to Bangladesh. Then, barely half a year later, the Indian 
government sought to counter Chinese efforts by providing a US$5 billion 
line of credit and other economic assistance to Bangladesh. This was the 
biggest single line of credit that India had ever extended to any country 
(Chakma 2019: 228). On another occasion, in 2018, India similarly sought 
to counter China by offering US$1.4 billion in f inancial aid to the Maldives 
for infrastructure development (Ganapathy 2018).
Integration of the Region or Integration with China?
Even though Indian observers acknowledge that China has a legitimate inter-
est in the Indian Ocean to protect its supply lines, many of these observers 
believe that the Road is a proxy for China’s strategic ambitions and part of 
its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy13 (Singh 2019: 206). According to Singh (2019: 
208) and Borah (2018), many Indian analysts believe that as part of this 
strategy China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) wants to dominate 
trans-continental littorals. These analysts see this ambition from China as 
something that signif icantly impacts India’s security interests. According 
to one interviewee (Delhi, September 2019), China is using micro-steps to 
encroach on and make advancements in South Asia’s security realm: f irst 
through diplomacy, then through the economy, and then into security. Over 
time, in the aggregate, these micro-steps become major strides. Another 
Indian interviewee (Delhi, September 2019) made a similar argument: ‘China 
is trying to organically create a need for PLAN as if it is rendered necessary by 
supply chain protection, or circumstances such as a humanitarian disaster. 
That way, they will obtain incremental control.’ Whereas these statements 
have a speculative nature, they are indicative of prevailing views of encircle-
ment by China and are bound to feed into Indian policy-making processes.
The (perceived) encirclement is terrestrial as well. China has been 
insensitive to Indian territorial integrity and one of India’s core interests: 
13 A geopolitical theory introduced by the US and highly popular in Indian policy and academic 
circles claims that China premeditates a network of commercial and military facilities and 
relationships from its mainland through the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa.
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India-claimed and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Part of Kashmir is known 
in Pakistan as Gilgit-Baltistan,14 which the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) crosses. One interviewee (Delhi, September 2019) asked 
how China would feel if India were to go against China’s core interests in, 
for example, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the South China Sea. The interlocu-
tor went further and stated that the rift between India and Pakistan 
is being sustained and hardened by the BRI. They said that, instead of 
closer integration, there is now an East South Asia and a West South 
Asia. This schism is perhaps somewhat overstated, as there was a(n) (in)
visible rift in South Asia long before the BRI surfaced. However, it is true 
that the BRI has bolstered Pakistan’s position and further complicated 
the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand, there is growing awareness in 
Pakistan and China that the CPEC makes limited economic sense if India 
and Afghanistan are not part of it (two interviewees based in Islamabad, 
October 2019, via Skype). Currently, BRI connectivity in continental South 
Asia courses vertically, i.e. it runs from China to Pakistan and then down 
through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. There is no CPEC horizontal integra-
tion with either of Pakistan’s regional neighbours, India or Afghanistan. 
However, this is a conscious choice that has been made by India, while 
Afghanistan has an uneasy relationship with Pakistan and is embroiled 
in an ongoing civil war.
The next section will discuss how the three South Asian regional realities 
are linked with the BRI’s regional impact and the evolution of the perceptions 
and policies of individual regional states.
The Evolution of Perceptions and Policy Responses in South Asia
In line with the evolution of BRI impact since 2013, academic perceptions 
of the initiative in South Asia have also evolved. Academic perceptions and 
policy responses can be characterized by drawing the analogy of who is 
seated at the f igurative BRI table. The perceptions and policy responses of 
different states are reflected by who cooperates with China under the BRI 
banner and how they have acted. Proximity to the table indicates greater 
interest. The role of the region’s three critical realities are interwoven in 
the argumentation.
14 Gilgit-Baltistan, despite being part of the larger occupied Jammu and Kashmir issue has 
always had a slightly different status, as it gained and announced independence from the British, 
and then surrendered to Pakistan, which merged it into the larger Jammu and Kashmir territory.
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Not at the Table but Keeping a Very Close Eye – India
As elaborated on above, the political relations between India and China are 
complex. A number of Indian scholars define that relationship through the 
4 C’s of conflict, cooperation, competition, and containment (Sachdeva 2018: 
286). India’s position regarding the BRI best f its in the latter two categories 
of competition and containment. India has been both competing with, 
and containing, the BRI since 2014. It does this not only because the BRI 
infringes on Indian regional influence, but also because it is convinced that 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) wants a unipolar Asia (Katoch 2019: 
104). India perceives that more connectivity brought about by the BRI aids 
this CPC objective. This connectivity translates into greater strategic space 
and mobility for China in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, at the expense 
of India’s operational space (interview, Delhi, September 2019). This is, of 
course, a correct observation.
Keeping this in mind, India’s official policy on the BRI has been consistent. 
The Indian government has always been outspoken about CPEC.15 However, 
formally India has mostly remained silent about the BRI and has neither 
really accepted nor rejected the initiative. Perceptions of the BRI in India 
can be divided into two phases:
Phase I. In this phase, between 2014 and 2017, the debate centred on 
geopolitical and developmental implications. China off icially invited India 
to join the BRI in February 2014. However, the Indian government did 
not express much enthusiasm due to 1) a lack of clarity on the initiative’s 
economic objectives, 2) a lack of consultation by China with India and 
others on BRI specif ics, and 3) hesitation among many Indian observers 
about its strategic implications (Singh 2014: 135). This complied with a 
constant in India’s rich and long history of foreign policy: independence of 
action alongside a level of realism and idealism.16 The BRI mostly hit the 
realism string. However, India did make more cooperative moves in the 
broader context of the Indian-Chinese relationship. In 2014, India became a 
founding member of the AIIB and the New Development Bank (formerly the 
BRICS Development Bank). It then became a full member of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation in 2017. Chhibber (2017) refers to the phase of 
relations between India and China that stretched from 2014 to 2017 as one 
of ‘competitive cooperation’.
15 After the 2018 Wuhan summit off icial rhetoric has toned down, perhaps as a result of a plea 
by President Xi Jinping.
16 Pande 2018 offers a useful overview of ancient to contemporary Indian foreign policy.
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In the early years of this period, 2014 to 2015, Indian analysts saw the BRI 
both as an opportunity to boost regional connectivity and a threat to India’s 
prominence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region (see, for instance, 
Singh 2014: 143; Mohan 2014a and 2014b; Nataraj & Sekhani 2015). These same 
analysts suggested that India come up with its own connectivity initiatives 
to hedge the BRI. Simultaneously, they expressed the rationale for joining 
the BRI. Some academics, to no avail, recommended a partial engagement 
(e.g. Singh 2014; Nataraj & Sekhani 2015: 71). Recommendations to join the 
BRI were based on the fact that it would give India an ability to shape the 
agenda and to tap an unfolding geoeconomic reality. Mohan (2014a and 
2014b) def ined India’s off icial stance at the time as rigid and detrimental.
The Indian government was, however, receptive to the China-led Bangla-
desh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), which predated the 
BRI by fourteen years. India saw the BCIM as having the potential to open 
up India’s tribal, landlocked Northeast region. Some analysts, such as Uberoi 
(2016), questioned this off icial stance, which produced the dichotomy of the 
BRI versus the BCIM. Yet, when the Chinese state subsumed the BCIM into 
the BRI in 2015, Indian off icial interest tumbled. In that year, the Indian 
government continued its silent off icial stance on the BRI, though it publicly 
rejected CPEC. By and large, in this f irst phase, geopolitics dominated over 
developmental implications because of a f ixation on CPEC (Sachdeva 2018: 
286). This f ixation is increasingly visible from 2017 onwards. In 2017, the 
Indian government visibly protested by not sending a single delegate to 
the f irst Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. Publicly, a day before the forum, 
a key Indian policy shift took off. The Indian government started to oppose 
the BRI as a whole rather than just CPEC by pointing to lack of compliance 
with international norms on transparency, economic sustainability, and 
debt sustainability (Ministry of External Affairs 2017). Even the fact that 
it gained membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in that 
same year did not change India’s stance towards the BRI.
Five prominent initiatives. Delhi used the years between the introduc-
tion of the BRI and the f irst forum to up its agency. To foster its ambitions 
and geographic centrality, India launched f ive prominent initiatives: the 
Neighbourhood First policy (2014), the Act East policy (2014), Project Mausam 
(2014), Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) (2015), and, co-
initiated with Japan, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) (2017).17 
These initiatives are important policy responses and merit elaboration. 
17 A year later it was renamed ‘Platform for Japan-India Business Cooperation in Asia-Africa 
Region’.
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The Neighbourhood First policy f irmly prioritized connectivity with South 
Asia, not merely restricted to commerce. The Act East policy is a follow-up 
on the somewhat inert Look East policy from 1991. The Act East policy, 
combined with the Modi administration’s Neighbourhood First policy – a 
major foreign policy – tactically rebalanced India’s geostrategic orientation. 
India’s foreign policy had long been oriented towards the West but had now 
become more neighbourhood- and Indian Ocean-centric (Katoch 2019: 23).
To support this shift in orientation, the Indian government introduced 
Project Mausam. Mausam aims to revive ‘lost’ maritime, cultural, and 
economic connections in the Indian Ocean region. It can be interpreted 
as India’s answer to the Road. Interestingly, cultural ties are utilized as a 
key cohesive driver in Project Mausam. Strategically, particularly admin-
istratively, f inancially, and diplomatically, India simply cannot compete 
with China and its BRI. It has therefore had to come up with alternative 
ways to compete. One interviewee (Delhi, September 2019) reflected on 
the rationale behind Project Mausam and articulated that ‘Chinese money 
and investment are not the only currency: cultural, lingual, historical, and 
religious similarities are currencies, too. Economic incentives are short-
term, while cultural relations are long term’ (my emphasis). Following after 
Project Mausam, Prime Minister Modi announced SAGAR, a vision at the 
conceptual level for economic growth and security in the Indian Ocean. 
The partnership with Japan lacks Indian investment, and progress has been 
slower than Japan foresaw (interview, Delhi, September 2019).
Phase II. In this phase, which began in late 2017 or early 2018 and continues 
to the present, geopolitics has remained a central element. In addition, the 
political economy, sustainability, and practical mishaps of the BRI have 
increasingly come to the fore. How can this be explained? In 2018, Chinese 
trade in the region was f ive times more than India’s trade with its neighbours 
(Xavier 2020: 10). Suspicions of the BRI on the part of the Indian government 
and Indian analysts continued to grow in 2018-2019. The reasons for these 
suspicions became more f ine-grained than mere geopolitics, they were 1) 
geoeconomic, 2) geostrategic, and 3) of a security nature.
Geoeconomically, the (perceived) mishaps of the BRI in South Asia made 
Indian commentators further doubt the BRI’s vision and its intentions. An 
example of the type of events that increased Indian doubts about BRI is the 
case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, which a Chinese company18 obtained 
through a so-called debt-for-equity swap. Describing the kind of misgivings 
felt in India about the BRI, Khurana (2019: 28) writes that ‘the BRI is seen 
18 China Merchant Port Holdings Limited.
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as a Chinese project which capitalizes on other nation’s vulnerabilities, 
desires and insecurities’. The same author describes the BRI as a Chinese 
attempt to move low-end sunset industries elsewhere (ibid.: 29). On the 
same subject, a Pakistani interviewee stated that India, backed by the 
US, had deliberately been marketing the BRI in the region as a debt trap 
solely serving China (interviewee based in Islamabad, September 2019, 
via Skype). There is also growing belief among Indian analysts that the 
initiative has limited economic rationale in South Asia, particularly as it 
relates to CPEC, and is rather aimed to constrain the rise of India (Katoch 
2019: 33). This sentiment is also reflective of the underpinnings of strategic 
distrust in Indian-Chinese ties. One Indian interlocutor even questioned the 
benefit the BRI could provide India (Delhi, September 2019). They remarked: 
‘We are not anti-China, but what do we actually gain if we sign onto the 
BRI? The initiative is not transparent at all, so what is the use?’ It may help 
that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in India has been growing 
consistently, so India is not necessarily losing out on the BRI (Basrur 2019).
Geostrategically, in this phase Indian policy and academic observers 
have cemented their view of the BRI as being primarily a unilateral Chinese 
project. One analyst, for example, stated that ‘the more we thought about 
the economic rationale of Gwadar, Hambantota, and Chittagong Ports the 
less sense it made’ (interview, Delhi, September 2019). As a result, India has 
slightly shifted away from its long-term non-alignment policy and taken a 
harder position on the strategic grid. Trust, or rather the def icit of it in the 
context of China’s BRI, was also a key message of Prime Minister Modi’s 
address on connectivity and cooperation at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue 
(Modi 2018). India sought closer security coordination with, e.g., the US, 
Japan, and Australia through the nascent ‘quad’, and by endorsing the 
Japan-US initiative to ‘marry’ the Indian Ocean space with the Pacif ic, the 
‘Indo-Pacif ic’.
Security concerns, logically, have also mounted. The Indian Navy spotted 
fourteen Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy warships in the Indian 
Ocean in 2017 (Singh 2019: 203). India’s sovereignty and development depend 
– profoundly – on maritime security, and China’s swift naval expansion 
through the Road is challenging this. To emphasize the gravity of the situ-
ation, an interviewee (Delhi, September 2019) said: ‘We feel that we may 
succeed, or we may fail as a state in the coming 100 to 150 years. Much of 
this will depend on our naval power in the IOR. Delhi perceives the BRI 
not as a threat but as a major risk factor, as are the US and the EU, in this 
regard’. India’s interest in the maritime domain is therefore not induced 
by the BRI, but it has highlighted a fundamental national security interest. 
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Another analyst (interview, Delhi, September 2019), interestingly, and ac-
curately, concluded that the BRI, thus far, has mostly been examined by 
India through a geopolitical and regional lens. India only looks at the BRI 
in South Asia and does not look too much beyond the region for its impact. 
Therefore, perceptions are biased and there is no full-picture analysis. 
Irrespective of this, as of the middle of 2020 India is still not at the BRI 
table. Indian agency, or its ability to influence or resist influence in South 
Asia, has simultaneously been limited and boosted by the BRI. India has 
set up a few small connectivity tables of its own and watches very closely 
what neighbours do, particularly Pakistan.
Deep Seated – Afghanistan and Pakistan
Of all the different connectivity visions that include Afghanistan, the BRI is 
by any measure the grandest and most ambitious. The Afghan government 
has consistently been very receptive to the BRI and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2016. The president, Ashraf Ghani, and his administration 
want to transform the landlocked and war-torn country into a logistical 
hub between Central and South Asia and welcome infrastructure invest-
ment. However, BRI progress in Afghanistan has been limited. In 2016, 
the Sino-Afghanistan Special Railway Transportation Project resulted in 
freight being delivered by train from Nantong, in China’s eastern Jiangsu 
province, to Hairatan, in Afghanistan’s northern Balkh province. In 2017, 
cargo moved two ways, but the exchange, by and large, can be considered 
symbolic. A fibre-optic cable was laid through the sliver of land that connects 
Afghanistan with China, the Wakhan Corridor (Jahanmal 2017), and a road 
is being built to connect the two countries through this rugged province 
(Foster 2019). However, Afghanistan simply is not a very attractive investment 
destination for the BRI as long as armed conflict and political instability 
linger. India is, nevertheless, working to connect with Afghanistan through 
Iran’s Chabahar Port (Pakistan does not permit India to use its territory for 
transit). This is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor 
(INSTC) that aims to improve connectivity between India, Russia, Central 
Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran.19 In 2017, India even managed to ship wheat 
through Chabahar to Afghanistan.
Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is very much seated at the BRI table, though 
it has a much more prominent seat. As mentioned previously, Pakistan is 
19 An agreement was signed by the initiative’s founders, India, Russia, and Iran, in 
September 2000.
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host to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is the flagship 
corridor of the entire BRI. It is also the single largest recipient of BRI f inancial 
allocations, having received some US$60 billion by April 2018 (Hillman 
2018), an amount close to 7% of Pakistan’s external loans (Hussain 2019: 
4). Financing has taken place through investment projects, concessional 
loans, interest-free loans, and government grants (Chattha & Hyder 2019: 
106). China and Pakistan have had a very close relationship since 1950 
when Pakistan was one of the f irst countries to cut diplomatic ties with the 
Republic of China on Taiwan. An aspiration to have a corridor between the 
two countries runs back to that same period and motivated construction of 
the Karakoram highway. Pakistan has always had a strategic need to have 
China on its side as a counterweight to Indian dominance and centrality 
in the region. However, China is not just a strategic balancer; it is also a 
‘replacement’. When the US grew increasingly disillusioned with Pakistan, 
following growing evidence of its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
China was the most logical go-to actor for Pakistan’s leaders. It is also not 
just the policy community that holds these views: China is seen as a more 
reliable and constructive strategic partner than the US according to popular 
sentiment (Pakistani interviewees based in Islamabad, September and 
October 2019, via Skype). Pakistan also desperately needs Chinese investment 
and is very welcoming of it, like Cambodia in Southeast Asia (see Ferchen on 
China and Southeast Asia, Chapter 10 in this volume). Chinese investment 
is anticipated to give a boost to the economy and help f ight unemployment 
and terrorism. It is also seen as a solution to Pakistan’s endemic energy 
crisis, which has long crippled the economy.
Nonetheless, the interdependence between China and Pakistan is not 
straightforward, and agency is rather complex and asymmetric. While 
f inancially China has the upper hand, Pakistan is at an advantage geo-
graphically and strategically (Afridi & Khalid 2016: 669). Gwadar Port, 
located in Pakistan’s southern Baluchistan Province, offers China virtually 
direct access to the Strait of Hormuz, through which some 40% of global 
daily oil transit fares. CPEC will also shorten the route for China’s energy 
imports from the Middle East by about 12,000 kilometres (Bhattacharjee 
2015: 2). Moreover, it gives China a strategically advantageous position in 
South Asia.
Although there has been near-unanimous support for the game-changing 
CPEC since the inception of the BRI, the corridor has been a topic of hot 
contestation in the Pakistani policy community. Once China and Pakistan 
started to plan, quarrels f lared up within Pakistan over dividends, routes, 
and specif ic projects (interviewee based in Islamabad, September 2019, via 
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Skype). This was particularly the case when the Nawaz Sharif administration 
shifted the initial short(er) route from Pakistan’s west, running through 
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, to a route which would also run through 
Punjab Province in the east. This altered route signif icantly lengthened 
the distance down to Gwadar Port in Baluchistan Province. However, it 
connected the various urban centres in the country, including Lahore and 
Faisalabad, which are, respectively, Pakistan’s second- and third-largest 
cities. The Sharif administration controlled tensions relatively well by 
holding broad consultations with political parties and social leaders, thereby 
mitigating a more negative perception and impact of CPEC (Hussain 2019: 
10). At the Pakistani subnational level, sidelined stakeholders of CPEC, 
most notably the Balochis and the business community, have frequently 
expressed dissatisfaction about transparency and the distribution of spoils. 
Insurgents in both Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan have blown up 
pipelines and on occasion even attacked Chinese engineers. The Pakistani 
military has stepped up in response and CPEC’s construction has continued 
on pace.
CPEC is being built in phases that are under continuous review. It has 
just passed the 2015-2018 phase of so-called early harvest projects. Many of 
these projects focused on power plants (mostly fossil, but also renewable and 
nuclear) and on critical infrastructure. The second phase, which will focus 
on additional connectivity projects and gradual industrialization, coincides 
with a new administration. While he was in opposition, the incumbent 
Prime Minister Imran Khan strongly opposed CPEC modalities, but not 
the corridor itself. He said the initiative needed to be more transparent and 
fairer in regard to economic burden and debt sustainability, mostly pointing 
the f inger at his predecessor (Hussain 2018). At that time, Khan did not hold 
political off ice so he could afford to take this position. However, when he 
came to power in 2018, he adopted a much softer stance towards CPEC, even 
on the renegotiations that he had previously demanded. Most of the project 
timelines had already been met by the time he took off ice. Nonetheless, the 
Khan administration is more careful when chalking out new projects. As a 
result, there is slightly more transparency now (Hussain 2019: 13-14). Some 
projects have been revised. For example, Pakistan has insisted that a larger 
airport be constructed in Gwadar. China has also learned from how the 
CPEC project has unfolded in Pakistan. For instance, because the Chinese 
state needs a secure investment climate it is now engaging frequently with 
Baloch leaders and giving more attention to local communities too (Abrar 
2019). As a result the agency of these local actors has grown, after it had 
diminished in the initial years of the CPEC project.
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Moved the Seat – Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka
Bangladesh, the world’s eighth most populous country, has fairly consistently 
and skilfully balanced policy between pursuing the benef its of the BRI 
and showing sensitivity to India’s core concerns (Chakma 2019; Titumir 
& Rahman 2019). India edges virtually the entire stretch of Bangladesh’s 
borders. But, if anything, because of its investment needs Bangladesh has 
moved its seat closer to the BRI table since 2016. In the process, Bangladesh 
has achieved remarkable economic growth. It has enjoyed a GDP growth 
rate of no less than 7% since 2016 (World Bank Data 2020).20 To Bangla-
desh, the Road and the BCIM corridor appeal in particular as means to 
increase export-import capacity (Karim & Islam 2018). Bangladesh is the 
only other country in South Asia, besides Pakistan, where the Belt and the 
Road components of the BRI connect. Not coincidentally, Bangladesh is 
the second-largest recipient of BRI loans in the region after Pakistan. By 
early 2018, China had implemented US$10 billion worth of infrastructure 
projects (China Daily 2018). A notable example is cooperation on capac-
ity development of Bangladesh’s largest port, Chittagong. Nevertheless, 
Bangladesh is a very selective borrower and coordinates the BRI well with 
its own development priorities without bending to pressure from either 
China or India (Ramachandran 2019). Still, Bangladesh is more important 
to India than to China, for security, economic, political, geographic, and 
foreign-policy reasons (Chakma 2019: 228; Islam 2016). Demonstrative of 
this is the fact that India had been Bangladesh’s top trading partner for 40 
years until China took over in 2015 (Anwar 2019).
The Maldives is a clear-cut case of a state that has distanced its seat 
from the BRI table due to fear of overdependence on China and a political 
leadership swing. The nearly 1200 islands that comprise the Maldives sit right 
in the middle of the Indian Ocean. This is a highly strategic setting among 
key international shipping lanes and has long been under India’s political 
inf luence. Chinese diplomatic overtures, such as Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s visit to the archipelago in 2014, and BRI-related financial injections, 
helped to turn the tide during the f ive years that President Abdullah Yameen 
was in off ice, with his administration engaging in extensive borrowing. The 
Maldives even signed a Free Trade Agreement with China in 2017. Based on 
2017 f igures, the Maldives’s debt to China accounted for 27% of external debt, 
though only 8.6% of total debt (Samaranayake 2019: 12). Yameen’s successor, 
20 2016-2018. It should be noted that the average growth rate was never below 5% from 2004 
to 2016.
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Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, who ousted him in a landslide victory in the 2018 
elections, rectif ied the marginalization of India and overdependence on 
China under Yameen. After all, India is the central actor in the Maldives’s 
greater geography. President Solih also tried to rescind BRI projects that were 
perceived as having inflated prices, but many had already been completed 
(Elmer 2019).
Like the Maldives, Sri Lanka is also strategically located along the Europe-
Asia trade route as a low-cost transit point. It also lends itself well for foreign 
offshore supply to security and naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Shifts 
in the political landscape and growing debt concerns, even though China 
only holds an estimated 12% of Sri Lanka’s external debt (Samaranayake 
2019: 6),21 have also altered policy stances on the BRI. However, more than 
the Maldives, Sri Lanka is entangled in a power play that, besides China and 
India, also includes Japan and the US (the country’s top export destination). 
Both China and India have attempted to influence Sri Lankan domestic 
politics. In turn, Sri Lanka has tried to play them against each other. Initially 
there was a pro-China tilt that translated into numerous BRI projects. In 
2017, China accounted for 35% of foreign direct investment, more than 
twice India’s 16% share (Xavier 2020). The 99-year Hambantota Port lease 
sent shockwaves through global media, but the debt-for-equity swap was 
incompletely portrayed in Indian and Western media (Elmer 2019; Sautman 
and Yan 2019). Since 2019, the new Sri Lankan government led by President 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa has pursued agency that seeks to better balance foreign 
influence and maximize benef its to Sri Lanka. Chinese-Indian strategic 
distrust is a useful reality in that regard. President Rajapaksa has clearly 
warned, though, that unless powers other than China invest in the country, 
the BRI will prevail (Elmer 2019).
To Sit or Not to Sit – Nepal
While Sri Lanka’s geographic setting means it can draw from a diverse pool 
of international interest, Nepal’s setting is much less exploitable. Rugged 
Nepal is exemplary of a politically divided country that is (over)dependent 
for transit and investment on both India and China and accordingly needs 
to balance between the two. Nepal was an early BRI signatory in 2014, the 
same year that Chinese investment in the country surpassed that of India. 
Not long after this, Nepali authorities accused India of blockading the transit 
of (mostly) fuel and vital goods to Nepal (BBC 2015). As a result, Nepal has 
21 When narrowed to external debt China’s share is 12% (Samaranayake 2019: 6).
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veered a little closer to China, but the country does not have a very coherent 
foreign policy due to political fragmentation. India wants to maintain Nepal 
within its sphere of influence, while China is actively working to pull it away. 
The Modi administration worries that the Belt will grant China (further) 
direct access to its territory (Sapkota 2017). It is important to realize that 
Nepal is landlocked and is enclosed by India on three sides and China on 
the other. As a result, India has had a de facto monopoly on Nepali exports. 
The BRI could change this. Nonetheless, perceptions of the BRI amongst 
academics and politicians range from lukewarm to positive (Sapkota 2017: 
115). In the policy community this old division mostly runs along the fault 
lines between the single largest party, the pro-India Nepal Congress, and 
the pro-China Nepal Communist Party that currently rules. There are a 
number of reasons that specif ically drive Nepali interest in the BRI. The 
most signif icant is that it could increase international trade and transform 
Nepal from a landlocked to a land-linked country (Shrestha 2017: 36; Panda 
2019). Much of this revolves around the Trans-Himalayan Economic Cor-
ridor, part of the BRI.22 Nepal is a demonstrative of the weight and complex 
interplay of South Asia’s three critical realities. It also indicates how this 
complex interplay can, potentially, be turned to an agency advantage by a 
small regional actor.
Conclusion
BRI impact on connectivity and integration in South Asia is dissimilar to 
any other region where the initiative is active. Three interrelated elements 
help produce this dissimilarity. The f irst is the region’s distinct geographic 
reality. Emerging India is literally and allegorically the centre. Meanwhile, 
the more-swiftly re-emerging China is an immediate neighbour to all but one 
continental South Asian state. The second element is the way the region has 
a congregation of various, deep-rooted geopolitical f issures, most notably 
deep antagonism between its two largest actors, India and Pakistan. The 
third element is the severe strategic distrust of China in the Indian policy 
and military community, as well as in much of the Indian academic com-
munity. BRI connectivity in South Asia has consequently had to work its 
22 This corridor could act as a land bridge between China and India and improve transit with 
and reduce transit costs to the Tibet Autonomous Region, Sichuan, and Yunnan (Adhikari 2018: 
47-49). Together with CPEC, BCIM, and the Road, it is one of four main BRI subprojects in South 
Asia.
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way around India. Therefore, despite select improvements of national and 
select extra-national connectivity in Pakistan and smaller states, the BRI 
has not been able to genuinely integrate the region more closely – at least so 
far. However, the initiative has triggered a host of connectivity initiatives in 
South Asia, led mostly by India as well as by extra-regional powers. As a result 
of this and greater diversity of investors, the agency of South Asian states 
other than India has, on balance, improved – as has China’s. Scholars should 
take note of this. The BRI has also given a highly fragmented region stronger 
impetus to connect, which is a remarkable accomplishment. Nonetheless, 
the BRI has intensif ied historical tensions between China-Pakistan versus 
India. It has also helped sustain the India-Pakistan rift. Moreover, the BRI 
has led to a further internationalization and complication of the region’s 
geopolitics – including the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean.
The evolution of perceptions of the BRI, as well as policy responses 
to it, in South Asia differs from the evolution seen in other parts of the 
world. The changing perceptions of BRI and policy responses in the region 
can be characterized by drawing an analogy with who is seated at the 
f igurative BRI table. India has been very consistent: it never took a seat. 
Since the BRI’s inception, India has been suspicious of the economic 
rationale, and lack of transparency and multilateralism of the initia-
tive. Of India’s traditional foreign policy attributes of independence of 
action alongside a level of realism and idealism, the BRI has mostly hit 
the realism string. This string has continued to vibrate as the BRI has 
unfolded rapidly in India’s sphere of inf luence. India has been actively 
seeking to compensate for the deliberate disconnection policies that it 
pursued for most of the second half of the twentieth century. That said, 
India does not have the diplomatic, f inancial, and administrative clout of 
the BRI. Therefore, Indian agency has simultaneously been limited and 
boosted by the BRI. War-torn Afghanistan, and Pakistan, both thirsty for 
investment, have also been very consistent in their BRI policies. However, 
contrary to India they both have very much taken a seat at the BRI table. 
In Pakistan, the policy community under the incumbent Prime Minister 
Imran Khan has become more involved and slightly more cautious in 
CPEC planning. The Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all 
become frontlines for Indian-Chinese competition over inf luence and 
investment. Sri Lanka and the Maldives have readjusted their interest in 
BRI following political leadership swings, concerns over the sustainability 
of external debt, and wariness over long-term strategic costs. They have 
distanced their seats a little from the BRI table. On the contrary, the 
selective-borrower Bangladesh has continuously been able to smartly 
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negotiate BRI investments while tending to Indian core interests. Politically 
divided Nepal, landlocked between China and India, has taken a seat to 
lessen a long-term overdependence on India.
These responses indicate that countering the BRI by a regional power, 
in this case, India, is of limited effect in a geopolitically fragmented region 
that yearns for investment, improved connectivity, and a power balance. 
Despite having grown slightly less enthusiastic and cautious, South Asia, bar 
India, still welcomes BRI investments. Nevertheless, if India and China do 
not sit at the same regional connectivity table, the initiative will not truly 
integrate the region, and will sustain regional divisions.
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12 Geographic Agency




Chapter 12 focuses on Iran and tackles two issues. First, it seeks to demar-
cate the conceptual boundaries of ‘geographic agency’. Second, it attempts 
to apply this concept to the case of Iran. Adopting a critical geography 
approach, the chapter unpacks how Iran is reinventing itself geographically 
through certain ‘space-making processes’ and ‘space-framing assumptions’. 
The chapter argues that Iran is showing agency at three geographical 
levels: 1) as a nation state, it is systematically representing the ‘idea of Iran’ 
as a ‘civilizational crossroads’; it does so 2) in a region that the Iranian 
government chooses to call ‘West Asia’ (and not ‘the Middle East’), and 
3) in an emergent world whose organizing trope is a ‘New Silk Roads’ 
imaginary and which has a geoeconomic rather than geopolitical logic.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, Iran, geographic agency, Silk Roads, 
China, civilizational crossroads
If the twentieth century was def ined mostly by geopolitics and mostly by 
Western actors, this century is being defined increasingly by geoeconomic 
processes mostly instigated through the agency of Asian actors such as 
China, India, and others.1 If the previous century was about establishing 
Westphalian political borders to separate nation states, this century is 
increasingly about how infrastructure can create further ‘connectivity’ 
among economies, cultures, and peoples. This connectivity brings both 
1 This is not to say that the former century lacked geoeconomics or the current one lacks 
geopolitics.
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
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opportunities and risks (such as the current pandemic, COVID-19). The 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is currently the most forceful and the 
only truly global initiative in the world in terms of the economic, diplomatic, 
and discursive momentum that it has created. However, the BRI is not the 
only initiative and China is not the only actor showing such agency. The 
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) aims to link India 
via Iranian land to Russia, Central Asia, and Europe. The Russian initiative, 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), aspires to geoeconomically (re)
connect the former geography of the Soviet Union. Finally, the Ashgabat 
Agreement aims to connect Central Asia to international waters via Iran 
and the Persian Gulf.
A new geographic imaginary and global centre of gravity is emerging. 
This new centre has been described as ‘Asia’, ‘new continentalism in Eurasia’ 
(Calder 2012), ‘Afro-Eurasia’ (Frankopan 2015), or the ‘East’ leading to the 
‘Easternization’ (Rachman 2017) of global geography. No matter which trope 
one adopts, West Asia or the Middle East plays a signif icant role in it. Its 
role is considerable for a host of important reasons and processes, which 
include global energy (production, transit, pricing, and conflicts), refugees, 
Persian Gulf security, nuclear non-proliferation, political Islam, non-state 
actors (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, civil 
wars (such as that in Syria), regional tensions (such as the Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry), the Chinese BRI, the International North-South Transport Corridor, 
the Ashgabat Agreement, the Russian Eurasian Economic Union, as well 
as others.
Iran, which is centrally located at the heart of West Asia, is in one way 
or another deeply enmeshed in all these geoeconomic and geopolitical 
processes in the region and beyond. More often than not, the academic 
literature focuses on Iran only geopolitically. This chapter aims to address 
this gap in the literature by focusing on Iran’s role in Eurasian geoeconomics. 
The questions that this chapter aims to address are 1) How is Iran adapting 
to the geoeconomic shifts unfolding in Eurasia, especially the rise of actors 
such as China and the advent of the BRI? and 2) How is Iran reimagining its 
‘place’ and the place of its region in global geography? Adopting a critical 
geography perspective, which views geography as simultaneously both mate-
rial and ideational, this chapter aims to address these questions by doing an 
analysis of both the ideational developments (the discursive developments) 
and the material developments (the policies and infrastructure processes) 
in which Iran is engaging.
The overall argument of this chapter is that in the context of contempo-
rary geoeconomic processes, Iran is showing geographic agency by actively 
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engaging in geoeconomic processes that are transforming not only global 
and regional geography but also Iranian national self-perceptions. Under 
contemporary conditions, Iran is geographically reimagining itself at three 
levels: Globally, Iran views the contemporary world in terms of the rise of 
‘the East’, rise of Asia, and particularly in terms of the rise of the (New) Silk 
Roads, hence its ‘turn to the East’. Regionally, it is articulating its preference 
for the concept of ‘West Asia’ to replace ‘the Middle East’, which it views 
as Eurocentric. Nationally, Iran is reimagining itself as a ‘civilizational 
crossroads’ between various economies, peoples, and civilizations. The 
three geographic reimaginings are deeply interlinked with each other and 
deeply rooted in Iranian history. In terms of the BRI, Iran is increasingly 
becoming integral (if not indispensable) to the China-Central Asia-West 
Asia (CAWA) Corridor.
The argument laid out above will unfolded in this chapter as follows: 
Section 2 will introduce the concept of geographic agency. Section 3 will 
briefly review the literature on the changing ‘idea of Iran’. Section 4 will 
examine Iranian geographic assumptions about the rise of the New Silk 
Roads, the Iranian policy of ‘turning to the East’, and its preference for 
‘West Asia’ as the name of the region. Then Section 5 will unpack Iran’s new 
geoeconomic self-perception, what I call ‘Iran as a civilizational crossroads’ 
with its concomitant policies of port modernization and railway upgrade. 
This will be followed by a conclusion.
Geographic Agency
This section demarcates the conceptual boundaries of what I call geographic 
agency. First, geography. Traditionally, in the humanities, geography has 
been understood in terms of ‘absolute space’ that is rooted in Newtonian 
physics. In this conception, absolute space is understood, according to 
Harvey (2006: 121), as an absolute ‘pre-existing and immovable grid ame-
nable to standardized measurement and open to calculation’. The f ield of 
international relations (IR) has not been an exception to this rule. It has also 
suffered from such problematic ‘geographical assumptions’, including the 
‘territorial trap’ of sovereignty (Agnew 1994), or what Larkins (2010) calls the 
‘territorial apriori [sic]’. These are assumptions that render IR state-centric 
(Guzzini & Leander 2006), Eurocentric and ahistorical (Van der Pijl 2007), 
and West-centric (Bilgin 2010).
Critical geography aims to avoid such problematic assumptions by 
conceiving of geography as both ideational and material. Like many other 
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critical schools of thought, it was a brainchild of the late 1960s and early 
1970s and was a response to the major issues of the time. These were issues 
such as the rise of civil rights and student movements, environmental move-
ments, and the Vietnam War (Peet 2000). Traditional geography, according 
to Peet (ibid.), was part of a conservative shift in Enlightenment thinking 
in the late nineteenth century. Spatial science could be progressive only 
in the sense of ‘social engineering rather than the organic sense of social 
transformation’ (ibid.: 951). Critical or radical geography became critical of 
positivist schools of thought and methodologies. It went through several 
transformations that brought under its umbrella various critical schools of 
geography, such as Marxism, feminism, poststructuralism, postmodernism, 
and discourse analysis. Critical geography aims to approach the question 
of space as a dynamic process that both constructs and constrains social, 
political, and economic processes and is simultaneously constructed and 
constrained by them. It aims to remain socially and politically relevant, 
to uncover hegemonic arrangements, geographies of resistance, fears and 
hopes, and unpack (in)justices and power relations that are often hidden 
in geographic representations.
More specif ically, this chapter will draw on the theoretical work of Mat-
thew Sparke. He focuses on the hidden hyphen in the word ‘geo-graphy’, 
calling for a ‘persistent examination in terms of acknowledging how the ‘geo’ 
of any particular geography is ‘graphed’, that is to say, produced, by multiple, 
often unnoticed, space-making processes and space-framing assumptions 
(Sparke 2007: 338). The main objective of this chapter is to investigate these 
‘processes’ (material geography) and ‘assumptions’ (ideational geography) 
that are at work in Iranian geographic agency.
What of agency? And how does it play into geography? Critical geography 
argued that traditional notions of geography and spatial thinking were 
themselves instruments of hegemonic power and oppression. These notions 
took agency away from oppressed actors and populations and represented 
them in a reductionist or negative manner, or simply did not represent 
them. Critical geography is more interested, as mentioned above, in doing 
justice to local representations and ‘organic social transformations’. Part of 
such organic social transformations, I would argue, is the ability of actors 
to have agency over geographic matters and to def ine their own place in 
the various spaces of global geography. For the purposes of this chapter, 
geographic agency can be defined in a twofold fashion. Ideationally, it is the 
discursive ability of an actor (such as a group of people, an individual, or an 
organization) to def ine, articulate, and (rep)present themselves and their 
place (their identities, fears, and aspirations) in the world geographically; 
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practically, geographic agency can be def ined as the ability of the said 
actor to act in the world (through actions and implementing policies) to 
materialize their geographic discourse and self-representations. The two 
dimensions are inextricably interlinked.
Regarding methodology, the following approaches have been taken. 
To examine the ideational aspect (or ‘space-framing assumptions’), the 
discourses of Iranian off icial outlets have been analysed to examine 
how Iran is geographically reimagining itself. Such outlets include an-
nouncements, policy documents, and policy speeches by the Iranian 
leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Iranian President (Hassan Rouhani), the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Transportation, and the Iranian 
Railways (RAI). They also include some (semi)off icial news outlets. For 
the material aspect (or space-making processes and policies), the chapter 
draws on the knowledge gained by the author during years of attending 
global academic workshops and conferences related to the topic (in both 
China and Iran), and attending think tank events about the topic in several 
countries. It also draws on eight f ield trips that the author has made to Iran 
in the last f ive years in order to investigate its role in the BRI and other 
initiatives. These include three recent trips that were made in late 2019 
and 2020 specif ically to gain the latest updates and carry out interviews 
to be included in this chapter. The recent f ield research included visits to 
the Iranian capital of Tehran to conduct semi-structured interviews with 
academics and policymakers in institutions including the Eurasia Center 
at Tehran University, the Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Ministry, 
Boushehr (to investigate China’s interests in Iranian energy resources), 
and Chabahar Port (to investigate Chinese and Indian interests in the 
International North-South Transport Corridor).
‘The Idea of Iran’
This section offers a brief review of the literature about what Gnoli (1989) 
called ‘the idea of Iran’ and some of the momentous changes in the Iranian 
self-perception throughout history. Since their conception, terms such as 
‘Iran’ and ‘Iranians’ have been contested concepts. Their meaning has been 
debated throughout the civilization’s long history, a history of dominating, 
occupying, and traumatizing the region as well as being dominated, oc-
cupied, and traumatized by the forces of the region and beyond. The ebbs 
and flows of Iranian history show ‘the remarkable resilience of the idea of 
Iran’ (Axworthy 2008: xi). What is this idea?
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The agricultural settlements or villages in what is today Iran have been 
traced back to at least the sixth millennium BCE’ (see Berkowitz 1996; 
Axworthy 2008). However, most of the Iranian popular and official discourse 
starts the historical narrative with the Achaemenid Empire (c. 550-330 BCE), 
the so-called First Persian Empire, founded by Cyrus. Since its advent, a 
foundational question has been what to name its geography and the rich 
diversity of its multinational state. The Achaemenid inscriptions did not 
def ine their kingdom in a geographic or ethnic sense (Gnoli 1989: 6). This 
was natural as the idea of the empire meant the whole globe (ibid.). Cyrus 
defined himself as ‘the King of Kings’. Later emperors referred to themselves 
as ‘the king of lands’, ‘king of the peoples’, or the ‘king of this (far-reaching) 
earth’ (Gnoli 1989: 6-7). This empire, Gnoli argues, can be best known as the 
‘earth-empire’ (ibid.: 7). Alexander put a brutal end to it, but the idea of this 
empire survived through absorbing Hellenistic culture and administration.
The idea of Iran returned with the Sassanian Empire (224-651 CE), this 
time with a more formulated agenda for territorial and political demarca-
tion. This empire tried to create a systematic history and a def inition of 
the medieval Iran. The word Iran is derived from ērān, the f irst existing 
record of which dates back to the investiture reliefs of Ardashir, the founder 
of Sassanian Empire. The geographic space that these people occupied 
came to be called ‘Iranshahr’ or the land or ‘empire of the Iranians’. Anērān 
meant those subjects, peoples, and provinces that were part of the Iranian 
empire (such as present day Cappadocia, Syria, and Egypt) but whose peoples 
were not considered to be of Iranian identity. Little by little, ērān took on a 
geographic dimension and meant the land of Iranians. This obviously came 
into effect through imperially ‘overwhelming the indigenous populations 
politically, linguistically, and culturally’ (Malandra 2005: 116).
The Iranian narrative or myth of origin, and the sense of Iranian nationalism 
for many Iranians today, is rooted in these two pre-Islamic empires. In terms of 
physical geography, these two empires occupied and spread Iranian influence 
in the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indus River. They built 
major infrastructure projects that connected various parts of the empire. 
The most famous of these projects was the Royal Road built by Darius in the 
fifth century BCE, which was one of the first transcontinental highways, so to 
speak, built in global history, spanning from the south of Iran to present day 
Turkey (back then part of Achaemenid Empire). These infrastructure projects 
together with the state security provided by these two empires contributed 
immensely to the advent and operation of what we call the ancient Silk Roads 
geography. The Sassanians controlled much of Western Asia until it fell to the 
emergent Islamic Empire that began the Islamization of the country.
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Iran survived this invasion and absorbed the new ideas of Islam. Arab 
conquerors became Persianized (Canfield 2002: 4). Zoroastrianism did not 
survive as the state religion and Iran was Islamicized. Islam was partly 
Iranicized as well. After the Arab rule of Iran, the Samanid Empire (819 to 
999) came to power, the f irst Iranian empire to rise after the invasion. The 
empire’s religion was Sunni Islam, but it was tolerant of Shia Islam (Daniel 
2012). It became independent of Arab rule and revived the Farsi language and 
culture, and with that the idea of Iran as an empire. This empire is regarded 
in today’s scholarship as part and parcel of the ‘Turko-Persian Islamicate 
culture’, which is defined as an ‘ecumenical mix of Arabic, Persian, and Turkic 
elements that melded in the ninth and tenth centuries in eastern Iran’ and was 
carried ‘to neighbouring areas, so that it eventually became the predominant 
culture of the ruling elite classes of West, Central and South Asia’ (Canfield 
2002: 1). Canfield goes on to write that the ‘underlying stratum from which 
Turko-Persian Islamicate culture sprang was Persian’. This Persian stratum 
was rooted in the Achaemenid and Sassanian Empires (ibid.) and the material 
and ideational infrastructure they had built in the region.
Later dynasties further redefined Iran. The Safavids (1501-1736) converted 
the country to Twelver Shia Islam, which is the foundation of the contem-
porary off icial religious identity of the country. Other changes include 
the conquest of Iran by the Mongols between 1219-1221 (who also became 
Persianized), the invasion by Tamburlaine in 1383 (whose empire was also 
Persianized), and the conquest of India by the Iranian Nader Shah (1736-1747). 
Then there is also the idea of constitutional monarchy, which Iranians got 
from Europeans during the Qajar dynasty (1789-1925), the turn back between 
1925 and 1935 to the absolutist dictatorship of the Pahlavi dynasty (a close 
ally of the West), and once again the return to political Islam with the 1979 
revolution. To sum up, Iranian geography has always been a malleable 
heterogeneous repertoire of identities. As I will show in the next sections, 
the current Iranian ruling elites resort to both Islamic and pre-Islamic parts 
of Iranian history in order to make geographic and historical sense of the 
position of the country in the world today. The idea of Iran has always been 
creatively and conveniently (mis)read, (re)made, and revised by Iranians 
at moments of great strength or great weakness, as well as at moments of 
change such as our contemporary era. Selden (2013: 143) argues that ‘creative 
mythmaking […] has always served progressively to consolidate the identity 
of Iran’. Along the same lines, Axworthy (2008: 12) rhetorically asks:
If […] the centre of Iranian culture had moved at different times from 
Fars in southern Iran to Mesopotamia, to Khorasan in the north-east and 
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Central Asia, and to what is now called Azerbaijan in the north-west; and 
given its strong influence far beyond the land of Iran itself, into Abbasid 
Baghdad and Ottoman Turkey for example on the one side and into Central 
Asia and Moghul India on the other, and beyond; then perhaps we should 
set aside our usual categories of nationhood and imperial culture and 
think instead of Iran as an Empire of the Mind?
In the following sections, I will unpack the ways in which the emergence 
of new Asian geoeconomic initiatives in general and the BRI in particular 
have impacted the idea of Iran.
Iran Reimagining Global and Regional Geography
Iranian geographic agency manifests itself most broadly at the global or 
continental level in actively promoting the revival of ‘Silk Roads geographic 
imaginary’, as well as presenting the rise of Asia or ‘the East’ (as a space-
framing assumption) and the ‘turn to the East’ strategy (as a space-making 
process or off icial policy). This section will argue that both the ‘imaginary’ 
and the ‘turn’ had already been at the heart of the Iranian official geographic 
discourse before the advent of the BRI. However, these have found clear 
unmistakable discursive, material, infrastructural, and policy expressions 
with the emergence of the BRI and other initiatives. At the regional level, 
Iranian off icials are articulating their unmistakable preference for the 
geographic concept of ‘West Asia’ over ‘the Middle East’.
Iran Promoting the Revival of Silk Roads
First, a caveat. There is a tendency in global mass media and even among 
some experts to associate the ancient Silk Roads with China (as if they were 
a highway between Rome and Beijing) and also to associate the new Silk 
Roads with China’s BRI. Both accounts are simplistic and false. The ancient 
Silk Roads were ‘not an actual road, but a stretch of shifting unmarked 
paths across massive’ geographies of Afro-Eurasia (Hansen 2012: 5), hence 
the plural concept of ‘Roads’ used in this chapter. Nor is the idea of New Silk 
Roads a Chinese concept. The discourse has been alive and well in Iran, and 
in other countries in Asia, especially Central Asia, since at least the 1990s.
Khamenei, who has been the Iranian leader since 1989, has been promot-
ing this idea for a long time. In his 2009 meeting with Abdullah Gul, then 
Turkish president, Khamenei talked about how ‘Iran and Turkey are capable 
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of reviving the Silk Road’ (Khamenei 2009). Khamenei’s 2009 remarks about 
reviving the Silk Road is evidence of how the discourse of Silk Roads existed 
long before the BRI. It is not far-fetched to trace this idea back to Turko-
Persian Islamic civilization discussed in the previous section. An even earlier 
attempt by Iran to revive this particular moment and geography of ancient 
Silk Roads is the very idea of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 
which is a regional integration organization (similar to the idea of ASEAN) 
that was set up in 1985 by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. When put together, 
the geographies of these three countries resonate with the geography of 
the Turko-Persian Islamicate cultures of the ninth and tenth centuries. 
The Economic Cooperation Organization’s secretariat is based in Iran. De 
Cordier (1996) described the logic of this organization as ‘New Silk Road’, a 
‘road’ intended to create ‘a common destiny’ (ibid.) for the three countries 
involved, thus eerily foreseeing the concept of the ‘community of common 
destiny’ adopted by the current Chinese President Xi Jinping in recent years.
The rise of the BRI gave a major boost to Iran (among others) in its promo-
tion of the (New) Silk Roads discourse. There are several interesting reasons 
why Iranian elites have opted to refer to the BRI as the ‘New Silk Roads’. First 
and foremost, it is easier for the audience of this discourse to understand 
the concept of the ‘New Silk Roads’ than to understand the new concept of 
the BRI. When described as the ‘New Silk Roads’, the Iranian and regional 
audiences can more readily understand the idea and its global implications. 
It resonates with both the elite and the general population in Iran. This is 
because various Iranian empires (such as the Achaemenid, Sassanian, and 
Sassanid dynasties) had a foundational or instrumental rule in the ancient 
Silk Roads. The idea of the Silk Roads is part of the collective historical and 
geographical consciousness of the nation. The role of the country in that 
world (and the myths therein) is invoked to suggest the promise of the future 
role of the country in the New Silk Roads, especially in the BRI.
This discourse also provides Iran and its regional or global partners with 
a common cultural, historical, and geographical language to speak with 
each other about their (desired) place in this brave new world. Chinese 
President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran in 2016 included paying a visit to the 
Iranian leader, Khamenei. During this visit, Xi pointed to the relations and 
interactions between the two civilizations along the ancient Silk Roads as 
the basis upon which future cooperation along the New Silk Roads could 
be built (Off ice of the Supreme Leader 2016). Iran’s spatial assumption, 
one can infer, is that the Silk Roads constitute the next iteration of human 
globalization, a world in which Iran could not be sidelined due to the ‘the 
centrality of Iranian geography’. This geographic centrality is a theme that 
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comes up in every part of Iranian off icial geographical discourse and the 
interviews conducted.
It should be noted that the use of the term ‘Silk Roads’ by both the Iranian 
elites and ordinary citizens brings forth an often overly romanticized myth of 
the ancient Silk Roads. In this myth, it is assumed that Iran reigned supreme, 
although in reality it did so only at certain times and only over certain parts 
of that geography. At other moments, Iran was brutally victimized. There is 
a subconscious selectiveness at work in sidestepping the traumatic moments 
of history and focusing on the successful empires only. Along the same 
lines, there is also a selectiveness in the way that Iran has defined ‘the East’.
The ‘Turn to the East’
The rise of the New Silk Roads in Iranian off icial discourse is coterminous 
with the rise of Asia or ‘the East’. Iranian leaders have opted for what has 
been named the ‘turn to the East’ or the ‘look to the East’ strategy as a policy 
that encompasses Iranian political, economic, and infrastructural involve-
ment in the BRI, as well as in other initiatives such as the International 
North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), and the Ashgabat Agreement. For Iran, ‘the East’ was formerly 
synonymous with the Soviet Empire. However, in more contemporary official 
discourse, and due in part to the Soviet collapse and the geopolitical realities 
of Iran (such as the Western sanctions), ‘the East’ as a geographic discourse 
has undergone a transformation and taken on positive connotations. It 
now stands for Asia and represents economic and scientif ic progress. This 
progress is especially associated with actors such as China, India, Russia, 
and Turkey. Iran has pragmatic relations with all of these ‘Eastern’ actors.
The ‘turn’ to the East involves relying on foreign relations (both geo-
economically and geopolitically) with these ‘Eastern’ actors. This is done 
partly to evade the negative effects of the American sanctions regime, and 
to develop what has come to be known as the ‘resistance economy’. It is 
also done partly out of cultural familiarity and mutual interests. According 
to Khamenei, who determines or at least off icially greenlights all of Iran’s 
strategic policies, this approach can be described as follows: ‘[R]egarding the 
realm of foreign policy, we should prefer the East to the West and neighbours 
to distant countries. We should choose nations and countries that share 
common interests with us’ (Khamenei 2018b).
China and Iran do not currently lack common interests. This ‘turn to the 
East’ is being solidif ied in the backdrop of a Sino-Iranian ‘comprehensive 
strategic partnership’. This partnership involves the BRI in more ways than 
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one. Since Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit to Iran, the two countries were rumoured 
to have been negotiating a comprehensive ‘25-year deal’ or ‘roadmap’ (see 
New York Times 2020). This deal is supposed to cover all major areas of 
cooperation, including the energy sector (oil, gas, and petrochemicals), 
infrastructure, (multi-modal) transport, sizable investments in Iranian 
manufacturing, free economic zones (such as the Island of Qeshm), banking, 
industrial parks, and closer defence and intelligence cooperation in West 
Asia. The deal is estimated to be worth around US$400 billion. The invest-
ments are from China to Iran. In return, China gets discounted Iranian 
energy. The general outline of the deal was confirmed by Javad Zarif, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, in July 2020. The full details are yet to be made 
public. The deal, when f inalized, will wed Iran to the BRI. It has divided 
the country. Some view it as an economic lifeline for Iran (whose economy 
and currency are at the moment under heavy pressure). Meanwhile, others 
(especially in popular Iranian social media circles) are very suspicious of the 
deal, suspicions that in too many cases are articulated through Sinophobic 
sentiments.
The same division exists with regards to the ‘turn to the East’ strategy. 
There are some factions within the ruling elites and the general population 
that prefer more cultural and economic ties with ‘the West’. The ill-fated 
nuclear deal was carried out by this camp. However, with America reneg-
ing on the deal, and the Europeans being unwilling or unable to make a 
meaningful move independent of the US that would compensate for the 
damage that the US has introduced to the deal’s dynamics, the ‘turn to the 
East’ strategy is witnessing increasing momentum. With the 25-year deal 
between China and Iran in the process of being f inalized, this Iranian ‘turn 
to the East’ looks almost inevitable. The more pro-‘Western’ camp has been 
reduced to silence and compliance. In terms of relations with India and 
Turkey, there is agreement between all factions (conservative and moderate) 
that deeper relations with these two actors are positive for the country. 
Feelings about Russia show the same kind of ambivalence and division as 
those about China. However, the direction is clear. Iran is both choosing, 
and being forced by ‘the West’, to ‘turn to the East’. All this is evidence of 
how relational, malleable, and contingent geoeconomics is.
Iran Reimagining the Region as ‘West Asia’
If the new ‘East’ is synonymous with ‘Asia’, what kind of ‘middle’ does the 
‘Middle East’ occupy as a region? One way in which Iran shows geographic 
agency has been through reconceiving the region in its off icial discourse 
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as ‘West(ern) Asia’. This is one of the most explicitly articulated examples 
of Iranian geographic agency that has been implemented in a top-down 
fashion, starting from the highest political-religious power in the country, 
the Iranian leader himself. From his off ice, this regional renaming discourse 
has percolated down to other political, economic, and media organizations. 
Khamenei never refers to the region as the Middle East in his speeches. 
The same is true for online archives, websites, and social media accounts 
associated with him or representing him or his off ice. In a 2012 speech to 
an academic audience, he made his geographic reasoning clear:
I insist on calling this region ‘West Asia’, not ‘Middle East’. The terms ‘Far 
East’, ‘Near East’ and ‘Middle East’ are not correct. Far from where? From 
Europe. Near to where? To Europe. This implies that Europe is the centre 
of the world. […] This is a def inition that was presented by Europeans 
themselves, but this is not acceptable to us. Asia is a continent. It has an 
eastern part, a western part and a middle part. We are in the western 
part. Therefore, our region should be called ‘West Asia’, not ‘Middle East’. 
(Khamenei 2012)
There are several aspects of this quote that are interesting. First it provides 
an accurate historical narrative of the origins of the term ‘Middle East’. 
According to Beaumont et al. (1976: 1), the term Middle East was developed 
out of a ‘strategic preference’ in a ‘Eurocentered world just as the older 
terms “The East”, “Far East”, and “Near East” had been’ (ibid.). ‘The Middle 
East’ seems to have originated in the 1850s in the British imperial off ice. It 
became ‘current in the English-speaking world around 1900’ (ibid.). Second, 
this is a surprisingly progressive view of geography from a conservative 
religious leader. In today’s academic circles, especially the critical strands 
of the social sciences, Eurocentric or Orientalist views of global history and 
geography are being radically questioned (see Van der Pijl 2007 and Said 
1979, respectively). For Iran, one can infer from the discourse that part of 
the logic of jettisoning the term ‘the Middle East’ is to do away with all the 
negative Orientalist connotations associated with the term and (re-)associate 
the region with Asia. Getting rid of the term aims to remove the vestiges of 
the imperialistic geographic imagination that named this geography ‘the 
Middle East’ and to rebrand the region in a new light. This is a clear sign 
that Iranian elites consciously and explicitly are aware of the constructed 
nature of geography and are actively engaged in the making of both the 
discursive and material geography of the country and the region. This is 
an instance of Iranian elites exercising their geographic agency. Apart from 
GeoGRaPhIC aGenCy 303
the push to call the region ‘West Asia’, other examples of this kind of agency 
are the creation and promotion of geopolitical terms such as the ‘axis of 
resistance’, a term used by Iranian elites to refer to Iran and its (state and 
proxy) allies in resisting American hegemony in the region.
It is therefore no surprise that the term ‘West Asia’ is being increasingly 
used by Iran and several other actors in the region and the rest of Asia. 
Among others, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Turkish, and some Arab off icial 
discourses also refer to the region as ‘West Asia’, especially in their interac-
tion with each other. In the off icial United Nations demarcations of regions 
in the world, ‘Western Asia’ is the off icial designation for this region. What 
is more, one of the six off icial economic corridors of the BRI that passes 
through the region is China-Central Asia-West Asia (CAWA) Corridor. 
In off icial discussions across Asia, the ‘West Asia’ discourse has gained 
increasing momentum since the advent of the BRI and the emergence of a 
Silk Roads geographic imaginary, especially when the interlocutors in these 
discussions are all from Asia.
One can argue that the rise of this ‘West Asia’ discourse shows the geo-
graphic agency of a whole region, or even a continent, that aims to rename 
and reclaim this region as part of Asia and the Asian heritage. It should 
however be noted that just as the choice of ‘the Middle East’ was a Western 
strategic and military choice, the choice of ‘West Asia’ made by Iran and 
other Asian actors is also a strategic choice. As the former Western discourse 
negatively (geo)politicized the region for (neo)colonial purposes, the new 
‘West Asia’ discourse is also aiming to (geo)politicize the region (albeit in 
a way that is benef icial to Asian actors). This latter naming discourse is 
yet another political project that does not aim to separate geography from 
power relations. It aims to reclaim power.
Iran Reimagining Itself as a ‘Civilizational Crossroads’
If contemporary Iranian geographic agency contends that the emerging 
global geography is a (New) Silk Roads geography, in which ‘the East’ or Asia 
is rising, and if the region is not ‘the Middle East’ but ‘West Asia’, then what is 
Iran? What kind of space-making assumptions and space-making processes 
or policies is Iran in the business of promoting or implementing about its role 
in the emerging regional or global geography? Such assumptions include, 
f irst, the idea of ‘greater Iran’ as a ‘civilizational state’ and, second, the idea 
of Iranian geography as a ‘civilizational crossroads’. Three processes or 
policies that are being carried out in order to make the crossroads dream 
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a reality are ‘port connectivity policies’, ‘the railway revolution’, and the 
international ‘geoeconomic connectivity push’. These policies all result 
in international pacts, agreements, and initiatives. In what follows, I will 
briefly elaborate on the two assumptions about the identity of Iran and the 
three processes to which they lead.
Space-Framing Assumptions: ‘Greater Iran’ as the ‘Civilizational 
Crossroads’
One common theme that appears in off icial Iranian discourse (politically 
and academically) is the idea of ‘greater Iran’, sometimes also called ‘greater 
cultural Iran’. The expression is common among Western classicists and 
means ‘that which was within the political boundaries of states ruled by 
Iran, including Mesopotamia and usually Armenia and Transcaucasia’ (Frye 
1962: 241). The term is clearly an academic one, but it seems that Iranian 
political elites have picked up on this academic discourse and are using it as 
a cultural and economic category. One of the strategic edicts that Khamenei 
has given the Iranian elites is to conduct what he calls ‘public diplomacy’. 
This involves activities such as gathering the (academic and cultural) elites 
of ‘West Asia’ together for dialogue in Iran. He places special emphasis on 
the elites of the ‘greater cultural Iran, that is the vast cultural geography of 
Iran in previous centuries’ (Khamenei 2018a). This is therefore a demarcation 
of Iranian boundaries that goes beyond the Westphalian notions of Iran 
and views the Iranian geography as culturally, historically, linguistically, 
and religiously rooted in the pre-Islamic and Islamic imperial geographies 
of the country. The hegemonic ambitions beyond the idea of ‘greater Iran’ 
is hard to miss here. This idea is not very different from Axworthy’s (2008) 
description of Iran as an ‘empire of the mind’.
One can see that Iran is once more delving deep in its ancient pre-
Westphalian history in order to dream of a future for itself in what it calls 
the ‘post-Western world’ (Zarif 2016) of Silk Roads. Along the same lines, in a 
2018 UN speech Iranian President Hassan Rouhani rejected accusations that 
Iran is after geopolitical domination of the region by describing his country 
in the following terms: ‘Iran does not need an empire. Iran is an empire, in 
terms of its civilization and culture. Not through political domination. Iran 
has served as the link between East and West and will continue to do so’ 
(Rouhani 2018). The two themes or assumptions that frame Iran are evident: 
Iran as a ‘link’ or ‘crossroads’, and Iran as a ‘civilization’. The discourse has 
not been hierarchically produced. It is part of what, in the theory section 
of this chapter, was called an ‘organic social transformation’. Most Iranians 
GeoGRaPhIC aGenCy 305
of all walks of life understand their country in terms that go beyond the 
Westphalian geographic imaginary of nation states. For some the frame 
of reference is the Islamic traditions of the past, while for others it is the 
pre-Islamic imperial traditions of Iran, and then for a third group it is a 
combination of both. An example of the latter is former President of Iran 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who tried, in vain, to push both banners of the 
Islamic and pre-Islamic Iran. These two discourses are not limited to any 
specif ic faction within Iran. They usually co-exist in the off icial discourses 
and are employed on an as-needed basis.
In the meetings between Iranian and Chinese leaders, the civilizational 
discourse is abundant. At the very beginning of the negotiation documents 
for the ‘25-year deal’, for instance, there are references both to the ‘greatness’ 
of the Iranian and Chinese civilizations in the past and also to how their 
contemporary cooperation, including in the BRI context, is ‘natural’. I would 
argue that the numerous references to the ‘Iranian civilization’ and ‘Persian 
cultural heritage’ in documents amounts to calling Iran a ‘civilizational 
state’. The idea of such civilizational states is gaining increasing discursive 
momentum in Asia. Zhang (2012), for example, calls China a ‘civilizational 
state’ (his eponymous book became a bestseller in China). Meanwhile, 
Kumar (2002) calls India a ‘civilization-state’. One can only infer that this 
is the discursive tool these actors choose to use in order to make sense of 
their long and complex history and geography in a Westphalian system 
of ‘nation states’ that is less than 500 years old. Without using this term 
explicitly, the Iranian discourse of ‘greater Iran’ is making a very similar 
geographical-historical-political move. Not only does Iran see itself as a 
‘civilization’, but it sees itself as one whose identity is that of a ‘link’ or 
‘crossroads’ between various other civilizations, economies, and cultures.
Space-Making Processes: Connectivity Policy Drive, Port 
Modernization, and Railway Revolution
In what follows, I will examine some of the policies and processes that Iran 
is actively pursuing in order to make its dream of being a ‘civilizational 
crossroads’ dreams become a reality. The f irst process discussed here is 
what can be called Iran’s international ‘geoeconomic connectivity drive’. 
It dates back to the early years of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and aims 
to geoeconomically connect the country with the region and beyond. Im-
mediately after the revolution, Iran initiated talks concerning founding the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO), which was discussed above. 
Turkey and Iran are particularly interested in the prospect of signing a free 
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trade agreement under the auspices of this organization or in the form of 
a free trade agreement.
Iran has also enthusiastically welcomed the BRI and is considered an 
integral part of the CAWA Corridor. This is the least developed corridor of 
those in the BRI. Its lack of development is due in large part to the geopolitical 
complexities of the region and the conflicting geoeconomic and policy 
interests of regional actors, which are too numerous to unpack here. After 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran Nuclear Deal) came into 
effect in 2015, the Chinese President Xi Jinping was the f irst foreign leader of 
a major country to visit Iran, rushing to the country and signing seventeen 
economic and security agreements and MoUs, covering the various dimen-
sions of the BRI. During the trip, Xi emphasized the ‘geographic, human, 
and energy’ potential of Iran. It is not an accident that Iranian geography 
plays such a central role in the discussions between the two countries’ 
leaders. This geographic awareness exists among both Chinese and Iranian 
political and economic elites. According to the Iranian President, China and 
Iran signed the preliminary version of a ‘comprehensive 25-year document’ 
(discussed briefly in the previous section). This document indicates how 
seriously China takes the question of Iran in the three areas that Xi pointed 
to. This close partnership between China and Iran has been referred to by 
American observers as China’s ‘Great Game’ in Iran’. Such a description, 
however, assigns too much agency to China and too little to Iran. The former 
is portrayed as an all-powerful evil actor and the latter as a victim in this 
kind of analysis.
However, dealing with the BRI and China is not the only game in town for 
Iran. Iran was a founding member of the International North-South Transport 
Corridor in May 2002. India is currently the main drive behind this initiative. 
Effectively, one might call this the Indian Silk Roads. India has given this 
initiative serious attention since the BRI was introduced. The role of Iran 
and the Chabahar Port (discussed below) is indispensable in this initiative. 
Iran is also a major trade partner of the Russian geoeconomic initiative, 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Iran and the EEU signed a free trade 
agreement in 2018, to be operationalized from 2021. The two countries 
have also signed a preferential trade agreement, which has already boosted 
trade between them to some extent. All these geoeconomic initiatives also 
connect to the Ashgabat Agreement, in which Iran has a pivotal role due to 
the centrality of its physical geography. Geopolitics (for instance, American 
sanctions) has very negatively affected and slowed down these processes. 
However, Iran’s geoeconomic foundations have been solidif ied enough to 
ensure that its role in these processes and initiatives cannot be denied.
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The second space-making process that Iran is involved in is ‘port mod-
ernization’. Ports across Asia are gaining significant attention in the context 
of the BRI, of the International North-South Transport Corridor, and other 
initiatives. Iran, given its well-connected geography in the region, is no 
exception. This dimension of Iranian geography involves several ports, such 
as Bandar Anzali and Astara in the north and Bandar Imam Khomeini, 
Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, and Chabahar in the south. Due to the limited 
scope of this chapter, I will briefly focus on Chabahar and its role as the 
only deep water port in Iran that is off icially associated with all the major 
initiatives mentioned in this chapter, especially the BRI and the International 
North-South Transport Corridor.
In 2016, after years of negotiations, Iran, Afghanistan, and India signed 
a trilateral connectivity pact, the centrepiece of which is Chabahar Port in 
south-eastern Iran. This pact shows the geographic agency of all these three 
countries. All three countries are trying to overcome specif ic geographic 
challenges (for example, the issue of being landlocked for Afghanistan) and 
produce new geographic opportunities for themselves. At the signing cer-
emony in Tehran, Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s President, said the following 
words in the presence of Rouhani and Narendra Modi: ‘We wanted to prove 
that geography is not our destiny. With our will, we can change geography’ 
(Financial Times 2016). If there were to be one def inition of ‘geographic 
agency’, this could be it. Changing geography is part of a dominant global 
trend that Khanna (2016) calls ‘connectography’. This can be def ined, to 
use the Ghani quote, as the will to change one’s geography, and therefore 
to change one’s destiny, by creating new types of geographic, cultural, 
economic, energy, and political connectivity.
Chabahar Port is supposed to connect India via Iran to Afghanistan, so that 
Indian exports do not have to go through Pakistan. In terms of land access to 
the rest of Asia, the Caucuses, Russia, and Europe, Chabahar is now and for 
the foreseeable future the only reliable option that India has. This fact makes 
the Iranian geography indispensable for India. Chabahar is, in the words 
of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a ‘golden gateway’ for India 
(Bhattacharjee 2018). Indian officials feel that the Chinese BRI has geopolitical 
and containment elements against India. They want to create India’s own 
geoeconomic Silk Roads, if you will. This Indian dream, however, is completely 
dependent on passing through Iran. Other options would be going through 
either Pakistan or China, which Indian officials do not find ideal for obvious 
geopolitical reasons. Here, geopolitics is producing unique geoeconomic reali-
ties. This is something that Iranian elites are taking advantage of by further 
deepening their ties with India and bringing Indian investment to Chabahar 
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Port to further develop it. As the only Iranian deep water port, Chabahar can 
potentially rival the Pakistani port of Gwadar (the two ports are close to each 
other). Gwadar is the centrepiece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Ports are nothing if not connected to other major cities. India is therefore 
investing in the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway. Zahedan is the closest major 
Iranian city to Chabahar. This brings us to Iran’s third space-making process 
or national policy intended to materialize the idea of Iran as a geographical 
and civilizational ‘crossroads’. This involves building new railway lines and 
upgrading old ones, a process described by some as the ‘Iranian railway 
revolution’ (Alterman & Hillman 2017). The role of this railway upgrade 
is f irst and foremost to adapt and prepare the country for the BRI, which 
is heavily focused on railway transport technology. China is leading a 
‘high-speed railway revolution’ in the world that is positively impacting its 
economic development (Chen et al. 2016). Iran is trying to catch up with the 
railway trend and is thus heavily dependent on China for this upgrade. For 
the BRI corridor to West Asia, China and Iran have already made operational 
a direct train connection. A train arrived in Iran from China for the f irst 
time in 2016. In 2018, another connection was established. The documents 
setting out the ‘25-year deal’ between Iran and China emphasize and promise 
large investments in the transportation f ield, especially in railways.
China is not the only destination for Iranian railway. The Iranian railway 
network is connected to almost all neighbouring railway networks. Accord-
ing to a report provided by Abbas Nazari,2 networks that the Iranian rail 
system is connected to include those in Azerbaijan, Turkey, Pakistan, and the 
Indian subcontinent. The network also has Imam Khomeini Port’s railway 
connection to international waters for multimodal transport, as well as the 
Bandar Abbas connection to international waters (it is also part of Bandar 
Abbas-Almaty Corridor). Then there is Amir Abad’s railway connection to 
the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan, and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which practically connects Iran to Central Asia, Russia, and 
Eastern European networks. In 2018, Rouhani also off icially opened the rail 
connection to Iraq. There are currently two routes between Iran and China. 
The f irst passes through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The 
second takes a similar route that bypasses Uzbekistan. It is therefore not 
a surprise that the International Union of Railways (UIC) has its Middle 
East Off ice in Tehran, of which Abbas Nazari of Iranian Railways (RAI) is 
2 Abbas Nazari is at the time of writing the Director General of the International Affairs 
Bureau of Iranian Railways and Director of the UIC Middle-East Regional Off ice, which is based 
in Tehran.
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currently the head. In 2019, Iran held the UIC’s 7th Nextstation Conference, 
which was described as ‘the global reference for leaders and decision makers 
to share the latest experiences and best practices regarding the design, 
f inancing and operation of railway stations’ (UIC 2019). Such proactive 
events and moves by Iranian Railways has increased familiarity, interest, 
and investment in Iran’s railway network.
Iranian Railways (RAI) as an institution has been very proactive and 
shown systematic geographic agency by holding such conferences as well as 
bilateral or multilateral meetings as part of the country’s railway revolution 
and connectivity drive. It is also in the process of developing seven new 
railway projects inside the country. The high-speed rail between Tehran-
Qom-Isfahan is the showpiece of the whole network, f inanced and under 
construction by China and off icially associated with the BRI. Construction 
started in 2015 but is facing delays due to sanctions and other issues. Interest-
ingly, RAI’s maps of Iran’s current and planned railway network on its official 
website refers to Iranian connectivity to Europe and China in terms of the 
‘Silk Road’ (see, for instance, Alterman & Hillman 2017). It can therefore 
be argued that institutions such as Iranian Railways are involved in the 
making of geography both in the material sense (the physical railway) and 
the ideational sense (the Silk Roads vocabulary). Such activities, policies, 
and institutional undertakings speak of the fact that discourses constitute 
and make realities and are not merely f igments of imagination.
Conclusion: Iran between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics
As an international actor, Iran is viewed in both the global mass media 
and academic literature in political science and international relations 
as an almost exclusively geopoliticized country. In such literature, the 
geoeconomic processes and policies of the country are, more often than not, 
ignored. The Iranian geographic imagination has also not been critically 
assessed either. This chapter was an attempt to compensate for this dual 
gap in the literature.
Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian elites have been trying to geoeconomize 
the country by coming up with the plans and initiatives that were discussed 
above. The geoeconomic drive has been boosted considerably since the advent 
of the BRI. Iran is increasingly aligning its destiny with the geoeconomics of 
Asia, and especially with the Chinese BRI. The recent official acknowledge-
ments of the Sino-Iranian ‘25-year deal’ point to one conclusion: Iran, with its 
vast and central geography and its steady partnership with China, has become 
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the centrepiece of China’s West Asian policy and the most important piece, 
one could argue, of the BRI’s CAWA Corridor. A question remains, however, 
about how lopsided Iranian reliance on China and the BRI will be. To avoid this 
lopsidedness, Iran has made itself an indispensable part of the International 
North-South Transport Corridor and the Ashgabat Agreement, as well as 
an important partner for the Eurasian Economic Union. Such geoeconomic 
processes can potentially help geoeconomize certain regions such as West 
Asia, Central Asia, or certain actors such as Iran or Pakistan, which have 
been geopoliticized in the dynamics of the last century (see Forough 2019).
Currently, geopolitical processes (mainly American unilateralism) are 
making this transformation slow and complicated. However, the trend in 
the past three decades has been one in which Iran has made itself integral 
to Eurasian geoeconomics. In this emerging world, functional infrastructure 
can say much more about how the world operates than Westphalian political 
borders. Contemporary maps should show highways, railways, ports, airports, 
pipelines, communications lines, as well as paths of contagion and other risks, 
instead of merely showing political borders (Khanna 2016). Iranian geographic 
discourse, in a major multi-pronged effort to plug the country into this dynamic 
geoeconomic world, selectively picks and chooses elements, events, or processes 
from its long history (both Islamic and pre-Islamic) and geography in order to 
create a coherent narrative about the country’s role in the world. Thanks to 
the BRI and other initiatives discussed above, the idea of Iran, for now at least, 
is turning into one of a ‘civilizational crossroads’, in a region it chooses to call 
‘West Asia’, in a world in which the principal organizing trope, geographically 
and historically speaking, is that of the (New) Silk Roads. As opposed to the 
‘neither West nor East’ narrative of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran is currently 
shooting off in all directions, ‘East’ and ‘West’ as well as ‘North’ and ‘South’, 
in the hope of someday becoming a fully fledged crossroads.
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13 Exploring the Political, Economic, and 
Social Implications of the Digital Silk 
Road into East Africa
The Case of Ethiopia
Sanne van der Lugt
Abstract
Chapter 13 analyses various causal relations through which Ethiopian and 
Chinese actors interact in the context of the Digital Silk Road initiative. 
What is playing out in Africa is part of a larger contest between the West 
and China for dominance over technology and global influence. From a 
Chinese perspective, the Digital Silk Road is an attempt to narrow the gap 
between underdeveloped and developed countries through capacity build-
ing. From a Western perspective (Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, 
etc.), Chinese investments in the Digital Silk Road provide unethical 
support to authoritarian leaders. The chapter moves beyond this simple 
dichotomy of good and bad Chinese investments in the digitalization of 
Africa, instead identifying the actors involved and investigating their 
motives and levels of influence.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, Digital Silk Road, East Africa, Ethiopia, 
China, agency
In March 2015, the Chinese government announced plans for a third 
component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): the Digital Silk Road. The 
plans for the Digital Silk Road included the construction of cross-border 
optical cables, transcontinental submarine optical cables, and spatial 
and satellite information passageways. These would be created to expand 
information exchanges and cooperation (NDRC 2015). The decision of the 
Schneider, Florian (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency 
through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021
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Chinese government to develop the Digital Silk Road could be seen as its 
reaction to the news that Western spy agencies were tapping submarine 
cables (see, for example, Goetz et al. 2013). Shen (2018: 2691) suggests that 
through the Digital Silk Road, the Chinese government aims to create its own 
‘transnational network infrastructure through submarine, terrestrial, and 
satellite links, primarily alongside the Belt and Road Initiative countries’.
Ethiopia is one of these Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries. The 
Ethiopian Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT)1 aspires to lead 
the Ethiopian economy toward tech-led growth. As a result, MIT revised 
its f ifteen-year-old national science, technology, and innovation policy as 
part of a series of reforms currently taking place in Ethiopia (Ayele 2019).
The aim of the Ethiopian government to become Africa’s next tech hub 
and the plan of the Chinese government to promote the Digital Silk Road 
seem to go hand in hand. From an Ethiopian perspective, the transnational 
network infrastructure that the Chinese government plans to build in the 
BRI countries is an opportunity to be better connected. Meanwhile, from a 
Chinese perspective, the Digital Silk Road is an attempt to ‘narrow the gap 
between underdeveloped and developed countries, to remove bottleneck 
problems holding up the development of relevant countries, and to greatly 
improve their own production capacity [of these relevant countries]’ (Lu 
2017). However, the question is whether the cooperation between countries 
such as Ethiopia and Chinese f irms will lead to more or less independence. 
And who will have control over these technologies?
From a Western perspective (as expressed by organizations such as 
Freedom House and Human Rights Watch), Chinese investments in the 
Digital Silk Road are often depicted as the unethical support of authoritarian 
leaders. This is especially the case when these investments take place in 
countries with authoritarian regimes. For example, the ‘Freedom on the Net 
2018’ report, an annual country-by-country assessment of Internet freedom 
published by Freedom House, stated that ‘Beijing’ took steps to propagate 
its model abroad by conducting large-scale training of foreign off icials and 
providing technology to authoritarian governments (Freedom House 2018). 
Perhaps this means that support from the Chinese government leads to 
more independence for the Ethiopian government, but less independence 
for the ordinary citizens in Ethiopia.
Western NGOs and the Chinese government use different discourses to con-
vince their audiences that the support of Chinese firms for the digitalization 
1 Before 2018 the Ethiopian Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT) was called the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST).
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of African countries is either good or bad; that it is either about development 
or exploitation. With this study, I aim to go beyond the simple dichotomy of 
good and bad. I will identify the different actors that, with the help of Chinese 
f irms, are involved in the digitalization of East Africa and investigate their 
motives and levels of influence. Then I will test the dominant propositions 
that have been made about the social, economic, and political impacts of 
support from Chinese f irms for the digitalization of East African countries. 
The main question addressed is: In the context of the Digital Silk Road, to 
what extent does Chinese information and communications technology 
(ICT) contribute to the Ethiopian government’s control over its citizens?
Digital Developments within Ethiopia
Ethiopia is underestimated as a source of digital talent. The country is usually 
connected with either coffee or drought and drought-related hunger. It might 
surprise many Western readers, for example, that the Ethiopian software 
developers of iCog Labs in Addis Ababa developed part of the software for 
Sophia, a social humanoid robot created by the Hong Kong-based Hanson 
Robotics (and the only robot in the world with citizenship).
iCog Labs is a research-and-development company that collaborates 
with international artif icial intelligence (AI) research groups and serves 
customers around the world. It was established by Getnet Aseffa with the 
help of American researcher Ben Goertzel (Wuilbercq 2015). The company’s 
core specialty is AI, including machine-learning-based data analysis, 
computational linguistics, computer vision, mobile robots and cognitive 
robotics, cognitive architectures, and artif icial general intelligence. One 
of the employees of iCog Labs, Betelhem Dessie, is a good example of the 
kind of digital talent that exists in Ethiopia. Only 20 years old, she is the 
founder and CEO of Anyone Can Code, a coding school at iCog Labs that 
teaches children the skills that are needed for the future job market. Dessie 
started coding when she was just nine years old (Mella TV 2019). At the age 
of twelve, she started working as a developer for the Ethiopian Information 
Network Security Agency (INSA). Aseffa argues that Ethiopian programmers 
have the same skills as those from China, from the US, and Europe. The 
only difference is the economic gap and the daily challenges that they face. 
These challenges include: lack of infrastructure, erratic Internet access, and 
frequent power cuts (Wuilbercq 2015).
MIT aims to establish Ethiopia as the premier IT hub in Africa. In June 2019, 
the government approved legislation that would open the telecom market 
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to competition and provide much needed foreign investment. In Septem-
ber 2019, the process to part-privatize Ethio Telecom, the only provider of 
telecommunications services in Ethiopia, moved forwards when the company 
was audited. Meanwhile, it is expected that two licenses will be offered to 
international operators by the end of 2020 (Lancaster & Lange 2020).
In January 2020, the French company ArianeGroup started to build a 
satellite manufacturing, assembly, integration, and testing (MAIT) facility 
in Addis Ababa. The company is using funding from the European Union’s 
European Investment Bank (EIB) (Space in Africa 2019b). After completion, 
the MAIT facility will be managed by the Ethiopian Space Science and 
Technology Institute. It is expected to be the centrepiece for Ethiopian 
satellite technology development and manufacturing. There are currently 
only two functioning assembly, integration, and testing facilities on the 
African continent, in Algeria and South Africa. However, Egypt and Nigeria 
are also building facilities (Ibeh 2019; Ibeh 2020).
State of Research
This section discusses the three main debates examined in this study. These 
are: 1) the debate about the impact of high technology on development and 
repression; 2) the debate about the extent to which China-Africa relations 
pose a threat; and 3) the discussion about the need to include African agency 
in studies on China-Africa relations.
High-Tech and Development versus Repression
Shen (2018) argues that the Chinese leadership has assigned its Internet 
companies a central position in the BRI to achieve f ive major policy objec-
tives: cutting industrial overcapacity, enabling corporate China’s global 
expansion, supporting the internationalization of China’s currency, the 
renminbi (RMB), constructing a China-centred transnational network 
infrastructure, and promoting an Internet-enabled ‘inclusive globalization’. 
Meanwhile, according to Wang Yiwei, a professor in the School of Interna-
tional Studies at Renmin University, the Digital Silk Road will also offer 
benefits for participants by efficiently connecting landlocked and developing 
countries to the global economy through a more inclusive international 
trade and investment system (Wang in Shen 2018: 2693).
In contrast to the self-interested high-tech discourse’s promises about the 
inherently democratic nature of new information and telecommunication 
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technologies, Walton (2001) argues that these technologies are embedded in 
a social context. It is not the technology itself but the way people will use it 
that leads to either development or repression. However, this does not mean 
that technology is inherently neutral. Rather, the context in which a new 
technology is used influences whether the impact of this new technology 
is perceived as positive or negative.
European development cooperation institutes, such as the German Society 
for International Cooperation (GIZ), are enthusiastic about the potential of 
‘digital solutions for sustainable development’ (GIZ 2017). However, Western 
institutes are more critical about the digitalization of African countries 
when Chinese f irms are involved. For example, the ‘Freedom on the Net 
2018’ report by the US-based non-governmental organization Freedom 
House (2018: 2) states that:
[Chinese] companies have supplied telecommunications hardware, 
advanced facial-recognition technology, and data-analytics tools to a 
variety of governments with poor human rights records, which could 
benefit Chinese intelligence services as well as repressive local authorities.
China-Africa Relations
In the literature on relations between China and African nations, the main 
debate has been about whether or not China’s growing presence in Africa 
is a threat to Western or African interests. The blog ‘China in Africa: The 
Real Story’ and the associated book The Dragon’s Gift, both produced by the 
scholar Deborah Brautigam (2009), have contributed to shifting this debate 
more in favour of China. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) have suggested that the 
conclusion that the behaviour of Chinese actors on the African continent 
is not uniquely immoral is not so surprising. They argue that the idea of a 
China threat is the result of the heavy influence of Western states’ policy 
interests on the literature on Chinese foreign policy.
Another recurring debate in the literature on Sino-African relations, 
linked to the idea of a China threat, is the debate about the motives behind 
Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) in Africa and the role of the 
Chinese government in this. Chinese economic cooperation in Africa is seen 
by some as a ‘charm offensive’ through which it seeks to win political and 
economic clout. Buckley et al. (2007) argue that the Chinese government 
has used ODI to ensure the supply of those natural resources that are scarce 
in China. This leads to Chinese ODI that is primarily resource seeking. 
Others have argued that Chinese telecom companies’ investments in large 
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infrastructure networks in Africa are used by the Chinese government for 
both traditional and economic espionage (Reed 2013).
These theories about the motives behind Chinese ODI all share the as-
sumption that Chinese policymakers have an all-encompassing strategy 
for Africa. However, as Taylor and Xiao (2009) have rightly pointed out, 
China is not a centrally controlled, monolithic, unitary actor. There is a 
multiplicity of Chinese actors operating in Africa. As such, there is a need 
to go beyond broad studies that look at the motives and practices of Chinese 
investors in general. Instead, it is necessary to conduct more detailed studies 
of specif ic Chinese actors to get a better understanding of the motives of 
various Chinese players in Africa, as well as their specif ic practices and the 
challenges related to these.
Agency
In most analyses of China’s engagement with Africa, little consideration is 
given to the role of African agency (Mohan & Lampert 2012). Brown and 
Harman (2013) argue that the study of Africa’s international relations has 
for a long time been preoccupied with explaining how the continent has 
been governed, shaped, and marginalized by external actors. In their book, 
they ask how far, and in what ways, African political actors are impacting 
on, and operating within, the international system, instead of looking at 
how the international system impacts on Africa. Their book attempts to 
focus on interaction rather than one-way domination.
As a philosophical concept ‘agency’ refers to the capacity of individuals 
to act independently and to make their own free choices. The idea of the 
individual as a ‘free agent’ – able to make rational choices – was born with 
the emergence of philosophical individualism in the early Enlightenment. 
Later, the English philosopher John Locke (1978) rejected the binding 
power of tradition, aff irming the capacity of human beings to shape the 
circumstances in which they live. According to Emirbayer and Mische, 
this way of thinking ‘embedded agency in an individualistic and calcula-
tive conception of action that still underlies many Western accounts of 
freedom and progress’ (1998: 965). Ethiopia is often considered to be a more 
collectivistic society (Hofstede-insights 2020). It, therefore, makes sense to 
look at a more relational aspect of agency in this study.
In her research on poverty and citizenship, Lister (2003, 2004) distin-
guishes between four dimensions of agency and argues that these dimensions 
interrelate. For example, to act politically, one f irst requires a sense of 
personal agency and then acting as a citizen further strengthens that sense 
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of personal agency. Coulthard (2012) had pointed to how Lister’s connection 
of personal agency with political agency relates to debates from Giddens, 
Long, and Van der Ploeg about the socially embedded nature of agency. 
These scholars argue that the capability a person has to act and make a 
difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or events necessarily involves 
social relations and can only function through them (Coulthard 2012).
This chapter, therefore, uses a def inition of agency that emphasizes 
the ability to make free choices – either as a group or an individual. How 
free is the choice made by the Ethiopian government about whether or 
not to use Chinese ICT? How free are the choices made by groups in 
Ethiopian society about whether or not to make use of Chinese ICT? Are 
these actors capable of exercising agency and changing a pre-existing 
state of affairs?
Methodology
The research question in this chapter is: In the context of the Digital Silk 
Road, to what extent does Chinese ICT contribute to the control of the 
Ethiopian government over its citizens? This is a question about both agency 
and motivation. Currently, most studies of the motives behind Chinese 
outward direct investment (ODI) are based upon statistical correlation (see, 
for example, Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad & Wiig 2012; Ramasamy et al. 2012). 
However, while such regression analysis can point out the strength of a 
certain correlation, it cannot prove a causal relationship. For this reason, in 
the research for this chapter, I have adopted a case study method to answer 
the research question.
Design
Case studies can make inferences about which causal mechanisms may 
have been at work by examining intervening variables in individual cases 
using a method called process tracing. In this way, ‘process tracing is a 
fundamental tool of qualitative analysis’ that can contribute decisively 
to evaluating causal claims (Collier 2011: 823). Process tracing involves a 
mechanistic understanding of causality. It is the search for intervening 
variables that link an independent variable with a dependent variable in 
a process that is commonly referred to as a causal mechanism. When it is 
possible to theorize a mechanism linking a cause, or several causes, with 
an outcome, process tracing can be used to test this theory.
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To study the impact that the use of Chinese ICT in Africa has on the control 
that governments have over citizens, a case study is selected which looks at 
Ethiopia. For this case study, there are various theories which hypothesize 
causal mechanisms and which we can test. Beach and Pedersen (2016) 
suggest f ive steps when using process tracing for theory testing: 1) select 
typical cases, 2) conceptualize and operationalize the causal mechanism, 
3) collect empirical material and evaluate whether there is evidence of 
the predicted causal mechanism and if we can trust this evidence. When 
evidence is not found for the whole mechanism, it then becomes necessary to 
4) investigate whether the chosen case was idiosyncratic, or when evidence 
is not found for even a part of the mechanism, it is necessary to 5) engage 
in theory building to revise the theory.
The following sections will describe how these steps have been carried 
out in this study of the use of Chinese ICT in Ethiopia. The next section 
discusses the sampling of data that was performed for this study.
Sample
Ethiopia is an East African country with strong economic relations with 
China. It is linked to China’s BRI via the small neighbouring nation of 
Djibouti, where Chinese f irms have invested heavily in port infrastructure 
and Africa’s f irst fully electrif ied transnational railway from Djibouti Port to 
the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa (Clemoes 2019). The Ethiopian authorities 
are focusing on digital economic transformation as part of their Second 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II). They aim to improve the ICT 
infrastructure and services in Ethiopia and to enhance the role of the ICT 
sector in economic, social, and political activities for their country to become 
a ‘low middle-income country by 2025’ (National Planning Commission 
2016: ix).
This digitization of the Ethiopian economy is being enabled with technol-
ogy and support from China. The Chinese telecom vendors Huawei and ZTE 
have dominated the telecom infrastructure market in Ethiopia since 2008, 
supplying the sole telecom provider in the country, the state-owned Ethio 
Telecom. This Chinese dominance in the country’s digital infrastructure 
was last year supplemented by the launch of the f irst Ethiopian remote 
sensing satellite, which was developed and largely paid for by China and 
then launched in China (Reuters 2019). It was also increased by recent 
agreements between China and Ethiopia regarding the joint development 
of a communication satellite (Space in Africa 2019a) and a new digital trade 
platform (Gebre 2019).
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Ethiopia has long been seen as an authoritarian regime and is still re-
garded as ‘not free’ in terms of Internet freedom, political rights, and civil 
liberties (Freedom House 2020a, 2020b). However, Ethiopia is changing for 
the better. In February 2018, Hailemariam Desalegn suddenly resigned as 
the Prime Minister to allow reforms in the country after mass protests led 
to the loss of life and displacement of thousands of Ethiopians (NTV Kenya 
2018). Reports by Freedom House show the progress that is being made in 
Ethiopia. In 2018, Ethiopia received only 12 out of the maximum 100 points 
in the Freedom House awards. In 2020, this number increased to 24.
After Hailemariam’s resignation, the reform-minded Abiy Ahmed took 
the position of Prime Minister in a snap election. In the f irst few months 
after he came to power, Abiy lifted the state of emergency, ordered the 
release of political prisoners, allowed exiled dissidents to return home, and 
unblocked many websites and TV channels. He f illed half of his cabinet with 
women. He also ended the state of war with Eritrea by agreeing to give up 
disputed border territory, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2019 (Nobel Prize 2019).
However, although Ethiopia is becoming freer it still has a long way to 
go to be classif ied as ‘free’ by Freedom House. A controversial hate speech 
law, which imposes jail terms for people whose Internet posts stir unrest, 
was passed in February (Al Jazeera 2020). The question of how the use 
of Chinese ICT in Ethiopia will impact the government’s control over its 
citizens is therefore highly relevant.
Conceptualization and Operationalization
This study seeks to test whether, and in what ways, the use of Chinese ICT 
leads to strengthened control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens. 
To test this, it is necessary to identify the observable manifestations (the 
potential evidence or ‘empirical f ingerprints’) of the causal mechanisms 
theorized in the literature. Testing a causal mechanism might be likened 
to the method of Sherlock Holmes, who looks for evidence that proves or 
disproves his theories. In the same regard, ‘empirical f ingerprints’ are a kind 
of evidence that when present can help prove or disprove a causal relation. 
We, therefore, need to ask: If X causes Y, what do we expect to observe?
Beach and Pedersen (2016) suggest that researchers should f irst identify 
as many potential observable manifestations of a causal mechanism as 
possible. Then they should evaluate the pros and cons of these different 
observable manifestations systematically, before selecting the most ap-
propriate evidence (empirical f ingerprints) of the causal relation to look for 
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in their data. In this study, one hypothesized causal mechanism is that the 
use of Chinese ICT in Ethiopia leads to strengthened control of the Ethiopian 
government over its citizens. We might expect to see the following empirical 
f ingerprints or evidence of this causal mechanism at work:
1 Chinese f irms advise the Ethiopian government on a master plan for 
ICT.
2 Ethiopian firms initiate contact with Chinese f irms to acquire hardware 
and software from them that could be used as surveillance tools.
3 The Ethiopian government requests surveillance tools from China.
4 The Chinese government invites Ethiopian off icials for training in 
China on controlling cyberspace.
5 Chinese f irms provide the Ethiopian government with hardware and 
software that could be used as surveillance tools.
6 Chinese f irms provide the Ethiopian government with access to data 
collected via their technology.
7 Ethiopian off icials attend the 2017 World Internet Conference in the 
Chinese city of Wuzhen.
8 Ethiopian off icials attend a Seminar on Cyberspace Management for 
Off icials of Countries along the BRI in China.
9 Ethiopia has an authoritarian regime.
10 The Ethiopian government can legally search and seize personal data 
at any time.
11 Western f irms refuse to deliver surveillance technologies to Ethiopia 
because of moral objections.
12 The Ethiopian government adopts a cybersecurity law that mimics the 
Chinese cybersecurity law.
13 The Ethiopian government passes restrictive media laws that mimic 
Chinese media laws.
The resulting causal mechanism in f igure 13.1 shows how these empirical 
f ingerprints are expected to be linked to each other.
Data Collection
The data for this study consists of both primary and secondary data.2 
I have collected media, academic, government, and company reports 
dealing with (and either conf irming or disconf irming the presence of) 
2 I had planned to collect both primary and secondary data. However, due to the COVID-19 
pandemic it was not possible to make a f ield trip to Ethiopia.
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the potential observable manifestations that I identif ied. Primary data 
collection was performed using the search engine Google. When this did 
not yield suff icient, or suff iciently reliable, data about the topic under 
investigation, I then used my networks in China and on the African con-
tinent to supplement this with additional data. The data received from my 
network in China and on the African continent was always checked for 
reliability. For example, a Chinese colleague told me that the Ethiopian 
Minister of Information had attended the World Internet Conference 
in Wuzhen and sent a link to information about this in Mandarin. On 
checking the website, the picture of the ‘minister’ did not match with the 
actual minister at that time.
The following section will provide an analysis of whether there is evi-
dence to prove the presence of the causal mechanism hypothesized by the 
literature. To reiterate, this causal mechanism is that the increased use 
of Chinese ICT in Ethiopia in the context of the BRI is strengthening the 
control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens.
Analysis
In this section, I test the popular assumption that the Digital Silk Road (and 
with that the use of Chinese ICT in countries along the Silk Road) benefits 
repressive local authorities. I do so by carefully studying the case of Chinese 
ICT support in Ethiopia under the label of BRI.
Figure 13.1 The causal mechanism
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The previous section discussed the need to identify the evidence of causal 
mechanisms which analyses should look for, or to ask: ‘If X causes Y, what 
do we expect to observe?’ Before we can ask this, however, we need to f ind 
out whether X and Y themselves are true, or merely assumptions. Let us f irst 
look at X, which in this case is the use of Chinese ICT technology in Ethiopia. 
It should be asked whether Chinese ICT (surveillance) technology is being 
used in Ethiopia and whether its use has increased since the announcement 
of the Digital Silk Road.
From 2008 to 2013, the Chinese f irm ZTE was the only telecom vendor 
building telecom infrastructure in Ethiopia. Since 2013, ZTE has shared 
this market with the large Chinese company Huawei. These two Chinese 
f irms have each gained a 50% share in the carrying out of a US$1.6 billion 
project to introduce 4G in Addis Ababa and expand 3G services around 
the country (Maasho 2013). In 2014, the Swedish company Ericsson took 
over part of ZTE’s share in this project because the Ethiopian government 
had disagreed with ZTE about the costs of upgrading an existing network 
(Reuters 2014).3 However, in 2016 Huawei took over a 3G project that was 
part of Ericsson’s share (Fikade 2016). Huawei and ZTE, therefore, continue 
to dominate the telecom infrastructure market in Ethiopia.
The digital infrastructure over land in Ethiopia is supplemented with 
digital infrastructure in space. In December 2019, Ethiopia launched its f irst 
remote sensing satellite into space. This satellite was developed by Chinese 
and Ethiopian engineers, largely paid for by the Chinese government, and 
being launched in China (Reuters 2019). In July 2019, the Chinese and Ethio-
pian governments also agreed on jointly developing a communication and 
broadcast satellite (Space in Africa 2019a). In November 2019, another digital 
connection between China and Ethiopia was created when the Ethiopian 
government agreed with Jack Ma, the co-founder and former executive 
chairman of the Alibaba Group, to connect Ethiopia to Alibaba’s electronic 
world trade platform (eWTP) (ENA 2019). Then 2020 started with talks 
between China and Ethiopia about jointly building a continental satellite 
data receiver station in Ethiopia (Ibeh 2020). To conclude, Chinese ICT use 
in Ethiopia has increased since the Digital Silk Road was announced.
Having established that X is true and that Chinese ICT is being used in 
Ethiopia, it is then also necessary to look at Y. Does the Ethiopian government 
3 However, it is important to note that ZTE’s strategy for entering into a new market is to 
initially make an underpriced offer to build a network with the aim of then earning money 
through the maintenance and upgrading of the project (interviews with ZTE employees in 
Africa, January 2016).
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use technology to exercise control over its citizens and in what ways? Ac-
cording to Freedom House the Ethiopian government still has strict control 
over its citizens:
Despite the recent improvements, Ethiopia still has a nationwide Internet 
blocking and f iltering system that can be redeployed at any time for 
political reasons.
Anonymous communication is compromised by strict SIM card registration 
requirements. Upon purchase of a SIM card through Ethio Telecom or an 
authorized reseller, individuals must provide their full name, address, 
government-issued identification number, and a passport-sized photograph. 
Ethio Telecom’s database of SIM registrants enables the government to 
terminate individuals’ SIM cards and restrict them from registering for new 
ones. Internet subscribers are also required to register their personal details, 
including their home address, with the government. (Freedom House 2019)
It can therefore be concluded that the Ethiopian government has strict 
control over its citizens that is partly accomplished through technology.
Four players potentially have a key role in the increased use of Chinese 
ICT in Ethiopia. These are: the Ethiopian government, Ethiopian f irms, 
the Chinese government, and Chinese f irms. These are therefore the four 
potential starting points of the presented causal mechanism.
The remainder of this section tests whether we see the hypothesized 
causal mechanism at work in the case. To recap, this is a causal mechanism 
that shows how the use of Chinese ICT in Ethiopia (X) could contribute to 
the control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens (Y). The section 
tests for this causal mechanism by looking to see whether those empirical 
f ingerprints that I have previously identif ied as key indicators of this causal 
mechanism are present.
Empirical Fingerprint 1: Chinese firms advise the Ethiopian government on 
a master plan for ICT
The Shenzhen Outbound Alliance (SOA) set up its f irst African branch in 
Ethiopia in 2017. According to the SOA, it is responding to the aims of the BRI 
and is helping Chinese companies to go global. It represents Shenzhen-based 
companies abroad. According to Sun Tianlu, vice chairman and secretary 
of SOA, Shenzhen is well-placed to share best practice with other global 
cities as this is the city where global tech f irms like Huawei and ZTE are 
based (Mamabolo 2017). On its website, SOA claims to have good relations 
with the Ethiopian government (SOA n.d.).
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From this information about SOA, we cannot conclude that Chinese f irms 
necessarily have such a level of influence over the Ethiopian government 
that they can advise on a master plan for ICT. However, this information does 
show that Chinese f irms often have the means, as well as the contacts, to 
carry out lobbying. Therefore, while Empirical Fingerprint 1 can be observed 
to some degree in the data, the evidence to suggest that Chinese f irms advise 
the Ethiopian government on a master plan is less clear than expected.
Empirical Fingerprint 2: Ethiopian firms initiate contact with Chinese 
firms to acquire hardware and software from them that could be used as 
surveillance tools
Ethio Telecom issues the tenders for telecom infrastructure (HRW 2014; 
Maasho 2015). Ethio Telecom is a state-owned company (HRW 2014). This 
means that any choice to use Chinese technology is a choice made by the 
Ethiopian government and not by independent Ethiopian f irms.
The project to build and launch Ethiopia’s f irst remote sensing satellite is 
being run by the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian Space Science and 
Technology Institute (ESSTI) is aff iliated with the Ministry of Innovation 
and Technology. It was also ESSTI that signed the Framework Agreement 
with China for a communication satellite (Space in Africa 2019a).
In other words, the initiative for using Chinese ICT seems to mainly come 
from the Ethiopian government and not from private f irms. Therefore, there 
is no evidence that Ethiopian f irms initiated contact with Chinese f irms 
and so Empirical Fingerprint 2 has not been observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 3: The Ethiopian government requests surveillance 
tools from China
As discussed above, when looking for Empirical Fingerprint 2, the evidence 
showed that Ethiopian government agencies have initiated most of the 
cooperation with Chinese agencies in the realm of digital technology. 
For example, the communication satellite that will be developed with 
support from the Chinese government will be fully owned by the govern-
ment (Space in Africa 2019b). It is too early to judge whether the Ethiopian 
government will use this communication satellite as a surveillance tool. 
No public sources are showing that the Ethiopian government has made 
requests for Chinese technology to use it for surveillance. However, the 
communication satellite will increase the surveillance capabilities of the 
Ethiopian government.
Furthermore, the evidence looked at for Empirical Fingerprint 2 also 
showed that the Ethiopian government chose ZTE to build the national 
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backbone. ZTE offers its customers the ability to make use of surveillance 
software, presenting this software as a tool to manage a customer database 
(see the discussion of Empirical Fingerprint 5 for more information about this 
software). The international non-governmental organization Human Rights 
Watch (HRW 2014) found that the Ethiopian government has been making 
use of this software for surveillance. However, this is not conclusive proof 
that the Ethiopian government requested the surveillance tools from China. 
Theoretically, it could be that the surveillance tools were an advantage 
that came with the Chinese technology. To conclude, there is some, limited 
evidence that the Ethiopian government might request surveillance technol-
ogy from China and so Empirical Fingerprint 3 has been partly observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 4: The Chinese government invites Ethiopian officials 
for training in China on controlling cyberspace
There is information available online describing the training of Ethiopian 
engineers in China. However, this training seems to be focused on build-
ing and maintaining satellites (Space in Africa 2019b). It would be more 
interesting to know whether Ethiopian government off icials have also been 
sent to China for training in controlling cyberspace. Such training would 
be more likely to involve the control of information. However, Freedom 
House (2018) does not mention Ethiopia specif ically as one of the countries 
whose government off icials have received Chinese training on controlling 
cyberspace.
It might be telling, however, that during his 2018 visit to Ethiopia the 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of 
China (NPC), Li Zhanshu, said China will work with the Ethiopian parlia-
ment to improve the country’s legal environment (Bo 2018). Muferiat Kamil 
(speaker of the Ethiopian House of People’s Representatives) and Keria 
Ibrahim (speaker of the Ethiopian House of Federation) replied to say that 
Ethiopia valued cooperation with the NPC. They said that Ethiopia was 
ready to learn from China’s development experience. During his stay, Li also 
visited the data centre of the Ethiopian Ministry of Science and Technology.
From this information, we cannot conclude that the Chinese government 
invited Ethiopian off icials for training focused on controlling cyberspace. 
However, such training was likely included in the broader training that the 
Chinese government has offered to Ethiopian off icials. Therefore, Empirical 
Fingerprint 4 has not been observed. No evidence has been found that the 
Chinese government invited Ethiopian off icials for training in controlling 
cyberspace, but it has also not been shown that this def initely has not 
occurred.
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Empirical Fingerprint 5: Chinese firms provide the Ethiopian government 
with hardware and software that could be used as surveillance tools
In 2008, the Chinese f irm ZTE won a deal with Ethio Telecom to exclusively 
develop Ethiopia’s nationwide network to cover fourteen major cities in 
Ethiopia. In 2009, ZTE’s video surveillance solution won the bidding for a 
city security surveillance project in Ethiopia. This project involved placing 
more than 200 cameras on the roads of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa 
(ZTE n.d.). In 2013, ZTE and Huawei together won a new deal to introduce 4G 
in Addis Ababa and expand 3G services around the country. As mentioned 
previously, the Swedish company Ericsson took over a part of ZTE’s share 
in this project in 2014. However, in 2016 Huawei again took over part of 
Ericsson’s share. As a result, the Chinese f irms Huawei and ZTE are still 
the main providers of telecom infrastructure for Ethio Telecom, which is 
Ethiopia’s sole telecom provider.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW 2014), information on all phone 
calls and text messages in Ethiopia is stored and easily accessed through 
Ethio Telecom’s customer management system, called ZSmart. The customer 
management software was developed by ZTE. It should be noted that this 
software is rather common and has not been specially developed for the 
Ethiopian government. It is also in use in the Netherlands and Germany 
(Dutch IT-channel 2014), for example. Human Rights Watch suggests that, 
unlike democratic countries, Ethiopia also makes use of the software’s 
potential to record phone calls and text messages, as well as ZTE’s central-
ized monitoring system, called ZXMT. Human Rights Watch quotes Eric 
King from Privacy International, one of the world’s leading researchers on 
surveillance technology, who states that:
One of the things that sets ZTE apart is that when it enters a telecom 
market it often packages all of its products together as part of its contract, 
so you get the ‘lawful’ interception products unless you specifically request 
to opt out of it. Not too many governments that ZTE does business with 
are likely to do this. (HRW 2014)4
In March 2019, Ethio Telecom and ZTE agreed to establish a joint innova-
tion centre. As part of this agreement, ZTE donated and deployed new 
technologies worth more than US$3 million to help build the innovation 
4 HRW emphasizes that the term ‘lawful intercept’ is used by equipment makers as an industry 
label for systems that enable surveillance and does not necessarily mean surveillance practices 
are legal under national or international law.
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centre (Ethio Telecom 2019). The agreement to establish the centre dates 
back to the middle of 2017 when the two institutions decided to further 
develop their cooperation and collaborative engagement. In 2017, Ericsson 
was close to bankruptcy. The timing of the initial agreement could therefore 
have been an attempt by ZTE to regain some of its market share in Ethiopia 
after losing business to Ericsson and Huawei.
From this information, we can conclude that Chinese f irms have provided 
the Ethiopian government with hardware and software that could be used 
for surveillance. Therefore, Empirical Fingerprint 5 has been observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 6: Chinese firms provide the Ethiopian government 
with access to data collected via their technology
The Ethiopian government also has a Safe City agreement with Huawei. 
Safe City initiatives are Huawei’s f lagship public safety solution for provid-
ing local authorities with a wide range of modern products intended 
to improve policing efforts. When asked if Huawei implemented any 
safeguards to ensure the technology would not violate human rights, 
Adam Lane, senior director of public affairs for Huawei’s Southern Africa 
division, said:
Huawei does not manage, use or have access to any of our systems – we 
only sell them to the customer and train them how to use it. It is up to 
individual countries to set their own policies, regulations and laws to 
govern how such systems are used, and for their legal systems to ensure 
implementation. (Lane in Woodhams 2020)
From this information, we can conclude that Chinese f irms provide the 
Ethiopian government with access to data collected via their technology. 
To conclude: Empirical Fingerprint 6 has been observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 7: Ethiopian officials attend the 2017 World Internet 
Conference in the Chinese city of Wuzhen
On the off icial website for the 2017 World Internet Conference, a list of 
important guests with their photos indicates that the Ethiopian Minister 
of Information attended. However, the picture of the minister on the site 
does not match the description given. The man in the picture is not the 
former Ethiopian Minister of Communication and Information Technology 
Debretsion Michael.
From this information, we cannot conclude anything. No evidence could 
be found that Ethiopian government off icials attended the conference and 
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so Empirical Fingerprint 7 could not be observed. However, it could not be 
proven that such off icials did not attend the conference either.
Empirical Fingerprint 8: Ethiopian officials attend a Seminar on 
Cyberspace Management for Officials of Countries along the BRI in China
It was not possible to f ind any information on the attendance of this seminar. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that Ethiopian off icials did not 
attend this seminar.
Again, from this limited information, we cannot conclude anything. 
Therefore, Empirical Fingerprint 8 could not be observed, however, it was also 
not possible to show that some Ethiopian officials did not attend the seminar.
Empirical Fingerprint 9: Ethiopia has an authoritarian regime
Although Ethiopia is reforming, it is still regarded as ‘not free’ (the lowest 
category) in terms of Internet freedom, political rights, and civil liberties 
(Freedom House 2020a, 2020b). In February 2020, a controversial hate speech 
law that imposes jail terms for people whose Internet posts stir unrest was 
passed (Al Jazeera 2020). Therefore, there is evidence that Ethiopia has an 
authoritarian regime and so Empirical Fingerprint 9 can be observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 10: The Ethiopian government can legally search and 
seize personal data at any time
The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution introduced a range of privacy safeguards, 
which were informed by the privacy provisions found in international 
human rights instruments to which Ethiopia is party. However, the right 
to privacy is not absolute in Ethiopia. It can be limited to protect other 
competing interests (such as national security or the public peace, the 
prevention of crimes or the protection of health, public morality, or the 
rights and freedoms of others) provided in subsidiary laws if the necessary 
conditions are met (Taye & Teshome 2018). These limitations to privacy and 
data protection are actually similar to those that are found in the European 
Union (EDPS 2020). It is the way government off icials use this space that 
determines how protected citizens feel.
The Ethiopian government collects personal data. For instance, the 
Registration of Vital Events and National Identity Card Proclamation al-
lows the collection of personal data, as well as the transfer of this data to 
various institutions, including intelligence authorities, without consent 
(Federal Negarit Gazeta 2012). Again, the same applies to European Union 
countries. However, one main difference seems to be the lack of adequate 
legal, regulatory, and policy frameworks in Ethiopia (Taye & Teshome 2018).
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Another important difference between Ethiopia and EU countries in this 
respect is the fact that Ethiopia has only one telecommunication service 
provider: the state-owned Ethio Telecom. Ethio Telecom requires a lot of 
personal information from users when they register SIM cards. It has access 
to all phone calls and text messages sent via its networks. It is more than 
likely that the ‘not free’ Ethiopian government collects and monitors this 
data. Ethiopian refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch (HRW 2014) 
have stated that the Ethiopian government has access to their call histories 
and messages. However, the revelations made by Edward Snowden in 2013 
have shown that this is not unique for so-called authoritarian states and 
that the US government also conducts mass surveillance of its citizens.
To conclude, evidence that the Ethiopian government collects data on its 
citizens has been found and so Empirical Fingerprint 10 has been observed. 
However, it may be noted that this f inding is not unique for Ethiopia.
Empirical Fingerprint 11: Western firms refuse to deliver surveillance 
technologies to Ethiopia because of moral objections
A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW 2014) on telecom surveillance 
in Ethiopia stated that in 2012 a FinSpy command and control server had 
been discovered in Ethiopia. FinSpy is an example of a type of remote 
monitoring tool (often referred to as spyware or malware). In 2012, the FinSpy 
software was still owned by a UK-headquartered company called Gamma 
International, which said it sold this software exclusively to governments 
(the software is now owned by the German company FinFisher). The Human 
Rights Watch report argued that the presence of a command and control 
server in Ethiopia did not by itself mean that the Ethiopian government was 
deploying FinSpy. However, the report also said that ‘given the high costs 
of these tools and the fact that Gamma states it only sells to governments, 
it is unlikely that a nongovernmental party would have purchased and 
used the tool in Ethiopia’ (HRW 2014). The software has been found in the 
devices of Ethiopian citizens who are living overseas and who have links 
to Ethiopia’s opposition party.
Human Rights Watch has also reported the use of spyware from 
the Italian company Hacking Team. It reported that this spyware was 
employed in an attempt to hack into the Ethiopian Satellite Television 
Service (ESAT) – a diaspora-run satellite television station. Hacking Team 
offers a product called ‘Remote Control System’, which allows the user 
to take control of infected computers or mobile phones. Like the FinSpy 
software, the Remote Control System is very expensive software and 
Hacking Team has stated that it only sells this software to governments, 
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particularly to law enforcement or intelligence agencies. According to its 
publicly available customer policy, Hacking Team does not sell products 
to governments or countries blacklisted by the US, EU, UN, NATO, or 
ASEAN. However, Ethiopia is not on any of these sanctions lists. Human 
Rights Watch asked Hacking Team about whether it had discovered any 
‘red f lags’ during its review process in Ethiopia. In response, Hacking 
Team said that it ‘expect[s its] clients to behave responsibly and within 
the law as it applies to them’.
From this information, we can conclude that not all Western f irms have 
refused to deliver surveillance technologies to Ethiopia. Therefore, the 
evidence does not show that Western f irms refuse to provide technologies 
to Ethiopia and so Empirical Fingerprint 11 has not been observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 12: The Ethiopian government adopts a cybersecurity 
law that mimics the Chinese cybersecurity law
In this case, mimicking implies that the Ethiopian government actively and 
consciously followed the example given by China’s laws. This seems to be 
the case. However, Fourie (2015) has argued that this mimicking is more 
likely to be the result of an Ethiopian tradition than the result of efforts 
made by the Chinese government to export its model. She has described 
how for decades Ethiopian elites have looked at ‘frontrunner’ countries to 
draw lessons. These elites not only looked to the models offered by European 
countries such as France and the UK but also looked to Japan and other 
nations for models. In the 1970s and 1980s, the repressive Derg government 
looked at the Soviet Union as a model.
Fourie (2015) explained that when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted the Derg in 1991, it found itself at a critical 
juncture. The various rebel groups that comprised the EPRDF had all been 
founded and run on communist principles, yet the ideology had now become 
unpopular both globally and within the country. As a result, there was a 
period of relative ideological uncertainty in Ethiopia.
The desire shown by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, as well as other 
members of the EPRDF, to learn from China is in line with these historical 
processes. In 2005, Ethiopia’s most democratic elections to date ended in 
chaos and contestation. Some believed that the electoral violence was a 
result of Ethiopia having tried to liberalize too much and too soon. This 
belief led to arguments that Ethiopia should adopt a model that would allow 
it to reap the rewards of the global market while keeping control f irmly in 
the hands of a strong and authoritarian ruling party. The model for this 
was found in China.
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Gagliardone (2014) has argued that the Chinese government has aided 
Ethiopia both indirectly, by offering legitimation for alternative models of 
media engagement, and also directly, through the provision of essential 
technical and f inancial support. The Chinese government’s offer of a US$1.9 
billion loan in 2006 was a critical factor in the Ethiopian government’s 
ability to expand mobile services and Internet connectivity while keeping 
the state-owned Ethio Telecom as the only player in the market.
However, we have to keep in mind the agency that the Ethiopian govern-
ment has in choosing its own development path. As Fourie (2015) has also 
explained, the initiative to adopt elements of the China model came from 
the Ethiopian elite, who were looking for examples abroad of how to manage 
economic development while resisting neoliberalism. Political stability is 
one of the core aims of the governments in both Ethiopia and China. As 
Gagliardone (2014) has noted: ‘Even the increasingly popular “Africa rising” 
narrative is placing greater emphasis on stability, as a precondition for 
investments, over rights.’
At the moment, the Chinese government is putting more effort into 
promoting its cybersecurity model abroad. In the International Strategy of 
Cooperation on Cyberspace (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2017), 
Chinese Internet f irms were encouraged to go global and to help develop-
ing countries with such things as distance learning, remote health care, 
and e-business to contribute to their social development. The promotion 
of Chinese technology exports seems to still focus on serving the main 
goal of the Chinese government, namely maintaining political stability. 
China’s 2017 International Cyberspace Cooperation Strategy emphasizes 
Internet sovereignty. With the export of Chinese technology, the Chinese 
government makes it possible for developing countries to claim Internet 
sovereignty and experience its benefits. This then means that these develop-
ing countries will likely support this Chinese concept in international 
institutions.
From this information, we can conclude that the Ethiopian government 
actively and consciously mimics the Chinese cybersecurity law. Therefore, 
evidence of Empirical Fingerprint 12 has been observed.
Empirical Fingerprint 13: The Ethiopian government passes restrictive 
media laws that mimic Chinese media laws
When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in October 2019, the Nobel committee praised his ‘discontinuing media 
censorship’ among a series of achievements made during his f irst hundred 
days in power in 2018. Ethiopia jumped 40 places in the 2019 World Press 
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Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders – from 150 to 110 
out of 180. This is the largest leap that has been made by any country.
At the same time, Freedom House has criticized the current Ethiopian 
government for repressing media and repeating the authoritarian ways of 
previous governments. In particular, it has criticized the ongoing imple-
mentation of a controversial Anti-Terrorism Proclamation to stifle dissent. 
One reason for the restrictions that is given by Prime Minister Abiy is that 
Ethiopian media are ‘fomenting unrest’. In this respect, Abel Wabella, the 
managing editor of the Addis Ababa-based newspaper Addis Zebye, has said 
in an interview with the German news organization Deutsche Welle that:
The problem now is that so many individuals are mixing up the roles of 
activist and media when they shouldn’t go together – media is meant to 
have its own ethics and rules. You have people running media who are 
calling for protests – it’s totally absurd. (Jeffrey 2019)
Eskinder Nega, a prominent Ethiopian journalist and blogger who was 
released from prison under Abiy’s reforms in early 2018, admits that journal-
ists double as activists ‘as a necessity’:
We have found out as Ethiopian journalists that to be a journalist you 
have to have a liberal democratic order, but if you live in an authoritar-
ian setting, it’s not going to work. So, whether you like it or not, to be a 
journalist here, you have to struggle for democracy, you have to double 
as an activist. (Jeffrey 2019)
Kiya Tsegaye, an Addis Ababa-based lawyer, argues that Ethiopia is a fragile 
society and therefore that a Western, liberal-style, free media is not possible. 
He argues that Ethiopia is in a transitional time and that the government 
needs to intervene to keep the country stable.
Some Ethiopian journalists have noticed a trend that has occurred after 
every regime change since the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974. Initially, new 
media flourish with the lifting of restrictions, but within a few years, the 
new government once again begins cracking down and attempting to put 
the lid back on what it opened.
Abiy Ahmed may be following this trend, or he may be really working 
on long-term reforms for the media in Ethiopia and just being careful in 
doing so. Regardless of which of these is true, Ethiopian media law seems to 
reflect the national situation at different times. For example, in the middle 
of June 2020, Ethiopia’s state-owned telecommunications monopoly, Ethio 
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Telecom, suspended the country’s Internet service for more than a week. It 
is suspected that they did this because the government was trying to block 
the leak of national exam answers (Mbah 2019). Then again, on June 22, there 
was another Internet shutdown enforced across Ethiopia, after a group of 
soldiers staged a failed coup in Amhara state.
In other words, Ethiopian media law does not appear to have been 
mimicking China’s media law but instead following its own path. Therefore, 
Empirical Fingerprint 13 could not be observed.
Conclusion
This study found that the empirical evidence partly supports the hypothesis 
and popular belief that increased use of Chinese ICT in Ethiopia leads to 
strengthened control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens (see 
f igure 13.2). The ‘f ingerprints’ that are coloured green are the f ingerprints 
where I found evidence to suggest that the causal mechanism was present. 
The ‘f ingerprints’ that are coloured red are the f ingerprints for which I found 
evidence that challenged the idea that this causal mechanism was present. 
The f ingerprints that are coloured grey, are the f ingerprints for which I 
did not f ind confirming or disconfirming evidence. The f ingerprints with 
the green stripes are the f ingerprints for which I found some, but limited, 
evidence to support the presence of this causal mechanism.
When we look at f igure 13.2 we see that there are two most plausible routes:
 Route 1:
X (3) 5 + 9 10 Y
 Route 2:
X (1) 5 + 6 10 Y
To begin, let us follow the f irst set of causal links that can occur in this 
causal mechanism (Route 1), shown by the f irst green path in f igure 13.2. One 
example of the increased use of Chinese ICT technology in Ethiopia (X) that 
has been partially observed in this study is that the Ethiopian government 
requested surveillance tools (3) and has received Chinese technologies that 
could be used as surveillance tools (5). The f indings show that the Ethiopian 
government initiated most of the cooperation with Chinese agencies in the 
realm of digital technology. The combination of the fact that the Ethiopian 
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government classif ies as an authoritarian regime (9), has access to surveil-
lance tools (5) and can legally search and seize personal data at any time 
(10) leads to the fact that the Ethiopian government strengthened its control 
over its citizens (Y).
However, the f indings for Empirical Fingerprint 11, or the fact that Western 
companies did not appear to be refusing to supply the Ethiopian government 
with software on moral grounds, suggests that this causal process does not 
only occur for Chinese ICT support to Ethiopia. Despite the fact that many 
Western countries have criticized the export of Chinese surveillance tools to 
authoritarian states, Human Rights Watch has demonstrated that European 
companies also sell surveillance tools to the Ethiopian government. The 
Chinese company ZTE appears to offer more ways for the Ethiopian govern-
ment to monitor the users of its network than either Huawei or the European 
companies Ericsson and Nokia. However, with the software provided by 
European companies such as FinTech and Hacking Team, the Ethiopian 
government can collect similar information to that which it collects with 
the ZTE software ZSmart. This means that the outcome would not be so 
different if the Ethiopian government did not use Chinese ICT and instead 
made use of other foreign ICT.
Now let us follow the second set of causal links that can occur in this 
causal mechanism (Route 2), also shown as a green path in f igure 13.2. 
The fact that Chinese f irms have the means and contacts to advise the 
Ethiopian government on a master plan for ICT (1) is another potential 
example of the increased use of Chinese ICT technology in Ethiopia (X) 
that has been partially observed in this study. It has then been found 
Figure 13.2 The resulting causal mechanism
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that Chinese f irms provide the Ethiopian government with hardware 
and software that can be used as surveillance tools (5) and that they also 
provide the Ethiopian government with the data that these tools collect 
(6). Furthermore, this study has found that the Ethiopian government 
can legally search and seize personal data at any time (10). This means 
that Chinese ICT strengthens the control of the Ethiopian government 
over its citizens (Y).
It appears that on the Chinese side it is the commercial interests of Chi-
nese f irms, rather than the geopolitical interests of the Chinese government, 
that is driving involvement in Ethiopia and the supply of technology to the 
Ethiopian government. On the Ethiopian side, the government’s desire to 
enhance its control appears to be the reason why it has chosen to work with 
ZTE instead of with European companies such as Ericsson or Nokia, and also 
the reason why it has chosen to develop satellites together with China. The 
Ethiopian government has only been able to maintain its monopoly over the 
telecoms industry, held by the state-owned telecom provider Ethio Telecom 
because it has been able to borrow money from the Chinese government to 
build an advanced telecom network. The Ethiopian government also may 
have decided to develop its own satellites in cooperation with the Chinese 
government to break from its dependence on foreign satellites for which 
the costs were considered too high.
To answer the main research question: This study has found that in the 
context of the Digital Silk Road, the use of Chinese ICT does contribute to 
the control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens. However, it should 
be noted that the main Chinese actor involved in the digitization of Ethiopia 
does not seem to be the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the central 
state, but commercial and state-owned enterprises. This does not preclude 
‘Chinese influence’ (i.e. state influence) but points to the complexity of the 
reality on the ground.
The main Ethiopian actor that is actively bringing in Chinese ICT is the 
Ethiopian government. However, this study has found that the Ethiopian 
government also acquires ICT from German, French, Italian, and British 
companies.
The focus in Western media on China’s export of surveillance technology 
to Ethiopia attributes most of the agency to Chinese f irms and the Chinese 
state. However, this study has found that the Ethiopian government has 
the agency to independently choose what technology it acquires and from 
where. By cooperating with China as well as Europe to develop its own space 
technology, the Ethiopian government safeguards its negotiation position 
and capacity to act independently.
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At the same time, this study has also found that non-state actors in 
Ethiopia (like iCog Labs) are putting much effort into developing home-
grown and state-of-the-art technologies. With these efforts, they are perhaps 
helping to make their country more independent from foreign technologies.
From a European perspective, it would have been more desirable if 
Ethiopia had to open up its telecom market to improve its network and if 
the Ethiopian government remained dependent on Western-made satellites. 
However, the Chinese government has increasingly offered an alternative 
to these options and as a result, the tables have now turned. The Ethiopian 
government is increasingly leaning on Chinese ICT. This has made it of 
greater interest for Europe to promote the technological self-suff iciency of 
Ethiopia as a way of ensuring it does not become too dependent on China. 
The European funding for a satellite MAIT facility in Ethiopia is a step in 
that direction.
As Gagliardone (2014) rightly points out at the end of his article on new 
media and the developmental state of Ethiopia:
The Ethiopian government is unlikely to radically revise its media strat-
egy in response to donor criticism. But it may evolve a more open and 
responsive system over time if it is encouraged to reform from within, 
in a way that is consistent with the principles on which the state has 
been founded.
Throughout history, the Ethiopian leadership has striven to leapfrog by 
learning from other states while keeping a focus on maintaining stability 
in the country. This is how the impact of the use of Chinese ICT on the 
control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens should be interpreted.
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